The Joint Intelligence Committee and the German Question, 1947-61 by Case, Simon







The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 





Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
The Joint Intelligence Committee 
and the German Question, 1947-61 
Simon Case 
Queen Mary, University of London 
PhD thesis 
el, , 
Statement of oripinality of this thesis 
I certify that this thesis, and the research to which refers, are the product of my 
own work, and that any ideas or quotations from the work of other people, published or 
otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices 
of the discipline. I acknowledge the helpful guidance and support of my supervisor, 
Professor Peter Hennessy FBA. 
2 
Description of thesis 
The Joint Intelligence Committee 
and the German Question, 1947-61 
This thesis analyses the contribution that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIQ 
made to British policy concerning Germany (both West and East) during the early Cold 
War. The question of control over war-ravaged, but strategically significant Germany 
was critical to the security of Europe. As such, Germany and Berlin in particular, 
became the most important Cold War battleground in Europe. By combining recently 
released JIC archives with both existing research on intelligence, foreign and defence 
policy and records from the other government departments, this research adds to the 
understanding of one of the central themes of the Cold War. It reveals how ministers, 
senior officials and military officers made use of the assessments produced by the JIC in 
formulating their policies towards Germany and the developing threat from the Soviet 
Union and its allies. 
This research takes a chronological approach, in order to trace both the 
development of policy and of the role of the JIC within central government. It explores 
the major crises of the period: the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, the riots in East 
Berlin of June 1953 and the 1958-61 Berlin Crisis. Away from these crises, the thesis 
examines the picture that the JIC painted of Soviet intentions and capabilities in Eastern 
Germany and of the development of the two German nations. It also looks at the JIC's 
contribution to British attitudes towards German rearmament. The developing role of 
the intelligence apparatus, both within central government and in Germany is a major 
theme running through the thesis. By improving its sources, its product and its 
administration,, the JIC ensured that it became an essential tool for successive 
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BSSO British Services Security Organisation 
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CCG Control Commission Germany 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union - Christian Democratic Union 
(West Germany) 
CFM Council of Foreign Ministers 
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CRO Commonwealth Relations Office 
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DRPC Defence Research Policy Committee 
DRS Documents Research Staff 
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FO Foreign Office 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
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GDR German Democratic Republic 
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Security (USSR) 
M15 Security Service 
M16 Secret Intelligence Service 
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NORTHAG Northern Army Group 
NSA National Security Agency (US) 
NVA Nationale Volksarmee - National People's Army (East Germany) 
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
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PR Photographic Reconnaissance 
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PUSC Permanent Under- Secretary's Committee 
PUSD Permanent Under- Secretary's Department 
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RAF Royal Air Force 
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Notes on sources 
All documents referred to in the footnotes are held in the National Archives 
(TNA) in Kew, unless otherwise indicated. 
Introduction 
The context 
In his report on intelligence on weapons of mass destruction before the 2003 Iraq 
war, Lord Butler of Brockwell wrote that secret intelligence is just one of the sources of 
information that contribute to the make-up of governmental decisions. ' That very 
description secret, however, when accompanied by a lack of official documents and the 
influence of espionage fiction, can reduce commentary on intelligence, both historical 
and contemporary, to little more than ill-informed rumour. Worthwhile answers to 
questions surrounding the nature, value and limitations of intelligence are too easily lost 
in the melee surrounding scandal. 
The academic study of intelligence has slowly developed in the United Kingdom 
as a counterbalance to fiction and sensationalism. 2 Since William Waldegrave's 1992 
announcement as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for Open 
Government,, that some historical intelligence files would be released, this development 
has accelerated. 3 The selected files were principally from archives of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, the central assessment and co-ordinating body within the 
British intelligence community. This study aims to contribute to the historical 
understanding of the role of secret intelligence in British Cold War policy-making, 
through an extended case-study of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the German 
Question, 1947-61. 
1 Review ofIntelfigence on Weapons ofMass Destruction: A Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, 
FIC 898 (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), paragraph 21 
2 Goodman, Nfichael S., "Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United 
Kingdom7, Studies inIntelligence, Volume 50, Number 2 (2006), pp. 57-65 
3 Bennett, Gill, "Declassification and Release Policies of the UK's Intelligence Agencies", Intelligence 
and National Security, 17,1 (Spring 2002), pp. 21-31 
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Germany, intelligence and the Cold War 
Where the combined forces under the command of the United States and Britain 
met the Red Army of the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, the 
frontline of the Cold War, was established. 4 Germany divided, first into zones of 
occupation, and then later as two nations, was the physical manifestation of 
irreconcilable political suspicions and ideological differences. ' This had not always 
been the intention: at least some of the participants of the Yalta Conference in February 
1945 had intended that the zones of Germany should one day be reunified. 6 The driving 
aim of the division was security against German resurgence, but with its economic and 
military potential, Germany quickly became crucial in the strategic Cold War balance. 7 
As Wilfried Loth put it, "Germany was both a cause of and a battleground for the Cold 
War. ,8 The future of Germany became the German Question. 
This study takes 1947 as its starting point; the earlier development of the West's 
assessments of the Soviet threat is well covered in other research. 9 By 1947, the 
Russian threat was clear. The Western Allies were becoming convinced that the Soviet 
Union posed an increasingly immediate threat to their security. 10 After the unproductive 
Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in spring 1947, Ernest Bevin, the 
British Foreign Secretary, brought round the other Western Powers to accept longer- 
term division of Germany in preference to a unified Germany under Soviet Control. " 
Losing Western Germany to the Soviets was too great a strategic danger, even if that 
4 Austria should be included here, up to 1955, when the former war-time Allies withdrew their troops and 
the country became neutral. 
5 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were founded in 1949 (May 
and October respectively). 
6 During the discussions at Yalta, only three zones were planned: the French zone was added later. 
President Roosevelt had reportedly told Churchill at Yalta that he expected the Americans to withdraw 
from Germany within two years. Danchev, Alex & Todman, Daniel (eds), War Diaries 1939-1945 of 
FieldMarshal LordAlanbrooke (London: Phoenix Press, 2002), p. 657 
7 Greenwood, Sean, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 6-16 
8 Loth, Wilfiried, "Germany in the Cold War: Strategies and Decisions" in Westad, Odd Ame (ed), 
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 242-257 
9 For example, Cradock, Percy, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World 
(London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 25-49 
10 Perl, Matthew, "Comparing US and UK Intelligence Assessment in the Early Cold War: NSC-68, April 
1950", Intelligence and National Security, 18,1 (Spring 2003) pp. 119-154 
11 Deighton, Anne, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division ofGermany, and the Origins of the Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 136-67 
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meant accepting division in the centre of Europe. The solution to security,, dependent on 
the United States, was massive economic investment through schemes such as the 
Marshall Plan announced in 1947, a continued military presence and a reliance on 
accurate information on the enemy. So relatively quickly after Hitler's defeat, some of 
those men and women who had come together within British intelligence during 
wartime, had to turn their attention to the next strategic threat. 12 
With such great conventional and atomic military power developing across the 
German divide and such great suspicion of the opponent's intentions, learning the 
secrets of the other side became a paramount concern. Michael Herman describes secret 
intelli ence as "a central element of the Cold War on both sides; never before was 9 11 
intelligence so extensive, institutionalised and prized in peacetime. " 13 The relative 
bonanza of wartime was over. The successes of the Government Code and Cipher 
School at Bletchley Park in breaking several of the Nazi ENIGMA codes had given the 
Allies an advantage over the Germans. 14 The intelligence picture could not have made a 
starker contrast, however, as the main enemy changed from Germany to the Soviet 
Union. The West had few sources of information about the intentions and capabilities 
of the emerging Soviet threat. In the interwar period Britain's intelligence services had 
focused on the 'Red Menace', almost to the point where they completely failed to notice 
the threat from Nazi Germany, but there was little of significance to carry through to the 
post-war years. 15 What intelligence the West had on the Soviet Union, in particular 
from the American VENONA decrypts of Russian intelligence signals, pointed largely 
not to Soviet intentions, but to the levels of penetration of Western governments by 
Soviet agents. 16 
12 Aldrich, Richard J., The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: 
John Murray, 200 1), pp. 57-67; Annan, Noel, Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of 
Germany (London: HarperCoUins, 1995), pp. 137-241 
13 Herman, Nfichael, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 200 1), p. ix 
14 For an understanding of wartime intelligence, see Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second 
World War, Volumes 1-3 (London: HN4SO, 1979-83) and Volume 4 (Hinsley and Simkins, C. A. G. ) 
(London: IHMSO 1990) 
15 Andrew, C. M., Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 
1985), pp. 203-246 
16 West, N., Yenona: The Greatest Secret ofthe Cold War (London: HarperCollins, 1999) 
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Germany rapidly developed as the major battleground for information on the 
Soviet Union and the protective satellite bloc that was firming up around her borders. 17 
Markus Wolf described Berlin as "the 1nvisible Front". 18 Furthermore, as the former 
head of the East German foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung Aujkldrung 
(HVA), Wolf assessed, "Strategists and politicians on both sides assumed that if there 
was to be a third world war, Berlin was the most likely place it would begin. " The 
British intelligence apparatus in Germany was considerable in the early years of the 
Cold War. The Intelligence Division, which encompassed elements of both military and 
civilian intelligence services, was within the British Control Commission which ran the 
British Zone and sector of Berlin. 19 The scale and value of intelligence operations in 
Germany meant that it needed its own local directing body, the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (Germany) . 
20 Even as the focus of the Cold War shifted in the 1950s and 
beyond from Europe to struggles in Asia, Africa, and the Americas,, Germany was 
always kept under close watch. Divided Germany and Berlin in particular, provided a 
convenient gateway to the Soviet bloc. 21 
The ultimate direction of tasking and analysis of intelligence came from 
London. 22 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London was and still is the hub of 
the British intelligence machinery. 23 By May 1948, under a Foreign Office chairman, 
the Committee brought together the three Service intelligence chiefs, the heads of the 
civilian collection agencies, M15, the Security Service and M16, the Secret Intelligence 
Service, the Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Chairman of the Joint 
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee. 24 Peter Hennessy describes the JIC as 
"the apex of the British intelligence process", the pot into which raw information from 
" Maddrell, Paul, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 297-8 
18 Wolf, M. with McElvoy, A., Memoirs ofa Spyniaster (London: Pimlico, 1998), pA 
19 Aman, Changing Enemies, pp. 13 9,152-4 
20 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 260 
21 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 191 
22 There were also local Joint Intelligence Committees in the Nfiddle East and Far East, albeit under the 
ultimate control of London, 
23 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 1. For an explanation of the current central intelligence machinery, see 
National Intelligence Machinery (London: The Stationery Office, September 2006) 
24 CAB 158/30, JIC(57)123 "History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation", 29 November 1957 
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all of the civilian and military agencies collects to be mixed with overtly acquired 
material, for analysis and assessment . 
25 The Joint Intelligence Staff drew up all-source 
assessments, which once considered by the Committee at weekly meetings, were passed 
on to the highest decision-makers in government. 
The JIC was first established in 1936 and it went on to work as part of the centre 
of government during the war . 
26 In 1945, the Committee emerged as a Sub-Committee 
under the Chiefs of Staff. In 1947, the Committee became a full Committee with two 
Joint Intelligence Staff teams of analysts. 27 Perhaps the most significant factor at this 
time for the future of the J1C, as Cradock puts it "was the reaffirmation by the Chiefs of 
Staff in their report on future defence policy in May 1947 of the importance of 
intelligence at a time of increasing austerity". The Chiefs recognised the role that 
intelligence had to play in determining future policy when the armed forces were being 
dramatically reduced and Britain's place at the top table of international politics was 
going to be under threat. John Young has since agreed with the Chiefs' view: "It was in 
the nature of the Cold War that international tension became permanent, a 'surprise 
attack' was always possible (if unlikely) and gathering information in Communist states 
through normal diplomatic channels very difficult. Covert intelligence became vital, as 
did the use of propaganda offensives against the enemy. -)-)28 
Intelligence was also at the heart of the continuing 'special relationship' between 
the United States and Britain. The exchange of secrets had become common-place 
during the war, and after an imagery intelligence agreement in 1946 and the UKUSA 
signals intelligence agreement in 1947-8, this relationship was established in the Cold 
War environment. 29 On the ground in places such as Germany, the two allies worked 
25 Hennessy, Peter, The Secret State: "itehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 3 
26 Cradock, Know Your Enem pp. 7-24 
27 lbid, p. 261 
28 Young, John W, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 150 
29AIdfick The Hidden Hand, P. 213 
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together, whilst in London and Washington, the final products of the intelligence 
community, the analyses, were also exchanged. "' 
British foreign and defence policy during the early Cold War cannot be 
disentangled from either the world of intelligence or from the relationship with the 
United States. 31 Writing the history of British policy, therefore, should not ignore these 
themes. Contrariwise, historical study of the impact of intelligence on policy should 
never claim to be the whole story. In particular during the early Cold War, policy 
towards Germany was, like most other such significant areas of foreign and defence 
affairs, a complex set of inter- and intra-governmental debates. The JIC very rarely 
gave direct policy advice; rather its assessments of the current and likely future 
circumstances in which policy might develop sat alongside contributions from the 
Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Treasury as part of the fi7amework around 
decision-making. In attempting to reveal the manner in which intelligence assessment 
was used by successive governments, the present study will add useful insight to the 
historical understanding of how decisions were made at the highest levels. 
As Cradock puts it, the Joint Intelligence Committee provided "the interface 
between intelligence and policy". 32 It is this area that will be the main theme of this 
study. providing an account of the JIC"s contribution to the British government's view 
and understanding of the German Question. Under the main inquiry into the impact that 
the JIC had on policy, there are a series of areas to be explored: what assessments did 
the JIC make during the high-points of tension in Germany, during the Soviet blockade 
of Berlin in 1948, the riots in East Berlin in 1953 and the 1958-61 Berlin Crisis? Away 
from those crises, what picture of Soviet intentions and capabilities in Eastern Germany 
did the JIC portray? How did the JIC view the two developing German nations? How 
did JIC assessments change over time? There were also the practicalities of the 
30 For details of the exchange of intelligence assessments, see Aldrich, The Hidden H=4 and Perl, 
"Comparing US and UK Intelligence Assessmenf 
3' Even where policy differed, the relationship with the United States could not ultimately be ignored. See 
Hennessy, Peter, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 
pp. 207-247 and Kyle, Keith, Suez: Britain's End ofEmpire in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002) 
32 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. I 
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intelligence machine: how was that machinery arranged and what information was 
gathered in Germany? How did the JIC develop during the Cold War to meet the needs 
of government, if at all? 
Although the intelligence history has much to add to the understanding of 
government and international politics, it must be treated carefully. Rarely are the 
sources available to give a complete picture of the role of intelligence in history. 
Intelligence is necessarily secret at the time and some of it remains so for good reason. 33 
Historians are confronted with a fragmentary record. The skill is to recognise the state 
of the record whilst drawing what conclusions are sensible, without making claims that 
cannot be justified. Given the significance of the role that intelligence seems to have 
played in Cold War decision-making, it would be to miss the chance of extra 
understanding if the considerable, though incomplete, intelligence archives were to be 
ignored. 
Historiography 
Since Joint Intelligence Committee files have been released, only one published 
work has been produced which concentrates wholly on the history of the JIC: Percy 
Cradock's Know Your Enemy. The author was himself the JIC Chairman from 1985-92, 
and his intention in writing was "an attempt to draw on the new material to show how 
Britain's view of the world developed during that time [1945-68] and how the 
assessments and predictions of the Committee related to the decisions ministers 
eventually made. , 34 Cradock's study is not a full chronological account of the JIC 
during the first part of the Cold War, but rather he judges the performance of the 
Committee at particular moments of interest, including the Berlin blockade, the Korean 
War, Suez, and Berlin 1958-61. Balancing his own personal experience of the 
33 Under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958) and exemption s. 23 of the Freedom of Information 
Act (2000) certain records can remain closed indefinitely, on the grounds that their contents might damage 
national security. See Bennett, "Declassification and Release" 
34 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. I 
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Committee and Whitehall with sensible historical scrutiny of those documents available 
to him, Cradock produced a superb overview of the JIC's place in government during 
the early Cold War. 
Due to the lack of available JIC assessments of the conditions inside Berlin 
during the blockade, Cradock largely tells the story of British policy and action in 1948- 
9 through Foreign Office records, Chiefs of Staff, Cabinet and Cabinet Committee 
meetings minutes. He does, however, draw on some of the JIC papers from the 
blockade but was not able to make any use of the JIC (Germany) files that include the 
frequent reviews of any indications of escalation into war, since they had not been 
declassified when he was preparing his book. Cradock's chapter on the 1958-61 crisis 
pulls together both archival materials as well a large number of secondary sources to 
conclude, "The links between this showmanship [Macmillan's policy] and sober 
intelligence estimates were probably not very strong. , 35 More JIC documents are now 
available to aid in appraising British policy at the time, including the Weekly Reviews 
of Current Intelligence from 1958-9 which provide a week-by-week archive of the 
intelligence information that was being presented to policy-makers. 
Cradock is happy to acknowledge the debt he owes in his work to an earlier 
researcher into the KC, Alex Craig. Craig's 1999 PhD thesis, Ae Joint Intelligence 
Committee and British Intelligence Assessment 1945-1956, remains unpublished. This 
thesis was the first scholarly attempt to use the new archives to assess the HC 
performance during the early years of the Cold War. Like Cradock's work, Craig's took 
a global view of the material, covering the assessments of Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East. Given the shorter time span Craig was able to examine, he does provide a more 
fully chronological account of the HC work, including very brief descriptions of the HC 
view of questions over West German rearmament and the 1953 East German 
disturbances. Both Craig and Cradock reach a favourable conclusion of the HC 
performance during this time and claim that any failings were understandable. Craig 
emphasises that historians have failed to recognise fully "that these were essentially 
35 lbid, p. 160 
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failures in intelligence collection rather than in analysis. )-)36 Such a conclusion does not 
completely absolve the JIC, however, since the Committee was responsible for the 
overall direction of both the collection of intelligence as well its analysis. 
Peter Hennessy and Richard Aldrich have written extensively on the interface 
between British intelligence and the politics of Whitehall. In The Secret State, 
Hennessy demonstrates the key role JIC threat assessments had to play in the wider 
picture of secret government Cold War nuclear defence planning. Hennessy explores 
the part that intelligence had to play in providing reassurances as well as warnings to 
decision-makers. As a provider of either comfort or concern, Hennessy reveals the 
impact of the JIC in one seemingly simple question, "What was it in those assessments 
which led to so high a proportion of the UK's national wealth being deployed for so 
long on politico-military purposes? -)-)37 Aldrich focuses more on the significance of 
British intelligence in international relations, especially with the United States, rather 
than on internal planning in Whitehall. 1he Hidden Hand paints a portrait of 
intelligence as part of partnership against Communism, but also as a manifestation of 
competition. Aldrich contrasts his conclusion "Intelligence served to vanquish 
aggressive challengers to the Anglo-American pattern of dominance" with his assertion 
that "intelligence also served to increase tension among the Western powers", as 
American influence displaced British imperial power. 38 The Hidden Hand is packed full 
of detail, which makes it an essential reference work for the intelligence historian. 
Away from the analysis of intelligence and high policy, British intelligence 
collection in Germany has received some attention from researchers. In Spying on 
Science, Paul Maddrell focuses specifically on the unique value of Germany to the West 
in terms of gathering scientific and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union. He 
emphasises the priority given by Western intelligence agencies to finding information 
on all aspects of Russian military technology capability, research and development, but 
36 Craig, A. J., "The Joint Intelligence Committee and British Intelligence Assessment 1945-1956" (PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999), p. 260 
" Hennessy, Secret State, P. 13 
38 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 9-10 
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does not seek to complete the story with full analysis of the impact of this intelligence 
39 on Western military planning and development . Part of Maddrell's thesis is that so 
great was the fear of Western intelligence in Germany that "the building of the Berlin 
Wall was, to some extent, their [the East German government's] response to the West's 
subversion and espionage". 40 
Tony Geraghty has told the story of BRIXMIS, the British Commanders'-in- 
Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany, through the memories of former officers 
and men . 
4' The Mission which ran from 1946 to 1990 conducted tours of East Germany 
sanctioned by the Soviets, often in considerable physical danger. Although the original 
intention behind the Mission was liaison, it rapidly became an unofficial intelligence 
asset. Geraghty puts forward the view that the contribution of BRLXM1S to knowledge 
of Soviet military capabilities was largely underestimated both at the time and by 
historians since . 
42 He did not, however, make use of documentary or oral evidence firom 
higher up the intelligence chain, and consequently misrepresents the value placed on the 
Mission by Whitehall during the early Cold War. Nevertheless, Geraghty's account is 
extremely readable and provides a valuable source of personal recollections. 
Perhaps the most famous of Cold War intelligence operations in Germany is 
explored in David Stafford's Spies Beneath Berlin . 
43 The joint British-American spy 
tunnel in Berlin and its exposure by the Russians in April 1956 was a spectacular news 
story at the time and remains one of those real espionage episodes which touch on the 
fictional levels of excitement. Stafford 1) s book serves two purposes. The first is rightly 
arguing for the value of the intelligence gathered from the tunnel, even given the 
Russian knowledge of the project from the start because of their agent in the British 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), George Blake. The second aim is to reveal the true 
extent of the British role in the operation, given the lack of credit previously attributed 
39 Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 7 
40 Ibid, p. 15 
41 Geraghty, Tony, BRIXMIS. - The Untold exploits ofBritain's most daring Cold War spy Mission 
(London: HarperCollins, 1997) 
42 Ibid, pp. 3,286-7 
43 Stafford, David, Spies Beneath Berlin (London: John Murray, 2002) 
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to SIS. In some ways, Stafford's account is a response to the joint American-Russian 
intelligence history, Battleground Berlin by Murphy et al. 44 They detail the Berlin 
Operations Base, the CIA station in Berlin, work in the operation, but apart from Blake, 
there is no mention of British involvement. There is very little mention of British 
intelligence at all in the book that was the result of collaboration between CIA and KGB 
veterans of the espionage war in Berlin from 1945-61. It does, however, make full use 
of Russian and American documentary and oral archives to detail the Cold War CIA- 
KGB battle in Germany. 
Sources and methods 
The JIC archive within the National Archive is remarkably complete. The CAB 
158 and CAB 186 files are made up of the long term assessments and reviews of the 
Committee. Some of the Weekly Summaries of Intelligence from 1954-6 survive within 
these files. These weekly publications provided the most senior ministerial, official and 
military JIC customers with highlights of current intelligence and therefore are a 
particularly valuable source. The Weekly Reviews of Current Intelligence (VvTRCI) from 
1958-9 can be found in the CAB 179 files. These were further weekly digests for a 
wider government audience. The minutes of the weekly meetings of the JIC can be 
found in the CAB 159 and CAB 185 files. The CAB 176 files contains the records of 
the JIC Secretariat, which including correspondence. Records concerning the 
organisation of the Intelligence Staff can be found in the CAB 163 file. 
The CAB 158 and 179 files will be the main sources for this study, with the 
minutes of meetings providing further background to the final products the Committee 
passed on. There are other archives that will make a significant contribution to the 
study, however. The DEFE 41 files contain the minutes of JIC (Germany) meetings 
from beginning of 1946 to end of 1952. These minutes include regular local intelligence 
44 Murphy, David E., Kondrashev, Sergei A. & Bailey, G., Battleground Berlin (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997) 
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summaries during the Berlin blockade of 1948 and details of the organisational 
development of British intelligence in Germany. A fragmentary BRDMS archive also 
exists, spread across War Office, Foreign Office and Air Ministry files. These files 
contain BRIXMIS intelligence reports from 1946-55, which provide evidence for a 
judgement on the Mission's contribution to understanding of the Soviet threat. 
The archival evidence available on intelligence and Germany is able to provide a 
good deal of historical information on what intelligence theorists call 'the Intelligence 
Cycle'. 45 Put simply, this is the process which ideally governs intelligence production 
and use: from collection, through to analysis,, dissemination to users, user feed back and 
then any re-tasking. The JIC (Germany) and BRIXM1S files are sources on the 
collection phase of the cycle. The JIC files show both the analysis and re-tasking 
phases. It is more difficult to find historical evidence of the user phases of the process, 
however. The users are often various and rarely are there records which clearly state 
that they enacted a certain policy because of certain intelligence information. 
There are archives of use, however, that can reveal something of the relationship 
between intelligence and policy towards Germany. The Prime Ministers' files, Cabinet 
minutes and memoranda, and the Cabinet Defence Committee minutes and papers offer 
an insight into policy-making at the highest levels. The Chiefs of Staff Committee 
minutes and memoranda, and the Joint Planning Staff reports are key sources on defence 
policy. Foreign Office papers are also available. Of particular interest are the Russia 
Committee papers, the group set up to monitor Soviet policy (1946-57); Central section 
Germany papers (including the Control Commission Germany and High Commission 
papers); the Western section Germany papers; the Northern department Soviet Union 
papers and the Permanent Under Secretary's Committee and Department papers, set up 
in 1948 to 'run' the Cold War from the Foreign Office. All of these records can be used 
in conjunction with knowledge of the JIC reviews and assessments to help build a 
picture of the use made of the intelligence provided on Germany. 
45Herman, Michael, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 283-304 
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These files obviously need to be combined with the body of published works that 
already exist in the fields of intelligence history, British foreign and defence policy, 
Cold War history and relevant autobiographies and biographies. There is a dual process: 
existing research can be assessed in the light of the new JIC papers, whilst the JIC 
archive can be set in its appropriate historical position. This study is designed to be a 
critical appraisal of both the JIC's contribution to British policy and its development in 
the centre of government, rather than just a description. Clearly, narrative description of 
the JIC's assessments is required, but this is done with an eye to making judgements. 
Furthermore, the JIC files provide an insight into collective views; they cannot provide a 
complete picture of individual personalities and therefore such discussion is rare. 46 The 
realms of counter-fact are deliberately avoided: it is impossible to answer questions 
about what would have happened had the JIC not existed or drawn up particular 
conclusions. 
Interviews have been conducted with former intelligence officers with direct 
experience of the JIC. Their information has been used to verify the contents of 
documents and expand on them where necessary. Because of the restrictions on 
revealing the identities of such Crown servants, it has been necessary to occasionally 
resort to noting sources as 'Private Information This can be frustrating for subsequent 
researchers, so the use of this formulation has been kept to an absolute minimum; it has 
only been used in instances where information provided by interviewees was not already 
in the public domain. 
Chapter structure 
This study is written chronologically. This is the most sensible way of 
presenting the information given the specified purpose of analysing the development of 
46 In order to provide a reminder that the HE was a collection of individuals and human processes. this 
study refers to the Committee as "they" rather than "it". Although this is grammatically incorrect, it 
makes an important point. 
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JIC assessments and function within government. Breaking down analysis into 
chronological chunks risks creating artificial breaks for presentational convenience 
where none should exist, but it is nevertheless necessary to make any research readable. 
The following chapters fit loosely around significant events in the development of 
divided Germany up to 1961. 
* Chapter I- 1947-49: the shift from a German to a Soviet threat; the Berlin 
Blockade 
* Chapter 2- 1950-52: the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic; German rearmament 
* Chapter 3- 1953-54: the June 1953 riots and their aftermath 
e Chapter 4- 1955-57: the Geneva conferences and disarmament 
* Chapter 5- 1958-61: The Berlin crisis and the Wall 
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Chapter One: 1947 - 1949 
Dividing Germa 
Germany's strategic position... coupled with German manpower and skill in 
the development of modem long-range weapons, might be of decisive 
consequence to the security of Western Europe including the United 
Kingdom, if Germany were wholly at the disposal of the Soviet Union. 
-RC(47) 7 "Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities", 6 August 19471 
The years 1947-49 represented a change-over period for British intelligence in 
Germany from fighting the Second World War to waging the Cold War. The threat of a 
resurgent, nationalist Germany was replaced by the danger of Communism in central 
Europe as the highest order concern for the British authorities in Germany and 
2 Whitehall 
. 
This reflected a similar shift in overall foreign policy as the machinery for 
international negotiation set up at the end of the War began to break down and East and 
West slid into stalemate that left Europe divided for nearly 45 years. 3 The seeds of the 
division had been sown years earlier in the uneasy Alliance of the United States, Britain 
and the Soviet Union in the war against Nazism, but from early 1947 onwards that 
potential trouble became a reality. 4 In 1947, Marshall Aid, the breakdown of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), the attempted Communist rebellion in Greece and 
in 1948, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin all 
contributed to this development. This very early Cold War period was largely a struggle 
for power in Europe, and Germany in particular, which though still devastated by the 
War, was of enormous strategic value. ' 
1 CAB158/1, JIC(47)7(Final), 6 August 1947 
2 CAB 176/22, JIC/880/49,13 May 1949, including JIC(Gennany)(49)51 "Intelligence Division, Control 
Commission Germany" 
3 CAB 129/23, CP(48)6 "The first aim of British Foreign Policy", 4 January 1948; CP(48)7 "Review of 
Soviet Policy", 5 January 1948 
4 Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War history (Oxford: OUP, 1997), pp. 1-53 
5 Tusa, Ann & Jon, The Berlin Blockade (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), pp. 40-6 
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Britain's military chiefs were ahead of their diplomatic colleagues in fronting up 
to a new enemy. 
6 The Chiefs of Staff suggested in February 1947 that British security 
demanded recognition of the fact that Russia was "a much more dangerous potential 
enemy than Germany and consequently they should think about ways to secure 
7 Western Germany as a friend to the West . 
Gradually, however, all departments and all 
Western Allies converged on a policy of supporting a new West German State, in 
8 defiance of perceived Soviet ambitions to spread Communism throughout Europe. The 
question of whether the Western Allies were reacting to Soviet policies and actions in 
Germany or vice versa is difficult to assess accurately and would most likely lead to a 
conclusion that there had been miscalculations and misunderstandings on both sides. 
Such considerations are not the main focus here, however, since this is an attempt to 
examine the contribution made by the centre of the British intelligence machinery, the 
Joint Intelligence Committee QIQ and its forward arm in Germany, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (Germany), or JIC(G), to British policy and action concerning 
Germany during these early years of Cold War development. 9 
In this chapter, the aim is to examine the JIC's role during the breakdown of the 
CFM during 1947 and then the Committee's part in the Berlin blockade of 1948-9. 
Cradock dedicates a chapter to the latter issue, but since the publication of Know Your 
Enemy, those files that Cradock acknowledges were missing from his research - those of 
the JIC(G) and weekly JIC assessments of current intelligence - have been released. 
10 
This chapter is not an attempt to give a detailed account of the early Cold War in 
Germany; that has been well done elsewhere. Rather, the following research focuses on 
those events to which the JIC turned its collective mind. 
6 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 6-11 
7 DEFE4/2, JP(47)4 "Military Control of Germany", 26 February 1947 
8 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 118-9; CAB 129/3 1, CP(48)3 06 "Policy towards Germany", 20 December 
1948 
9 The JIC was in fact the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee until January 1948, when it was given fall 
Committee status. See CA13158/3, JIC(48)2 "New title for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee", 10 
January 1948. In order to avoid confusion, it will be referred to as the JIC throughout this Chapter, even 
during descriptions of 1947. 
" Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 68-82 
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Intelligence in Germany 
Although the main focus of this study is the interaction between the JIC and the 
Committee's customers in Whitehall, it is worth briefly looking at how intelligence was 
collected in Germany, as well as how the local organisation administered the "coal 
face", as Aldrich describes it. " Recent research has exposed many details of British 
operations in Germany during the early Cold War, often using files fi7om TNA, so there 
is little need to go over the same ground in detail. 12 It is important, however, to pay 
some attention to the administration and collection of intelligence because it reveals the 
character of the information that went into the making of JIC assessments. 
Organisation 
The JIC(G) mimicked the JIC in terms of bringing together senior military and 
civilian staff, although the heritage of both marked them out as more military than 
civilian in function. 13 In 1947, JIC(G) was made up of the Chief of the Intelligence 
Division (ID), the military intelligence organisation in Germany (always JIC(G) 
Chairman); the Chief of the Political Division (Control Commission Germany or CCG); 
the heads of the three service intelligence branches; two Deputy Chiefs of ID; the 
Deputy Chief of Staff Execution; and the Head of No I Planning and Evaluation Unit 
(No I P&EU was the cover name for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or M16) in 
Germany at this time). 14 There were three sub-committees: the JIC (Berlin), to provide 
intelligence on Berlin; the Public Order Sub-Committee, to provide intelligence on 
internal security issues and a Co-ordinating Committee to oversee operations. In 
January 1947, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Control Commission Germany) had 
become the JIC(G), to reflect the fact that the Committee was not officially part of the 
11 Aldrich. Hidden Hand, p. 3 92 
12 The two outstanding works are Aldrich, Hidden Hand and Maddrell, Spying on Science 
13 Hinsley et al, BritishIntelfigence in the Second War, VoL I, pp. 3-43; Cradock, Know Your Enemy, 
pp. 11-24; Aldrich, Hidden Hantý pp. 181-2 
14 CAB 176/15, JIC/763/47,5 August 1947 
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Policy-making organisation of the Control Commission. 15 The JIC(G) was in fact under 
joint control of the Military Governor at the head of the Control Commission and the JIC 
in London. 16 
The JIC(G) was largely a body designed to collate intelligence collected in 
Germany, before passing it back to London for analysis or on to the Control 
Commission as a part of their policy process. There was a direct link between JIC(G) 
and the JIC for the communication of factual intelligence. 17 Any information requiring 
executive action by the Control Commission was passed through from the Deputy 
Military Governor to either Norfolk House, the London base of the Foreign Office 
German Department, or the Chiefs of Staff for approval. JIC permission was required to 
carry out clandestine activities in Germany. 18 
Scientific, technical and economic intelligence was handled separately through 
the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch,, Germany (STIB), the "forward link" of 
the Joint Scientific and Joint Technical Intelligence Committees (JS/JTIC). 19 STIB was 
"an integral part of the Intelligence Division... and it co-ordinated and inspired the 
collection of overt scientific and technical intelligence obtainable within Germany 
relating to preparations for war in Germany as a whole and the adjacent countries. " 
Alongside this, STIB obtained relevant economic intelligence for transmission to the 
Joint Intelligence Bureau, London (JIB). 
British intelligence as a whole was reviewed during 1947. The Chiefs of Staff 
noted in their "Future Defence Policy" in May: 
It is of the greatest importance that our Intelligence Organisations should be able to 
provide us with adequate and timely warning. The smaller the armed forces, the greater 
15 CAB158/1, JIC(47)11 "Joint Intelligence Committee, Germany", 4 February 1947 
16 JIC/763/47 
17 CAB 176/14, JIC/247/47,15 March 1947 
18 CAB 158/2, JIC(47)74(0) "Priorities of tasks for the collection of intelligence information from 
Germany", 24 November 1947 
19 CAB 176/14, JIC/357/47,17 April 1947 
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is the need for developing Intelligence Services in peace, to enable them to fulfil this 
responsibility. 20 
A report produced by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill examined the structure of 
British intelligence, but mainly from the point of view of improving scientific and 
technical intelligence aspects . 
21 Two consequences of the Evill report were the elevation 
of the JIC from a Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee to a full Committee and the 
reintroduction of a second Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) team of analysts to cope with 
demand. 22 Evill paid little attention to the intelligence organisations in Germany, but 
self-examination of ID was taking place at the same time, inspired by the changing 
intelligence priorities and the need to reduce costs in Germany. In May 1947, Vice- 
Admiral Harold Walker, the Officer Commanding Naval Forces in Germany, wrote to 
the JIC(G) stating., "in view of the* re-organisation of the Intelligence Division now 
taking place, it is considered that the moment is opportune to discuss the future 
intelligence policy regarding the USSR and Soviet dominated countries. -)-)23 Walker, like 
Evill, suggested that both Germany and Austria were ideal places for gathering 
intelligence on the Soviet Union and her satellite countries, but manpower and budget 
reductions would require increased efficiency. 
In October,, Major-General John Lethbridge, the Chief of the ID, attended the JIC 
to discuss the future plans for British intelligence in Germany. The central theme was 
the "new re-orientation" of the ID. 24 Recognising Cold War requirements, the JIC 
suggested that the "collection... of military intelligence on foreign powers" should 
become the highest priority, rather than the lowest, as it had been until then. Cuts in 
manpower meant that some intelligence tasks had to be separated away from the ID 
budget: political intelligence was handed over to the Political Division (CCG); No I 
P&EU had to find an alternative sponsor and overt censorship ended completely. 
20 DEFE4/4, COS(47)66hMeeting, 21 May 1947 
21 CAB 163/7, Misc/P(47)3I "Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947,6 November 1947 
22 During the Second World War, there were two JIS teams, but this was reduced to one in 1945. 
Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 26 1; CAB 158/3, JIC(48)20(0) "Review of JIC organisation. and 
procedure", 27 February 1948 
23 DEFE41/62, JIC(Germany)47/32,23 May 1947 
24 CAB 176/16, JIC/I 113/47,16 October 1947; CAB 159/2 JIC(47)7 1" Meeting, 22 October 1947 
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The October meeting did not resolve these issues fully; rather it was a starting 
point for a continual review of intelligence in Germany. In November, the JIC formed a 
delegation with a wide remit to investigate the intelligence requirements in Germany. 25 
The party carried out a two week visit in January 1948, visiting the major British 
intelligence sites - Herford (the Headquarters of ID and JIC(G) meeting place), Berlin, 
Dfisseldorf and Hamburg26 - and reported in March . 
27 The changes made included a 
new charter for JIC(G), more selective demands on SIS from Service Departments for 
order of battle (ORBAT) intelligence in the Soviet Zone and more technically trained 
personnel for the ID and SIS. 
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The new JIC(G) charter was delivered in June. 29 Representatives of JIB and 
JS/JTIC were brought onto the Committee, in line with the increased prominence given 
to scientific intelligence after the Evill review. The new charter emphasised a joint 
responsibility to the military commanders in Germany for "providing intelligence on 
matters which may concern internal or external threats to the Western Zones of Germany 
and to the British, French and American Sectors of Berlin" and "the fulfilment of JIC 
London's requirements particularly in respect of Russia and the Satellite countries 
leaving the Intelligence Division... to concentrate on its main task of supporting the 
Military Government of the British Zone of Germany". The area of responsibility for 
JIC(G) was set out as the four zones of Germany and all countries bordering, plus the 
Soviet Union. The terms of reference required that the Committee provide the military 
commanders with "co-ordinated Intelligence Reports and Joint Appreciations") on 
internal and external threats, as well as advice "on all matters of Intelligence and 
Counter-Intelligence policy and organisation in respect of its primary area of 
responsibility". JIC(G) was also expected to fulfil specific JIC requirements,, but,, as a 
matter of course, provided London with "joint intelligence appreciationsl)ý on the matters 
of concern to the military commanders in Germany. In order to meet these requirements 
25 CAB159/2, JIC(47)75hMeeting, 5 November 1947; JIC(47)77hMeeting, 12November 1947; 
CAB176/16, JIC/1356/47,24 November 1947 
26 CAB159/2, JIC(47)88hMeeting, 12 December 1947; JIC(47)9 0 Meeting, 19 December 1947 
27 CAB159/3, JIC(48)24thmeeting, 19March 1948 
28 CAB159/3, JIC(48)29hMeeting, 7 April 1948 
29 CAB 15 8/4, JIC(48)50 Final "Charter for Joint Intelligence Committee, Germany", 4 June 1948 
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JIC(G) was permitted to maintain direct contact with US and French intelligence 
organisations in Germany, British Embassies in countries bordering Germany, plus 
Moscow and Oslo, and the British intelligence agencies in Austria and Trieste. 
As recommended by the JIC delegation, Major-General Charles Haydon,, 
Lethbridge's successor, carried out an overhaul of the ID throughout 1948. In particular, 
the Headquarters were brought into line with their tasks, the structure of intelligence 
agencies in London and the requirements of the Regional Intelligence Staffs operating in 
Germany. 30 This meant five directorates: Co-ordination (within Germany and with 
London); Security (to provide security intelligence and physical security to the Military 
Administration); Production (responsible for overt intelligence including interrogations 
of Prisoners of War (POWs) and Deserters and liaison with BRIXMIS3 1); Analysis 
(agent running) and Administration. Outside these directorates there were STIB, JIB 
and the Special Reports Branch (economic, industrial and technical intelligence, centred 
in Berlin under cover of the Economic Sub-Commission). The ID's primary task 
remained "intelligence work in support of Military Government"'. 32 Secondary to that 
was "[c]losely to watch in Germany, the activities, not necessarily directly affecting 
Military Government, of Russia and her satellite countries". This meant providing "in 
the closest liaison and co-operation with M16, Intelligence material on the Soviet Union 
and satellite countries" and bringing leads beyond Germany to the notice of SIS. An 
equal secondary task was the provision of information to JEB -in their task of fulfilling 
long term requirements after the Control Commission has been withdrawn from 
Germany". 
Unsurprisingly, relatively little reorganisation of intelligence in Germany took 
place during the Berlin blockade. The focus was very much on collecting as much 
information as possible during the crisis, with little time available for making large 
administrative changes that were not absolutely crucial to the short-term targets. In 
January 1949, the JIC(G) requested that intelligence agencies, in association with their 
30 CAB176/19, JIC/1223/48,1 July 1948 
31 See later for more on BRIXNHS 
32 JIC/1223/48 
29 
London departments select "some six to eight subjects within their allotted tasks which 
-) 33 appeared to them to be of paramount importance' . This was to ensure that whilst there 
were "restrictions on manpower and other resources", available effort was targeted on 
"the most urgent and important tasks". Other requirements on the lists of intelligence 
targets were to be dealt with as and when sources and resources became apparent. 
In response to the planning for the handover of power to a West German 
government in 1949, it was clear that the local intelligence services needed to adapt. 
One particular problem was the requirement to significantly reduce staff numbers and 
hence, costs. The JIC discussed the problem in late April 1949, pointing out that staff 
numbers had to be kept high enough that they could still provide the much needed 
intelligence on Russia. 34 A working party formed to examine the future of the ID had 
little doubt about the value of the organisation: 
... it was generally agreed that, in the present international situation, the service of the Intelligence Division to London was of the greatest importance and any reduction in this 
service would have a most grave affect on our knowledge of Russia and her Satellites. 
The view was very strongly expressed, therefore, that every effort should be made to 
ensure that there was no diminution in the procurement of intelligence from the Soviet 
Union and the Satellite countries. 35 
General Sir Brian Robertson, British Military Governor in Germany, envisaged 
that after the handover of power to the Germans and the Control Commission had 
become a High Commission, the primary and secondary roles of ID would switch, so 
that intelligence-gathering on Russia would be above work in support of the High 
Commission. The duties would be divided up in a new way: 
(i) Tasks in support of the High Commission, for example watching KPD (German 
Communist Party) penetration of the Western Zones and subversive activities of 
Communists and right wing nationalists; 
33 CAB 159/5, JIC(49)7"' Meeting, 19 January 1949 
34 CAB159/5, JIC(49)41s'Meeting, 22 April 1949 
35 CAB176/22, JIC/1012/49,8 June 1949 
30 
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Tasks carried out on behalf of London agencies, for example interrogation of 
POWs, collection of scientific and technical intelligence and exploitation of 
German knowledge of Russia; 
(iii) Tasks for both the Ifigh Commission and London, for example overt and covert 
collection of political and economic intelligence; 
(iv) Work on behalf of the Services (locally and in London), for example defector and 
deserter interrogation and ORBAT intelligence. 
The peak in ID staff was in October 1947 when personnel numbered 3,43 1, In 
April 1948, there were 2,826 and in June 1949,, 1! )412. 
By April 1950, it was planned to 
be 1,, 090. Haydon believed that any drop below 950 would result in a "sharp decline" in 
the Division's service. Robertson was prepared to accept up to 1,000 intelligence 
personnel in the Control Commission's staff out of a total of 2-3,000,, although care was 
needed to conceal this high proportion of intelligence staff from the other Allies and 
36 Germans, in order to avoid embarrassment . 
Haydon and William Hayter, JIC 
Chairman, agreed that the numbers should remain fixed throughout 1950, during the first 
year of the new German Government. The JIC settled on a staff of 1090 for the ID in 
1950, with the following distribution: Entries and Exits (borders) - 50; No IP& EU - 
37 195; Headquarters - 298; Outstations - 158; and Regions - 389 . 
Roughly 500 were 
working in support of the Nfilitary Government and 500 on wider strategic intelligence. 
The High Commission carried 60 per cent of the cost on their vote and the remaining 40 
per cent was split between other departments. 38 
The new German government came into existence on 23 May 1949; the British 
Control Commission officially became a High Commission, although it took longer in 
reality to make all the necessary transfers. As far as the intelligence services in 
Germany were concerned very little changed; by this stage, the themes had been already 
been defined as a switch in target from denazification to the Cold War and controlled 
36 CAB 176/22, JIC/I 122/49,23 June 1949 
37 CAB 176/22, JIC/I 160/49,28 June 1949 
38 The other departments were Ministry of Defence (17%), Foreign Office (13%), War Office (4%), Air 
Ministry (31/o), Admiralty (2%), Treasury, Ministry of Supply and Board of Trade (sharing 1%). 
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retrenchment. The JIC(G) remained responsible to the JIC and the ED to the High 
Commissioner 
. 
39 The ID's main duty to the High Commissioner was the provision of 
intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief s Committee in Germany and the system 
whereby the Head of the ID also assumed the role of JIC(G) Chairman remained. 
Collection 
British efforts to gather intelligence in Germany have been exhaustively covered 
by other research. Maddrell has written in great detail about British operations to gather 
scientific and technical intelligence about the Soviet Union, which took full advantage of 
the unique window into the Soviet bloc provided by divided Germany. 40 Aldrich covers 
a wider range of intelligence targets, although he also gives great prominence to the 
importance of Germany in the technological fieldS. 41 Scientific, technical and military 
intelligence made up the bulk of the information collected; this was the sort of material 
that could reveal the USSR's actual and potential capabilities. In very short supply from 
Germany, or anywhere else in fact, was good political intelligence; the rare gems that 
might provide insights into the Kremlin's intentions. 
The Allied powers hoovered up German wartime scientific and technical 
expertise as they occupied the Third Reich, in order to learn all they could about German 
42 
technological advances. This expertise became a battleground: the Western Allies vied 
with the Russians to secure the services of valuable individualsl both to benefit Western 
programmes and also simply to deny them to the opposition. Those Germans that had 
fallen into Russian hands, however, became a potential source on the new enemy's 
programmes. STIB ran operations such as MATCH BOX and TOP HAT which from 
1947-9, enticed over 400 Germans across from the Soviet Zone, provided them with 
temporary housing, debriefed them and then found them employment. 43 From 1949, as 
39 DEFE5/18, COS(49)448 "Commanders-in-Chief Conunittee, British Forces, Germany", 21 December 
1949 
40 Maddrell, Spying on Science 
41 Aldrich, Hidden Hand 
42 Maddreff, Spying on Science, pp. 17-21 
43 lbid, pp. 33-43,185-7 
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Germans who had been working on Soviet programmes inside the USSR began to return 
home in significant numbers, STEB used operation DRAGON RETURN to induce as 
many as possible to defect to the West. 44 
Individuals with valuable knowledge from behind the Iron Curtain came in many 
guises: there were Displaced Persons (DPs) and POWs returning to Germany after time 
in the USSR who could offer their observationS45 ; refugees fleeing East Germany grew 
in numbers as the grip of socialisation tightened 46; West German businessmen and 
academics who legitimately travelled into the Soviet bloc could provide information on 
personalities and contactS47 ; and deserters and defectors from the Soviet forces and 
administration could provide up-to-date ORBAT intelligence. 48 Of course, individuals 
crossing the internal German border could also be used by the Russians to feed the West 
disinformation and gather counter-intelligence information, so Western services had to 
treat them with care until their integrity had been established. 49 The JIC were acutely 
aware that as time went on, the flow of genuine sources would drop, both because DP 
and POW numbers were limited and Soviet border security would tighten . 
50 As the 
valuable flow of defectors decreased,, both the JIC and the JIC(G) worked with the 
Foreign Office Information Research Department (1RD) and the BBC Overseas Service 
to induce defection through radio broadcasts. 51 
The occupation of Germany yielded further intelligence opportunities. As 
Western forces captured elements of the Nazi administration, German intelligence on the 
Soviet Union fell into their laps. Operation APPLE PIE, run jointly by the British 
Documents Research Staff (DRS) and an American team, wrung out SS Security Service 
44 Ibid, pp. 187-196,205-235 
45 Ibid, pp. 103 -118; CAB 159/6, JIC(49)84thMeeting, 26 August 1949; jlC(49)112 th Meeting, 2 November 
1949 
46 Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 53-68 47 Ibid, pp. 87-97 
48AIdrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 193-5; CAB159/1, Confidential Annex for JIC(47)41" Meeting, 2 July 1947 
49 CAB 159/4, JIC(48)99t" Meeting, 10 September 1948; CAB 158/5, JIC(48)124(Final) "Procedure for 
handling defectors arriving in the British Zones of Occupation7,8 December 1948 
50 DEFE41/63, JIC(Germany)68thMeeting, 7 December 1948 
51 CAB159/6, JIC(49)84thMeeting, 26 August 1949; CAB 176/24, JIC/ 1886/49,19 October 1949; 
F01005/1174, JIC(Germany)(M)(49)14,1 October 1949 
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papers and personnel for information on Russian industry, infrastructure and 
geography. 52 In another joint operation, DICK TRACY, the RAF and USAF made full 
use of captured Luftwaffe photo reconnaissance of the USSR in drawing up their own 
target lists. 53 Western command of German territory was not only valuable for acquiring 
recent Nazi intelligence, however, since occupation brought with it control of postal and 
telephone communications. Interception provided scientific, technical and ORBAT 
intelligence. 54 Liaison between the Western intelligence organisations was a simple 
method of increasing the intelligence flow to any one particular nation. Even away from 
the joint operations like communications interception and exploiting Nazi intelligence, 
the exchange of assessments, although fraught with security problems, offered the 
chance to bolster knowledge at negligible financial cost. " 
BRIXMIS,, the British Commander-in-Chief s Mission to the Soviet Forces in 
Germany, was one of the most valuable sources of military intelligence in the British 
armoury. BRIXMIS and SOXMIS, the Russian equivalent, were established initially in 
1946 under the Robertson-Malinin agreement, as exchange missions to keep their 
respective governments informed about the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement 
in the other's zone, 56 The Americans and French had similar agreements with the 
Russians. The N/Iissions had,, however, rapidly become another source of intelligence. 
57 
Even though both the Russians and the East Germans attempted to restrict the movement 
of BRLXNHS,, the Mission, along with the American and French teams, had far greater 
access to East Germany than other Westerners. Although SOXMIS's activities in the 
58 
British Zone were thought to be a risk to security , 
by April 1948, the JIC recognised 
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that BRIXNUS was providing intelligence of such value that they were willing to accept 
those risks in order not to jeopardise the future of the Mission. " 
The JIC and JIC(G) files rarely reveal a great deal about other intelligence 
sources, such as SIS agents, early air reconnaissance over-flights of Soviet territory and 
signals intelligence (sigint); but this does not mean they were not going on. SIS ran 
agents of varying quality in East Germany during the late 1940s: many reported on 
military rail movements and Soviet troop dispositions; fewer on science-related projects 
such as the extraction of uranium from the Erzgebirge mines; and very few provided 
good information on the Soviet administration or East German government. 60 
According to Aldrich, by 1948, limited photographic over-flights of Eastern Germany 
were providing target intelligence. 61 He also reveals that as early as 1947, RAF planes 
supported by ground stations like RAF Gatow in Berlin were collecting sigint, likely to 
be both voice traffic (communications intelligence or comint) and electronic intelligence 
(elint). 62 There was also an intercept station at Gluckstadt, near Hamburg, which was 
the home to the no. I (Special) Wireless Regiment, Royal Signals until 1950.63 During 
the late 1940s at least, however, the most useful sigint collected relating to Germany was 
actually collected in the UK 64 
Priorities for Intelligence Collection 
The priorities for intelligence collection in Germany were reviewed regularly by 
the JIC. Departments submitted their requirements to the Committee so that they could 
be collated and distributed to Germany. Acknowledging the shifting priorities in 
Germany, in August 1947, the JIC noted that the lists of information required were now 
59 CAB 159/3, JIC(48)3 3d meeting, 15 April 1948; CAB 176/22, JIC/666/49,9 April 1949 
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largely directed against Russia, rather than at Germany . 
65 The co-ordinated tasking lists 
included all requirements except those of SIS, which were distributed separately as "a 
,, 66 list of special questions prepared in consultation with consumer departments. The 
requirements for scientific and technical intelligence were grouped separately for no 
reason other than convenience. 
In November 1947, no specific targets were included in Priority 1, the highest 
priority. This was usual since this category was reserved for "tasks of over-riding 
importance requiring special action" which would be indicated by the JIC to the JIC(G) 
in special briefs "as the situation demands". Any such emergency requirements 
warranted specific, extra resources. Standing requirements of the highest priority were 
Priority 2. These included "Russian intentions in Germany"; "The security of the British 
Zone of Germany", with particular attention to the activities of the Russian intelligence 
agencies in Germany, the Satellite countries and in Russia; submarine construction; 
information on Russian "naval exercises and manoeuvres, particularly those in which 
submarines play a part, and with reference to the use of radar" and "Co-operation 
between aircraft and warships"; ORBAT of Soviet Army and Air Forces including their 
organisation, -strengths, locations, designation of units, equipment, movements and 
identification"; "18'h Air Army (Long Range Force), PVO [the air defence branch of the 
Soviet military], early warning system and AA [anti-aircraft] defences"; aircraft and 
aircraft engine production; armaments and engineering industries; the "training tactics 
and state of efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces' 
"Breaches of Potsdam Agreement and progress in denazification in the Russian 
Zone"; the Russian use of former members of the German armed forces, German 
technicians and industrial experts; and the dismantling of factories in the Russian Zone 
of Germany were all in Priority 3, along with further military information. As a signal 
of issues further afield, included in Priority 3 tasks were, "[a]ctivities or organisations 
65 CAB159/1, JIC(47)57hMeeting, 29 August 1947 
66 CAB 158/2, JIC(47)74(0) "Priorities of tasks for the collection of intelligence information from 
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for illegal immigration into Palestine") and "[a]ny symptoms of Russian interest in 
Jewish extremist activities". 
The list of scientific and technical intelligence requirements was daunting by any 
standards and reveals quite how desperate the need for any intelligence on Soviet 
weapons development was. This list did not change throughout 1947-9.67 The highest 
priority standing tasks included information on atomic energy, biological warfare, 
chemical warfare, guided missiles, electronics and scientific and technical education, 
68 naval equipment, army equipment and air equipment. Atomic energy was a priority 
for British intelligence generally, and Germany presented an opportunity for gaining 
some sort of insight into Russian progress on nuclear weapons manufacture. 69 On the 
list of requirements was information on "prospecting for, mining and processing of 
uranium ores, particularly in Saxony and the Erzgebirge", "production of high purity 
calcium at I. G. Farben, Bitterfeld", "production of high purity... nitric or hydrochloric 
acid, sodium carbonate,, caustic soda, sodium hydrosulphate, oxatic [sic] acid", 
"manufacture of very high purity graphite", research being carried out and the 
personalities involved. Appearing twice, underlined, was information on the 
"destination" of the uranium ores and calcium. This revealed the need for British 
intelligence to work out exactly where the research and development centres were inside 
Russia. 
Information on progress in the Soviet atomic weapons programme was in short 
supply. In September 1947, information on German high grade metallic calcium 
suggested that the Russians had more uranium than had been previously estimated. 70 
The report also stated that the Russians were trying to extract every last bit of uranium 
from Germany and Czechoslovakia, even though it was only of poor quality. As is often 
the case with intelligence analysis, one piece of information received results in a call for 
67 CAB158n, JIC(49)46(Final) "Priorities of tasks for the collection of intelligence information in 
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more. The report ended with a request for more information on the quantity, purity, use, 
shipping route and destination of the calcium being produced in Germany. Similar 
information was also needed on the uranium ores being extracted. Furthermore, any 
intelligence from Germany on the production of very high purity chemicals such as 
sulphuric, nitric and hydrochloric acids as well as high purity graphite blocks for a pile 
could be used as indicators of the progress in the Russian atomic project. In December, 
the JEB estimated that the earliest date by which the Russians could produce an atomic 
weapon was January 195 1, whilst stating that calcium and uranium from Germany was 
71 crucial to the Russian project . 
1947: Supporting the Control Commission 
In its support role for the Control Commission, the JIC(G) kept a close watch on 
domestic security inside Germany. In February 1947, the British and Americans carried 
out their last major anti-Nazi operation, SELECTION BOARD, during which 133 
72 
people were apprehended . 
The greater concern, however, was the threat of unrest, 
which the Public Order Sub-Committee met monthly to assess. 73 In early 1947, they had 
to report grim conditions. morale was low and the "news that a three year calory [sic] 
basis of 1800 calories is planned has caused considerable consternation, being regarded 
as prolonged starvation". 74 In March, the Committee reported not only an increase in 
theft of food and fuel, but also an increase in infanticide and abortion. 75 In May, the 
-) 76 food position was "very critical' . 
Throughout that spring, the JIC(G) considered 
reimposing the curfew in order to head off outbreaks of desperate violence. 77 
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Coupled with this problem of considerable discontent among the German people, 
there was the threat posed to security by Ru ssian- inspired propaganda and infiltration. 
Intelligence reports heightened fears within the British Government that the Russians 
were using their own zone as a base for spreading communism throughout all 
Germany. 78 In June, JIC(G) reported to the JIC- 
It is apparent that the Russians are now concentrating on recruiting a higher standard of 
agent and a consequent reduction in the large numbers of untrained line-crossers coming 
into the British and US Zones is noticeable. A recent report indicates that at least one 
espionage school is operating in the Russian Zone for the purpose of training agents for 
long term tasks in the British and US Zones. 79 
The report explained that the Russian aim was large scale penetration of Western Zones 
as "part of the general plan for the eventual communisation of those areas". The JIC(Q) 
explained that radio stations such as Nord West Deutscher Rundfunk were already well 
penetrated by Communists. 80 The report also warned that "British Intelligence Services 
are probably facing the greatest test they have yet encountered, having as their adversary 
an organisation powerful in numbers and with unrivalled experience". JIC(G) had sent a 
request to London asking that a "Wireless Intercept Organisation" be set up in Germany 
to capture information from the growing number of illicit radio transmissions, believed 
to be connected with both German subversive activity and foreign intelligence services 
operating in the Zone. 81 
In June 1947, Air Marshal Sholto Douglas, Robertson's predecessor as Military 
Governor,, warned the Chiefs of Staff that he considered it "unwise in the extreme" to 
further reduce the strength of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). His warning was 
specific and based on the recent trends in Germany: 
Until recently, I have felt in a position to assure you that the British Army of the Rhine 
was quite capable of dealing adequately with any internal security situation in the zone 
78 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 21-22 
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which could be foreseen under the existing conditions. Recent developments have 
caused me to review this position, and, in my opinion, the trend of events is placing Rhine Army [sic] in a much less favourable position to deal with the internal security 
situations which may arise in the future. 82 
Real difficulty for the security forces lay in growing discontent amongst the Germans 
towards the Occupying Powers, egged on by Russian propaganda. This was made more 
difficult because not only were a large proportion of the British troops in Germany 
young and inexperienced National Servicemen but also the British forces were reliant on 
315,, 500 German employees. 83 There was no way to vet this German labour, even in 
critical areas such as aviation. 84 
Douglas repeated warnings to the Chiefs that planned cuts in forces would be 
dangerous. In July, he argued against reducing British manpower in the Zone ftom 
85 103,000 to 67,000 in 1948. In August, he expressed doubts that the planned 44,000 
troops for 1950 would be able to meet the internal security requirements. 86 In the same 
month, Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), made a visit to Germany to assess for himself the requirement for troops. He 
recommended one Infantry Division, two District Headquarters with minimum essential 
administrative troops, one Armoured Brigade Group, one Infantry Brigade, one 
Parachute Division and three Armoured Car Regiments. 87 These British troops required 
the support of Belgian, Danish and Norwegian troops already in the Zone. By 
September,, the Chiefs were looking for alternative solutions to the problem of saving 
money without jeopardising security. They suggested that maybe British troops could 
88 be reduced if the Americans were willing to increase their commitment. 
In his August paper, Douglas wrote: 
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Developments so far indicate that provided Intelligence Division is maintained at 
reasonable strength with adequate facilities, clandestine organisations can be broken up before they become dangerous. A further period of severe hardship or widespread disorders from political causes would, however, provide an opportunity for the rapid and dangerous growth of clandestine organisations which, at present, exist only on a small 
scale. 89 
In particular, Douglas saw the threats as the KPD working under Soviet command to 
create disorder, as well as clandestine organisations. 
The British security organisations were targets for Russian penetration 
themselves. The JIC set up a Working Party to examine those measures which were 
necessary to combat penetration. 90 The Party reported in August that "recommendations 
from London on defensive security measures have not been fully implemented" in 
Germany. They also asserted that "offensive counter intelligence measures to counter 
the Russian Intelligence Services... should be regarded as the most important aspect of 
security tasks. " The Working Party, led by M15, suggested a great deal more 
investigation was required. 91 
In January 1948, unrest in Germany caused both Ernest Bevin, the Foreign 
Secretary, and the Chiefs of Staff to express concern about "the possibility of the spread 
of Communism producing disaffection in the Ruhr and among civilians now employed 
by our occupation forces for the provision of essential services. ). )92 In little over a week, 
the JIC responded with an assessment of the "Possibility of disaffection and disorder in 
Germany". 93 They concluded that "it is not unlikely that, in the future, the German 
Communist Party might take a more active part in initiating strike action. They would 
be considerably assisted in this role by continued food shortage. " They reported that the 
promised average daily food ration was not being met, and that unless this could be 
alleviated, the German Socialist Party (SPD) may well lose control of the Trade Unions 
89 COS(47)159(0) 
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to the KPD. The JIC had not found any evidence that the strikes which had occurred in 
January had been inspired by the KPD. On a more comforting note, the JIC reassured 
Bevin and the Chiefs, that although general disaffection among the civilian labour force 
employed by the British would "paralyse the British administration, no such 
development is likely to take place, except as a consequence of widespread disaffection 
among labour in general". 
1947: Watching Soviet Troops 
The threats to the Western position in Germany were not all internal. Producing 
accurate information on Soviet troop numbers in Germany was a critical function of the 
JIC in assisting defence planning and foreign policy-making. As Cradock puts it, 
"[o]nce the enemy was identified, the question for the analysts became the seriousness 
94 
and immediacy of the threat that he posed" . 
In February 1947, the JIC judged there to 
be some 405,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Germany. 95 This represented a reduction of 
some 150,, 000 fi7om the year before, and further reorganisation and reduction was taking 
place. In May, a further assessment confirmed this figure was made up of some men in 
up the Soviet Military Administration (SMA), the Russian equivalent of the Control 
Commission, but the vast majority of the number formed the four Soviet Armies 
stationed in Eastern Germany. 96 Two rifle armies were arrayed, facing "the Southern 
and Western demarcation line". with two mechanised armies in support. 
Troop numbers were a key bargaining counter in the diplomatic and propaganda 
struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers for lasting control of 
Europe. The May JIC assessment recalled that during the Moscow CFM in March and 
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April, the Russians had offered to reduce the number of their troops in Germany to 
200,000, provided that the number of British and American troops in the respective 
zones together was also limited to 200,000. This proposal had been rejected on the 
grounds that the British and Americans thought they should be treated as separate 
entities in Germany, each with 200,000 troops. 
No concrete demilitarisation plan was set during the 1947 rounds of Four Power 
negotiations, but JIC estimates of Soviet troop numbers slowly declined due to 
withdrawals and some reorganisation. In October, the JIC reported to the Minister of 
Defence,, AN. Alexander, 375,000 men or 28 divisions, with the Russian Air Force in 
Germany and Poland with 1,800 aircraft (roughly proportioned at 40 percent fighters, 20 
percent ground attack, 25 percent bombers and 15 percent other types). 97 A further 
October assessment included important information for defence planners. the Rifle 
armies actually faced the Northern and Southern sections of the demarcation line. 
Furthermore,, it reported "[t]here are two formations known as Guards Independent 
Cadre Divisions, each of which contains the staff and equipment required for an army. 
Each division has 30 per cent of the former army strength, but holds full scale army 
equipment; they were not mentioned in our last report as it is only recently that their 
nature has been definitely confirmed. "98 Even so, by February 1948, there was no 
change in the JIC overall estimate of 375,000.99 
Supporting the Foreign Office 
The CFM had been the main instrument for East-West talks since the end of the 
War. Germany was the most important issue for the Moscow meeting in spring 1947.100 
One of the British aims was the reduction of forces of occupation, Bevin told the 
97 CAB 176/15, JIC/968/47,17 September 1947 
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Cabinet that "[t]here were dangers in maintaining the present arrangement by which four 
national armies confronted one another at close quarters in Germany. "101 He also 
wanted to prevent the resurgence of a strong, centralised Germany but nevertheless to 
secure an upward revision of agreed levels of production for German industry. 102 Bevin 
recognised a need for a balance between power and a good economy in Germany. 
According to Sir Frank Roberts, Bevin's Private Secretary from 1947 to 1949, the 
Foreign Secretary felt particular responsibility "for his stewardship of the British zone of 
occupation in Germany and of the British sector in Berlin. "'O' 
The JIC worked to assist the ministers and civil servants waging the increasingly 
acrimonious diplomatic war. Before both of the 1947 CFM meetings, the JIC, with 
JIC(G) assistance, produced assessments to support the negotiating position of the 
British delegations. In March, before the Moscow round of talks, the JIC produced a 
report entitled "Evidence of Contravention of the Potsdam Agreement 1)), which explained 
the extent of Russian employment of ex-Nazis. 104 This report must have made 
uncomfortable reading for those hoping to hold a strong position on this issue: "[t]here 
should be no doubt that in general the process of denazification in the Russian Zone has 
been enforced more rigidly than in the British or American Zones". These were exactly 
the accusations that Bevin had to deal with. 105 The assessment noted, however, that the 
Russian job of denazification had always been smaller than that faced by the other 
occupying powers. Furthermore, the Russians had reduced the number of Germans 
working for them in their zone by transferring armaments plants and personnel to the 
USSR, many as a part of operation OSOAVIAKBIM in October 1946.106 Bringing up 
the subject of employing former Nazi scientists was not easy: to do so might have led to 
the Russians transferring all those remaining to Russia, denying the British the 
opportunity to recruit them for their own projects. 
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The number of ex-Nazis employed by the Russians was considered to be 
C4 extremely small" and of those "many of them have succeeded in achieving political 
backing under the present administration by becoming members of the Socialist Unity 
Party [SED]"". 107 Of particular concern to the British were the reports that the Russians 
were employing former German officers and soldiers, through such groups as the 
Seydlitz Army. Many of these Germans had been POWs taken at Stalingrad, whilst 
under the command of General Walter Seydlitz, some of whom had become instructors 
to the Russian Armed Forces. The JIC reported that in January 1946 approximately 10 
former POW German officers were sent to all zones of Germany "to assist local 
Communist party branches in elections" after special political indoctrination. Naimark's 
research suggests that this was probably an underestimation. 108 In April, a telegram 
from Germany to the JIC reporting an intercepted Soviet telephone conversation was the 
first time they had "got proof' that German officers were being recruited and a plan 
existed to employ many more. 109 This source was highly valued: "[t]he telephone line 
passes through our sector and we hope to get further valuable material by the same 
means. Care should therefore be taken not to compromise the source. ") 
The Moscow Conference (10 March - 24 April) did not go well for the British. ' 10 
Bevin's report to Cabinet explained that there had been no agreement on the political 
future of Germany, the Russians had complained about the fusion of the British and 
American Zones and Britain had been heavily criticised for employing German ex- 
servicemen and not completing the demolitions of industrial plants. "' Both sides had 
managed to agree on raising German levels of production. Bevin recognised the dangers 
in not solving the issues surrounding Germany, meaning that the November CFM in 
London "would be the critical meeting, and the most strenuous efforts would have to be 
made to secure agreement then on these vital questions which affected the whole future 
of Europe. " 
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In August 1947, between the Moscow and London CFMs, the JIC produced their 
-)-) 112 annual report on "Soviet Interests,, Intentions and Capabilities . These reports, 
produced from 1946 onwards, often ran over one hundred pages as they covered both the 
breadth and depth of Soviet past and future global policy. Unlike the majority of JIC 
papers in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which were marked for distribution to the 
Chiefs of Staff, these assessments were specifically marked to go to senior Cabinet 
members and officials, as well as the Chiefs. 
Cradock praises the August assessment for "accurate definitions of Soviet aims 
in Germany". 113 It certainly left little doubt that there was not much chance of 
agreement with the Russians over Germany. The paper concluded that the highest 
priority for the Soviet Union would be the reconstruction of the Russian economy. The 
immediate aim was to "make good the damage done by the war to the Soviet economy", 
but the longer term aim lay in over-taking the US in terms of industrial production. 
Further ambitions were the establishment of a protective belt; the avoidance of a major 
war; the continued aggressive promotion of Communism; and the "disintegration and 
weakening of the capitalist world wherever possible both by political infiltration and the 
promotion of unrest at home and in colonial territories. " The strategic, economic and 
political prize that Germany represented made it a centre of "acute conflict of interest 
with the Anglo-Saxon Powers"). The JIC considered German reparations, which the 
Soviets were claiming from all Zones, were "playing a significant part in Russia's 
efforts to reconstruct and develop her own economy". The Committee anticipated that 
the Russians would try to prevent the Western Powers from harnessing the Ruhr. 
The JIC did not consider the major factor in Soviet policy towards Germany to 
be economic, however. Rather the Committee believed it to be strategic: the "key to her 
policy in Central Europe" was the collective Russian memory of two devastating wars 
with Germany within a thirty year period. As a consequence, the Soviet ambition would 
be to prevent the "rehabilitation of the industries of Western Germany by the Anglo- 
112 JIC(47)7 
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Saxon Powers" since "no resurrection of Germany could be contemplated unless it were 
a Communist-directed Germany". The JIC was adamant that the latter would be 
disastrous for Britain. 114 The Committee thought, however, that Soviet policy in East 
Germany was alienating the Germans. The retention of POWs and tough security, 
coupled with the stripping of Eastern Germany of valuable capital and people, had 
resulted in a lack of popularity for the " Soviet- sponsored" SED, as shown in the October 
1946 Berlin elections. 115 Nevertheless, despite not enjoying popular support the SED 
had "very effectively Sovietised" Eastern Germany. In the Western Zones, the JIC 
believed the Russians were encouraging trade unions and youth movements to be their 
mouthpieces whilst propaganda tried to convince Germans that reunification could only 
be attained under the SED. 
The assessment made no mention of the Western position in Berlin. At that time, 
the JIC believed that the Russians would continue to rely on international diplomatic 
arrangements: "the Soviet Government will endeavour to keep the precarious means of 
intervention in the Western Zones afforded them by the quadripartite machinery. " The 
Soviet game would be a patient one: whilst they consolidated their base in the East,, 
"they hope that deteriorating economic conditions in the Western Zones and mistakes by 
the Western Powers may give them the chance to establish firmly their political 
influence in these Zones. " 
The Foreign Office (FO) wanted to make the Russian recruitment and training of 
German Armed Forces an important issue during the London CFM- The diplomats 
asked the JIC whether they could make use of intelligence assessments during the talks, 
particularly on the Seydlitz Army, as part of '. a plan to carry the war into the Russian 
camp when they accuse us of allowing activities in our own Zone of Germany which are 
in contravention of the Potsdam... agreement". 116 As a consequence, the JIC revised an 
August assessment for use by the British delegation at the forthcoming conference, 
114 See quote at the beginning of the chapter 
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including the proviso, "we wish to explain, however, that although the bulk of the 
evidence substantiates the report, individual items of evidence cannot be produced at the 
conference for reasons of security. " 
117 
The conclusions of the report explained and Naimark's research agrees, that 
former German military personnel were certainly being employed both as advisers to the 
Soviet Armed Forces and after indoctrination., as administrators and policemen in the 
Soviet Zone of Germany. "8 The report assessed as "probable" that the Russians were 
recruiting Germans both in POW camps and in the Soviet Zone and that some "small 
armed units" existed but not as "an organized fighting force comprising large 
formations". The JIC considered that these recruits could be used either "to replace 
Soviet Occupation administration in Germany including the police forces" or as a 
"Cadre for a 'Satellite' Army in a future war. " The Soviets were also interested in 
recruiting others with technical skills as well as those who had been directly involved in 
fighting the Allied Normandy invasion. Ex-Luftwaffe personnel had assisted the Soviet 
Air Force in bringing jet fighter aircraft into service quickly (by late 1946) and the 
Soviet Navy was looking for former U-boat and destroyer commanders. Even by 1947, 
the British estimated that the Russians still held some one and half million German 
POWs, including one quarter of a million released by the Western Allies and rearrested 
by the Russians. The JIC suggested that the number of Germans recruited by the 
Russians either as instructors, as trained future administrators or as members of small 
armed units "might well number 200,000 to 300,000", a huge rise from their earlier 
estimate. 
The final document produced by the JIC for use by the FO included a rare insight 
into the sources and reliability ratings for the intelligence that went into the assessment. 
Over 450 pieces of information went into the report, many of which came from 
117 CAB 158/1. JIC(47)47 Final (Second Revise) "Russian recruitment and training of former members of 
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communications interception. "9 Although many of the individual items corroborated 
one-another,, there were very few high-grade sources that could be used on this particular 
topic. It was perhaps for this reason or because of the remaining sensitivities over 
denazification in the British zone, that the issue was not substantively raised during the 
conference. 
120 
The Committee was also asked to examine a possible Soviet proposal at the 
London Conference that all occupation troops be withdrawn. The BAOR Commanders, 
after consulting with the American authorities in Germany, concluded that it was a 
"distinct possibility" that the Russians would put forward such a proposal. 12 1 Bevin also 
feared that the Russians would put forward a plan for withdrawal that the Western 
Powers, as Bullock puts it, "would find it embarrassing to reject. ). ). 122 Initial discussions 
in October in the JIC had thrown up some early conclusions on the subject. 123 Hayter 
suggested that "by withdrawing their troops from Germany, the Soviet Government 
would be likely to lose control of their zone. " The Head of SIS or "C", Major-General 
Sir Stewart Menzies, pointed out that "the withdrawal of British occupation forces from 
Germany would lead to a serious loss of intelligence. " Major-General Templer, the 
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), made a prescient observation: "a further point 
which he considered was worthy of examination by the FO was the possibility that, in 
the near future, the Soviet Government might attempt to make the Zones of the Western 
Powers in Berlin untenable. " 
By the time the London Conference had begun, the JIC had produced a large 
assessment entitled, "Likelihood and implications of a proposal for the withdrawal of all 
-) 124 occupation troops from Germany' . The report 
by the JIC was typical in that it 
examined the question from a Russian point of view. It concluded that the Russians 
would be unlikely to withdraw unless they were certain that either the Western Allies 
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would withdraw and Germany would become a unified Communist state or, at the very 
least, Eastern Germany would become a separate Communist state. Eastern Germany 
represented too crucial a part of the Soviet "security belf' for the Russians to lose 
control. The JIC reported recent and reliable information which suggested that there 
was no intention of withdrawing, but that "there is some evidence that the Russians 
intend to make a proposal for withdrawal at the meetings of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers with no idea of its being accepted but simply as a ruse to place the blame for 
continued occupation on the Western Powersý'. The JIC considered that calling their 
bluff and accepting the proposal would most probably result in the Russians finding 
some way to wriggle out of any agreement. 
The assessment suggested the advantages to the Soviet Union of a withdrawal 
were clear: it would leave the US and Britain without a military foothold on the 
continent and, given the levels of reparations taken by the Soviets already, there would 
be "little to lose economically from the evacuation of their Zone of Germany". 
Furthermore, were the Allies to vacate their Zones, the Communist political presence in 
terms of left wing parties and the indoctrinated former POWs would be well placed to 
attempt the spread of Soviet socialism. The disadvantages were seen to outweigh the 
advantages though. The JIC repeated their doubts that the German people would readily 
choose the SED and without the SMA, the means of sovietisation of the Russian Zone 
would have gone. This would clearly mean that from a strategic point of view, the 
Soviet line for attack or defence had moved east whilst there would also be fewer troops 
close to Poland and Czechoslovakia "to influence the course of political events". 
Withdrawal from Germany would also mean "a reduction in the supplies of Uranium ore 
to the Soviet Union". 
The JIC believed that any Russian suggestion of a withdrawal would be 
inconsistent with their attitudes to Germany, which involved using occupation as the 
means of ensuring demilitarisation. Such a change of strategy, however, might be 
designed to embarrass the British and American governments with their own voters as 
50 
well as improve the standing of the Russians in the eyes of the German people. 125 The 
evidence indicated that the Soviets did not genuinely intend to withdraw: they were 
improving lines of communication through Poland; developing their own military 
facilities in Eastern Germany; and "planning to incorporate the Russian sector of Berlin 
into their Zone in the event of a breakdown at the Council of Foreign Ministers". There 
was perhaps one of the earliest warnings that Berlin could well grow into an issue in its 
own right: "this is to some extent supported by reports that the Russians may ask for the 
termination of the occupation by the Western Powers of any part of Berlin' 
The 1947 London CFM was the last round of foreign minister-level diplomacy 
until after the Berlin blockade. The day the meeting began Bevin warned the Cabinet 
that he was "not optimistic about the'outcome" since he believed the Russians "had no 
present desire to reach agreement with the Western Powers for the peaceful settlement of 
Europe". 126 He was confident, however, that if the Soviets did offer to withdraw their 
troops, the British people would doubt the intention behind it. 127 JIC support for the 
British delegation continued during the CFM. The FO requested assistance in keeping 
records of Russian breaches of the Potsdam Agreement up to date, particularly any 
instances of Soviet unwillingness to enforce disarmament. 128 The JIC also responded to 
a request for assistance from the Board of Trade in their reparations bid for two 
hydrogen peroxide plants fi7om Germany. 129 
Bevin's fears were confirmed, reporting to the Cabinet during the talks that there 
was likely to be no agreement over Germany and that unless the Russian attitude 
changed, he could see "no purpose in continuing the discussions through the medium of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers. " 130 In reality, there was little chance of a Soviet 
change; by the time of the London CFM, Russian suspicions of US intentions in Europe 
had been confirmed by the announcements of both the Truman Doctrine supporting 
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freedom (12 March) and the Marshall Plan tying American money to European 
reconstruction (5 June). "' Once the talks had collapsed, Bevin considered that the 
CFM had become a useless tool and felt that a rethink of British policy towards Europe 
as a whole was required. 
132 
1948: The lead up to Blockade 
The breakdown of the London CFM drove Bevin to circulate a paper to the 
Cabinet warning that Soviet and Western policy were on a collision course. 133 He 
believed that Britain and the United States had to work to create a union of democratic 
states in Western Europe in order to halt the expansion of Communism westwards. 134 
Germany required urgent attention. On 8 January, Bevin explained his new policy 
towards Germany to the rest of the Cabinet -- 
... the guiding principle of his policy was to foster the creation of a truly democratic Germany. While nothing should be done to preclude the eventual emergence of a united 
Germany, it was important that the Germans should be made more effectively 
responsible for managing their own affairs in the Western Zones. 135 
This meant encouraging a new elected Government in the Western Zones, working to 
get raised production levels and improving the standard of living in Western 
Germany. 136 Bevin was aware that this would antagonise the Russians but he 
acknowledged he could at best only guess what their response might be. 137 The Chiefs 
of Staff were right in line. They believed that the conflict between East and West was 
"becoming more and more a struggle for the possession of Germany". 138 Their aim was 
a German government set up in the Western Zones and then "to make this new Germany 
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so flourishing that the Germans in the Russian zones will want to join it, and will look 
westwards". The Prime Minister, however, was not getting carried away with the idea 
of building Germany back up. Attlee was disturbed by Montgomery's suggestion that 
the strength of Germany should once again be re-established. 139 Bevin's solution was to 
build Germany up inside the system of Western Union defence. 
Tension in Germany mounted from the beginning of 1948. During January, the 
Russians began to interfere with Berlin rail and road traffic and relations were failing 
within the Berlin Kommandatura, the four power controlling committee. 140 In February, 
the Russia Committee, one of the FO's key Cold War bodies set up to analyse Soviet 
policy, warned that the issue of currency reform in Germany might well lead to 
trouble. 141 In response to any agreement reached by the Western Powers outside the 
quadripartite machinery, they predicted "the Russians would almost certainly take 
serious steps to prevent the success of our efforts' . The communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia during February served to heighten Western fears of Soviet 
intentions. 142 The Soviets were suspicious that the Western talks on Germany that began 
in London on 23 February were a prelude to a West German state. On 20 March, the 
Russians walked out of the Allied Control Council. Nevertheless, the JIC and CIA were 
confident in their estimates that the Russians were not ready for war, nor would they be 
before the end of 1956.143 Bevin and his senior officials were convinced by these 
appraisals. 
144 
April 1948 was a bad month for the hopes of lasting peace in Europe. On the 5 
April, a British passenger plane en route to Berlin collided with a Soviet fighter, killing 
all on board. At the start of the month, the Russians began stopping Allied trains into 
Berlin in order to inspect papers. On 8 April, Montgomery told the Chiefs, after a trip to 
139DEFE4/1 0, COS(48) Ie Meeting, 4 February 1948 
140 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 93-5,98-9 
141 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 128-130,154; F0371n]. 687, Russia Committee Meeting 19 February 1948 
142 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 95-102 
143 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, p. 55; CAB 158/3, JIC(48)1 1 (0) Final "Increase in the likelihood of 
a major war after the end of 1956", 13 March 1948 144 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 97-117 
53 
Germany, "that the atmosphere in Berlin was highly charged". 14' By his reckoning, had 
the aeroplane involved in the collision been American, war would already have broken 
out between the Americans and Russians. In Montgomery's view, "There could be no 
doubt that the Russians would now make every effort to squeeze us out of Berlin and it 
was obviously important that we should not allow them to do so. " There was not, 
however, an agreed Western response to Soviet moves. 146 
Cradock describes the blockade as "a policy-makers' crisis-)'. 147 He asserts that 
"because of the way it developed, intelligence had a relatively small part to play. The 
element of surprise was lacking and by the spring of 1948 the broad shape of the coming 
danger was widely known. " The papers made available since Cradock's research was 
published, do not significantly alter this assessment. During early 1948, the JIC did not 
produce papers relevant to Berlin, beyond those concerning military matters. In 
February, they reported no increase in Soviet troop numbers in Germany. 148 As 
mentioned above, in March, the JIC maintained their view that the Russians were not 
ready for war. By May, although the Committee described an unclear picture, in which 
the Cadre Armies were possibly filling up and manoeuvres were taking place, they did 
not raise any alarm and actually estimated that overall Soviet troop numbers in Germany 
had dropped by 55,000 to 320,000.149 The significance of these military assessments 
should not be overlooked, since they reassured ministers and officials that Soviet actions 
in Berlin were political not military. Beyond that, however, the JIC does not appear to 
have had much more of a role in British policy formation in the run-up to the blockade. 
During April 1948, the JIC(G) had begun to reorganise its efforts to keep a close 
watch on any Soviet preparations for war. They sent the JIC a watch list of " events and 
trends which, if they came to pass, either wholly or in part, might lead the Committee to 
conclude Russia was preparing to invade Western Germany". 150 The list included such 
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things as improvements in communications, reinforcements of men, equipment and 
supplies, a build up of Soviet wireless and radio traffic and increased activity among the 
Russian intelligence services. The stockpiling of rolling stock on the dilapidated Soviet 
zone railway system was considered to be not only a likely sign of preparations for war, 
but also a bad sign for the East German economy that relied on the fragile track 
network. 15 1 The JIC(G) intended to review any evidence at each of their three weekly 
meetings, before passing the information on to the j1C. 152 This review was only 
intended to be a local appreciation of events, as opposed to an assessment of wider 
Russian intentions or indicators of a World War. The JIC received the first review in 
May. 153 
The JIC(G) also proposed that they develop a new system for acquiring tactical 
intelligence concerning the Soviet military activities in Eastern Germany. 154 They 
informed the JIC that both British and American intelligence were receiving a large 
number of reports concerning Soviet troop movements and concentrations in the forward 
areas of the Soviet Zone. Such reports were, however, mostly from low-grade sources 
and were often so sketchy that useful evaluation could not be carried out. Furthermore, 
it often took more than a week to verify information about a given area that was just 
across the border. JIC(G) wanted a method of checking intelligence within 24 hours. 
They analysed their current sources of information and judged there was no present 
system available to meet the requirements. Deserters from the Soviet Army and the 
interrogation of German refugees and line-crossers were a poor source of dependable, 
tactical information, since allied interrogators did not know when and where they were 
going to appear, on top of which their numbers were likely to fall. TX sources', as SIS 
information was known, produced "very useful intelligence on Soviet military activities 
in the Soviet Zone, which they have penetrated to its full depth". The information often 
took three or more weeks to collect and communicate, however, plus the time taken to 
conduct initial tasking. BRIXMIS were able to "provide valuable information from 
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trained officers" but it usually took days to arrange a tour and this let the Soviets know 
what the British were interested in. Information from BRIXAUS, like that from the 
censorship of mail, was open to simple Russian disruption in the run-up to war. 
As a solution JIC(G) proposed a new organisation to cover the gap. 155 It would 
reach 15 miles into the Soviet Zone with a briefing-to-information-delivery time of no 
more than 24 hours. It required "a special network of agents" in the British Zone with as 
few "cut-outs" as possible to speed up communication. These agents would be selected 
"for their good local knowledge and connections" and "[b]riefing will be confined to 
basic essentials"). The network was to be run by No I P&EU on behalf of the primary 
consuMerl Intelligence Headquarters, BAOR. In order to get information to the 
Headquarters as quickly as possible'. existing military signals were employed where 
necessary. 
The JIC approved the plan, but insisted the network cover a depth of up to 50 
miles inside the Soviet Zone. 156 Menzies wanted to be sure that this operation did not 
interfere with current priorities or SIS resources. Military Intelligence whole-heartedly 
approved of any system that improved their knowledge. In order to improve the 
intelligence picture available in Germany, the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), the sigint agency, increased the rate of flow of their material to 
the jC(G) . 
157 No I P&EU made further preparations for crisis by drawing up their 
operation to evacuate key Germans fTom Berlin. 158 
On 4 May, the JIC received the first JIC(G) appreciation of the possibility of the 
Russians making war. 159 It showed a noticeable increase in the strength of ground forces 
in Germany including a new mechanised army on the German-Polish border. Troop 
numbers were increasing as new recruits arrived, without the usual release of older 
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classes of men. This was considered to be "part of the war of nerves on Berlin. " 
Increased ftontier controls had been noticed, but for the moment these were considered 
to be "intended defensively". As for political indicators, 
They [the Russians] are undoubtedly working towards a showdown in the Kommandatura and the Berlin transport situation shows that the immediate objective is 
to undermine the position of the Western Allies in Berlin, But this campaign is being 
conducted gradually and the Soviets are clearly anxious to go as far as they can without 
provoking incidents leading to hostilities. 
The key point was that the Russians would try to evict the Western Powers from Berlin) 
but "by all means short of war. " This remained in line with all earlier JIC predictions 
that the Soviets were not yet economically, militarily or politically ready to go to war. 
JIC(G) believed they would proclaim Berlin to be the capital of a new German 
government under Russian control and they would strengthen the Iron Curtain along the 
Zonal boundaries in Germany, but they were not preparing for all out war, 
Montgomery was convinced war was inevitable, but he had taken on board the 
JIC estimate that it was unlikely at present. 160 The FO complained to the JIC that there 
was not enough information about the "anticipated timing of Russian measures for 
restricting movement in the Berlin Area", "Russian intentions in respect of evacuation of 
their families from Berlin" or "Russian recruitment and employment of Germans". 161 In 
response to the latter complaint the JIC produced a brief paper in which they stated that 
they did not anticipate the use of Soviet-trained Germans in direct action against the 
Western zones of Germany. 162 
Talks on Germany between the British, French, American, Dutch, Belgian and 
Luxembourg governments ended in London I June. The Soviets were enraged when the 
Western Powers reached agreements concerning economic and political reforms in the 
Western Zones and Western Sectors of Berlin. 163 The introduction of a new currency in 
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Allied controlled Germany was the final straw. 164 Soviet intelligence had been reporting 
from the beginning of 1948 that Western intentions to reform German currency were a 
prelude to a West German state. 165 In an accurate "Forecast of the World Situation in 
1957", the JIC predicted that Germany would still be divided between East and West, 
with two rival economies wrestling for one position as the viable and attractive 
Germany. 166 On the 18 June, the JIC sent out a list of military, political and economic 
indicators of Russian preparations for war to UK representatives in countries across 
Europe, Asia and the Middle East to be shared with American colleagues. 167 Some 
indicators such as the movement to forward areas or building up of ammunition dumps 
required immediate transmission to London. 
The Berlin blockade 
On the 24 June the road, waterway and rail access to Berlin from the Western 
Zones was cut. Unlike the three air corridors linking West Germany to Berlin, which 
were protected under a November 1945 access agreement, the land routes had no such 
guarantees. 168 The blockade had begun. British ministers acknowledged the dangers: 
"The Cabinet recognised that a very serious situation might develop in Berlin; and it was 
important that the Western Powers should take their stand on a position which they were 
confident of being able to sustain. " 169 Attlee's committee on Berlin made up of senior 
ministers, military chiefs and diplomats knew that the American approach was "to 
maintain a firm though unprovocative attitude"). 170 Bevin favoured a tough, committed 
stance, as he had done throughout the building crisis. 171 Although the initial estimates 
for what an airlift could achieve were not good, Bevin latched onto the idea and 
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convinced others to go along. 172 He also thought that the counter blockade the Allies 
had imposed on materials moving from the Western to Eastern Zones would be 
effective. Ministers and Chiefs of Staff decided that it was premature to decide whether 
they would be prepared to go to war over Berlin, but that it would be prudent to plan on 
the assumption that there might be a war: "[t]hey recognised that the Russians were in a 
position to squeeze the Western Powers out of Berlin without having to use force; if 
shooting started it would be the Western Allies who would do so. " 
As Cradock points out, the JIC failed to predict both the exact nature of the 
Soviet pressure on Berlin and when it would begin. 173 In a 1951 review of their 
assessment accuracy, they acknowledged this failing. 174 The problem had been that the 
Russians' decision to impose the blockade had been an administrative one with no 
physical preparations necessary. The limited Russian forces required to enforce the 
blockade would only have needed to receive the order and unless the JIC had managed 
to get hold of a copy of that specific piece of paper or message, they had no chance of 
giving prior warning. As described above, within the intelligence community 
preparations for providing warning of military action had been made. It is not clear, 
however, what significant benefits the West would have enjoyed had they received an 
accurate warning of the blockade. It was not a complete surprise: interference with 
Allied communications had been building up gradually and warnings of Soviet action in 
Berlin had been coming in the months before. 175 Furthermore, the fact that intelligence 
provided no indications that the Russians were preparing for imminent military action 
gave ministers the room to take a tough stance on Berlin. 
Despite crisis-level events in Berlin, the 13 July JIC(G) assessment of Russian 
intentions to make war was entirely reassuring. 176 All military, naval, air and counter- 
espionage indicators were negative. On the political front, it was clear the Soviets were 
172 Hennessy, Peter, NeverAgain: Britain 1945-51 (London: Jonadm Cape, 1992), p. 354; Tusas, Berlin 
Blockade, pp. 143 -153; DEFE4/14, COS(48)96hMeeting, 9 July 1948 173 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 76-7 
174 CAB 158/13, JIC(51)87 "Review of assessments of Communist intentions made since January 1947 by 
the Joint Intelligence Committee", 12 December 1951 
175 Bullock, Bevin, p. 571 
176 DEFE41/63, JIC(Germany)6lt Meeting, 13 July 48 
59 
determined to drive the Western Allies out of Berlin, but there was no political evidence 
to show that the Russians were willing to risk war to achieve this aim. Three days later, 
the JIC discussed their view on the state of Russian preparations for war: "[t]he general 
view was expressed that at the present time there was insufficient evidence to conclude 
that the Russians were intending to launch an offensive in the near future. ). )177 
Furthermore, the JIC decided it would,, from then on, produce a weekly review on the 
subject. Cradock writes that Bevin asked Hayter to provide him with weekly 
summaries. 178 To assist in the acquisition of as full a picture of Soviet preparations as 
possible, the JIC prepared lists of targets for clandestine aerial photographic 
reconnaissance in Germany and the Satellite countries. 179 
The Cold War developments Of 1948 produced a shift in the JIC view of Soviet 
policy objectives. The coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet moves to consolidate 
their power in Germany clearly impacted on the JIC's 1948 edition of their annual 
appraisal of 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities'. 180 The Russians' "immediate 
search for security" had led the JIC to believe that the establishment of a protective belt 
of friendly countries ranked higher than the restoration of their economy in Soviet policy 
priorities; a reversal from 1947. The interpretation of Russian policy in Germany was 
almost completely unchanged from 1947, but with the new addition of. "the Russian 
authorities are taking advantage of the fact that Berlin is an enclave in the Russian Zone 
to exert strong pressure on the Western Powers in Berlin, with a view to forcing them to 
withdraw. " This would be done through direct interference with Allied communications 
and wrecking the quadripartite control machinery. The JIC acknowledged that German 
morale was low, but believed "[t]his is not at present a serious factor, but it might 
become so if there were any serious deterioration of the position of the Western Powers 
in Berlin. " The prediction was grim: Britain could expect the Soviet "all-round policy of 
harassing and aggression" in Germany to continue. 
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Whilst the British adopted Bevin's policy of standing firm in the face of Soviet 
pressure, the Chiefs of Staff wanted measures taken at once to shore up the British 
defence effort in case of an escalation of the Berlin crisis. 18 1 in response, the Defence 
Committee recommended to the Cabinet that preparations ought to include suspension of 
releases from the Services. Bevin requested that the Americans send three squadrons of 
B-29 bombers to Europe as a signal of their earnest intentions. The Chiefs recognised 
that the military realities of Berlin meant that the best option for the Western forces in 
the event of war was to withdraw to the Rhine and try to hold a defensive line there. 182 
They used the JIC to draw up a list of key strategic targets, such as industrial 
installations,, that would be demolished in the event of a withdrawal. 181 
The Chiefs supported the Cabinet, view that forcing an armed convoy fi7orn the 
Western Zone to Berlin was out of the question and cabled the US Chiefs of Staff to say 
as much. 184 The only option was to keep trying to supply the city by air whilst the two 
sides locked homs in a diplomatic struggle, as they did throughout the second half of 
August and all of September in Moscow. In early August, the JIC(G) reported that the 
Russians had been surprised by the success of the airlift and the determination of 
Berliners. 185 Murphy et al write that Soviet intelligence generally underestimated the 
success of the airlift. 186 JIC(G) noted accurately that the Soviets considered their 
position to be strong and the Western willingness to negotiate had been taken as a sign 
of weakness. 187 An Allied counter-blockade was having some noticeable effect, 
however. By the end of August the JIC(G) noticed that a raw material shortage in the 
Soviet Zone was reducing productivity. "' Geraghty writes that BRIXMIS in particular 
were able to gather evidence of the effectiveness of the counter-blockade. 189 
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few months of the airlift,, called Operation PLAINFARE by the British 
and VITTLES by the Americans, the supply of food and fuel to Berlin was improving 
slowly, but it was still only proving just enough to keep the population alive. 190 Viewed 
from any direction, the Allies were not in a strong position. Berlin was indefensible 
militarily, and supplying the city depended on a somewhat fragile sky bridge. Hopes of 
negotiating a way out of crisis must have been founded on the belief that the Russians 
were not prepared to go to war. The Cabinet's Defence Committee was convinced the 
Soviets were still not ready for war. '91 The JIC provided an assessment on the first day 
of October stating "[p]ositive indications of Soviet preparations for war in the near 
future are few, indefinite and not all confirmed. " 192 Although there were a few positive 
indicators, "[n]egative indicators have far outnumbered positive and provide strong 
ground for believing that Russia is not making preparations for war in the near future., )l 
In the future though, it would not be so easy to make timely predictions: "we believe that 
although no attempt has been made to mobilise the [Soviet] armed forces, or to bring 
army formations up to their full strength, these forces are even now sufficiently powerful 
to undertake a limited offensive without warning. " The JIC supplied detailed forecasts 
of Soviet movements in a war to the UK delegation to the Military Council of the 
Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. 193 The JIC held the view that the destruction 
of Allied forces on the Rhine would be the first aim in any Russian plan to invade 
Westem Europe. 
Although the conversations in Moscow did not produce a settlement, the JIC(G) 
believed, somewhat hopefully, towards the end of October that the Russians genuinely 
wanted to see tension relaxed and find a resolution to the Berlin currency issue, even if it 
meant lifting the blockade. 194 They noted that the Soviet press had eased off its attacks 
on the West whilst the question of Berlin was before the United Nations. JIC(G) was, 
'90 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 143 -23 3 191 CAB 13 1/6, DO(48)61 "Defence RevievV', 14 September 1948 
192 CAB 158/4, JIC(48)70(0) FirW "Short term indications of Soviet preparedness for war", I October 
1948 
193 CAB 158/5, JIC(48)115(Final) "Intelligence brief for UK delegation to the Military Committee of the 
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however, still busy making plans for the worst. Project SAFE PASSAGE for covertly 
moving people either from or to Berlin via the Western Zone had set up suitable routes. 
By the end of the blockade in May 1949, operation EASY EXERCISE involved eight 
safe passages between Berlin and the Western Zones and vice versa, four of which were 
regularly tested. '9' Such routes were used only for the highest grade agents; during the 
blockade they were utilised by No I P&EU "with complete success on several 
occasions"). 
Berlin's division between East and West was made more complete in December. 
Berlin Assembly elections in the Western Sectors were countered with further 
restrictions on movement into the Eastern Sector by the Russians. 196 On 7 December, 
the JIC(G) told the JIC that the Russians had set up a "puppet Magistrat" to run the 
Eastern Sector. 197 JIC(G) believed that this had split Berlin and had made it more 
difficult to resolve the currency issue. They maintained the belief that the Russians were 
intent on meeting their objectives, namely consolidation of the Eastern Zone and an 
intensification of the war of nerves., without violence. Away fi7om Berlin, during the last 
few months of 1948, the British, Americans and French had also set in motion their 
policy for creating a democratic West German state. 198 German political representatives 
met in Bonn in their Parliamentary Council to draw up a draft constitution, or Basic 
Law, whilst the Allied Military Governors ironed out an Occupation Statute handing 
over power to a German government. 
The JIC were happy that intelligence on the state of the Soviet forces in Germany 
was improving. 199 In September 1948, in response to a FO United Nations delegation 
request, the JIC produced an assessment of Soviet troop numbers. 200 They estimated 
there were 300,, 000 land forces,, 150,000 in excess of "reasonable requirements" and 
1,450 aircraft, a 1,100 excess. As part of their first monthly 'Periodic Intelligence 
195 F01005/1173, JIC(Gennany)(49)48, May 1949 
196 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 291-5 
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200 CAB158/4, JIC(48)101(0) Final "Strength of Russian forces outside the Soviet Unioif', 27 September 
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Summaries for the Western European Command er-in-Chi efs Committee' 
(WEURCINCCOM), in December, the JIC estimated there to be 3201000 troops. They 
also included a list of senior Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) personalities. 201 
In early January 1949, when the JIC reflected on Soviet movements between 
October and December 1948, they noted that although Soviet troop numbers were great 
enough to overwhelm Allied garrisons in Germany with their 5,000 tanks and self- 
202 propelled guns and 1,500 aircraft, any further reinforcements would be noticed . The 
Soviet forces had been operating at about 70 percent strength, their peacetime 
establishment. In order to get the forces to war strength, some 105,000 additional troops 
would be required. The JIC noted that the Cadre divisions at least would expand before 
offensive operations. The news was that there was "no evidence of reinforcement of 
these cadre formations". 
In February, the JIC(G) reported the first indications that troop numbers might be 
increasing. 203 A few weeks later, the suggestion was that these were reinforcements for 
the Cadre armies. 204 Haydon commented that "it was possible that a period of some 
tension was ahead and probably a good many alarms an[d] excursions". 
205 Without 
Russian deserters, intelligence was difficult to come by. In mid-March, one such 
deserter revealed that "in effect all Soviet formations in Germany and Austria were 
-) 206 being brought up to full strength' . The JIC had to report that this meant even 
less 
warning "of Soviet aggressive intentions, since such reinforcement would otherwise 
have served as an indicator of these intentions"". 
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Mild times 
During the 1948-9 winter, the weather was milder than expected, which meant 
the airlift was able to keep Berlin supplied with just enough food and fuel . 
207 Robertson 
knew that it was ultimately down to the people of Berlin to decide the outcome of 
blockade. As he told the Chiefs of Staff, 
It is... not a subject on which one can make definite conclusions,, based on mathematical 
calculations, because our ability to hold Berlin depends on the final issue, upon the 208 morale of the population, which is a factor not susceptible of exact measurement . 
Whilst every effort was made to improve supplies for Berlin, the JIC reappraised the 
likelihood of war. They maintained that the Soviet leaders would not deliberately seek 
conflict before the end of 1956, but they did acknowledge it was possible war could 
come about by miscalculation . 
209 "The situation in Germany" stood out as one place in 
which miscalculation could lead to war. So far, the JIC believed that the Russians had 
"exercised caution" in pursuing their policy objectives in Berlin and Germany as a 
whole. Even "the most drastic measures intended to squeeze the Western powers out of 
the city have been introduced piece-meal and only after it has become reasonably clear 
in each case that they would not provoke war. " The JIC thought that the Russians faced 
a choice: 
If the situation in Berlin is not altered by March, 1949, the Soviet Leaders will have the 
choice short of open warfare, of continuing the blockade, which is producing economic 
difficulties in the Soviet Zone as well as the Western Zones; or of coming to terms; or of 
taking extremely provocative action, not excluding the use of violent means, in order to 
make the position of the Western Powers untenable. 
The JIC predicted that the Russians would not deliberately take any action that would 
lead to war. Such predictions confirmed the path Bevin had chosen for British policy; 
thanks to the success of the airlift, the blockade was failing to squeeze the West from 
Berlin and furthermore, it had in fact accelerated the delivery of the West German state, 
20" Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp-307-9 
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secured the Western European defence agreements under the Brussels Treaty and raised 
the probability of the North Atlantic Treaty. 210 
As part of the first quarterly report the JIC produced for the WELJRCINCCOM, 
they assessed the state of affairs in Germany. 21 1 The JIC, like Robertson, recognised 
that the circumstances in Berlin could become even more crucial if the typical cold 
weather set in, since "the stocks of coal accumulated before the Russian blockade will be 
exhausted in January. ""' The good news, however, was that the airlift was forcing a 
change in Soviet policy: 
It is clear that since the beginning of December the Russians have been occupied in 
reconsidering both policy and tactics and that in doing so they have been less optimistic 
about Berlin than three months ago. There has been a notable lull in propaganda 
demanding the withdrawal of the Western Occupying Powers from Berlin. 
Bevin shared this assessment in a paper he wrote for the ministerial committee on 
Berlin. 212 The Russia Committee debated amongst themselves whether the Russian 
attempts to drive the Allies out of Berlin was in fact a genuine, final Soviet policy, or 
whether it was merely being used as a bargaining counter. 
213 
It was becoming clear that the Soviet attempt to force the Allies from Berlin was 
not looking likely to pay off As Sheila Kerr has argued, even though it seems likely 
that the Russians were receiving good intelligence on Western intentions ftom their 
agent in the FO, Donald Maclean, they did not make good use of it. 214 The counter- 
blockade and Soviet policy of stripping the Eastern Zone was telling. - the economy had 
. ). )215 been forced to "a low ebb . 
The Soviets had introduced administrative measures to 
improve production, but these yielded little advance. Political changes were 
21 0 Bullock, Bevin, pp. 657-665; the Brussels Treaty was signed 17 March 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty 
was signed 4 April 1949 
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strengthening Communist control over the Eastern Zone and the JIC believed that the 
Russians had already formed "the nucleus of the future Government of the Eastem 
Zone". 216 The Russia Committee did not think remaining opposition parties in the Zone 
actually offered any viable alternative to Soviet control. 
217 In March, the JIC produced a 
218 very detailed assessment of parties and individuals in both East and West . The story 
told was rather a grim one: after nearly four years of occupation, Germany was divided 
with neither the Western nor Eastern zones enjoying the hope of certain improvement. 
The JIC thought that the politics of the Western Zone and in particular the 
German peoples' attitude towards the Allies was dominated by economics. The 
Committee expected Germans to be suspicious of a new democratic regime, because it 
had been delivered by the Occupation Powers. The success of the government lay 
simply in the living conditions in Germany: "[i]f material conditions continue to 
improve 'democracy' will be held to be vindicated; if the economic situation 
deteriorates, then 'democracy' will be considered to have failed. " Food rations had 
slowly increased during 1948, as had wages, but not in keeping with price rises. 
Currency reforms had led to some revival in the economy, but it had meant "great 
hardships" for many Germans including unemployment figures rising to I million out of 
the 40 million population in early 1949. The housing shortage was still desperate: 7 of 
the 19 million pre-war German houses had been "written off'. There was no notion that 
the German people naturally leant more towards Russia than the West, but still there was 
antagonism towards the Allies. There was "suspicion against the British in particular 
that the policy of the Occupying Power is directed towards eliminating German 
competition in British markets"; the Ruhr Statute which internationalised basic German 
industries was one such example. In the JIC's view, Konrad Adenauer, the man viewed 
likely to be Federal Chancellor of the new West Germany, had "proved on the whole 
obstructive to Military Government" and "a political leader of considerable calibre". 
Fortunately, there was no evidence that either extreme left or extreme right posed much 
danger in the wider scheme of Western German politics. 
216 Naimark confirms the assessment; Naimark, Russians in Germany, pp. 308-317 
217 F0371n7623. Russia Committee meeting, 21 January 1949 
218 CAB158/6, JIC(49)23 (Final) "Intelligence for WEURCINCCOM', 10 March 1949 
67 
Politics in the Soviet zone was more difficult for the JIC to interpret 
219 
accurately. The failure to force the West from Berlin had disrupted plans to 
consolidate the Eastern zone with a "fully-fledged communist government" * 
220 
Although SED speeches towards the end of 1948 had indicated a more "cautious and 
conciliatory line", supported by Moscow, the HC did not believe that the ultimate aim 
had changed: "The change is merely a change of propaganda tactics and has been 
accompanied by no relaxation of political pressure in the Zone or slowing down of the 
process of sovietisation. " Genuine opposition parties had been terrorised into 
disappearance. Internal security had developed: the Ministry of the Interior was due for 
transformation into "a fully fledged German MVD [secret service]" with the transfer of 
control of the police forces from the Soviet MVD in late 1948. The Russians would 
keep a tight grip, however: "[o]verall intelligence and security planning is controlled by 
the Soviet MGB (the Ministry of State Security) organisation, which operates on a semi- 
autonomous relationship with the SMA... It is believed that the MGB will continue to 
exercise general security control. " After the transfer of control of the police forces, 
there had been a purge on political grounds as well as an increasing emphasis on 
professional police training, "verging on military training". The JIC was still uncertain, 
however,, of the true strength of the Bereitschaften, the para-military police, although 
they were confident these forces would be used for domestic purposes only. 
Political and economic hardships enforced by the Russians led the JIC to the 
conclusion that "there can be no doubt whatever that the great majority of the population 
of the Eastern Zone is strongly opposed to the communist regime. " They estimated 
some 230,000 people had been put in concentration camps in the Soviet zone. 221 247000 
a month were leaving for the Western zones. Even so, there was "no evidence that any 
significant 'resistance movements' exist[edf . The nature of the 
"police state" meant 
that no such organisation was likely in the future. 
21 9 Although Naimark's research generally supports the JIC's conclusions, Naimark, Russians in 
Germany, pp. 44-68,353-397 
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Important intelligence on the Eastern Zone and on the Soviet armed forces in 
particular came from deserters during the blockade, but increased security reduced the 
flow. In March, the JIC reported that in September, October and November 1948 there 
were eight per month, in December four, in January 1949 three and in February none. 222 
The JIC estimates of Soviet forces changed slightly, staying with 22 line divisions in 
Germany, including eight Cadre divisions, but by February 1949 giving a strength of 
roughly 3 10,000 men. 223 The JIC noted that 120,000 reinforcements would be needed to 
bring all divisions up to strength. Even so, with 2-3,000 men per personnel train, only 
50 trains would be required to achieve this. The JIC warned, "Such a nett increase can 
only too easily be disguised within a leave train programme which makes true analysis 
impossible, but the evidence strongly supports the view that some nett increase has taken 
place and is proceeding. " Unusual activity had been noticed, outside expected 
movements in the case of large-scale troop movements. The cause was considered to be 
either large-scale war strength manoeuvres, sabre rattling, a genuine increase in 
readiness in response to the international tension or it really was the first step in 
preparation for an offensive. Without supporting economic, political or military 
evidence they concluded it was probably the first, although the second and third were no 
doubt factors. One of the deserters, a Soviet Army Colonel, brought information on 
Russian military plans. 224 He reported that so long as the Western Allies did not resort 
to the use of atomic or other weapons of mass destruction, the Russians were only likely 
to follow up a Western withdrawal to the Rhine on the outbreak of war. 
The Soviet grip on Berlin gradually slipped as it became clear that the blockade 
had failed to force the West out of the city. The blockade did not officially end until 12 
May, after East and West agreed to reengage through a CFM, scheduled to begin in Paris 
on 23 May. 225 The JIC reported to the WEURCINCCOM in late April that progress 
towards completing the establishment of a Western German government and growing 
222 CAB 158/6, JIC(49)29 "Soviet troop movements in Europe", 12 March 1949 
223 Unusually, the sources of this assessment are given: 4 deserter reports; I SIS report; 4 BAOR reports- 
and 19 reports from American organisations. 
224 CAB176/22, JIC/732/49,22 April 1949 
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Russian fear that their policy in Berlin had failed meant the Allies "must expect more 
determined Russian attempts during the summer to reopen four Power discussions on 
Berlin and Germany as a whole". 226 Supporting this assessment were Stalin's comments 
to the press in January that indicated there might be a way to negotiate an end to the 
blockade without having to address the difficult topic of Berlin currency, alongside the 
general relaxation of Russian propaganda, 227 
The JIC recognised that the crisis over Berlin had allowed the Western Allies to 
settle some internal differences over such things as disarmament in Germany, national 
boundaries and policy towards prohibited German industry. 228 But this had been at the 
cost of Berlin, where "during the last few months the split between the Soviet sector of 
Berlin and the Western Sectors has* been completed"'. The JIC noted that a de facto 
solution to the East-West tension over Berlin through a mutually, but grudgingly, 
accepted split, meant that Soviet tactics had switched to focus on a "peace campaign" to 
unite all Germans in opposition to the establishment of a West German government and 
a dejure split within Germany. 229 To that end, the sovietisation of the Eastern Zone had 
slowed, temporarily, and the SED leaders were warning all Germans that war within 
Germany was imminent. The Soviets had also been forced to supply the Eastern Zone 
with steel, food and equipment from the USSR to alleviate the dire economic conditions 
in the Zone. The JIC did not know the significance of the replacement of Marshal 
Sokolovsky with General Cuikov as Commander of Soviet Occupation forces, although 
they were sure of the Russian intention to use the Bereitschaften to relieve Soviet forces 
in Germany in the event of a withdrawal. 
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The Bereitschaften 
The question of Russian recruitment of former members of the German Armed 
Forces, which had arisen during 1947, remained during the blockade. In February 1948, 
the JIC received a CIA report suggesting that JIC assessments of the numbers involved 
were exaggerated . 
230 They had received no intelligence that "an organised German 
army" was "being maintained in the USSW'. They did believe that some German armed 
units and "a form of central staff' were in existence. Murphy et al write that the CIA 
231 had good coverage of the subject . 
As described above, in the run-up to the blockade, the JIC produced a negative 
assessment of the likelihood of Russian-trained Germans being used in direct action 
against the Western Zones in Germany, after Bevin had raised the matter. 232 The 
Committee did not discount the possibility of East German saboteurs, however, although 
they did not have any evidence of specific plans. "Numerous reports" during 1948 
suggested that former POWs were being trained in Russia and then re-introduced into 
the Soviet Zone as a police force. The JIC also believed that a small number of Germans 
were being sent as political agitators to industrial areas in the British Zone. 
By September, the JIC had received a JIC(G) report saying that the National 
Committee for Free Germany (NYFD), or Seydlitz Army, had no real military presence, 
despite being organised along military lines. 233 The group instead was providing police 
units and advisers to Russian forces, whilst other men were being trained as 
administrators or political agitators. In October, JIC(G) was able to report back to JIC 
that the first units of an armed police force, the Polizeibereitschaften, had been set UP. 
234 
Naimark's research shows that this was good, up-to-date intelligence. 235 In November, a 
high-ranking defector passed on information stating that the Bereitschaften were to be 
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equipped with tanks and artillery, becoming the military wing of the East German 
government. 
236 
In January 1949, the JIC produced a brief for the WEURCINCCOM on the 
Bereitschaften. 237 They had to admit that the Seydlitz Army had probably never existed. 
The Committee reported, however, that the armed police force had been formed in July 
1948, with former POWs making up about 50 percent of the strength. The JIC had no 
evidence that these former POWs had received military training, although American 
intelligence reports indicated they had. 238 Since deserters were already crossing into the 
Western zones, the JIC expected more information. They could report that 
Bereitschaften headquarters was responsible to a special branch of the Ministry for the 
Interior and estimated the force's strength at approximately 36,000 strong, but suggested 
that a figure of 200,000 was the ultimate goal . 
239 The role of the Bereitschaften was not 
then understood. The JIC thought that they would be used to "enforce Russian policy 
and keep order" or perhaps to take over from Soviet occupation forces in the event of a 
withdrawal. The Committee thought it unlikely that the Bereitschaften would be 
employed to spread communism into the Western Zones by force whilst Allied troops 
remained there, especially since the Communist Party in the West was so weak. 
Nevertheless, intelligence on the emerging Bereitschaften did encourage British military 
planners to begin rethinking their approach to European defence. 240 
The question of strength and purpose of the Bereitschaften remained unsettled 
through to the end of 1949. In March, the JIC received information that recruitment for 
the Bereitschaften was proving unsuccessful and a number of defectors had reported that 
they had only joined the force as a way to get from POW camps in Russia back to 
Germany. 241 Certainly defectors remained an important source of information. Between 
236 CAB159/4, JIC(48)126hMeeting, 12 November 1948 
'37 CAB 158/5, JIC(48)130 Final "Aggression in Germany", 10 January 1949 
238 Nainwk, Russians in Germany, pp. 371-2 
239Naimark suggests the figure was more like 10,000. 
24() Dockrill, SaId, "Britain and the Settlement of the West German Rearmament Question in 1954", in 
Dockrill, Michael and Young, John W. (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London: Macmillan, 
1989), pp. 149-172 
241 CAB159/5, JIC(49)24hMeeting, 4 March 1949 
72 
January and the end of November 1949, deserter figures into the British Zone alone 
numbered 128 from the Bereitschaften and 303 from the Grenzpolizei, the border 
police . 
242 Uncertainty about these forces existing at level of inter-Allied relations. The 
French feared they were being prepared for aggression in Germany. 243 The CIA 
disagreed with JIC assessment of actual and potential strengths of the police forces. 244 
The Americans did not think the forces could reach 200,000 in number) and they put the 
current strength at 10,000 for each of the two police forces, with 75 percent of recruits 
being former POWs. Although the CIA did not put the potential figure of the forces as 
high as the JIC, they did expect that the reliability of the forces would increase as pay 
and conditions improved. As a response to all the uncertainty, the War Office, who 
thought that the police forces would have reached 50,000 in early 1950, suggested that a 
great deal more intelligence was required on training, recruitment, present and future 
strength and desertion rates. 
245 
British policy after the blockade 
The Paris CFM was a tense and fruitless affair . 
246 The Allies were confident by 
then, however, that Berlin could be supplied by air, should the Russians reinstitute the 
blockade. 247 The Russia Committee believed the main Soviet objective was the 
restoration of trade between the Eastern and Western Sectors as well as a limitation of 
economic and democratic development in the Western sectors of Berlin . 
248 No matter 
what Russian aims were, the Chiefs of Staff and FO agreed that any proposals for total 
249 
withdrawal from Germany should be rejected Once the Conference was over, the JIC 
summarised the talks: 
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The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris ended on the 20 June when a strictly limited agreement was reached which in effect recognises for the time being the 
existing division of Germany while leaving the door open for further efforts to reach 
agreement on political and economic unity. 250 
The new West German constitution, the Basic Law, had been drawn up and 
agreed by the Germans and Allied powers in April . 
25 1A draft constitution for the 
Democratic Republic of Germany had been approved in March. The JIC noted that 
although there were many echoes of the Weimar Constitution in the Basic Law, new 
252 limitations on the power of central government displayed lessons well learnt . The 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had a positive outlook for the future; the Allied 
powers had signed the Occupation Statute specifying their limited powers in Germany. 
Alongside this, the Allies had agreed. to the end of military government in Germany once 
the Federal German government and Occupation Statute had come into effect Even so, 
the JIC did not anticipate relations with the Germans would suddenly improve, since 
some matters of dismantling and denazification remained. 
The division of Germany was, of course, most evident in Berlin. The JIC 
acknowledged the worsening divide as the Western Military Governors had issued a new 
statute similar to the Occupation Statute, granting full legislative, executive and judicial 
powers to the Berlin City Government, whilst the Russians had set up a "puppet Eastern 
Berlin City Government" under Fritz Ebert. 253 The JIC believed there was no mistaking 
the style of government in the Eastern Sector where a system of street wardens had been 
established to act as informers on the population and armed police had been used to 
break the railwaymen's strike over pay in May and June. Elections for the "People's 
Congress" took place on 15/16 May, when votes were cast for or against single-party 
lists of candidates, the overwhelming majority of whom belonged to the SED or its 
affiliated organisations. An unusually large no vote (33 per cent) was probably 
deliberate, "in order to give the impression to the outside world that the elections had 
been held in a democratic way", but the JIC thought a political purge was impending in 
250 CAB158/6, JIC(49)4/1 (Final) "Periodic Intelligence Sununaries for WEURCINCCOW, 22 July 1949 




the Soviet zone as a consequence. Internal security in the Eastern Zone was 
intensifying. The JIC reported that the Interior Ministry top brass was being bolstered 
with successful policemen and the K-5. the Political Police, had been placed under the 
direct command of the Vice-President of the Interior Ministry. The Bereitschaften was 
also developing whilst more rigorous political selection measures had been brought in to 
tackle the problem of desertion. 
The picture concerning Soviet troops in Germany did not settle into focus 
immediately after the blockade. The JIC was unsure how to interpret reports in July and 
August of possible increases in Cadre army strength as well as some runway 
lengthening. 254 Time was needed to draw accurate conclusions from the information on 
troop numbers, especially given the annual rise and fall during the main training season. 
The JIC remained confident, however, that they would detect the necessary Soviet 
preparations for hostile action in the forward areas close to the Zonal frontier. By 
September, the Soviet troop estimate had increased to 350,000.255 The JIC was 
interested in the development of close air-to-ground co-operation during the annual 
training, but overall, interpreted the troop movements during the year "as defensive 
preparations and a general tightening up of the efficiency of the armed forces. , 256 By 
December, the JIC confirmed that the two mechanised armies that were in cadre form 
had been brought to full peacetime strength. 257 The Committee was puzzled though by 
the unusually large armour to infantry ratio. They judged that either a "radical change" 
in Soviet doctrine had taken place or before offensive action could be mounted, the 
Russians would have to bring in more rifle divisions. If it were the latter, they hoped 
this would be noticed by British intelligence in Germany or Poland. 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded on 7 October 1949. The 
JIC(G) considered this an important step in the full integration of the Eastern Zone into 
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the Soviet BIOC. 258 Diplomatic missions were exchanged with other Satellite countries 
and SED economic representatives were admitted into Moscow's economic planning 
bodies. The Political Division in Germany did not think that the GDR government 
would get "any real measure of sovereignty" since the SMA would not become a High 
Commission like the Western Control Commissions. The Russia Committee noted that 
the Russians had not made any real concessions of power to the East Germans . 
259 The 
JIC(G) thought that the Soviet intention was to outdo the Bonn government in appealing 
to German nationalism whilst demonstrating Russian equanimity through adherence to 
quadripartite agreements. The exact nature of the hand over of power in the Eastern 
Zone was kept "deliberately obscure", but the Russians were able to case life in the 
Eastern Zone by proclaiming an end to rationing after the 1950 harvest, although this 
was in fact dependent upon large imports from the USSR and Satellite countries. 260 As 
time went on, the Russians were keen to emphasise the economic plans and successes in 
the Eastern Zone,, especially under General Chuikov, the new Soviet Control 
Commissioner 
. 
261 The JIC(G) correctly predicted that the Russians would carry out a 
campaign to win recognition for the GDR from Western states as well as win support in 
Western Germany through demonstrations of Soviet-German co-operation. 
The JIC reported to WEURCINCCOM on the results of the first elections for the 
262 
new Bundestag in the FRG . 
The Christian Democrats (CDU) won 139 seats, the SPD 
131 and the FDP 52. Theodor Heuss was elected President and Konrad Adenauer, the 
CDU leader, was elected Chancellor with a CDU-FDP-German Party coalition 
government. Of concern from the election was the appreciable rise in support for 
nationalist parties in the British Zone, and the prominence in every party's campaign of 
opposition to British dismantling policies. The "Growth of Right Wing nationalist and 
258DEM 1/64. JIC(Germany)(M)(49)14,18 October 1949 
259FO37ln7624, Russia Committee meeting, 25 October 1949 
260 DEIFE41/64, JIC(Germany)(M)(49)15,8 November 1949 
261 DEFE41/64, JIC(Germany)(M)(49)16,29 November 1949 
262 CAB 158/6, JIC(49)4/2(Final) "Periodic Intelligence Summaries for WEURCINCCOM', 25 October 
1949 
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militarist organisations in Germany" had actually been added as a Priority 2 target in the 
list of priorities for intelligence collection in Germany back in January. 263 
The economic circumstances in Berlin had continued to be dire, long after the 
264 blockade had ended . Credit aid from the Western zones was required, and supplies 
had not been restored sufficiently until August, when the airlift finally wound down. 
Some of the crews and planes remained on standby in case the operation had to be 
reinstated at short notice. That looked possible to the JIC in October, since although 
some quadripartite talks had taken place, there was still considerable disagreement over 
amongst other things, currency agreements. 265 The Eastern Zone was little better off 
economically than Berlin; the JIC noted that shortages had led to the railways working 
"under increasing strain", roads andbridges going unrepaired and waterway tonnages 
falling well short of the yearly plans. 
An increase in the flow of deserters from the police forces in the Eastern Zone 
during July, August and December had provided good information. The JIC reported 
that both overt and covert sources were indicating that the Russians intended to form an 
Army from units of the Bereitschaften. 266 Recruitment drives were taking place among 
"reliable" groups of SED or Free German Youth (FDJ). The Committee's revised 
estimate of strength put the Bereitschaften at 12,000 and the Grenzpolizei at 11,000. 
The "preparation of the... Bereitschaften for an operational role" had been included in 
the list of "Indications of Russian Preparations for War" from June onwards. 267 
263 CAB 159/5, JIC(49)7 
th Meeting,, 19 January 1949 
264 Tusas, Berlin Blockade, pp. 3 73 -7 
265 JIC(49)4/2 
266 Ibid 
267 CAB158/6, JIC(49)4 I (Final) "Indications of Soviet preparations for war", 15 June 1949 
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The new West German State 
A de facto divided Germany was not the final aim of British policy; the idea of 
reunification at some point in the future remained . 
268 The division had really been the 
result of Western policies to establish the Federal Republic, the Soviet efforts to develop 
the GDR and the residual modus vivendi left by the breakdown of Four Power control 
and the blockade of Berlin. From a British perspective, a divided Germany would be a 
source of friction and possible war between East and West; Allied garrisons in Berlin 
would be "hostage[s] to fortune"; and the recovery of Germany would "inevitably be 
retarded"). However,, the divided Germany meant American troops remained in Europe 
which the British believed crucial to European security. In the eyes of the JIC, the 
significant point was that during 1949, Soviet policy in Europe had been badly 
hampered 
. 
269 The North Atlantic Treaty, the establishment of the FRG, Tito's continued 
dissention from Moscow and the failure of the Communist rebellion in Greece had all 
checked Russian ambition. The great Soviet success had been the detonation of their 
first atomic bomb on 29 August 1949, a development that took British and American 
intelligence by surprise. 
270 
The progress of the fledgling West German State was more important to the 
government than reunification. Stage one of the British policy towards West Germany 
had been completed with the establishment of the democratic Federal government 
through the Basic Law and Occupation Statute. Stage two, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, then 
head of the FO German Section, put it to the Chiefs, was to "see to it that the German 
Government [was] a success"' . 
271 The Petersburg Agreement signed on 22 November 
1949 by Adenauer and the Allied IFEgh Commissioners went some way along that path: 
the FRG was incorporated into the Western European community as an associate 
member of the Council of Europe; the West Germans agreed to join the International 
Authority for the Ruhr and co-operate with the Military Security Board, the Allied 
268 Bullock, Bevin, p. 693; DEFE4/26, COS(49)16e Meeting, 9 November 1949 
269 JIC(49)118 
270 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 55 -6 
271 DEFE5/16, COS(49)294 "Level of German industry", 9 September 1949 
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oversight body of military and security matters; and the industrial dismantlement 
272 programme was vastly reduced There were no decisions about German rearmament. 
273 a looming issue which the Chiefs of Staff had recognised back in September 1948 . 
Plans for a Federal Security Service had been drawn up in April 1949 by 
Robertson as a way for the Western German State to protect itself from communist 
subversive forces, since without effective intelligence any police or defence force would 
be powerless. 274 His plans were modelled on the British system of the Security Service 
and Police Special Branches, with an emphasis on decentralised power. On JIC advice, 
the Chiefs agreed to a Federal Security Service, based on close supervision by British 
intelligence officers at all levelS. 275 They were keen to ensure that the Service did not 
develop around the framework set up in the American Zone, since evidence existed that 
the American organisation had been penetrated by Russian agents. The JIC(G) pointed 
out that the original British plans did not guarantee against penetration by Soviet agents, 
nor did they include enough provision for Allied control over the Service. 276 
These matters were lek, however, during the negotiations that accompanied the 
277 
ending of the blockade since they were too politically sensitive. By October, in the 
absence of a tripartite Allied agreement, the British had gone ahead and implemented 
their plans in their own zone, hoping this would later become the model for the whole of 
278 Western Germany. Robertson reported, however, that the Germans themselves had 
suggested a much more centralised Security Service, and if the Americans and French 
agreed to it, the British ought to follow suit, whilst insisting that the Service did not have 
the powers of arrest and was well separated from the police. Before the end of October, 
the Americans had put forward their own proposals based on the organisation already 
272 Bullock, Bevin, pp. 738-9 
273 DEFE5/12, COS(48)217(0) "Employment of Germans in the defence of Western Europe", 27 
September 1948 
274 DEIFE5/14, COS(49)122 "Western German State - Arrangements for internal security", 6 April 1949 
275 DEFE4/21, COS(49)66hMeeting, 6 May 1949 
276 CAB 176/22, JJC/699/49,14 April 1949 
277 DEFE4/22, COS(49)80'hMeeting, 31 May 1949 
278DEFF-5/17, COS(49)349 "Establishment of Security Services in Germany", 19 October 1949 
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established in their zone . 
279 As the American proposals represented a worst-case 
scenario, the British accepted the German plans. The JIC admitted that a more 
concentrated service would make the jobs of "supervision and liaison" easier for the 
Allies 
. 
280 They were adamant, however, that a separation of powers between the 
Security Service and Special Branches must exist. As Aldrich writes, the British had 
success in influencing the foundation of the German Security Service, although it is 
questionable whether much was done to improve security in Germany. 281 
Settling Berlin 
In October 1949, the JIC produced a report on "Soviet intentions in Berlin" after 
the stalemate of the Paris CFM. 282 Robertson had warned at the end of September that 
the Russians might be preparing to adopt "a stiffer attitude" in Berlin. 283 The first draft 
of the JIC report concluded that the Russians were unlikely to attempt to evict the Allies 
from Berlin whilst German morale was high, but the Chiefs of Staff suggested that the 
JIC had not taken full account of the decline in morale in Berlin due to worsening 
unemployment and a lack of political progress. 284 The Chiefs concluded it was 
necessary for the JIC to reconsider the question of Berlin and to carry out a study of 
ways to prevent the Russians from interfering in a future airlift as part of a joint Anglo- 
American study. 
The final report began by stating that despite the failure of the blockade, the 
Russians maintained their ambition of evicting the Western Allies from Berlin. 285 The 
JIC did not, however, alter their conclusion that there was "little likelihood of a renewed 
attempt to evict us from Berlin by means of a blockade, 'while the Western Allies are 
279DEFE4/25, COS(49)156ý' Meeting. 24 October 1949 
280 CAB 158/8, JIC(49)100(Final) "Establishment of Security Services in Germany", 12 November 1949 
281 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 430-3; see later chapters for more on this. 
282 CAB158n, JlC(49)54(Final)(Revise), 10 October 1949 
283 F0371/77624, Russia Committee meeting 27 September 1949 
284 DEFE4/25, COS(49)149hMeeting, 5 October 1949 
285 JIC(49)54 
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united and on good terms with the Germans and so long as German morale is high. " 
The conclusions did accept that German morale was vulnerable which, when combined 
with a lack of Allied attention to the matter, could motivate the Russians to reintroduce 
the blockade. The JIC recognised that Berlin certainly remained a thorn in the side of 
Russian ambitions to develop a viable East German State as a reaction to the FRG. The 
Soviets had taken preparatory measures to shore up the Eastern Sectors of the city 
including building up stocks from the Western Zone, ensuring key personnel were 
resident in the Eastern Sector, developing food reserves, increasing training for the 
normal and para-military police and building rail communications. 
The JIC warned that the Russians could easily reimpose a blockade and 
furthermore, they could easily interfere with another airlift. The JIC expected 
determined disruption of another airliftl using balloons or smoke to complicate final 
approaches, heavy cross traffic in the airspace, jamming of communications and radar, 
sabotage or "stirring up labour unrest". The question of interference depended on 
political gambles the Russians were prepared to make. The JIC still believed the 
Russians did not want to risk war for the moment over Berlin, but they would, 
nevertheless, be able to have a serious effect on the success of a second airlift without 
taking great chances. The JIC's more positive note, however, was that Berlin was now 
much better prepared to survive a blockade. 
As part of his contribution to the joint Anglo-American study of Berlin, 
Robertson agreed with the JIC that the Russians would not reimpose the blockade, but, if 
they did, Berlin could cope. 286 Neither Robertson nor the JIC seem to have known that 
the RAF were planning to make serious cuts in Transport Command, which would have 
meant an even greater burden on the Americans and the new West German government 
to supply aircraft for any airlift. 287 For the moment, he expected the Russians and the 
GDR "to abide by the quadripartite agreements". Any interference with the Allies in 
Berlin by the new East German government would be cautious to begin with, for 
example, hampering Allied communications across the Eastern Zone. Forecasting 
286 DEFE5/18, COS(49)415 "Soviet intentions in Berlilf ', 28 November 1949 
287 DEFE4/27- COS(49)186hMeeting, 16 December 1949; COS(49)IO' Meeting, 22 December 1949 
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action some twelve years in advance, Robertson thought that the most drastic measures 
the East Germans would employ would be sealing off the Western Sectors of Berlin 
under Soviet encouragement. His further conclusion was that the Russians could 
attempt to force the Allies into official dealings with the Eastern government by 
claiming to have handed over all issues concerning communication rights. 
Conclusions 
More than anything, the 1947-9 period was about the JIC establishing and 
developing its Cold War role. In terms of collection, organisation and presentation, the 
intelligence community was bendin g to meet new challenges, as was the rest of 
288 Whitehall. Cradock writes that before the Berlin blockade, "Western assessments of 
the main Soviet objectives and the underlying Soviet caution were correct". 289 In terms 
of a specific warning, however, he notes that Western intelligence did not deliver, 
although he remarks that the CIA got closer than the JIC. The files made available since 
Know Your Enemy was published, validate these conclusions. British intelligence had 
developed enough to assess the general mood of the Cold War, but not the specifics. In 
November 1947, Evill wrote in his review: 
Our knowledge of Russia, geographical, economic, industrial and military is seriously 
lacking or out of date. Our knowledge of Russian intentions, tactical and strategic 
., scientific and 
technical capacity, and the progress of their research and doctrines' 
development in the military field appears even more seriously inadequate. 290 
By the end of 1949, the JIC had only really begun to address these problems. 
It is clear that the JIC did not have a major role to play during the blockade; the 
Committee had more of a supporting, but still noticeable, function. Bevin was the 
driving force behind British policy, probably motivated more by his vision for Britain's 
security and future than by intelligence assessments. Of course, the estimates provided 
288 Hennessy, Peter, "itehall (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989), pp. 120-168 
289 CradoCk, Know Your Enemy, p. 82 
290 Nhsc/P(47)31 
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in JIC papers, were part of the foundation of information on which judgements would 
have been based. In particular, the Committee's constant reference to an absence of 
information indicating Soviet preparations for military action in Germany was proof that 
the crisis was not turning into a war. The JIC's picture of Soviet military activity 
improved during 1947-9, to the extent that the Committee became confident they would 
learn of Soviet reinforcements. The sources available to the British such as BRIXMISI, 
low-level agents, deserters, defectors and other line-crossers, all of which were largely 
de visu,, leant themselves more to these sorts of targets than either the political or 
scientific areas. The system of conducting weekly reviews of Soviet preparations for 
war also developed to make more consistent and focused use of the intelligence. 
Beyond the military intelligence, there was little political insight in the JIC 
assessments that added much beyond the FO and Control Commission reports. British 
intelligence simply did not have the sources to provide any more than broad 
appreciations of Soviet intentions. That said, what the JIC did write was often accurate. 
They had recognised before the blockade that Russia rather than Germany needed to be 
their top priority. The Committee also produced sensible analysis of Soviet aims in 
Europe. They wasted no time in relaying the exact nature of the East German state that 
had developed under Soviet control. Furthermore, in constantly reminding customers of 
the shortages in Western Germany, the JIC reflected the vulnerability of the Western 
zones to disaffection and communist infiltration and influence. 
A big part of the JIC's function was to provide the surrounding Whitehall 
departments with whatever assessments they could muster. For example, they provided 
the FO with assessments on largely military matters likely to come up at CFM meetings 
and the Chiefs of Staff with estimates of Soviet intentions and strengths. Outside 
Britain,, soon after the foundation of Western European Commands, the JIC began to 
prepare papers for international consumption. No matter who the customer was, 
assessments were mainly focused on purely military matters or on the political 
ramifications of military considerations because of the Committee's raw intelligence 
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supply and function. The JIC was slowly becoming fit to operate at the crossroads 
between foreign and defence policy. 
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Chapter Two: 1950 - 1952 
Strenthening Allies 
A Korean feint? 
When the Cabinet first discussed the invasion of South Korea by North Korean 
troops, they were uncertain as to the level of Moscow's involvement in the action and 
what the US response might be. ' The government was unsure of what exactly might 
unfold either in the Far East or even in Europe. The West found it difficult to shake the 
idea that it was a Russian hand controlling events in the Far East, even though the troops 
were North Korean. This,, in turn, raised anxiety of a Soviet attack on Western Europe 
2 by proxy. British intelligence had failed to predict the invasion because of a lack of Far 
Eastern sources focused on Korea or China. 3A JIC note from the 30 June brought some 
good news, however: "We have no intelligence of any Soviet intention to make any 
immediate attack" in Europe, Turkey, Persia or Afghanistan. 4 Reports from JIC(G) in 
the last week of June and into July showed no indications of large-scale Russian 
preparations for war on the European frontline. 5 But this was not to be taken as the final 
word on likely events in Germany, since the JIC had to warn: 
Although we would expect to have intelligence of intensified Soviet preparations for a 
world war, we are less confident of receiving warning of local communist aggression. 6 
The JIC believed,, however, that so long as NATO stood firm in Western Germany, 
Berlin and Austria, the risk of a major war would be too great for the Russians to 
sponsor a westwards attack by the Satellite powers. 
1 The invasion began on 25 June 1950; CAB 128/17, CM(50)39,27 June 1950 
2 Kirkpatrick, Ivone, The Inner Circle (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 238 
' Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 272 
4 F0371/86756, RC/101/50 "Implications of the war in Korea on our defence policy in other parts of the 
World", 30 June 1950 
5 DEFF-41/65, JIC(Ger)(M)(50)9,27 June 1950; JIC(Ger)(M)(50)10,17 July 1950 
6CAB 158/11, JIC(50)72(Final) "Possible uses by the Soviet Union of Satellite Forces", 2 August 1950 
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As Cradock describes, by the end of August, the JIC were confident they had 
fathomed Communist intentions such that they could dismiss the idea that the Korean 
attack was a Sovi 7 et feint to divert attention from either Europe or the Middle East. That 
was not to say that the British should be unconcerned about the shift from Russian's 
cc skilful exploitation of the cold war technique" to a "noticeable tendency to increase the 
tempo". 8 The diagnosis for Germany including Berlin, therefore, was increased 
Communist pressure on the West to withdraw their forces, utilising propaganda and 
more direct methods including interference from the Bereitschaften, but stopping short 
of war. The JIC did not believe the East German Police were yet capable of an attack on 
the Western Zones or the Western sectors of Berlin, but that was thought to be a 
possibility for 195 1. If so, they could be used in a new attempt to force the West from 
Berlin, giving such action "a purely East German nationalist interpretation. " This would 
be particularly attractive to Soviet leaders since the GDR was now in a sufficient 
position to impose a blockade without direct Soviet participation, plus the Bereitschaften 
were well trained in provoking civil disturbances and the Anglo-American airlift 
capability was "seriously reduced" by Korean commitments. Renewed pressure on 
Berlin concurrent with the Far Eastern war could well have dangerously split Western 
strength and attention. The Russia Committee certainly shared the sentiment that it was 
a vulnerable time for Allied interests in Berlin. 9 The Chiefs of Staff were grateful for 
USAF reinforcements dispatched to Europe. 10 
Soviet interference with communications in Berlin in February, had resulted in 
heightened tension for a short period, especially when the West Germans reacted by 
imposing restrictions on exports to the East. " A JIC report in May 1950, distributed to 
the Minister for Defence, Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister as well as the Chiefs, 
assessed that the Russians were unlikely to risk military action or the reimposition of a 
7Cradock- Know Your Enemy, p. 93 
8 CAB 158/11, JIC(50)75(Final) "Probable Soviet Short Tenn developments", 23 August 1950 
9 F0371/86762, RC/105/50, Minutes from 4 July 1950 
10 Two extra bomber groups and one extra fighter group. Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 93-4 
11 CAB 128/17, CM(50)4,7 February 1950 
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full blockade during that year. 12 Some interference with communications was expected, 
particularly by the GDR authorities as they attempted to assert their power. The Eastern 
zone in general had been bolstered by the increased strength of the Bereitschaften and a 
reduction in reliance on imports from Western Germany. The JIC expected the Russians 
to use propaganda, economic measures and political infiltration in an attempt to weaken 
West Berliners' morale. The FO,, however, pointed out to the JIC that in fact the 
economic circumstances in the Western Sectors had improved, making circumstances 
there a little more steady. 13 Evidence later in the year from JIC(G) contradicted this 
view., suggesting West Berlin was still vulnerable on the economic fiont. 14 
Soon after the war in Korea had begun, the FO drew up a paper on the 
importance of Berlin to the WýeSt. 15 They believed the Allies had to stand firm and 
prepare for action in the guise of a Bereitschaften attack or a new blockade, in order to 
preserve the Western presence in what was considered to be both a '(. spy-hole" behind 
the Iron Curtain and a perfect Western "shop-window" to Eastern Europe. The JIC 
October assessment of "Soviet Intentions in Berlin" reported that military action or a full 
blockade was unlikely, but economic and propaganda pressure would be determined. 
16 
Once the Bereitschaften had improved in strength, equipment and training, this might 
change. Since the last report in May, the JIC believed that the Russian "pin-pricks 
against communications" had kept potential investors away from West Berlin, at a time 
when the standard of living in the Eastern sector had been rising. Soviet interference 
with transport routes was also able to limit exports from the Western sectors. 
17 
12 CAB 158/10. JIC(50)43(Final) "'Soviet Intentions in Berlin during 1951Y, 5 May 1950; DEFE4/3 1, 
COS(50)80"' Meeting, 22 May 1950 
13 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)ge Meeting, 23 August 1950 
14 CAB 159/8, JIC(50) 10e Meeting, II October 1950 
15 DEFE5/23, COS(50)291 "Iraportance of Berlin", 5 August 1950 
16 CAB 158/11, JIC(50)80(Final), 20 October 1950 
17 CAB128/20, CM(51)54,23 July 1951 
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Rearming 
The key to understanding the long-term effect of the Korean War on the German 
question is to recognise the role the war played as an accelerant on rearmament in 
Europe and the further entrenchment of the divide between the FRG allied to the West 
and the GDR satellite of the Soviet Union. Matthias Peter writes that,, "Within 48 hours 
[of the Korean invasion], the Pentagon discussed the question of West German and 
Japanese rearmament, and four weeks later recommended the formation of German units 
within NATO. " 18 As part of the Petersburg Agreement, the Allies had relaxed 
limitations on German shipbuilding and modified the industrial dismantling programme, 
but the emphasis at that stage was on economic recovery not some sort of 
remilitarisation. When Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, proposed his plan 
in May 1950 for what was to become the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the intertwining of French and German (and later Italian and Benelux) heavy industries 
began. 19 Whilst Britain did not join the ECSC, fi7om the early moments, Attlee's 
government welcomed the idea of European co-operation, a trend which continued when 
Churchill took power in October 195 1.20 Extant records suggest that the JIC had no 
notable involvement in these economic matters. 
There was awareness amongst the British government, however, of even more 
difficult deliberations ahead. The day before the unveiling of Schuman's Plan, as part of 
their discussion in preparation for the London Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Cabinet 
had recognised that "before long, it would be necessary to consider how Germany could 
best contribute towards the defence of Western Europe - though this raised grave 
questions which would require most careful consideration. , 2' Even though fear of the 
Soviet Union created an increased willingness to accept the idea of German rearmament, 
ministerial worries over Soviet reactions, age-old apprehension of a militarised 
18 peter. Matthias, "Britain, the Cold War and the Economics of German Rearmament 1949-5 1" in 
Deighton. (ed), Britain and the First Cold War, pp. 273 -290 
19 Bullock, Bevin, pp. 768-774 
20 Hennessy, NeverAgain, pp. 390-404; CAB128/17, CM(50)34,2 June 1950; CAB128/23, CC(51)10,22 
November 1951 
21 CAB 128/17, CM(50)29,8 May 1950 
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Germany, uncertainty over the damage likely to be done to hopes of reunification and 
significant British and French political and public resistance to an armed Germany still 
remained. 22 The Chiefs of Staff realised that whilst German rearmament was essential 
to the defence of Western Europe, it was not an ambition they could yet pursue on 
political grounds. 23 
The outbreak of the Korean War, however, "erased the gap between military 
desirability and political feasibility" of West German rearmament,, as Gaddis Puts it . 
24 
The Chiefs had their initial view of how best to use German resources in the defence of 
25 Western Europe ready by early August 1950. The path towards agreement on German 
rearmament was rocky,, however. Before the end of 1950, Churchill had advocated a 
European Army, the United States* and France had traded proposals and counter- 
proposals for a German military force and His Majesty's Government had welcomed the 
idea of a German Army contributing to a European force supported by an increased 
American commitment to the defence of Western Europe. The West Germans 
themselves spent a good deal of time debating the issue in their Parliament and press. 
German rearmament was only part of the developing Western defence plans. 
Attlee's Cabinet sanctioned an increase in British defence spending from Dbn to 14.7bn 
over three years, at huge economic and some political Cost . 
26 Britain, France and the 
United States agreed to increase their troop numbers in Germany: in 1951 the UK would 
send an extra armoured division (to bring their total to four divisions), the French 
offered five divisions to double their forces and the US promised five-and-a-half 
divisions to bring their total to seven-and-a-half. 27 As conditions of West German 
rearmament, Attlee wanted to see NATO countries rearm, Allied forces strengthened 
before a German contribution was raised, all German units associated with NATO forces 
22 DockriR. Said, Britain's Policyfor West German Rearmament, 1950-1955 (Cambridge: CUP, 199 1), 
pp. 12-5 
2-3- DEFE5/20, COS(50)139 "Defence Policy and Global Strategy", I May 1950 
24 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 124 
25 Dockrill, Britain's Policy, pp. 21-58 
26 Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 409-418; Dockrill, Britain's Policy, p. 73 
27 CAB131/8, DO(50)196' Meeting, 16 October 1950 
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to counter any German threat and the West German government agree on their level of 
contribution. " 
Whilst the JIC had, in effect, been contributing to the policy debate over West 
German rearmament for a number of years by stressing the dangers of the Soviet Union 
to Western Europe, the strength of the Bereitschaften and the necessity of a strong 
NATO presence in Germany to block Russian ambitions, their records show they did not 
start specifically discussing detailed aspects of it until September 1950, at roughly the 
same time as the Cabinet . 
29 The JIC explored how they could contribute to the security 
of any new force by analysing what information was held by British intelligence 
agencies on ex-Wehrmacht officers who might potentially end up in the German Armed 
Forces. The JIC discovered some useful information, but doubted that it could be used 
effectively since the Germans were unlikely to allow the Allies to vet their officers. 30 
In January 195 1, the JIC got involved in a policy-making dispute between the 
31 Chiefs, FO and Cabinet about defence, by advocating general Western rearmament . 
Cradock notes that the JIC moved away from their normal practice of analysing events 
to blatant advocacy for a particular policy, in this case proposed by the Chiefs in the face 
of some Cabinet opposition. 32 Using language far stronger than usual, the paper urged 
that the West had to equip itself with forces and weapons adequate to deter the Russians 
from using their preponderance of conventional forces in pursuit of their ambitions. 33 
Failure to do so would leave the West "powerless to stop continued encroachment by the 
Soviet Union over the territories of the free world. " The view of Soviet aggressive 
intentions was extreme and capped with an appeal that without rearmament, "the 
survival of the United Kingdom would... be in jeopardy. " 
28 Dockrill, Britain's Policy, p. 56 
29 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)96th Meetin& 13 September 1950 
30 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)105'h Meeting, 4 October 1950 
31 MaWby, Spencer, Containing Germany: Britain and the arming ofthe Federal Republic (London: 
Macmillan, 1999), pp-52-61 
32 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 94 
33 CAB158/12, JIC(51)6(Final) "The Soviet Threaf, 19 January 1951 
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The constant watch on events in Germany had intensified after June 1950 and 
intelligence production on the threats to peace in Europe continued. By October, the JIC 
recorded that the Bereitschaften had developed into a force that could be used "to attack 
the Western Zones initially in order to create conditions highly suitable for a follow up 
attack by Soviet troops. , 34 These para-military policemen certainly represented a threat 
to Allied forces in Berlin. General Kenneth Strong, Director of JIB, felt, however, after 
hearing German opinions on this matter, that the Bereitschaften was not yet considered 
reliable enough politically by the Russians to use in an attack on the West. 35 As 
recruitment brought in more young, faithful Communists over time this was expected to 
change. 
Once the Western powers' had begun to seriously pursue West German 
rearmament, it became essential to have accurate insights into likely Soviet reactions. In 
their pre-Korean War paper on "Defence Policy and Global Strategy", the Chiefs of 
Staffhad noted: 
The fact remains', however, that in the long run the defence of Western Germany against 
a Russian invasion can only be secured with the assistance of some form of German 
armed forces. We do not suggest that this should or could be adopted as our policy in 
the near future; indeed, to do so might well split the Western Union in half and might 
even terrify the Russians to the point of preventive war. 36 
The crisis in the Far East certainly focused Western European minds sufficiently to deal 
with the problem of Western Union cohesion, but the uncertainty about the Russian 
reactions remained. The 1950 update of Soviet intentions and capabilities, produced by 
the JIC in October, stressed that the fear of German aggression was the prime motivation 
in Russian desires to unify Germany under Communist control. 37 The JIC believed, 
however, that the tools by which the Russians would achieve their German ambition 
would remain economic and political, rather than military, with an emphasis placed on 
34 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)111'hMeeting, 18 October 1950 
35 CAB159/8, JIC(50)127hMeeting, 23 November 1950 
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their propaganda campaign to appeal to the peaceful and unified hopes of the German 
people. The Communist campaigns launched at the October Prague Conference and the 
Second World Peace Conference in Warsaw, leading to the Russian proposal of a CFM 
38 to discuss Germany in November, seemed to buttress the JIC theory. Alongside 
achieving their ambitions in the Far East, British intelligence believed that wrecking 
German rearmament was the highest priority for Soviet foreign policy. Murphy et al's 
research into Russian intelligence archives shows that reporting back from the KI 
foreign intelligence agency residencies in Germany to Moscow tended to play up the 
threat of German rearmament and NATO, but failed ever to mention that the Korean 
War had a significant role in Western thinking. 39 Stalin seems to have known little of 
the true motivation of the West. 
The JIC believed that the Soviets would press hard for a peace treaty and a 
withdrawal of occupation forces, so that the whole of Germany would be left ripe for 
invasion by the Bereitschaften or easy picking for Communist economic and propaganda 
effortS. 40 Molotov's threat in December that rearmament had to be prevented either 
through war or a permanent peace treaty was taken seriously by the JIC. 41 The West 
should expect "a sharp Soviet reaction" if negotiations for a CFM came to nothing. The 
British recognised that the Russians were making a lot of noise in order to try and 
influence the meetings of the NATO Council, with specific attention being given by 
Soviet propaganda to the weak links in the West, such as France. The results of Western 
failure to respond favourably to Russian advances, the JIC thought, 
might take a number of forms, ranging from the denunciation of the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty, re-imposition of the Berlin blockade, or withdrawal from the Untied Nations, to 
actual military measures against Western Germany. The last would almost certainly 
provoke a world war, however, and the indications continued to point against any such 
military action in the immediate future. 
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The FO and Chiefs of Staff requested JIC input into a paper produced for 
ministers early in 1951 on likely Soviet reactions to German rearmament. 
42 After 
Chinese intervention in Korea in November 1950, the FO became particularly nervous 
that Western moves towards rearmament in Europe would spur a serious Soviet 
43 
reaction . 
Bevin and the FO preferred to see a German contribution to defence wait, 
whereas the Chiefs saw it as an even more pressing priority. The JIC agreed with the 
FO on the overriding Soviet intentions in Europe, but believed more consideration had 
to be taken of the measures the Russians could take "to hinder or prevent the 
rearmament of Western Germany. A4 In particular, the JIC believed that the FO had 
underestimated the likely capabilities of the Bereitschaften by the end of 195 1. Even so, 
intelligence indicated that Soviet leaders could not expect to prevent rearming, "unless 
by frightening the Germans themselves off it. " The more likely Soviet reaction was an 
attempt to weaken Western co-operation. 
At the same time as working on the FO paper, the JIC were producing their 
45 
annual assessment on the likelihood of war with the Russians. This stated that the 
Soviets did not have a sufficient atomic stockpile or the means to deliver the weapons 
over long-range, to risk total war before 1954. Even if the Russians decided on a 
preventive war before US and German rearmament was completed, they would look for 
as much preparation time as possible. Previous assessments of Russian preparations for 
war had judged that they would not have either the air force or atomic stockpile they 
would need until 1955.46 The JIC believed that if the Russians were to make a move 
before either they or the West were fully ready, the "period of greatest danger appears to 
be about the end of 1952". 47 That said, the Russians were not thought likely to take 
drastic action until the process of arranging a CFM had failed conclusively. In that 
42 CAB 159/9, JIC(51)12"' Meeting, 1 February 195 1; DEFE5/27, COS(51)41 "Possible Soviet Reactions 
to the rearmament of Western Germany", 26 January 1951 
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event the West could look forward to attempts to stir up public disorder in Germany 
against rearmament, the reimposition of a blockade of Berlin or a "military coup 
directed against Berlin by the Bereitschaften"), whose forces would be in a position to 
attack West Berlin by the end of 1951. Mawby suggests that this assessment had a 
significant impact on ministers, officials and the Chiefs of Staff, convincing all that 
rushing through German rearmament might provoke the Soviets. 48 
The JIC views of the preliminary CFM talks, taking place in Paris in early March 
1951, were not too OptiMistiC. 49 Whilst the first meeting had been "relatively business- 
like and unprovocative", the second had included Gromyko giving "a long propaganda 
outburst" and he "showed no disposition to compromise with Western proposals for the 
Ministerial agenda". The Russians insisted that demilitarisation of Germany, a peace 
treaty including the withdrawal of all troops and a Europe-wide reduction in arms be 
included in the talks. Their focus shifted over time, however, since they later insisted 
that NATO and American bases in Europe be put on the agenda, a proposal which the 
Western Powers could not accept. 'o The JIC believed the Russians were changing horse 
in mid-stream, moving away from the claim that German rearmament was the main 
source of tension in Europe to the statement that NATO was the problem .51 
They 
thought the Soviet goal had altered: "the main objective is now to undermine the 
Westem defence effort as a whole, not simply in Germany. " 
The Four Power talks collapsed without much hope of regeneration at the end of 
June. 52 The consequences of the breakdown were not as in the worst case scenario the 
JIC had given earlier; rather the JIC believed things might well calm down as Soviet 
53 
tactics changed . Sir David Kelly, Ambassador 
in Moscow, persuaded the JIC that the 
Russians would make maximum use of their peace campaign so that whilst continuing 
with their own military preparations, they would "change their political tactics so as to 
48 MaWby, Containing Germany, pp. 60-1 
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lull the fears of the West and so slow down Western rearmament, resorting to 
blandishments instead of threats. -). )54 The JIC considered that the Soviet peace campaign 
remained a potentially powerful disruptive weapon. The appraisal of the August 1951 
Berlin Youth Festival concluded that it had given a loud voice to the Communist peace 
campaign propaganda, although for the time being, such measures had "failed to impress 
the Western German populace"). 55 
Agreement between the Western powers was finally reached on the nature of 
German rearmament, as well as on the future status of Germany after the end of 
occupation, in Washington during September 195 1.56 German forces were to be raised 
within a European Army that would form a part of the European Defence Community 
(EDC). Eisenhower had already been appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) in April 1951, as part of the early agreements on the strengthening of US 
military ties to Western Europe. 57 Negotiations with the West Germans in early 1952 
ironed out both the exact German contribution to Western defence and the wording of 
the Contractual Agreements to end occupation and hand full power over to the 
Germans. 58 
Soviet wrecking operations did not come to an end with the final general 
agreement between the Western nations, since the opportunity to disrupt ratification still 
existed. Secret intelligence suggested that as a reaction to the Washington talks, the 
Soviets were to offer a peace treaty to either the whole of Germany or just the GDP,, 
followed by troop withdrawal. '9 An offer of all-German elections from Otto Grotewohl, 
the GDR's Prime Minister, which included a guarantee of Communist representation for 
the GDR in the small print, was countered by the FRG proposal for free elections 
guaranteed by a UN Commission. 60 Initially, the JIC were unsure how great the Russian 
54 CAB159/10, JIC(51)86h Meeting, 16 August 1951 
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concessions to secure a demilitarised Germany might be, believing it possible that the 
Soviets would allow free national elections in return for German impotence. 61 
Intelligence reviewed in January 1952 hinted, however, that Soviet intentions might be 
in the opposite direction from unification: 
There are indications that arrangements are being made to permit the effective sealing of 
the East German frontier with Western Germany if such action should become necessary 
without dislocation of the East German economy. 62 
East Germans who crossed into the West for work were being found jobs in the East, 
and Western workers with jobs in the East were being replaced. 
The negotiations between the US, Britain, France and Germany over the 
specifics of the EDC and the Contractual Agreements continued throughout the first half 
63 
of 1952 . At the same time, a pointless "battle of the notes" between the East and West 
was waged, with each side offering completely unacceptable solutions to the German 
Question to the other. 
64 The JIC reported in May that there was no intelligence to 
suggest either an increase in Soviet aggressive action or a real attempt to follow up 
65 Russian "conciliatory words" with deeds. However, the West should expect the 
Kremlin to "react strongly" to the ratification of the EDC Treaty and Contractual 
Agreements, by rapidly expanding the Bereitschaften or renewing pressure on Berlin. 
As part of a ploy to disrupt the conclusion of the Western negotiations, the West should 
expect more Russian offers of free elections and peace treaties to force the West into 
more talks and win over public opinion across Europe. The failure of Western 
agreements would represent a considerable boost to Soviet intentions. The JIC review 
of events in mid-May noted that the GDR government had issued a threat saying the 
signature of the Contractual Agreements would be "immediately answered" with 
61 CAB 158/13, JIC(51)103 (Final) "Likelihood of total war with the Soviet Union up to the end of 1954", 
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pressure on Berlin. 66 This needed careful watching, since the intelligence suggested a 
blockade "as a measure to hamper negotiations, was a distinct possibility. " The 
following week, the JIC stated that action against Berlin before ratification was not 
anticipated. 67 A few days after the signature of the Contractual Agreements, intelligence 
showed the only reaction had been the slight tightening of boundary controls. 68 
The JIC did not believe the Russians had given up their hopes of preventing 
West German rearmament and creating an all-German nation on their terms, even by 
June 1952 . 
69 They thought East Germany would not be fully integrated into the Soviet 
bloc, whilst opportunities remained to disrupt Western progress, since that might risk 
speeding up the ratification of the treaties. The JIC doubted, however, that the Russians 
could succeed in their ambitions and would therefore make plans to further draw the 
GDR into the Soviet orbit, sealed off from the West. Once the EDC and Contractual 
Agreements were enacted, the most likely course of Russian action was the acceptance 
of a divided Germany, where the GDR would be built up with strong armed forces and 
continuous pressure on the Western sectors of Berlin. An appeal to West Berliners to 
free themselves from occupation, made by Walter Ulbricht, SED First Secretary, at the 
SED Congress in July, was assessed as indicating Soviet contentment to work through 
70 the GDR government . 
In August, the JIC believed that the Soviets had "made up their 
minds that a United Germany is impossible of attainment on terms acceptable to 
them. , 71 
Before 1952 was over, assessments revealed a belief that the period of tension 
over Germany was cooling. The JIC thought it unlikely the Russians would commit to 
war before 1955, although they would continue to make full use of all methods short of 
war. 72 The threat of conflict through miscalculation remained, where an unforeseen 
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incident escalated or the Soviets reacted to some Western move through fear. "It is by 
combining strength and unity with resolution and restraint that the Western Powers can 
best hope to avoid a general war", declared the JIC. Furthermore, they felt confident 
that intelligence sources would pick up on the large scale movements of armed forces 
into East Germany, that would be a necessary preparation for a full-scale Russian 
mobilisation. 73 The likely warning period for a surprise attack on Britain remained a 
few hours, however, based upon reports coming in of Russian air force movements over 
Germany or Scandinavia and messages from the frontline saying Soviet ground forces 
were crossing into Western Germany. 
Counting on trouble 
Whereas JIC assessments on political developments often had to go forward to 
customers alongside separate FO reports, the one area in which JIC information was 
paramount during the Western negotiations over the plans for rearmament and the 
Contractual Agreements, was on Soviet and GDR military developments. During 
periods of tension, even more than usual, accurate intelligence on troop movements on 
the Cold War frontline was an essential part of reading Russian intentions: a difficult 
task for British intelligence given its lack of accurate sources. As a consequence, 
although the JIC were never convinced that the Russians were preparing for war, 
specific estimates of Soviet strengths fluctuated. 
Morale amongst Russian troops was thought to be lower in the GDR than at 
home in early 1950, despite attempts to use political indoctrination to focus the soldiers" 
mindS. 74 Realism in their battle training was stressed, with exercises including 
approximately 60 percent of forces in Germany focused on river-crossing and airborne 
attacks, whilst intensive airfield development took place. 
75 The JIC believed the 
numbers of Soviet troops stationed in Germany remained relatively constant in 1950, 
73 CAB158/14, JIC(52)5 I (Final) "Warning of Soviet attack 1952-54". 18 December 1952 
74 CAB 158/9, JIC(50)4/1 (Final) "Periodic Intelligence of WEURCINCCONf', 26 January 1950 
75 CAB 158/9, JIC(50)30/1 (Final) "Periodic intelligence summary for WEURCINCCONV, 20 April 1950 
98 
with 370,, 000 men divided into 32 divisions (22 line divisions), accompanied by nearly 
1,, 500 aircraft. 76 The ground forces were still in an odd formation, with an usually high 
proportion of armour to infantry, but the Committee thought it likely that this was just 
some temporary anomaly whilst forces were reorganised. 77 The potential of the Red 
Army was certainly not just in their numbers though: as the JIC put it in April 1951, 
"The Soviet Army is the most powerful and effective ground combat force in being in 
,, 78 the world today. The good news was that the numbers of troops in Germany 
remained well below what the JIC thought the Russians would need to launch an attack 
on Western Europe. An assault would require some 50-60 divisions initially, rising to 
75 -90 and 4,400 aircraft with 2,100 in reserve. 
The annual rotation of Russian forces meant the JIC assessments of troop 
numbers were constantly reviewed. During the heightened tension of the initial Western 
rearmament negotiations, information from deserters led to the JIC to believe the Soviets 
in Germany were 40,000 over strength . 
79 Development of airfield installations indicated 
to the JIC that "the Russians were contemplating some permanency of occupation. , 80 
Photographic intelligence was gathered on the deployment of new twin-engined light 
bombers (11-27s) to the Soviet Zone, whilst runways were constructed that could 
accommodate TU-4 heavy bombers . 
81 Anti-aircraft defences were also improved in the 
first months of 195 1.82 In late 1950, the JIC formally brought in a policy of not handing 
back Russian equipment that had ended up in the British Zone by accident or desertion, 
until all who wanted had had a chance to fully inspect it, so that the utmost was made of 
every opportunity to learn about the capabilities of Soviet bloc weapons. 83 
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Intelligence began to reach the JIC in July 1951 that troop numbers were being 
increased 
. 
84 A combination of rail-watching and copies of rail authority orders revealed 
that troop trains were arriving in late June, bringing the new class of recruits and 
artillery to Germany. 85 Estimates were that up to 70,000 men were arriving, without an 
equivalent number of departures, leading the JIC to believe the net increase was in the 
region of 49,000.86 In August, intelligence was received that trains had been crossing 
into Germany through routes previously unknown, raising the JIC estimate to an 
increase of 100ý1000.87 Intelligence on the purpose of the strengthening was lacking, 
leaving the JIC to wonder whether cadre units were being brought up to peace 
establishment, existing units were being brought up to war establishment or whether a 
very large release of troops had just simply not yet taken place. Nevertheless, an alert 
was sent to the Chiefs of Staff, including possible reasons for the unusual activities 
88 going on behind the Iron Curtain. 
The JIC believed that 140,000 men were required to bring the Soviet formations 
in Germany up to war-strength, leaving them to conclude that the men had been "used to 
bring units above Peace Establishment but not to full War Establishment and also to 
activate certain cadre units. , 89 Reinforcements had also been seen entering Austria and 
Hungary. Good intelligence on training indicated that the Russians were still focusing 
on river crossing and airborne assaults. 90 The good news was that the numbers of 
aircraft in the Soviet Zone had only slightly increased by about 100.91 However, further 
alarm was caused in October, when the annual Russian large-scale manoeuvres failed to 
begin at the usual time. 92 This was a possible indicator of aggressive intention, although 
the War Office felt that it was more likely that an attack would be launched "under the 
84 CAB159/10, JIC(51)70'hMeeting, 5July 1951 
85 CAB159/10, JIC(51)73dMeeting, 12 July 1951 
86CAB159/10, JIC(51)76thMecting, 19 July 1951 
87 CAB159/10, JIC(51)83rd Meethig, 9 August 1951 
88 CAB 15 8/13, JIC(5 1)72, "Recent activity in the Western Sector of the Soviet Orbit", 17 August 1951 
'39 CAB159/10, JIC(51)87hMeeting, 23 August 1951 
90 CAB 158/12, JIC(51)2/7(Final) "Periodic intelligence summary for SHAPE - General", 18 September 
1951 
91 CAB 158/12, JIC(51)3n(Final) "Periodic intelligence summary for SHAPE - ORBAT", 18 September 
1951 
92CAB159/10, JIC(51)105'hMeeting, II October 1951 
100 
cloak of large-scale manoeuvres. "9' Once the Soviets had begun their training, the JIC 
did not consider that preparations for an attack were underway, especially since some 
300 aircraft were withdrawn east out of Germany at roughly the same time. 94 British 
and American intelligence differed hugely on troop movements towards the end of the 
year-95 US sources indicated that 45,000 Russian troops had come into Germany, but 
29,000 had left, whereas the British estimated out the figures at 3,000 in and none out. 
The JIC had to admit that "there has been a remarkable lack of information through 
British sources and we cannot therefore confirm or deny American reports". 
The difference between the Allies was resolved early in 1952, when the 
Americans accepted 385,000 as the strength of Soviet forces, showing a rise of 81,000 
over their previous estimates. 96 The US put the Russian line divisions at 95 percent of 
war strength. The JIC reviewed their estimate, assessing that the increase in strength 
since May 1951 had been 69,000, but believed that in actual fact there had been no real 
increase in establishment. It was clear that by mid-June the Headquarters of the Soviet 
Group of Occupation Forces had carried out their long-planned move fi7om Potsdam to 
Zossen-Wunsdorf. 97 In September, JIC intelligence for NATO's Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) noted that information on Soviet troops in Germany, 
and in particular on their training, was not sufficient to produce comprehensive reports. 98 
The British did, however, feel confident enough in their intelligence to increase 
their estimate of Soviet troops in Germany to 400,000 (although this clearly does not add 
up to the late 1950 figure of 370,000 plus a 69,000 increase during 1951/2). 99 The JIC 
believed that troop numbers were still going up during 1952, although the quantities 
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involved were not as high as the 1951 figures. 'O" It is clear from the records that neither 
intelligence sources, methods of interpretation nor assessment were consistent though. 
The War Office noted: 
last year's [ 195 1] method of counting was not as accurate as this year's was thought to be. It seemed, however, that last year there was a total increase of 86,3000 men. This 
year's increase appears to be about 48,000 men. The combined increase for the two 
years was, therefore, considerable. It would seem, therefore, that the Soviet army in 
Germany was slowly but steadily increasing. It was not easy, as yet however, to make a 
good intelligence deduction on this vital subject. Nevertheless, the sharpest possible 
watch should be kept on the situation. 10' 
By the end of the year, although demobilisation was still continuing, the JIC believed 
that the Soviet forces had increased in strength since July by 60,000 men, 1,800 
armoured fighting vehicles and 2,200 guns. 102 
Ax. ccurate accounting for the Bereitschaften was as essential during the 1950-2 
period as it was for Soviet troops, especially after the North Korean invasion of the 
South raised the possibility in Western minds of local forces being used to expand the 
Communist ftontier elsewhere. 103 After July 1949, the GDR police forces had been seen 
reorganising and developing rapidly. 104 The JIC estimated their strength to be 42,780 in 
early 1950, although they were unsure of the exact organisation, training and equipping. 
The J11B, 
., 
in particular, was trying to establish what weapons were being issued to the 
Bereitschaften. 105 The JIC was unable to confirm press articles in December 1949 that 
the East German police were to be turned into an Army, although they did believe the 
claims made sense. 106 Information on intensive recruiting in early 1950 reached the JIC, 
raising their estimate of strength to 51,000.107 Secret sources reported that some 
factories were preparing men between the ages of 18-40 for service in the 
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"Volkspolizei", perhaps as a prelude to some sort of National Service order. The JIC 
also confirmed that the forces had been equipped with armour enough for four units. 
BRIXMIS, in particular, were used to gather information on the para-military 
police developments inside the Soviet Zone. 108 Bereitschaften defectors also provided 
valuable intelligence, but whereas the numbers of those reaching the British Zone in 
May, June and July 1950 had been 100 a month, towards the end of the year they had 
fallen to almost zero. 109 The JIC put this down to more committed recruits entering the 
service, as well as improved defection-prevention methods. 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) requested views from the Chiefs on the level of 
threat the Bereitschaften posed to West Germany after the Korean War began. Field 
Marshal Sir William Slim, the CIGS, thought Berlin could be held against an East 
German attack, but resupply problems would make such a defence short-lived. 110 
Information from the West Germans passed to the FO stated that the GDR police were 
"being rapidly developed into a highly mechanised army and will be increased from 
50,000 to 150,000 men by 1951. "111 Kirkpatrick, now British High Commissioner, was 
wary of such reports, believing they could have been fabricated for sale to intelligence 
agencies. 112 Even though BRD(MIS had helped dispel the fears about Soviet aggression 
against Western Europe in the months following the outbreak of war in the Far East, 
"the danger of action by the Bereitschaften still remained. " 113 By October, the JIC 
believed the East German forces could be at the vanguard of an attack on the Western 
Zones of Berlin. 114 Accurate information about the intended use of the Bereitschaften 
was still lacking in November, but the JIC believed they would be trained and equipped, 
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ready for independent action within five months. 115 Even so,, it was not clear that the 
Russians yet fully trusted the East German forces. 116 
Throughout 195 1, intelligence told a story of the expansion of what was 
becoming an East German fledgling military capability. Soon after Western 
announcements of their plans to rearm West Germany, British intelligence received 
information from a deserter in February 1951 indicating for the first time that small arms 
manufacture had begun in East Germany. 117 The following month, reports suggested 
that plans were being drawn up to develop an aircraft industry in the Soviet Zone. 118 
The JIC estimate of Bereitschaften strength rose to 57,000 in April, following a 
reorganisation of the force into the equivalent of 24 Soviet mechanised infantry 
regiments. 119 Intelligence on the further development of the administration in support of 
the para-military forces was enhanced in May, when sources told of the establishment of 
a central office to control all procurement. 120 Bereitschaften defectors did come across 
in small numbers during the year, enough to provide useful information for the British to 
draw up reports on status and fighting efficiency- 121 
The JIC intelligence summary for NATO in September 1951 contained a huge 
section on the para-military police in East Germany, since good information about the 
strengths and capabilities of the forces was necessary for NATO planning purposes. 122 
Twenty-four all-arms units, a few specialist signals and transport units and fourteen 
training schools were known to exist, giving an approximate strength of 53,000. 
Recruitment had been difficult and slow during early 1951, certainly well below the 
numbers required to swell the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften, as they were now known, 
fi7om its current cadre form into a 100,000 strong force. The JIC believed that 100,000 
could be the target for the end of 195 1. It seemed as though rumours of heavy weapons 
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could be dispelled, since at that time only small arms had been issued,, although artillery 
and armour existed in very small quantities as training aids. Training during 1950 was 
thought to have been substandard due to poor instruction, whilst 1951 training was still 
underway. Declining morale during the first half of 1951 had increased the supply of 
defectors at the end of 1950: 296 had come across during the first six months, allowing 
the JIC to judge that the men in the forces were now of considerably higher calibre than 
had been previously seen. A small "Seepolizei" of some 3,000 men, equipped with 
minesweepers and fast Patrol boats formed an embryonic East Germany navy. The JIC 
believed these forces could be rapidly expanded to double their strength at short 
notice. 12' Rumours that conscription would be introduced in East Germany during 1952, 
suggested that general expansion was on the cards. 124 
US intelligence on the Bereitschaften was somewhat at odds with British 
estimates. In February 1952, the Americans believed the Bereitschaften was to be 
expanded to 120,000 men. 125 By that stage the JIC reckoned their strength was up to 
60,000, but they considered that this "could not be increased by more than about 20,, 000 
men, without detriment to economic activity. "") Deserter intelligence did indicate, 
however, that an "Air Police"' was being developed. 126 Furthermore, reports that 
prototype tracked vehicles, probably eventually destined for the Bereitschaften, were 
being produced in the Soviet Zone, offered even more weight to the argument that these 
forces were being turned into fully-fledged armed forces in all but name. 127 By the 
middle of the year, British intelligence learnt that a Ministry of Defence was to be set 
up, followed by the call up of five per cent of factory personnel (78,000 men in the 20- 
30 age group). 128 Intensive recruitment in 1952 raised the JIC strength estimate to 
83ý000 by the end of July, by which time it was clear that an East German Army was 
being developed along Soviet model lines. 129 The JIC felt that the East German forces 
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were certainly being "used as an effective weapon in the cold war" by the GDR 
government, who were having to respond to West German determination to integrate 
fully with the West. 130 
Between June and September 1952,, the JIS pulled together all of the information 
on the Bereitschaften in order to assess "the size and nature of East German Military 
forces". should the Russians decide to respond to developments in West Germany by 
fully militarising the East German police forces. 131 During this time, the GDR 
government announced it would be forming armed forces to "protect" their country from 
the West, although the JIC believed the plan could yet be cancelled as part of some last- 
ditch effort to prevent enactment of the Contractual Agreements and the EDC Treaty. 132 
Since there was no military imperative behind the move, due to the available Soviet 
Army strength in the GDR, the development was political in nature. The East German 
forces did not, therefore, have to match the planned West German forces in size, but 
rather it was some sort of boost in self-esteem for the Soviet Zone. The JIC believed 
that the needs of the Soviet Zone economy meant the forces could not expand beyond 
150,000 men,, although the Russians were unlikely to permit growth over these limits 
anyway because of their inherent fear of German power. The armed forces would be 
formed out of the further development of the police forces, rather than founded afresh, 
boosted by recruitment from well-indoctrinated Communist youth groups. Both the 
navy and air force were likely to remain small. Before the forces could become an 
efficient fighting force, however, they needed more weapons and vehicles, useful 
Headquarters and Staffs and at least 18 months training. Even once the East Germans 
were prepared militarily, the JIC felt the Russians were "unlikely to entrust to East 
German forces any important offensive role in a conflict with the West. " 
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Turning enemies into allies 
By late 1949, progress had been made in improving the economic prospects in 
the 1FRG- The Petersburg Agreement reduced the number of plants for dismantling and 
cleared the way for German membership of the Ruhr Authority. The Allied High 
Commissioners also authorised a German representative to the OEEC. Improving trade, 
including with the Soviet Zone, gave hope of strong economic recovery in the Western 
Zones. The JIC saw a contrast with the Soviet Zone where, even after the proclamation 
of the GDR, there was uncertainty as to how tight the Russian grip on Eastern Germany 
would be. 133 After Wilhelm Pieck, GDR President, had become "ill", Ulbricht had 
started to run the SED,, bringing party discipline into line. The JIC knew Ulbricht 
enjoyed "the special trust of the Kremlin". 134 There was not much hope that the trend of 
a developing Communist police state would be reversed: "There is little active resistance 
in the Zone and there is a danger that the population will gradually come to accept the 
Communist system if not as satisfactory, at least as inevitable. " 135 The East Germans 
had enjoyed some economic improvement, but there was still reliance on agricultural 
rather than industrial exports, even after the Russians stepped in to enforce Satellite 
trade agreements to tackle unemployment and raw material shortages in 195 1.136 The 
JIC did notice a rise in living standards in the Eastern Zone during that year, including 
an improvement in the exchange rate of the East Mark against the West Mark. 137 
Both the JIC and the Russia Committee examined the likelihood of a Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Germany during 1950, after reports suggested that Andrei 
Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, had discussed it with the Germans 
during his December 1949 visit. The Russia Committee information stated that there 
would be no formal peace treaty forcing recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, but there 
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might well be an end to the state of war. 138 The FO felt no Soviet move would occur 
without a reciprocal Western measure. The JIC believed there were no indications to 
suggest a withdrawal was likely, rather economic, political and military aspects 
suggested consolidation. 139 Even before the effects of the Korean War were felt in both 
West and East Germany, the defacto divisions already ran very deep. 
The decision to rearm Western Germany would have seemed unbelievable to 
many five years earlier. Global politics had turned a one time enemy into an essential 
military ally against a new foe in an incredibly short time. Before the Germans could be 
brought fully into the fold, however, the problem of trust had to be resolved. The JIC, as 
the highest official body specifically responsible for security, began to consider the 
difficulties of sharing military information with the Germans in early 1951, by asking 
the JIC(G) to carry out a study. 140 Although this first JIC(G) report is not present in full 
in the files, the conclusions are reported in another document and the minutes discussing 
it make it clear that it did not make for comfortable reading. 141 JIC(G) thought the 
Federal Government was "completely insecure", fully penetrated by the Russian 
intelligence services and two years away from having an effective security service, all of 
which meant that "any military information passed at the present time... would 
undoubtedly run the grave risk of reaching a hostile intelligence service". At least, 
however., the JIC felt confident of "the pro-Western attitude of both the Government 
Coalition [under Adenauer] and the Social Democrat Opposition". 142 The Chiefs' Joint 
Planning Staff (JPS) had already notified the JIC that in order for the Germans to take up 
a useful role in Western defence, NATO strengths and plans would need to be shared 
with them. 143 The JIC decided the matter had to be urgently discussed with the 
Americans,, concurrent with considerable attention from the British authorities. 
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Joint British and American examination continued throughout 1951 and into 
1952, but little actual progress was made in improving security in Federal 
Government. 144 The JIC advised NATO in July 1952, that the Germans were certainly 
penetrated by Communist intelligence agencies and were still not in a position to enforce 
COSM1C (the codename for the system of NATO secrecy) security requirements, 
especially since the BfV (Bundesamt far Verfassungsschutz, the German Security 
Service) was not in a position to adequately vet German staff. 145 Britain's advice was 
that information given to the Germans as part of the EDC preparations should be 
specially drafted with minimal inclusion of sensitive NATO material. The JIC were not 
willing to share any classified information with the Germans until they had installed a 
system limiting the circulation of such to properly vetted individuals. 146 jC(G) had, in 
fact, been passing local security intelligence to the BfV since 1950.147 Of course, the 
problem of ensuring adequate security was likely to increase once the EDC had come 
into being and German industry was involved in the supply of arms. 148 
Major-General Kirkman, the Commander of the British Intelligence Organisation 
(Germany), attended the JIC in October 1952 to discuss German security. In his view, 
the Germans "were psychologically unable to be as secure as say the British" because of 
their "need to amount to something" and their lack of an "authority or individual who 
commanded unquestioning loyalty such as formerly the Kaiser, Hitler or the 
Welirmacht". 149 It appeared to Kirkman that resentment caused by conflicts of power 
between Land Security Services (LfVs) and the Federal BfV made the problem worse. 
He also thought the higher up the ladder the officials got, the less likely they were to 
obey security regulations, especially where political advantage could be gained from 
disclosure of information. Kirkman was hopeful, however, that improvements would 
soon be made. The EDC Interim Committee, the NATO group developing the EDC 
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idea, had solved some of their problems by introducing the SPHERIC system which 
enabled "sanitized" NATO information to be shared with the Germans during the 
planning stages. The JIC welcomed this progress, whilst echoing Kirkman's hope that 
in time German security would improve. They gave full support to the NATO Standing 
Group Security Co-ordinating Committee which travelled to Germany to work with the 
Germans on the short-comings. '50 Kirkman's views were expanded in a JIC(G) report 
for the Chiefs of Staff, concluding that action was required at the highest levels of the 
Federal government, with Allied advicel, to remedy a serious problem. 151 
At the end of the war,, the Allies had captured German documents on the Soviet 
Union, former service personnel and other military topics that would have given the 
Germans a useful start in contributing to Western defence. The JIC thought from the 
earliest days of the rearmament question, however, that returning the archive was 
"undesirable from a security point of view. 152 The Germans requested the return of all 
captured documents in 1950, but the response was a long time coming. The Cabinet 
Office Historical Section and the JIC came together in November 1951 to draw up a 
policy on the release of documents, prompted by a further request from the German 
government for copies of personnel records held by the British. 153 A joint US/UK 
agreement not to return documents existed on the matter, but the JIC thought that after 
consultation with the Americans and with a proviso that the British could reftise 
particular requests on security grounds, copies of files could be given to the Germans. 154 
The JIC were alarmed when they discovered that the US seemed to be employing a 
much less strict policy on the release of material, leaving them to insist on a new joint 
agreement not to release certain classes of information which might "prejudicially 
affect" inter-government relations. 155 This included material on Allied "clandestine or 
intelligence services", "cryptographic matters of any shape or kind", Soviet intelligence 
services, German interrogation reports of Allied prisoners and intelligence gathered by 
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the former Nazi intelligence services on the Allies. The Cabinet decided in October 
1952 that all diplomatic documents could be returned to the Germans, but some military 
material would be withheld on security grounds. 156 
Herbert Morrison, Bevin's replacement as Foreign Secretary, announced in July 
1951 that the state of war with Germany would be "terminated forthwith". 157 The 
process of drawing up the full hand over of power back to the Germans began to run 
concurrently with the EDC negotiations. As a result, tricky questions about intelligence 
in Germany arose. Granting full sovereignty to the Germans meant losing the powers 
both to prevent the development of a West German external intelligence service and to 
carry out intrusive collection on German territory. 158 
The JIC had discussed reports in January 1950 that the FRG already had "certain 
agencies" collecting limited intelligence from abroad, but they agreed that for the 
moment, developments should be carefully watched. 159 It was considered unwise on 
security grounds to allow German services to have contact with neighbouring foreign 
organisations. 160 Bertie Blount, the Director of Scientific Intelligence, noted after a visit 
to Germany in September 1950 that the Federal Government had already set up an office 
dealing with science and a research council. 161 SIS reported back to the JIC every six 
months on the progress of the German foreign intelligence service, including early 
indications that the Gehlen Organisation (the group under American control in line to 
become the external collection agency) was penetrated by the Soviet and other Satellite 
intelligence agencies 162 The KGB station in Karlshorst had a good deal of success 
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during this time in crippling West German operations against the GDR or other 
Communist states. 163 
The British realised that there was nothing they could do to prevent the Germans 
acquiring an intelligence service once power had been transferred back from the Allies, 
but there was the opportunity to exploit the time taken for the organisation to become 
fully effective. 164 The Germans might be persuaded that it was essential for their own 
protection that the Allies maintain their own strong intelligence services during the start- 
up period of a German service. Kirkman thought the Germans might accept the 
presence of British intelligence arrayed against the Russians on their territory, but they 
were unlikely to allow operations concerned with German domestic security and 
intelligence. 165 Given that the Gehlen Organisation, codenamed RUSTY, was already in 
existence under American oversight, he believed the British ought to at least be on 
speaking terms with it. Moreover, it was essential that Britain safeguard some of the 
rights granted to their intelligence services in order to maintain effective cover of the 
Soviet threat. ZEI 68, the law which enabled the British arrest and interrogation of 
suspected enemy agents in Germany, or at least the right to conduct an initial interview, 
had to be kept. Kirkman also wanted to be able to continue detaining and interrogating 
enemy deserters, defectors and line-crossers. Finally, he thought the interception of mail 
from Russia was "essential" whilst it would be "highly desirable" to continue examining 
mail from the GDR. 166 
JIC(G) and SIS thought that the sooner RUSTY "was recognised, and proper 
relations with it established, the better", presumably based on improved security in the 
organisation. 167 In July 1951, permission was given for "very cautious contacts" with 
RUSTY,, initially through General Truscott, CIA Head in Germany. 168 The Chancery at 
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Wahnerheide was not convinced that improvements in German security would be easy, 
however. Kirkman visited the RUSTY headquarters in Munich in November 1951 and 
reported back to the JIC that he had found an adequate nucleus of a German intelligence 
service, although SIS would need to investigate the levels of Soviet penetration. 169 He 
later noted that it was in Britain's interests that the Germans set up a "good intelligence 
service", requiring that the British did "everything possible to influence its development 
along the right lines. " 170 
The JIC considered a JIC(G) report on the future of German intelligence in June 
1952, finally setting out the British position. 171 They believed it was not yet possible to 
predict exactly what form an overt service would take, since international negotiations 
about the EDC5 for instance, were still in progress. Any covert organisation had to be 
unified and efficient,, with very close links to the German BfV and Allied intelligence 
services. The JIC felt it was time for the UK High Commissioner to approach the 
German Chancellor to express British views on the subject, after which more precise 
examination could take place. The Chancellor ought to be persuaded that the British 
pattern was the best one to follow, where departments were independent but under a 
central co-ordinating committee. 172 The High Commissioner's brief suggested advising 
that military intelligence ought to be organised under NATO requirements, whilst 
RUSTY and the BfV ought to be official and under government control through separate 
ministries with political safeguards. 173 
The High Commissioner's Office was a key part of the negotiations for the 
Contractual Agreements with the Germans and this extended to the intelligence aspects 
of the treaty. On occasion this led to clashes of opinion, as over 
ZEI 68. Kirkman 
believed that such a law was essential to the provision of protection against enemy 
intelligence services, especially whilst the German counter-intelligence apparatus was 
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embryonic, whereas the High Commission was willing to let it go. 174 Whilst the JIC was 
aware of the political difficulties in persuading the Germans to accept what would be 
considered "unconstitutional by British standards" (because the law included the power 
to imprison without trial), they believed Kirkman was right. 175 After Patrick Reilly, 
Hayter's replacement as JIC Chairman, had made a visit to Germany in July 1951, he 
reported back that the Chancery were not optimistic that the Germans would accede to 
British wishes, although they might be willing to accept some temporary solution until 
an effective German counter-intelligence organisation had been put in place. 176 The JIC 
insisted, however, that every effort should be made to stress the importance of the ZEI 
68 provisions to the Germans. 177 The War Office pointed out that a similar level of 
importance ought to be attached to the retention of Allied powers to hold and interrogate 
defectors and deserters. 178 Reilly pointed out, however, that no special legal provisions 
were required in this area so long as the defectors continued to voluntarily put 
themselves into the hands of the Allied powers. 
The Contractual negotiations ran fi7om July 1951 to May 1952, discussing areas 
of disagreement between the parties, such as German rearmament and occupation 
expenditure, security safeguards against German aggression, decartelisation of industry 
and the custody of war criminals. 179 During this time British intelligence kept a close 
watch on how the final agreements might affect their operations in Germany. Whilst the 
Germans seemed keen not to accept openly anything that contravened their own 
constitution, there was the hope that informal arrangements might solve some of the 
problems over the powers granted to Allied intelligence services. The Service 
departments, in particular, agreed with the JIC(G) that the end of communication 
monitoring in Germany would be a considerable blow to intelligence production, but this 
was one area where the Germans were thought to be willing to covertly co-operate in the 
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continued interception of mail in return for a share of the take. 180 The JIC was pleased 
with the "Memorandum of Understanding" issued jointly in May 1952 with the FRG 
covering the rights of foreign forces stationed in Germany. "' The Germans agreed to 
notify the Allies of all defectors and deserters coming across, as well as permitting the 
continued interception of external, but not internal, communications. 182 Furthermore, 
the Allies were permitted to protect their forces from sabotage or other attack, side- 
stepping the precise problems of replacing ZEI 68. 
Intelligence, politics and strategy 
William Hayter left the Services Liaison Department in the FO to become 
Minister at the Embassy in Paris in December 1949.183 Patrick Reilly, a man with 
wartime experience as Personal Assistant to (C),, took over as JIC Chairman with 
corresponding seats on the Russia and PUS Committees. 184 It is difficult to deduce 
which changes in JIC procedures were a result of changing personalities and which were 
responses to world events. One of Reilly"s early actions as JIC Chairman was to revive 
the wartime practice of attaching a FO man to SIS (to be known as the Foreign Office 
Adviser rather than as Personal Assistant to 'C'), in order to improve liaison, but also to 
ensure that the FO knew exactly what SIS were Up to. 185 
In September 1951, encouraged by both the Chairman and the Korean War, the 
JIC decided to carry out a review of its own performance in assessing Communist 
intentions since January 1947.186 Of the papers concerning Germany which were 
reviewed, it was judged that five had already been proved correct and one had "not yet 
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proved correct". 187 By and large they had managed to predict that the Russians were 
unlikely to withdraw from Eastern Germany in either 1947 or 1950, whilst they had 
managed to accurately forecast Soviet unwillingness to cause all out war over Berlin 
since early 1949. They had not yet seen the disaffection and disorder in Western 
Germany that the JIC feared in January 1948. Overall, the number of mistakes by the 
JIC was considered low, but that was received with little comfort: 
Our assessment of Communist intentions has not however, been as good as the small 
number of miscalculations suggests. In the first place we failed altogether to forecast the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and the attack on South Korea in 1950. We have also, in 
many cases, drafted our conclusions somewhat equivocally and so allowed ourselves a fairly wide margin of error. 
The next necessary step in the review process took place within a month. A 
paper entitled, "Present state of our intelligence on the Soviet Union, the European 
Satellites and China, and measures to improve it" was produced in early January 
1952. '88 It recognised that information enabling the forecast of the "exact nature" of 
changes of Soviet policy was scarce due to "a high level of efficiency" in Russian 
security. Secret sources, including sigint were able to provide "partial cover only and 
because of the lack of confirmation cannot always be relied on. 71) The current formula 
for Cold War predictions was: 
For the most part we must rely on a combination of political speculation and such 
limited intelligence as we can obtain on Soviet preparedness for war in the military, air, 
naval, economic and scientific spheres. 
"The acceptance of greater risks and the provision of greater resources" were the only 
ways to ensure the necessary improvement in the standard of intelligence on the 
intentions and capabilities of the Communist countries. 
The JIC knew that occupied Europe and the Satellites were slightly easier targets 
for intelligence-gathering, but even here there were "numerous gaps in our intelligence,, 
and security measures appear to be becoming more restrictive. " Sigint, defectors and 
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deserters and agents were considered to be the best potential sources of intelligence. 
Aerial photographic reconnaissance was still limited until the long range and high flying 
189 Canberra PR7 came into operation in 1953 . Since the last review of intelligence 
gathering methods, in 1950, agents had continued to enter the Soviet bloc either by 
parachute or by boat. SIS in Germany was heavily involved in sending emigres back 
into the Soviet Union and satellites, although given the level of KGB penetration of both 
agent networks and SIS itself, through Kim Philby, these missions were almost 
completely unsuccessful. 190 Ignorant of these problems, the JIC suggested that both 
parachute- and submarine-landed agent operations should be expanded. This also 
required the FO to set up a Working Party organisation to co-ordinate these operations 
as well as to obtain the specific ministerial permission that was required before each 
operation could be conducted. 
An improvement in quality and quantity of staff involved in intelligence was also 
recommended by the JIC. 191 An increase in source material from expanding collection 
and a greater burden of NATO requirements had in fact been met by a reduction in staff 
in some areas. As a result, the JIC thought efforts on collation and evaluation of 
intelligence had suffered. Special grades for civil servants involved in intelligence were 
required in order to provide attractive pay and conditions, as well as opportunities for 
cross-posting across the range of organisations and ministries. 
When Churchill returned to Number 10 as Prime Minister and Minister for 
Defence in October 195 1, a man with vast experience of and passion for intelligence 
returned to the top job in British Politics. 192 With progress already under way on 
German rearmament and the Contractual Agreements, little changed in policy towards 
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Germany under the Conservative Government. '9' Cold War strategy did change, 
however, during the 1950-2 period and not just because of an election result. There had 
been unease in the civilian quarters of Whitehall from early in 1950 with the use of 
covert organisations in stiffing up trouble behind the Iron Curtain as part of a 'liberation' 
plan. 194 Only the Chiefs of Staff tended towards a more aggressive approach to fighting 
the Cold War, more in line with the uncompromising American ambitions set out in the 
NSC 68 "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" of April 1950.195 
The Russia Committee was very wary of making use of Titoist and Yugoslav 
propaganda in Germany in an attempt to fracture the Soviet bloc, although "small but 
successfial" programmes were carried out in both Eastern and Western Germany to 
encourage "deviationism". 196 
In December 1950, however, the Official Committee on Communism 
(Overseas), also known as the Dixon Committee after its Chairman Sir Pierson Dixon, 
gained ministerial approval for limited covert operations in the Satellite States in order 
to "check the gradual isolation of the Satellite countries of Eastern Europe and their 
absorption by Russia, and to reduce the value of these countries in the event of war. ). )197 
r. f By mid 195 1, the JIC noticed that with American support, Eastern European emigre 
organisations had begun to develop into significant anti-Soviet groups, including in 
Germany. 198 Intelligence suggested "widespread opposition to Sovietisation", but this 
remained mainly passive because of "repressive methods used by the Communist 
Governments"'. There were no signs of "indigenous resistance" in the Soviet Zone of 
Germany but many of the defectors from the East had received help along the way from 
sympathetic East Germans. The JIC also reported that groups were trying to set up 
clandestine networks from Western Germany into the Eastern Zone to spread anti-SED 
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and anti-Soviet propaganda. The Chiefs felt that although British covert operations had 
been no more than a "nuisance to the Soviet bloc", if limitations on action were lifted, 
((. operations in Eastern Germany could pay a more significant dividend. " 199 
Towards the end of 195 1, disagreements within the Dixon Committee showed it 
was necessary to pull together future strategy in order to combat the divergence of views 
between the military and diplomats, and between Britain and the United States. 200 The 
Chiefs stuck to their view that more "positive action" was required to win the Cold War, 
since a policy of "containment" would not do the job . 
201 This action should "weaken the 
Communist ideological and military potential internally", especially in Eastern 
Germany. The Chiefs felt "a more realistic and less apprehensive approach" to the 
worries of such action provoking the Russians, would not only bring Britain into line 
with the US, but might also allow "the United Kingdom to have some moderating 
influence on US activities in that sphere. " During this time, fears were at their height in 
Whitehall that the US might make use of their nuclear superiority in a pre-emptive war 
against the Russians. 202 The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), Vice Admiral Eric 
Longley-Cook, wrote a paper for very limited circulation in the summer of 195 1, which 
revealed his belief that some in Washington were eager for war. 
The FO returned fire with their "Future Strategy towards Soviet Russia" paper, 
which appears to have been written as much with the Americans in mind as the 
Chiefs. 203 Although Dixon had been meeting with the Chiefs during the second half of 
1951 in order to emphasise common ground, the basic underlying thrust of the paper 
shows differences remained . 
204 The Permanent Under- Secretary's Committee (PUSC) 
advocated finding a modus vivendi with the Russians, based on some sort of equilibrium 
between the two sides, with "local and limited settlements" solving issues in trouble 
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spots. They concluded "operations designed to liberate the satellites are impracticable 
and would involve unacceptable risks", and where they failed, it left the West in a 
weaker position. The focus needed to be more on psychological warfare, using 
broadcasting, until Western strength had been built up enough to interfere behind the 
Iron Curtain with relative immunity from Soviet counter-punches. The FO wanted 
covert operations to focus on intelligence-gathering rather than raising revolution, 
although they would accept limited, "specialist operations designed either to disrupt the 
machinery of government or the economic structure of satellite States, or to poison 
relations between the satellite Governments and the Soviet Union. " The Russia 
Committee believed any Western pressure on the Russian position in Germany, 
however, would most likely lead to general war. 205 Where the FO and Chiefs did agree 
was on the necessity of keeping an eye on the US and their Cold War plans. 
By July 1952, the Chiefs and the Cabinet's Defence Committee had come to 
accept that the Cold War offensive needed to be founded on Western strength in air 
defence and nuclear weapons, with propaganda as the main weapon. 206 They had 
softened on the need for liberation operations behind the Iron Curtain at the present 
time: 
In prosecuting the Cold War with increasing vigour care must be taken to avoid the 
stimulation of premature reaction in the satellite states. The need for close co-ordination 
of subversive activities with the development of a situation favourable for their success 
was demonstrated during the war. It is the interests of friends and potential rebels 
against Communism that must be considered and not Russian susceptibilities. 
Young asserts that the PUSC view had little impact on Anthony Eden's thinking as 
Foreign Secretary, perhaps because the "the general lines of the paper seem to have 
fitted in with his own approach". 207 During joint conferences in 1952, the British had 
little success in winning over the Americans with regard to special operations in the 
205 "Soviet Reactions to Western Pressure on 'Sore Spots' ", 19 February 1952, reproduced in Young, 
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satellite states. "' Rather as Aldrich puts it, it was the events of June 1953 in Berlin and 
November 1956 in Hungary, that really seem to have been the demonstrators of "the 
5 209 futility of resistance operations against police states' . 
British Intelligence Organisation (Germany) 
The intelligence organisation in Germany was thrown into administrative chaos 
during the early 1950s, by the twin considerations of limited funds and the handover of 
power. Sir Philip Vickery, who had been head of Indian Political Intelligence 1926-47, 
delivered a report to the FO in May 1950, recommending reductions in those parts of the 
intelligence organisation which served the Ifigh Commission .2 
10 The report stated that 
there should be no diminution in the flow of intelligence produced in Germany for 
London on the Soviet Union. Vickery recommended 150 staff should be cut, although 
Robertson instructed Haydon to find 300 officers and junior grades that could go. 211 
Some tasks, such as POW interrogation, were coming to their natural end, so some 
reductions were obviouS. 212 The JIC had to debate the figure, however, after Haydon 
reported that intelligence on Russia would suffer if 300 staff were lost. 213 Whilst they 
agreed with Vickery and Haydon, the FO was unable to persuade the Fligh Commission 
to reverse its decision. The JIC also noted that any loss of intelligence on Western 
Germany was inopportune whilst power was being handed over to the Germans, but this 
was a secondary concern to intelligence on the Soviet Union. 
Vickery attended the JIC on 29 June. 214 In the face of War Office warnings 
about reducing security in Germany, Robertson's demand for extra cuts had been based 
on a belief that in the light of the power granted under the Basic Law and Occupation 
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Statute to the Germans, intelligence work in support of the High Commission should be 
cut. Vickery seems to have been the peacemaker, commenting that it was difficult to 
predict what demands would be placed on intelligence in Germany in the future, so they 
would struggle to see beyond the end of 1950. Whilst he recognised that if the German 
Security Bureaux functioned properly in their early months there ought to be much less 
need for ED to carry out security work, it was too early to bank on this. The debate was 
put on hold until Reilly had made a tour of Germany in july. 215 
During his trip, Reilly managed to persuade Kirkpatrick, Robertson's successor, 
to accept Vickery's original recommendation of a 150 cut during 1950, whilst the 
proposed further cut of 150 for early 1951 ought to be "reviewed in the light of the 
Committee's views" . 
216 Haydon's -final proposals for a reduction of 183 by 31 
December 1950,, to leave ID in Germany with 767 officers and junior grades were 
accepted by the jIC. 217 Since by now more than half of ID's work covered the Soviet 
threat, Reilly suggested that the Service Departments take over the greater part of the 
ID's costs from the FO German Section. 
Major-General John Kirkman became Head of ID and Chairman of JIC(G) in 
January 1951 
. 
218 Reilly's attempt in late 1950 to make the Deputy High Commissioner, 
a FO post, JIC(G) Chairman ex officio failed on administrative grounds. 219 In particular, 
as the ID moved from Herford to Wahnerheide during 195 1, the demands put on 
uncertain communications for the Deputy High Commissioner to fulfil the role would 
have been too great . 
220 Rear Admiral Anthony Buzzard (DNI), reported back to the JIC 
after a visit to Germany in July 1952, that the distance between the JIC(G) and the 
221 Service Headquarters was likely to cause critical problems during a crisis. In March 
195 11 JIC(G) was given a new charter that reflected the organisational changes that were 
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going on in Germany . 
222 The Committee now reported to the High Commissioner's 
Military Conference in Germany rather than to the High Commissioner, but the 
responsibility to j1C (London) remained. 
In December 1950, an enquiry into the charter and functions of the EE) had 
begun. A draft revised charter rearranged the primary and secondary tasks of the 
Organisation, placing the production of intelligence on Russia above intelligence on 
Germany. 223 That much remained settled during the following months, unlike the 
question of responsibility for ID. Once SACEUR had been introduced, the 
Commanders-in-Chief, Germany, to whom ID partially answered, would "bear certain 
responsibilities towards SHAPE. -)M4 The JIC did not want ID to fall under SHAPE 
responsibility, although it was clear there would need to be contacts between the two . 
221 
It was also necessary to transfer the Division's financial burden from the ever-shrinking 
Control Commission to the High Commissioner's Military Conference; that is from the 
FO to the War Office. 226 These matters had to be considered amongst the uncertainty of 
how the full handover of power to the Germans would affect the organisation. The JIC 
noted that the doubts about the future status and size of the Division was resulting in 
staff resigning in order to take up more secure contracts elsewhere. 
This question over the future of the ID was sent up to Permanent Under- 
Secretary level, with meetings between the MoD, the Service Departments and the 
FO. 227 Here it was decided that the transfer from the FO had to take place and studies by 
both JIC and JIC(G) of the mechanics of the move began soon after . 
228 The personnel 
problems were not helped by the planned change. Kirkman reported to the JIC that the 
FO was reluctant to fill vacancies whilst the transfer was being prepared and the War 
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Office could not yet take the responsibility. Reilly made another trip to Germany in July 
1951 and discovered that nearly all of the contracts for staff in the Division were due to 
expire in September 1952.229 Unless some sort of security of tenure could be offered in 
early 1952, it was likely that a serious loss of staff would occur. 
The JIC decided that the ID's charter needed slightly amending, as a bridge 
between the transfer to the War ýOffice in October 1951 and the final outcome of the 
Contractual negotiations with the Germans some time in 1952, in order to ensure 
political intelligence reports continued to reach the High Commission . 
230 Anew title for 
the Division was also required which would make it clear that it did not come under the 
command of SHAPE . 
23 1 British Intelligence Organisation (Germany), or BIO(G), made 
the point. 232 The Chief, ID became the Commander, BIO(G). 
The War Office took up the question of contracts in April 1952, barely in time 
for the September expiry date. 233 Kirkman's answer was "to offer established posts to 
some 50 to 60 selected officers, but short contracts accompanied by a gratuity 
scheme. -5-)234 He was very concerned that the normal processes of promotion and filling 
existing positions were failing to function as a result of the uncertainties about the future 
of BIO(G). One happy coincidence of the staff problems in Germany may have been 
their role in Leo Long's departure from his senior job in M114 . 
235 Recruited pre-war by 
Anthony Blunt, Long had been spying for the Russians since he joined the Intelligence 
Corps in 1940. It seems that his work for the Soviets reduced when he joined the 
intelligence section of the British Control Commission in 1945, but Blunt still 
occasionally visited him in Germany to pick up information of interest, until 
Long left in 
1952. Whilst JIC(G) had been making concerted efforts to tighten security by limiting 
the circulation of papers and removing Communist Party members 
from the Control 
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Commission since 1950, they failed to discover Long. 236 Requests for extra manpower 
237 for protection duty all across the British Zone were refused. JIC(G) fought a 
particularly tough battle in 1951 with all of the British departments in Germany to 
238 persuade them to tighten security, particularly regarding the Germans they employed. 
Changes in responsibility, security and personnel were not the only arenas of 
trouble for intelligence in Germany. In late 1952, the Commanders-in-Chief Committee 
(Germany) passed judgement on JIC(G), stating that it was "unable in its present form to 
meet the increasing requirements of the Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs for 
Intelligence appreciations at short notice and for day to day Intelligence on Service 
. ), 239 matters. The problem was tripartite and in no small way a result of earlier 
organisational changes. During 1952, the British forces in Germany became an 
increasing part of the SHAPE organisation. The BAOR became the dominant 
component of the NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), with the BAOR C-in-C 
becoming the NORTHAG C-in-C, responsible for the front from Hamburg to Kassel in 
the event of a Soviet invasion. The first part of the problem was that BAOR HQ at Bad 
Oeynhausen became the NORTHAG HQ, putting the JIC(G) and BIO(G), in their new 
Wahnerheide location, some 150 miles from the military command they had to support. 
Demands from BAOR for short term intelligence appreciations for NATO planning 
purposes grew but, of course, it had been specifically decided in 1951 that JIC(G) and 
BIO(G) had to remain outside the Allied organisation; the second part of the problem. 
Finally, in the event of war, both JIC(G) and BIO(G) were to disappear, even though the 
requirement for joint intelligence under the Commanders-in-Chief would remain. 
Changes were required, whilst recognising the peculiarities of intelligence in 
Germany. The organisations had the opportunity to provide "intelligence of wider scope 
and of a longer term nature which is urgently required by London departments' 
however, this information could not necessarily just be passed to the local commanders 
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to satisfy their requirements. The Commanders-in-Chief accepted that a good deal of 
this intelligence was unsuitable for sharing within NATO circles. The problems with 
information exchange amongst the NATO allies in Germany had been put before the JIC 
by the JIC(G) on more than one occasion. 240 There was, however, a critical need for a 
political element to all intelligence and planning in Germany and in particular Berlin, 
since every move was "deeply influenced by political considerations". 241 
The JIC(G) discussed the question of passing more sensitive political and 
economic intelligence to SHAPE from May 195 1.242 Special channels were established 
between the military parts of the High Commission organisation and SHAPE to ensure a 
limited flow of intelligence from the British to the Allied effort. 243 In the summer of the 
following year, the JIC considered handing over responsibility for the exchange of all 
information with the NATO commands to the Commanders-in-Chief in Germany, so 
that the process could be speeded Up. 244 
The JIC(G) began to search for a permanent solution to the problematical 
relationship between national intelligence and the Allied Commands in August 1952. 
Some sort of new JIC (Northern Forces) seemed to be the best option to those stationed 
in Germany. 245 There would be only one JIC in Germany, but there would be a standing 
group to deal with the operational requirements of the Northern Army GrOUP. 246 The 
final proposal put forward to the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and to the JIC 
(London) was for a permanent intelligence group (with the working title "Northern 
Forces Intelligence Group", or NFIG) based at the Northern Forces Headquarters whilst 
the JIC(G) remained in its current role and position. 247 
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NFIG was to be made up of the three senior Service intelligence officers, a JIB 
representative and a political representative, with the specific task of providing day-to- 
day intelligence for military planning purposes . 
24" The JIC initially received the plan 
with a good deal of scepticism, fearing that the two-organisation solution would lead to 
conflicts in authority. 249 They did, however, eventually approve the establishment of the 
Group, with the stipulation that it should be limited in scope and subordinate to the 
JIC(G), although in the event of war the whole effort would be put under the NFIG. 250 
The name of the organisation was finally fixed as Joint Services Intelligence Committee 
(Northern Forces) or JSIC(NF). The JIC granted a trial period of six months for the new 
organisation, to be followed by a further review. 251 
The 1950-52 period was Unsettled to say the least for the intelligence 
organisation in Germany. Staff had been lost throughout and reviews repeatedly 
questioned the functions and administration of the 'sharp end' of British intelligence. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of all revealed itself after the signature of the Bonn Treaty 
in May 1952, which enabled the end of Allied occupation of Germany and forewarned 
of the imminent end to the occupation costs paid by the Germans to the Allies. Kirkman 
notified the JIC in July 1952 that whilst the financial future of his organisation was 
uncertain, he considered it unwise to keep intelligence efforts at full pelt until his 
Deutschmark budget ran out. 252 He thought it better to begin to economise where 
possible and make sacrifices in order to prolong his resou rces, and to do this the JIC had 
to prioritise the activities of BIO(G). The JIC was provided with a list of activities to 
choose from by Kirkman, but they were unable to agree on a ranking order for 
economies since no single item for sacrifice could be agreed on by all of the 
departments. 253 
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A paper produced by Kirkman for the JIC showed that the Germans were paying 
254 approximately two-thirds of the total BIO(G) budget . 
The assumption for the future 
was that the Germans would make no contribution to Allied intelligence efforts, since 
they would be contributing financially to their own defence under the EDC. Making an 
assessment on which areas of activities in Germany could be lost was almost impossible 
since the products from Germany "covered intelligence over the whole range of 
priorities". In April 1952, the Treasury had required that the MoD reduce the costs of its 
Service Attaches abroad by at least 15 percent, but cuts in Germany had been 
deliberately overlooked. 255 Material for which there was no alternative source to 
Germany would have to be built into the future intelligence budgetary requirements. In 
December, a JIC delegation was formed to "re-examine the provision of intelligence 
from Germany in anticipation of probable financial Cuts. -)-)256 The intelligence staffs of 
the services and BRI)(MIS were outside of the terms of reference, since the delegation's 
only concern was to find ways to reduce the L2.4 million budget of BIO(G) without 
damaging the supply of vital intelligence. BIO(G) and the JIC had to wait until 1953 to 
257 discover where the axe would fall . 
Collection 
Amidst the administrative uncertainty, the supply of intelligence had to be 
maintained. The JIC(G)-IRD-BBC campaign to encourage deserters continued to 
develop. Increased Soviet security measures made it more difficult for defectors to flee 
to the West, however. 258 Into 1952, Russian countermeasures such as jamming BBC 
broadcasts advanced . 
259 The value of the encouragement campaign was demonstrated, 
nevertheless, by the few individuals that had managed to cross the frontier stating they 
had done so because of BBC broadcasts. 260 In August 1952, the IRD intensified the 
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campaign. Broadcasts included "direct incitement" to defect, as opposed to the more 
general reports of better living in the West . 
26 1 The JIC agreed on the high value of the 
operation, acknowledging the small numbers of defectors involved but also the relatively 
small costs. In March 1952, the JIC, Chiefs of Staff and FO agreed that a defector with 
low intelligence value, who had killed a guard in the process of fleeing, should be 
handed back to the Russians to face prosecution for murder. 262 The JIC wanted to be 
sure that the publicity aspects of the case were carefully handled so as to minimise the 
damage to the encouragement campaign. 
The disposal of defectors was a problem, since many needed language and skills 
training. 
263 The JIC Sub-Committee on Defectors proposed that "defectors who could 
not be resettled elsewhere within six weeks of arriving in the British Zone of Germany, 
should be transferred to the United Kingdom. , 
264 This meant that one of the long-term 
265 defector training centres in Germany could be closed .A further centre that had been 
set up in Germany to handle defectors, Number II Assessment Centre at Bad Salzufen, 
was ear-marked for removal to the UK, so that under SIS and Security Service control, 
the staff could continue their operations. 266 
Securing the services of German scientists and technicians was as much of an 
intelligence battleground as it had been in the years before. Anyone, even of minimal 
value, was snapped UP. 267 In mid-1951, the JIC along w ith their American colleagues 
drew up a list of those Germans who would have to be evacuated from the country in the 
event of a Soviet attack, because they were too important to fall into Russian hands. 268 
The STIIB-run Operation DRAGON RETURN was given a new set of targets in 
September 1950 when 218 Germans who had been working on guided missile and 
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aircraft research and development in the USSR returned to Eastern Germany. 26' The 
operation helped to prove the value of STIB and ultimately save it from disbandment, 
when its existence came under threat from the High Commission in late 1950.270 The 
JIC was called on to assist the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC), the body 
overseeing the fate of Germans working for the British, in reducing the risk of the 
Russians making equivalent use of former British employees. 27' Because the employees 
were thought to be irreplaceable, the DRPC rejected the JIC's recommendation that the 
only way to keep down the security risk was to limit the knowledge the Germans had of 
British projects either by keeping them to lesser research or by sending them back to 
Germany quickly. 272 Instead, since Operation MATCH BOX had reached the 
conclusion of its original function as a recruiting facility, STIB was asked to convert its 
services to an employment agency for Germans returning from Britain in order to keep 
them out of Soviet hands. 273 
During 1950, the briefing system for BRIXMlS by agencies in Germany and 
London was improved so that they could better perform a full intelligence function. 274 A 
delay in the Russians issuing passes to BRDMS for several months in 1950, limiting 
the Mission to travel between Berlin and their base in Potsdam, represented a significant 
loss of vital information on Soviet troop developments in the Eastern Zone. 275 The 
position of the British Mission was always precarious since its activities were known to 
the Russians; this meant the only action available to the JIC in response, however, was 
to treat SOXMIS in exactly the same way. 276 Since both Missions were carrying out 
intelligence-gathering activities with at least some knowledge on the part of their hosts, 
it has to be assumed that each side placed enough value on their own Mission and was 
confident enough of the ineffectiveness of the opposing Mission, that this kind of 
observance of strict reciprocity, posturing and bluffing was the best way to solve 
269 DEFE41/91. sTiBnOO3/7113 "Operation DRAGON RETURN", II October 1950 
270 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)134th Meeting, 8 December 1950 
271 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)1 I Vh Meeting, 3 November 1950 
272 CAB 159/9, JIC(51)46th Meeting, 27 April 1951 
273 DEFE41/66, JIC(Ger)(M)(51)3,13 February 195 1; CAB 159/9, JIC(51)12th Meeting, I February 1951 
274 DEFE41/65, JIC(Ger)(M)(50)12,29 August 1950; DEFE41/67, JlC(Ger)(M)(52)l, 22 January 1952 
275 CAB 159/7, JIC(50)60th Meeting, 14 June 1950 
276 CAB 159/8, JIC(50)70th Meeting, 7 July 1950 
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problems for both sides. 
277 The issue of six month travel permits to the British Mission 
early in 1951 without the usual fuss was welcome news for the j1C. 
278 
In order not to antagonise the Russians, the FO wanted to keep BRDMS out of 
the most sensitive areas of the Soviet Zone, especially where there was coverage by 
other sources. 279 One of the roles that BRIXMIS could perform well, however, was to 
double-check intelligence from other sources. The Air Ministry in particular tasked its 
section of the Mission with confirming material already received from sigint or photo 
reconnaissance. The risks in touring the Soviet Zone were constant, as witnessed by a 
tour hunting for new Russian aircraft types in December 1951 . 
280 The Mission car was 
shot at, halted and detained by the Russians. On the release of the tour leader, Wing 
Commander Hutchinson, the Russians protested at his behaviour, so much so that the 
British High Commissioner and Mission Chief, Brigadier Dewhurst, recommended the 
Wing Commander's withdrawal. The JIC realised that nothing could be allowed to 
jeopardise the future of the Mission and that casualties were to be expected "in 
operations of this nature", so had no choice but to sacrifice Hutchinson for the good of 
the Mission. 
In 195o,, BRDMS answered exclusively and directly to the High 
Commissioner,, although both the Services and JIC(G) were able to offer briefings. 281 
The Contractual Agreements presented an opportunity to change this administration of 
the Mission,, especially since the High Commissioner was due to change into an 
Ambassador. 282 SOXMIS could not be accredited to the British Ambassador who in 
turn was accredited to the Federal German Government, since this represented a defacto 
Soviet recognition of the FRG and a British recognition of the GDR if BRIXMIS were 
277 DEFE41/65, JIC(Ger)(M)(50)17.12 December 1950 
278 CAB159/9, JIC(51)2 nd Meeting, 4 January 1951 
279 CAB 159/11, JIC(52)20thMeeting, 13 February 1952 
280 CAB 159/11, JIC(52)e Meeting, 16 January 1952 
281 AIR37/1454, JIC(Ger)(50)218 "Activities of BRIXMS", 4 November 1950; CINC/P(50)56,30 
November 1950 
282 AIR37/1454, PSO/P(51)93 "Status of BRDMS and SOXMIS after signature of the Contractual 
Agreements", 29 November 1951 
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accredited by the Soviet Ambassador . 
283 The Commander-in-Chief, BAOR, instead 
became responsible for BRIXMIS and issued passes to SOXNHS. 
284 The War Office 
took over the financial and administrative burdens of BRDMS from the FO in a very 
quiet transfer. 285 
The tour reports of the British Mission from 1950-52 reveal actually how 
valuable BR1XMIS could be both in terms of liaison and intelligence-gathering. On two 
occasions the recovery of crashed British aircraft in the Soviet Zone was done by 
BRIXMIS, performing a liaison role in keeping with its original function. 286 
Intelligence-gathering covered the Bereitschaften,, Soviet military manoeuvres and 
training, as well as non-military aspects of life in the Soviet Zone. 
287 Their ability to 
offer support during political machinations was shown during April and May 1952, 
when tour reports noted "there has as yet been no major physical reaction to the signing 
288 of the Contractual Agreements by the Western Powers". The tour conditions 
fluctuated, however, often with the wider political mood, Of the 68 tours carried out 
between September 1950 and February 195 1, only three were held up by the East 
German Police . 
289 By mid- 195 1, in the midst of Western negotiations over the future of 
Germany, the hold-ups were becoming frequent . 
290 BRIXMIS had to report that touring 
was "difficult" during the first months of 1952 due to increased security, a worsening 
291 
relationship with the Russians and restrictions on their freedom of movement . 
Nevertheless, an elaborate decoy system involving more than one car going out at a 
time,, with one going on a real mission and the others taking pointless trips round the 
292 
countryside was enabling two-thirds of real tours to get away without being trailed . 
British complaints to General Chuikov meant a brief let up in shadowing, but by the end 
283 AIR37/1454,143/2/11/52, Kirkpatrick to Air Marshall Sir Robert Foster, 10 October 1952 
284 AIR37/1454, DO 6511/25 CCS, 4 November 1952 
285 CAB 159/11, JIC(52)20thMeeting, 13 February 1952 
286 WO208/4978, BRX/BLN/R(50)10, October 1950; W0208/4987, BRX/405/18, August 1952; 
AIR37/1454, JIC(Ger)(50)218,4 November 1950 
287 W0208/4980, BRX/BLN/R(50)1 1, November 1950; W0208/4982, BRX/405/8, November 195 1; 
BRX/TS/405/6/1,14 September 1951 
288 W0208/4984, BRX/405/15, May 1952 
289 W0208/4978, BRX/BLN/R(50)10, October 1950; 
290 W0208/4982, BRX/TS/405/2, May 1951 
291 W0208/4983, BRX1405/1 1, January 1952; BRX/405/12, February 1952; BRX/405/13, March 1952 
292 W0208/4983, BRX/405/14, April 1952; W0208/4984, BRX/405/15, May 1952 
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of the year when BRIXMIS was trying to carry out tours of Soviet military training 
areas, the trailing and restrictions were worse than ever. 
293 
Conclusions 
The JIC's role in the rearmament debate was more significant than it had been in 
the Berlin blockade. The January 1951 paper on the Soviet threat stands out as rare 
example of the Committee wading obviously into policy-making. In doing so, the JIC 
explicitly supported the Chiefs of Staff view that rearmament was necessary; this came 
on top of the more constant function whereby the Committee described the threat from 
Soviet forces and the developing Bereitschaften. The JIC's impact did not lie just in 
advocating rearmament, however. As Mawby writes, when the February 1951 
assessment of the likelihood of war suggested that rearmament might speed up the 
outbreak of war with the Russians, the government responded by employing a policy of 
delay. 
It is noteworthy that the JIC was quickly able to allay fears in 1950 that war in 
Korea was a prelude to action in Europe and again in 1952 that completion of the Bonn 
and EDC treaties would result in Soviet aggression. This relied on the sort of military 
intelligence that British intelligence in Germany could handle, as it had done during the 
blockade. Beyond the immediate estimate of Soviet preparations for war, however, the 
JIC struggled; intelligence had not developed sufficiently to provide anything more than 
confused assessments of exact Soviet force strengths throughout the 1950-2 period. 
Whilst the Committee offered reassurance that war was not imminent, they provided a 
worrying picture of growing Soviet and East German forces. 
The predictions for Soviet intentions were of mixed success. The Committee, 
without specific intelligence, often seem to have hedged their bets by suggesting that the 
Russians could put pressure on Berlin; in June 1950, in early 1951 when examining the 
293 W0208/4986, BRX/405/17, July 1952; W0208/4990, BRX/405/22. December 1952 
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probable outcomes of the CFM and in May 1952 after the completion of the Bonn and 
EDC treaties. As the tension over German rearmament relaxed, the JIC's assessments 
became more accurate when they predicted the Russians would seek to build up the 
Bereitschaften as a response to West German forces. It is not obvious, however, that 
after the September 1951 internal review of JIC performance, assessments became any 
less equivocal. 
In the administrative arena., the JIC and JIC(G) were properly aware of how the 
changing politics and finances in Germany would affect intelligence; discussions began 
early enough. Setting up relations with the infant German intelligence services was 
clearly prudent. The solutions devised to manage the decline in resources and increase 
in functions were not always sensible, however; recognising the importance of 
intelligence from Germany whilst simultaneously failing to make adequate arrangements 
for staff seems somewhat absurd. It appears that the Committee were often aware of 
problems and shortcomings, as with the constant recognition that collection was 
deficient but not so often able to invent successful solutions. 
134 
Chapter Three: 1953 - 1954 
Riot 
Intelligence test 
The events of June 1953 offer a chance to make a judgement on whether British 
intelligence performed better in that key Cold War moment than it did either in the 
Berlin blockade or in the Korean War. Had intelligence collection developed enough to 
allow the JIC to move away from its track record of good assessments of Cold War 
mood to successful, specific warnings of impending crisis? In 1954, as Chairman of the 
JIC, Patrick Dean produced a brief for the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, on the 
results of British intelligence activities that partly answers this question. ' He told the 
JIC that "it was perhaps not always realised that policy decisions were often taken 
against a background provided by Intelligence, a background now so well known that 
knowledge of it had become virtually subconscious. " Dean noted that defence and 
defence research policy was now "based almost entirely") on intelligence appreciations. 
For him, one of the key duties of the intelligence agencies was "to establish a pattern of 
normal activities",, so that the abnormalities were always noticed. Furthermore, it was 
essential that on the day war broke out, as much information about the enemy was in 
British hands as possible as; "there would never be time to make good deficiencies once 
war had broken out. " 
Dean's words defined the relationship between intelligence and policy; what lies 
beneath them is fascinating. The JIC told the Chiefs of Staff in March 1954 that 
"although we had no grounds for complacency, within the limits of manpower and 
finance a great deal of knowledge on the Soviet bloc had been gained. ). )2 The major gaps 
were "Russian strategy and intentions on the highest level and the early stages of 
development of new Russian weapons. " The JIC acknowledged that a "great deal of 
1 CAB 159/17, JIC(54)85"' Meeting, 28 September 1954 
2 DEFE4/69, COS(54)36t" Meeting, 31 March 1954 
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intelligence" came from "purely overt sources", so there's little surpr1se about the nature 
of the gapS. 3 From 1947, the overriding question for the JIC was whether war was 
coming. Intelligence, and particularly those collection elements in Germany, had 
improved enough for the JIC to estimate they would have up to 30 days warning of a full 
scale Russian assault on Western Europe, although a small-scale sudden attack would be 
virtually impossible to predict. 
By 1954, the armed services felt they had good coverage of the military targets 
within Eastern Germany that were potential indicators of aggression. 5 An overview of 
the weekly JIC reviews that concerned East Germany reveals that the vast majority of 
information being collected on a week-by-week basis was military. What is more, some 
thing like 70 percent of that information suggests it was collected fi7om de visu sources,, 
such as BRfXMS and low-level SIS rail- and troop-watching agents. 6 Political 
information on East Germany was rare and usually labelled only confidential, the vast 
majority of which came straight from diplomatic reporting or open sources, such as 
Russian newspapers. ' 
Intelligence collection in Germany had clearly been the frontline of the Cold War 
in Europe and the effort that was going into it by 1953 was commensurate with its 
centrality. The SIS station in Berlin was M16's largest with about one hundred staff. 8 
There were plenty of people willing to supply them with information in return for 
payment, with some individual agents working for more than one organisation or 
country at a time. So long as these agents were assumed to be working for multiple 
agencies, their information could still be of some value if treated with care. 9 By 1953, 
SIS officers were also having some success in recruiting agents within the East German 
authorities, although it is unclear whether these were of any real value. 10 Peter Lunn 
3 CAB 159/15, JIC(54)17'h Meeting, 25 February 1954 
4 CAB 158/15, JIC(53)6 I(Final) "Warning of attack-, 18 August 195"), 
5 DEFE41/80, JSIG(G)/P(54)30 "Direction of intelligence effort", 19 July 1954 
' Of 191 reports over the 1953-4 period, 135 are obviously recognisable as de visu. 
'For example, CAB 159/13, JIC(53)2d Meeting, 8 January 1953; JIC(53)gP Meeting, 22 January 1953 
8 Blake, George, No Other Choice, (London: Jonatim Cape, 1990), p. 168 
9 Private information 
II CAB 159/14, JIC(53)79h Meeting, 23 July 1953; Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 211 
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took over as head of the Berlin station in 1953, with the express intention of looking for 
telephone cables to tap, building on the work he had done in Vienna. ' 1 What sigint there 
was in Germany at this time tended to be low-level, focused on elint monitoring of 
Soviet radar and interception of voice traffic using stations such as RAF Gatow in 
Berlin. 12 The JIC described the switch to higher frequency radio links within the Soviet 
Army in Germany as "a very serious development from our point of view", "everything 
possible" was done to break the new system. 13 
The intelligence BRIXMIS gathered was highly valued military information, 
often labelled 'Top Secret' in JIC reports. 14 In January 1954, BRIXMIS were granted 
permission to ignore Russian restrictions on their movement, if the objective was rated 
sufficiently high and they had received permission beforehand from the High 
Commission. 15 The Mission's work-rate increased through 1953 and 1954, as their 
intelligence-gathering function became more ingrained. In September 1953, they carried 
out 56 tours, covering 26,200 miles! 16 Additionally, more of their work tended to be 
done in liaison with other organisations such as GCHQ, RAF photo reconnaissance 
teams and their US counterparts, so that individual pieces of intelligence could be 
double-checked. 17 
Defectors continued to be valuable, although the numbers remained small. The 
campaign to encourage defection combined, under constant review, BBC broadcasts and 
covertly distributed unattributable leaflets. 18 The value of the campaign was contested 
within the JIC, however, whilst the Home Office stressed they were unwilling to have 
11 Stafford, David, Spies Beneath Berlin (London: John Murray, 2002) p. 86; see next chapter for more on 
the Berlin tunnel operation. 
12 Aldrich, Richard, "G-CHQ and Sigint in the Early Cold War, 1945-70", Intelligence and National 
Security, Vol. 16,1, Spring 2001, pp. 67-96 
13 COS(54)36thMeeting 
14 For example, CAB159/13, JIC(53)19thMeeting, 19 February 1953; JIC(53)30'hMeeting, 18 March 
1953 
's CAB159/15, JIC(54)lst Meeting, 6 January 1954 
16 WO208/4999, BRX/405/31 Monthly report September 1953,10 October 1953 
17 W0208/4995, BRX/405/27 Monthly report May 1953,29 May 1953; W0208/5000, BRX/405/32 
Monthly report October 1953,7 November 1953 
11 CAB159/13, JIC(53)49hMeeting, 13 May 1953 
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messages put out that would encourage all types of refugee to Britain. " The FO in 
particular was unhappy at the use of direct-incitement-to-defect messages within the 
distributed leaflets 
. 
20 Better security measures on the Eastern side of the border and 
improved morale amongst the indigenous armed forces was thought to have reduced the 
flow of defectors coming west. 21 Some high quality defectors, such as Nikolai 
Khokhlov ftom the MVD's Second Chief Directorate, still found ways to come across. 22 
In September 1954, the JIC concluded that it was not politically desirable to extend the 
campaign of encouragement whilst the West was trying to improve relations with the 
Russians. 23 They did, however, agree to a review of the material being used in the 
campaign to see whether more valuable defectors could be induced across the frontier. 
German scientists and technicians maintained their value as sources on Russian 
weapons development and industry. Although the JIC with the DPRC decided to 
abandon the list of those scientists they wanted to deny to the Russians in the event of 
war, useful East Germans were still contacted. 24 The ambition, however, had moved 
away from inducing defection to recruiting the Germans as long-term agents-in-place. 25 
By 1954, British intelligence had interviewed about a quarter of the 2500 returning 
scientists and technicians about their work in Russia. 26 Maddrell writes that these 
Germans provided a "considerable amount of intelligence") on atomic energy, guided 
missiles, aircraft, electronics and more, although because of the way the Russians 
employed them, the returnees were unable to provide much "up-to-date intelligence on 
research and development"' . 
27 
19 CAB159/14. JIC(53)92nd Meeting, 26 August 1953 
20 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)133d Meeting, 23 December 1953 
21 CAB 159/15, JIC(54)240'Meeting, 18 March 1954 
22 For more on Khokhlov, see Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 433-5; PREMI 1/772, PM/IK/54/75 "The 
Khokblov Case", 8 May 1954 
23 CAB 159/17, JIC(54)8 I st Meeting, 15 September 1954 
24 CAB 158/18, JIC(54)79 "Denial of German scientists to the Soviet Bloc", 22 September 1954 
25 Maddirell, Spying on Science, pp. 188-9 
26 DEM 1/16 1, Returnee Exploitation Group No EG 100 "List of German scientists and technicians who 
have returned from the USSR to the Soviet Zone of Germany", 19 August 1954; Maddrell cannot confirm 
this f1gure, Spying on Science, pp. 187-8 
27 Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 205 
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Detailing collection of intelligence is only part of the story, however, since it was 
through the assessment and distribution of JIC reports that intelligence had a chance to 
affect policy decisions. There is little doubt that under Dean's Chairmanship, which 
began in April 1953, the JIC tried to make serious attempts to widen their assessments to 
cover such matters as long-term Soviet economic PoliCY. 28 But perhaps the biggest 
change made to reporting during this period was the advent of the Weekly Review of 
Current Intelligence (WRCI). The weekly Perimeter Review of events the JIC had 
carried out since the blockade was not written up into an agreed document, but rather 
individual members of the Committee drafted the items discussed and distributed them 
to their departmentS. 29 The VV`RCI procedure required the JIC secretariat to produce a 
draft summary of briefs provided after the relevant departmental heads of section had 
met . 
30 The JIC then saw the summary and the original briefs to agree a final version of 
the WRCI. Dean noted that "the idea of producing a Summary had the advantage, 
amongst other things of giving some publicity to the work of the Committee. " It 
mattered to him that the work of his committee had the greatest possible influence. The 
first VVRCI was produced on 8 July 1954 and began, as many did thereafter, "There are 
no indications of Soviet military aggression. , 31 
Measures had improved in terms of collection, assessment and distribution by the 
end of 1954. The immediate question, however, is did the intelligence system function 
well enough in the first half of 1953 to ensure the policy-makers were not left flat- 
footed? There is a valid argument that says overall British policy would not have 
changed with or without good intelligence, because successive governments had already 
decided against liberation operations. 32 This view does not, however, invalidate analysis 
of intelligence performance during 1953 since clearly it mattered that British responses 
to Cold War developments were based on as much accurate information as possible. 
28 CAB 158/16. JIC(53)117(Final) "Soviet bloc econonlic policy and defence", I February 1954 
29 CAB 159/15, JIC(54)e Meeting, 14 January 1954 
30 CAB159/16, JIC(54)5e Meeting, I July 1954 
31 CAB 158/18, JIC(54)66/1 WRCI, 8 July 1954 
32 See previous chapter 
139 
The run-up to 17 June 1953 
JIC estimates put the Soviet Group of Occupying Forces, Germany (GOFG) at 
33 380,000 troops plus 20,000 Security troops in April 1953 
. 
The Joint Services 
Intelligence Group (Germany) QSIG(G), formerly JSIC(NF)34 ) reckoned that there had 
been an increase of some 40,000 since March 1952, putting their figure at around 
405,000. " This placed the GOFG at somewhere near 90 percent of their war 
establishment. The Soviet Air Force in Germany, however, was assessed at only 66 per 
cent of its peace establishment. BRIXMIS found themselves trying to gather this sort of 
information under increased restrictions, including more shadowing of tours and a larger 
number of out of bounds signs near military and industrial installations. 36 
Very useful intelligence was available which indicated that, for the first time, the 
Russians were planning huge winter exercises in Germany. The JIC reached this 
37 
conclusion after information was received on Soviet orders for rolling stock . 
This is a 
rare occasion where intelligence seems to have been received before the movements had 
taken place. The origin of this material is noted as "reliable British and Allied sources 11) il 
possibly indicating some sort of sigint or valuable agent. By the end of February, "ten 
of the thirteen major training areas [were] active". 38 By March, however, British and 
39 American sources agreed that the unusual activity had ended . 
The JIC had enough information to map the ORBAT of the East German Air 
Force in January 1953.40 Other developments in East German rearmament were taking 
place: the creation of registration offices in towns, along with quotas for supplying 
numbers of recruits to the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP), was thought to be the 
33 CAB158/15, JIC(53)14(Final) "Soviet and Satellite War Potential, 1953-56", 10 April 1953 
34 The name was changed to JSIG(G) in March 1953, DEFE5/45, COS(53)128 "Joint Intelligence for 
Northern Forces", 3 March 1953 
35 DEFE41/80, JSIG(G)/P(53)5(Final) "Increase in Soviet readiness for war I March 1952 -I March 
1953", 20 April 1953 
36 W0208/4991, BRX/405/23, BRDMS Monthly report January 1953,30 January 1953 
37 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)19'h Meeting, 19 February 1953 
38 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)22nd Meeting, 26 February 1953 
39 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)25"' Meeting, 5 March 1953 
40 CAB159/13, JIC(53)9th Meeting, 22 January 1953 
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introduction of conscription . 
41 A defecting engineer reported on the development of 
harbour f 42 acilities on Ruegen Island on the Baltic. The installations were designed to 
allow destroyers to dock, facilitate amphibious operations and provide submarine 
shelters. But despite improvements across all three of the East German services, the 
JSIG(G) still believed that the GDR forces were limited in operational capacity. " 
Within the KVP alone, there were an estimated 90,000 men, but a poor standard of 
training, maladministration and a lack of vehicles led the JSIG(G) to believe that these 
forces could only be used within the GDR frontiers, including West Berlin. If these 
problems were quickly rectified, the JSIG(G) thought that the KVP would be ready for 
other active operations in 1954, 
The JIC, however, was not only concerned with the military developments in the 
GDR; deductions about Russian foreign policy were also necessary. In July 1952, the 
SED had announced plans for "building Socialism" and the Committee knew that central 
and local government had been reorganised, rearmament had quickened, the GDR-FRG 
border had been tightened, transport links between East and West Berlin had been cut, 
laws akin to the other Communist states had been drawn up and "severe sentences were 
-) 44 LC awarded in various espionage trials' . 
The conclusion was that, appearing to accept 
the continued division of Germany for the time being, the Soviet Government began 
[during late 1952] to accelerate the Sovietisation of the Eastern Zone". In January 1953, 
Major-General Coleman, the British Commandant in Berlin, reported that as a 
consequence, "[p]robably never before has the regime been so unpopular. -)A5 
According to the JIC, the first steps towards collectivisation of agriculture had 
been accompanied by the "inevitable results". "severe food shortag&' were used as an 
41 The Bereitschaften became the KVP in 1952. CAB159/13, JIC(53)22ýd Meeting, 26 February 1953 
42 CAB 159/13, JIC (53) 36hMeeting, I April 1953 
43 DEFE41/80, JSIG(G)/P(53)10 "The aggressive potential of the East German Para-Military Forces", 30 
April 1953 
44 CAB159/13, JIC(53)19'hMeeting, 19 February 1953; CAB158/15, JIC(53)29(Hnal) "Survey of World 
Communism in 1952", 28 April 1953 
45 F0371/103838, CS 1016/3, Kirkpatrick to FO including Coleman's "Report on political developments 
in the last quarter of 1952", 21 January 1953 
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excuse to purge both remaining opposition parties and the SED. 46 In January, the 
Committee noted that Karl Hamann, the Minister of Trade, and his State Secretary, 
Rudolf Albrecht, had been arrested in a prelude to show trials over the failings within 
the economy. 47 Georg Dertinger, the Foreign Minister, was arrested for espionage, 
echoing the charges made at the show trial of Rudolph Slansky, the Secretary General of 
the Czech Communist Party, in December 1952.48 
The JIC reported that there were two causes of the shortages: planned shortages 
as a result of the focus on building stockpiles through production and investment on 
certain goods and industries; and unplanned shortages which were likely in all inflexible, 
49 
planned economies. The burden of rearmament on the GDR economy was 
considerable, made worse by poor management and the prioritisation of military over 
civil production, whilst collectivisation could "only dark[en] the outlook for the 
consumer for some time to come. "50 The Committee did not think all these measures 
were irreversible, however,, since "such a course could always be arrested to meet any 
change in the general situation. , 51 
The economic and political conditions in East Germany were observed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Spice, the economic representative on BRDMS. 52 Whilst 
the Western press were reporting that the GDR was close to collapse because of famine, 
mass refugees, stampedes for food and general chaos, Spice reported, "on the contrary, 
the East German Government,, and certainly its Soviet masters, have no such ideas, and 
the country is now in a ruthless grip of control the like of which it has never known 
before. , 53 Spice had noted some food shortages and the flight of older East Germans, 
and he anticipated that the GDR authorities would soon put a stop to any economically 
valuable people leaving the zone. According to JIC figures, 48,, 700 people fled 
46 JIC(53)29(Final) 
47 CAB159/13, JIC(53)2nd Meeting, 8 January 1953 
48 CAB159/13, JIC(53)9hMecting, 22 January 1953 
49JIC(53)2ýdMeeting 
50 CAB159/13, JIC(53)22dMeeting, 26 February 1953 
51 JIC(53)29(Final) 
52Geraghty' BptjWIS, p. 10 
53 BRYJ405/23 
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54 westwards during March 1953 
. During early 1953, nevertheless, Spice did not witness 
a slow down in "the industrial tempo". Agriculture in the East remained "somewhat an 
enigma" however, as Spice received conflicting reports over the amount and success of 
cultivation. " 
In the immediate aftermath of the Stalin's death on 5 March, the JIC began to 
interpret movements in Germany as part of the Soviet response to the news. A British 
Lincoln bomber on a training exercise on 12 March flew off course within the Berlin air 
corridor, violated East German airspace, as three other aircraft had done that day, and 
was consequently shot down by Soviet MiGs. 56 Kirkman "considered the incident was 
probably due to the nervousness on the part of the Soviet authorities who,, since Stalin's 
-) 57 death, might be watching for possible frontier crossings for propaganda purposes' . 
The cancellation of leave in the GOFG just prior to Stalin's death was "thought to have 
been a security measure imposed as soon as the authorities were aware that Stalin was 
5 dangerously ill' 
. 
Before the end of March, however, the JIC noted that the Russians looked like 
they were being more "conciliatory" over smaller international considerations, such as 
dealing with the Lincoln bomber incident (where BR1XMIS had actually been able to 
perform their liaison function 58), the reopening of the Rothensee ship-canal, freeing up 
the flow of inter-zonal transport and the Economic Commission for Europe talks. 59 
Such measures were welcomed as "relatively minor" and judged as part of a "tactical 
withdrawal in the cold-war". They did note that, although propaganda attacks on the US 
had not completely ended, the "peaceful co-existence" theme was becoming more 
prevalent. Military training in the Eastern Zone continued to follow familiar patterns 
throughout March, April and May. 60 
54 CAB158/16, JIC(53)68(Final) "Disturbances in East Germany, June 1953", 4 September 1953 
55 W0208/4994, BRX/405/26, BRD(MlS Monthly report April 1953,1 May 1953 
56 Geraghty, BRLVMIS, pp. 41-3 
57 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)3 V Meeting, 19 March 1953 
58 Geraghty, Bj? 'LYT, 
ýMIS, , pp. 41-3 59 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)34th Meeting, 26 March 1953 
60 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)42nd Meeting, 23 April 1953; JIC(53)47th Meeting, 7 May 1953 
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A more co-operative attitude was not taken as indicating any change in Soviet 
Policy towards Germany at this stage, however. Reilly pointed out that whilst 
construction of the kind at Ruegen harbour continued, the Russians clearly were not 
planning any sort of withdrawal . 
61 The FO urged caution over playing guessing games 
about Soviet intentions: "[s]o little is known of the character and views of Malenkov and 
Beria [the two men who seemed to be most in control] that it would be wise to keep an 
open mind in interpreting Soviet methods since Stalin's death. -)ý62 They noted that the 
Soviet leadership had decided "to make the carrot more evident than the stick in their 
handling of the Soviet population and also to adopt more fluid and even more 
conciliatory tactics in foreign policy. " The diplomats thought that this might be an 
opportunity both to demonstrate the feasibility of peaceful co-existence and to lay bare 
"Western unity and cohesion. " 
The JIC remained uncertain about developments in Germany. They do not seem 
to have had any prior warning of the 28 May announcement that the Soviet Control 
Commission was being dissolved and replaced with a civilian High Commission, led by 
Vladimir Semyonov. 63 The Committee did have information that General Chuikov was 
being replaced simultaneously as Soviet Commander-in-Chief, Germany by General 
Gretchko. The real significance of the change from Control Commission to High 
Commission was unknown, but the JIC suspected that the change was "one of form 
rather than substance". Soviet rights in East Germany were to be maintained as were 
existing Four Power agreements, allowing the JIC relief since "we need not yet fear the 
unpleasant consequences for Berlin that might flow from a relinquishment of Soviet 
rights to the 'German Democratic Republic". " The Committee actually believed that 
Semyonov's terms of reference might indicate a desire to return to working quadripartite 
contact or Four Power talks. Overall, however, their more pessimistic conclusion was 
that -. 
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In the main... the course of Soviet policy towards Germany appears to have remained unchanged in recent months and, if this is so, the Kremlin may be making it plain by this action that they do not intend to delay the normal development of their policy towards Eastern Germany pending the possibility of a Four-Power Conference, the success of which they may doubt. 
These conclusions seem to be almost exactly the same, word-for-word, as those 
presented by Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Churchill, six days 
earlier. 64 This is an indication, perhaps, that the JIC was reliant on the FO for this sort of 
foreign policy assessment. Lloyd added in his summary that "so far as we can judge at 
present, this Soviet move does not change the position significantly for better or for 
worse. " 
The JIC did not predict the events of 17 June, nor did their American allies. 65 
Whilst they had been observing for some time the changing circumstances in East 
Germany after the announcement of the enforced sovietisation in 1952 and then the 
change of leadership in Moscow, the Committee did not believe active resistance was 
likely: 
Although there is evidence of the hostility of the people of the Satellite countries to their 
Communist regimes, there are no appreciable signs of resistance, and continued 
improvement in Communist methods of control will prevent the development of 
effective opposition. 66 
Certainly, the JIC were under no illusions that the security apparatus in the GDR would 
allow an uprising. In fact, the most recent research carried out on Russian and German 
archives by Ostermann indicates that Moscow had little knowledge of how quickly 
things were deteriorating in the GDR until late May. 67 
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British intelligence did not yet have the capability to discover the disagreement 
between the SED leadership and Moscow, more specifically Beria, over the future 
course of action in the GDR. This information would have required high-level agents 
within the Soviet or GDR government. During talks in Moscow between Ulbricht, 
Grotewohl and the Kremlin leadership, the East Germans were warned that their tough 
path towards socialisation was leading to "a catastrophe"'. 68 The announcement of a 
"New Course" on II June was designed to ease the immediate pressure. Selwyn Lloyd 
reported to Churchill on this policy on 16 June, stating that economic and 
"psychological'" concessions were included in the announcement: farmers were to be 
spared collectivisation; there was to be less restriction on the Protestant Church; and 
inter-zonal travel would be made easier . 
69 The FO viewed mention of a Russian desire 
for German reunification as well-tiMed given that a West German election campaign 
was just beginning. Kirkpatrick reported to Lloyd that Berliners remained "sceptical", 
however. 
None of this reporting noted that the increase in production norms, announced in 
the GDR in May 70 
, remained 
in force, nor did it accurately portray the depth of feeling 
in East Germany that meant people were willing to protest, despite all they knew about 
the power of the security apparatus in the GDR. From the 12 Junel workers in East 
Berlin had been demonstrating against their government's decision to demand higher 
production levelS. 71 
Riots and resPonses 
The feed of official information through to the British government about what 
was happening in East Germany during the June riots can be reconstructed with the help 
of the FO messages from Germany back to London, JIC discussions and BRIXMIS 
68 Ostermann, Uprising, A 19 
61 pREMI 1/441, PM/MS/53/238 Lloyd to Churcbill "The Recent Measures in the Soviet Zone of 
Germany", 16 June 1953 
70 Ostermann, Uprising, p. xxxiii 
71 lbid, p. 163 
146 
reports. Clearly, wireless news from the BBC, other broadcasting services and printed 
news would have also played a part in forming the picture of events for those in 
Whitehall. It was perhaps BRIXMIS, with relatively free access to the Soviet Zone, who 
had the best opportunity to witness events. 72 Tours entered East Berlin on both 16 and 
17 June but were forbidden entry on 18 June. Eleven further scouting missions of East 
Berlin took place between 19 and 24 June. 
BRIXMIS had seen demonstrators on 16 June and recognised that rioting "began 
with startling suddenness7'. According to Geraghty, it was an East German maid who 
first alerted the Mission to the emerging events. 73 At 1045 am on 17 June, Jack Ward, 
the Deputy High Commissioner, sent a message to London reporting that protests 
against the norm increases had come to a head with a march from the Stalinallee to the 
GDR government buildingS. 74 He observed that the crowd had ignored pacifying calls, 
but there had not yet been any police interference. Ward noted that the authorities had 
responded by sending loudspeaker vans to tour the streets announcing that the norm 
increases had been cancelled. A further message from Berlin, just after midday reported 
that there had been no KVP intervention and that they were "so far behaving with tact 
and restraint" despite the fact that some speakers were claiming this was "a rising of the 
, 75 
people from the whole of East Berlin against the regime' . BRIXMIS saw 
Soviet 
troops, with armour, moving into the city between 113 0 and 123 0.76 Sir William Strang, 
PUS at the FO, told Churchill that "[w]e are keeping a close eye on these interesting and 
encouraging, but also potentially dangerous developments. If the Russians have to fire, 
this will undo all the effect of their recent gestures. , 77 
At 1406 the garrison in Berlin reported that a state of emergency had been 
declared in the Soviet sector . 
7" They thought the demonstrations were "a spontaneous 
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outburst of feeling" rather than an orchestrated rising. 79 Information remained scant, 
especially after the Eastern Zone had effectively been sealed around midday. 
Nevertheless, BRTXMIS saw shots fired and crowds in West Berlin, poorly controlled 
by the West German police, urge on the rioting. 80 The situation report produced for 
Churchill during the evening noted that after some firing during the day, order had been 
restored to East Berlin . 
81 Reports that the KVP had been in action alongside the Soviet 
troops were dismissed, but credit was correctly given to information that other 
disturbances in the Eastern Zone had taken place. 
Firing was heard during the night of the 17/18 June. The Berlin garrison 
reported that "increased numbers of Soviet troops, tanks and anti-tank guns are visible, 
1,82 and emplacements have been constructed at strategic points' . BRDMS noted a large 
number of broken down Soviet vehicles that had been abandoned en route into Berlin. 83 
It appeared that little notice had been taken of the SED calls to return to work. Ward 
had made contact with Otto John, the head of the BfV,, to get his view on the disorder. 84 
John claimed to "have evidence that [the] original demonstration was a put-up job by the 
Russians aimed at getting rid of the SED and replacing it by a government of 
'bourgeois' parties. " Ward thought that the "systematic way the demonstration started, 
before spontaneous popular feeling took charge" gave some credence to this conspiracy 
theory. He did note that John was alone, however, since "[o]ther senior German 
officials have expressed [the] view that riots were an entirely spontaneous reaction to the 
Soviet attempt to relax the restrictions in the East Zone for reasons of wider policy. ") 
On 18 June, the British had no clear estimate of the number of Russian troops in 
East Berlin, partly due to BRIXMIS repeatedly being denied access to the City. 85 
Coleman reported American estimates of 20,000 troops and 350 tanks. He was 
convinced, however,, that the riots were not being used as a pretext for a move on West 
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Berlin; there were no signs of aggressive preparations. Formations were consistent with 
internal security operations and defensive against incursions from the West. 86 In fact, 
Coleman felt the troops had acted "with marked restraint and moderation" and had used 
a "minimum of force". BRIXMIS had reported to him that their patrols of other major 
towns in the Soviet Zone had witnessed martial law in place and KVP, Soviet troops and 
armour controlling matters. 87 There had been "a general air of tension in the towns 
visited but no visible signs of rioting. " 
The JIC met on the 18 June whilst information was still coming in. They too 
concluded that "the demonstrations were spontaneous and not deliberately planned, that 
,, 88 they were probably the result of economic difficulties and food shortages. The 
Committee recorded their view that this was not part of a Soviet aggressive move, but 
the risk of inadvertent escalation remained. The Chairman, now Dean, drew attention to 
the level of provocation from crowds in West Germany, propaganda broadcasts and 
Adenauer's message of support for the rioters. He predicted that "these demonstrations 
would make the Russians extremely distrustful of the Germans and that consequently 
they would probably increase their control over East Germany". The Committee had to 
admit that they were unable to interpret accurately the decisions behind the 
announcement of the New Course a week earlier, but they recognised the GDR had to do 
something about the growing internal economic crisis. The JIC thought the disturbances 
in the Soviet Zone had arisen from this deterioration. 
The Western Commandants had been forced into countering Russian claims that 
the riots had been instigated by Western agent provocateurs. 89 In particular, they denied 
that Willy Geottling, a West German who had been executed for his part in the 
disturbances, was under the command of Western intelligence. Instead, the 
Commandants denounced the "harsh restrictions" and "irresponsible recourse to military 
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force. " These words irritated Churchill since he had not cleared them prior to release. 90 
He certainly thought the Russians could not have been expected to remain inactive5 
rather he "had the impression that they acted with considerable restraint in the face of 
mounting disorder. " The Prime Minister had Kirkpatrick recalled immediately from his 
vacation in Austria. 91 
By nightfall on the 18 June, Coleman reported, "All is apparently quiet in the 
Eastern Sector and shooting seems to have stopped" and "West Berlin is quiet" . 
92 MS 
staff was still being refused entry to East Berlin on official business, although BRIXMIS 
had managed to conduct three tours during that day. 93 These tours recorded that to a 
degree, transport was again running and Soviet troops were still holding key positions. 
It looked to BRIXMIS that the troops had come straight from training areas, giving an 
indication that the rioting had taken the Russians by surprise. Two tours of other cities 
in the Soviet Zone turned up no signs of rioting, but evidence of Soviet troops in 
barracks standing by. 
Coleman believed that a state of emergency remained in other parts of the Soviet 
Zone. For the first time, he felt able to give an account of what had been happening over 
the last few days, agreeing that the disorder was "entirely spontaneous". 94 He believed 
that the discontent had been rising for days before 17 June, but that even on 16 June, the 
crowds were merely "rowdy" rather than dangerous. By the morning of 17 June, "the 
character of the demonstrations had completely changed" into something more akin to 
an uprising with hopes of over-throwing the government. Clashes with the KVP took 
place, but both they and Russian troops had been more passive than aggressive in 
manner, an attitude which acted as further encouragement to the crowds that they might 
succeed. Coleman was in no doubt that "fuel was added to the fire by incitement of 
various sorts from West Berlin". Once the Russians had taken over control of 
operations, cordoned off the Eastern Sector and begun to open fire, the major 
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disturbances dissipated quickly. Coleman dismissed John's theory that this had been a 
Russian-inspired plot, since he could see that only damage had been done to Soviet 
credibility in East Germans eyes. 
Ward notified London on 20 June that, 
reliable evidence has just become available fi7om British intelligence sources (postal 
examination and telephone monitoring) that spontaneous protest strikes and riots, also 
originating in economic grievances, broke out in the Soviet Zone several days in 
advance of the first demonstrations in Berlin on June 16.95 
The first indications dated back to 7 June. There is no surprise that given the sources he 
quotes, it had taken several days for the information to become clear. Intercepting mail, 
reading, translating and reporting it would have taken some time. Telephone monitoring 
would probably have been quicker, but such operations rarely provided real time 
intelligence. 
Ward was not so sure that incitement from West Berlin was as significant as 
Coleman and others had made out. He had found the Americans eager "to disclaim any 
direct action by German propaganda groups in which they are covertly interested". 
Ward suggested that the Russians had increasingly laid the blame for the riots on 
Western intelligence and that they were "genuinely scared of intervention from West 
Berlin. " He was certain that Russian policy had taken a blow and the Soviets now faced 
a dilemma over whether to pacify the East German population with relaxations of policy 
or continue to shore up the faltering GDR government. Until now, even though "the 
Russians have overwhelming military force and few scruples", it appeared that "they 
have apparently been, by their standards, so far restrained in their repressions. " 
By 21 June, the Eastern Sector of Berlin had largely returned to normal, except 
for increased numbers of police, who had replaced Soviet troops. 96 Five BRIXMIS tours 
during 20 and 21 June reported that the KVP had gradually taken over from Soviet 
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troops, who had gone into reserve on the outskirts of the City. 97 Trips into East Berlin 
and other cities over the next few days saw a gradual reduction in this Soviet presence, 
Things seemed to have calmed and in fact "civilian morale appeared to be high". Given 
this, it came as a surprise to Brigadier Meadmore, the Chief of BRIXNHS, that the 
Western missions were then denied further access to East Berlin from 24 June to 2 
July. 98 Meadmore wanted air reconnaissance to fill the gap in knowledge, but only one 
sortie was made. " 
Churchill had been content with the information supplied throughout the 
disturbances,, but he let Coleman know of his irritation at the discrepancy between the 
Commandants' condemnatory remarks and the private messages from Berlin 
commenting on Russian restraint. 100 The Prime Minister warned him) "We shall not find 
our way out of our many difficulties by making for purposes of local propaganda 
statements which are not in accordance with the facts. " He was more thankful that Ward 
had managed to persuade the Americans against putting out a message in support of the 
rioters: 
It would indeed be a poor service to the German people, with whom I have the deepest 
sympathy, to provoke them into revolt against overwhelming power which might easily 
have been used and may still be used without the "restraint" of which General Coleman 
writes. 10 1 
Three days after his first summary of events, Coleman submitted his secondl 
based on "information from political sources, British Exchange Mission to the Soviet 
-) 102 Zone and BIO(G). His new information included the fact that some of the KVP had 
defected to the West during the disturbances and casualty estimates of somewhere 
between 20 and 30 dead and 123 injured admitted to West Berlin hospitals. More had 
been killed outside Berlin as news of the riots had led to disturbances in other cities. 
Coleman now believed that two Soviet mechanised divisions had been in Berlin on 17 
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June, with a third arriving on the 19 June. Given the commitment of troops to other 
areas in East Germany, there had been a considerable interruption to summer exercises. 
He noted that the movement of the troops had been "chaotic", with a "high proportion of 
breakdowns". BRLXMIS went further in their comments: "this particular move must 
have created almost a world's record in the huge number of tanks left crashed, bogged or 
just plain broken-down along the various axes of movement. ""' Coleman also gave his 
first impressions on the likely GDR government response to the riots, reporting that 
whilst some arrests had taken place and propaganda continued to blame the West, the 
"tendency of [the] government is to excuse the misled masses who took part in the 
demonstrations and to promise further instalments of the liberalization policy with 
particular attention to the needs of the workers. " 
Ward went over all he knew about East German and Russian policy before the 
riots and concluded the authorities had been following "a middle line between repression 
and relaxation. " 104 He believed the Soviets had to return to this, since they were clearly 
going to neither give up the GDR nor reinstitute a military government. The restoration 
of normal traffic and trade between Berlin sectors was an indication of this. Ward 
reported that the West German reaction to the riots had been "tremendous and very 
emotional'% with the rioters hailed as heroes. He felt that Western policy ought to toe a 
careful line between sympathy for all Germans and further antagonism towards the 
Russians. Propaganda had to be kept under control, whilst boundaries and order were 
strictly observed so as not to give further opportunity for the GDR authorities to claim 
Western provocation. Ward commented that American-controlled "propagandists do not 
always seem under control". FO German specialists were unsure whether the Americans 
had sent people to stir up the riots, but they were certain that American Radio in Berlin 
(RIAS) had boosted the protests by broadcasting speeches of the strike-leaders. 105 The 
speech made in the Commons by Selwyn Lloyd on the 24 June urged "prudence and 
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restraint so that further bloodshed and suffering may be avoided", whilst re-emphasising 
Britain's commitment to reunification. 106 
On 25 June, the JIC decided to begin an in-depth study of the events in Germany 
to see whether any lessons could be learnt from a political or intelligence point of 
View. 107 Kenneth Strong suggested that the movement of Russian divisions was 
probably similar to those that would be made in a transition to war, so the danger 
remained that such disturbances could be used as a cover for troop deployment. Dean 
was more interested to know how much the Russians knew of the unrest, what West 
German responses had been and why the Volkspolizei had taken no action. The CIA 
representative stated that the American view was that after the second day of the riots, 
there had been little encouragement from the West Germans. 
Intelligence available for the 25 June weekly Perimeter Review indicated that 
four divisions had been employed in Berlin, and "field guns, mortars, machine guns and 
tanks were seen on the streets. " The JIC noted that BRIXMIS had seen "no signs of 
disturbances" outside Berlin. The Committee did not change their view that the riots 
had been a result of economic factors, dismissing John's theory that the Soviets were 
behind it all. It was the "impotence" of the GDR government and the Russians' desire 
"to maintain the appearance of fairness and consideration for the population of their 
'new look' policy" that had allowed the protests to take place; nevertheless they needed 
to be crushed immediately. The JIC thought that the Russians were likely to return to 
the "new look" policy once order and control had been restored. The CIA felt that the 
Russians were more likely to reconsider their policy before moving forward. 
The following week, the JIC suggested that recent speeches in the GDR indicated 
that the "new look" policy was to be pursued once more. 108 Increased pay for miners, 
improved supplies of food and consumer goods and reduced production quotas for 
farmers had all been promised. Grotewohl had supposedly offered to pay for these 
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improvements by increased industrial efficiency and cuts in military spending. Reports 
had already reached the JIC, ) however, that the flow of refugees from East to West had 
begun again, made up largely of East Berliners. The Committee judged that the mood of 
East Germans was "one of sullen passive resistance and it is always possible that 
disorder might break out again". 109 The fact that a few extra Soviet troops remained in 
East Berlin, over two weeks after the riots, suggested that the Russians were not 
confident that further disturbances were impossible. The JIC felt that Soviet policy 
across the Satellites was under strain because of poor economic performance; they noted 
"tactical withdrawals" of policy in Hungary and unrest in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
Beria's downfall, reported by the JIC on 14 July, was seen as "the first crack, 
coming sooner than expected, in the apparent solidarity of the post-Stalin leadership". 110 
Very little was known about the reason behind the changes, even down to whether Beria 
had been too much of a proponent or opponent of the more liberal policies. The 
remaining presence of more Russian troops than normal in Berlin, reports of strikes in 
the Eastern Zone and indications that the Ruegen Island construction had stopped left the 
JIC even more confused about what was going on in the GDR: "it is at present 
impossible to predict what further manifestations may take place... in the present 
uncertain atmosphere, overshadowed by the possibility of Four-Power talks, and the 
developments in Russia. " Some minor changes in GDR government personnel were 
seen as attempts to restore control. "' As a result of the pressure that had grown during 
the riots and the general unease surrounding questions of future policy towards 
Germany, an offer of Four-Power talks on Germany for autumn 1953 was extended by 
the Western Allies to the Russians in july. 112 The Cabinet's primary aim remained the 
EDC, but they also recognised that the issue of German unity, required genuine effort 
and attention. 113 
109 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)72ýd Meeting, 7 July 1953 
110 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)75th Meeting, 16 July 1953 
111 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)79th Meeting, 23 July 1953 
112 OSterMann, Uprising, p. 320 
113 CAB 129/6 1, C(53)187 "Foreign Ministers, meeting in Washington: policy towards the Soviet Union 
and Germany", 3 July 1953; C(53)194 "Policy towards the Soviet Union and Germany", 7 July 1953 
155 
On the morning of 30 July, the Chiefs of Staff received a signal from Germany 
stating that "troop movements of an abnormal nature in East Germany had come to their 
attention. " 114 The alert had been triggered because "on the face of it5 they appeared to 
indicate an aggressive intention by the Russians". In an immediate briefing, the JIC had 
to decide whether the movements of rolling stock indicated "a reshuffle of troops or a 
reinforcement of East Germany". Other intelligence on the GDR was mixed: Soviet 
policy still seemed to be a muddle of the "new look" and attempts to restore control; a 
US-West German led scheme to distribute food to East Germany had begun on 27 July 
to the great irritation of the Russians; the Seepolizei had just taken charge of an ex- 
Soviet submarine; Russian troop training was normal; and some reports indicated that 
the KVP was being reduced. The Committee concluded, for the moment, that it was 
unlikely the Russians were embarking on an aggressive reinforcement of their forces in 
East Germany. 115 Dean noted, however, that "the political situation in Russia is most 
confused" and the FO felt a power-struggle was taking place in Moscow. Furthermore, 
the food distribution scheme had "had a remarkably damaging effect on the 
Communists" and some more uncoordinated riots had been seen. Dean warned that the 
Russians were "taking a more serious view than a month ago of civilian disorders". 
The JIC reported that the food distribution scheme had been a considerable 
success after only a week. Something like $15 million worth of food parcels had been 
collected by East Germans from West Berlin, but even that could not meet the demand. 
The GDR authorities had done all they could to prevent people getting into Berlin and 
those with parcels often had them confiscated. They had also attempted to set up their 
own scheme. The JIC reckoned the project had had "a very considerable effect in 
Eastern Germany", indicating that the food shortage was so bad that people were willing 
to risk openly defying the government. Kirkpatrick thought the scheme needed "careful 
watching if it is not to land us in serious and unnecessary difficulties. " 116 After warning 
the Americans of this, he had learnt that the project had very strong backing in 
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Washington and more worryingly "there are too many Americans ... who think that 
annoying the Russians is an end in itself, and who are zealous to play with fire in 
Berlin. " The Chiefs of Staff were at the same time trying to dissuade the Americans 
from inflaming tension further by setting up a Free-Volunteer Force of anti-Communists 
in West Germany. 117 By the time phase one of the food distribution scheme, where aid 
had mostly gone to East Berliners, had ended on 15 August over two-and-a-half million 
parcels had been given Out. 118 Phase two lasted to October, handing out parcels to those 
who lived outside Berlin only. To the eyes of the JIC at least, tension between the 
people and the GDR authorities was maintained and even encouraged by the food 
distribution project. 
Lessons learnt 
The process of reviewing events in East Germany that the JIC began in late June 
went on for some months. "A valuable contribution" to the study was made by Ray 
Cline,, the CIA representative on the JIC. 119 The first draft was produced by the JIS for 
Committee discussion in August. 120 Dean felt the key points in the study ought to be the 
fact that Soviet, rather than local, troops had been used against the uprising and "the 
remarkable resilience of the East Germans". Whereas the JIC had not considered an 
uprising in the Satellites likely before June 1953, Dean now stressed that "the East 
Germans were formidable people and these events showed their character coming out". 
Buzzard (DNI) wondered whether the JIC machinery had been sufficient to pick up on 
the economic factors behind events. 
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The final report was printed in September. 121 The factual account of events 
included hardly varied from the day-to-day picture that had been sent back from 
Germany during the rioting, suggesting that later investigations had demonstrated that 
despite many difficulties, the accuracy of reporting from the scene had been high. 
Kirkman informed the JIC separately that in his view the arrangements for briefing 
Coleman on intelligence had been "deplorable" and as a consequence he had set up a 
local committee in Berlin to cover this gap. 122 
The report concluded that the unrest had been aimed more at the GDR 
government than the Russians. The deteriorating economic conditions and mishandling 
of the "new look" policy lay behind the rioting. The JIC had also been able to examine 
the Western role in encouraging theriots. Whilst the Committee dismissed the Russian 
claims that the riots had begun because of Western agitators, they did, however, admit 
that some elements, including RIAS, West German Trade Unions and the SPD had 
encouraged trouble. All this, the JIC estimated had led to genuine fear amongst the 
Russians about Western intentions, hence the defensive positions taken up by their 
troops. 
The analysis of the unrest's significance is most interesting and was the main 
purpose behind the review. There is no surprise that the report states that "the position 
in Germany is still extremely fluid": there were discussions about a Four-Power 
conference; the Soviet leadership and policy did not look settled; and West Germany 
was going through elections whilst the outcome of the EDC and final power transfer 
negotiations were unknown. 12' The riots, the HC felt, had come as a shock to the 
Russians and had since "dealt a damaging blow to Soviet prestige and weakened the 
Communist control over the East German population. " Along the way, the Russians had 
"badly overestimated the efficiency of the East German Government machinery. " Once 
things had begun to boil over, "the Soviet authorities acted promptly and firmly, but 
with restraint". The Committee doubted the assumption that such restraint would be 
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shown in any future unrest, especially now the Russians had cause to doubt the 
reliability of Communist authority across all of the Satellites. They felt it was likely that 
Moscow had relied on the East Germans for information on internal security, rather than 
their own intelligence services, and "bearing in mind the Communist capacity for self- 
delusion, we believe that the riots took the East German Government genuinely by 
surprise". The JIC believed the GDR government would take a long time to re-establish 
its prestige, especially since the people had learnt "their united strength in resistance of 
authority". 
It mattered to the JIC that conclusions be drawn about the performance of 
Russian troops during the unrest. BRIXMIS had reported that the East German Police 
were ineffective and the KVP were only a little better. 124 They had seen the Soviet 
troops ordered to support them taken by surprise and then move in quickly but with poor 
march discipline and frequent breakdowns. The JIC agreed with BRLXMIS, however, 
that once the troops were in place, they had "displayed a good standard of discipline and 
efficiency during the disturbances", despite provocation from the crowds. 125 BRIXNHS 
felt they had been ordered "to show overwhelming power but to use the minimum 
necessary. " 126 One of the greatest effects of the disturbances was that because "elements 
of at least fourteen tank and mechanised divisions, the "teeth" of the Soviet forces in 
Germany", had been drawn away from their crucial summer training, the GOFG 
readiness for war had been adversely effected. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that, when the 
unrest in East Germany was combined with the leadership changes within the Kremlin 
and more flexible policies, "the Soviet Government, temporarily at least, will be more 
cautious in the conduct of their cold-war struggle against the West". 127 
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It is interesting to note that the Chiefs decided specifically not to share this 
assessment with the Americans. Churchill agreed with both the substance of the paper 
and the decision to limit its circulation: 
In particular, he deprecated the suggestion that it should be communicated to the United States authorities - it was unnecessary for us to do anything with might encourage them to reduce the level of their defence expenditure. 128 
Given that the both the Americans and Russians had exploded their first H bombs, 
Churchill thought the Cold War was entering an even more troubling phase, even more 
in need of negotiations. 129 Before his December trip to Bermuda to persuade 
Eisenhower to agree to a Summit, the Prime Minister received a briefing note ftom the 




Before the Four-Power conference on Germany met in Berlin from 25 January - 
18 February 1954, a long, wrangling exchange of notes took place. 131 It was clear early 
on aom Russian replies to the Allies' invitation to talks that they wanted to meet to 
discuss all of the major sources of tension, not just Germany. 132 In the opinion of the 
JIC, the Russian notes displayed that their priorities for the future of Germany had not 
changed: "the peace treaty first, All-German Government second and free elections 
last. -)7133 The disruption of NATO and the EDC remained the main Soviet aim according 
to the JIC, but now this goal included agreement to attend a peace conference and draw 
up a provisional all-German government within six months. 
128 CA13131/13, D(53)13th Meeting, 14 October 1953 
129 Jenkins, Roy, Churchill (London: Macmillan, 2001), p. 869. The American explosion was on I 
November 1952. The Russian explosion (12 August, 1953) was, in fact, a hybrid bomb. DeGroot, 
Gerard, The Bomb: A Life (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004), pp. 178-181 
130 DEFE5/47, COS(53)294 "United Kingdom/United States intelligence co-operation", 24 June 1953 
131 Dockrill, Britain's Policy, pp. 128-9 
132 CAB 129/62, C(53)236 "Reply to the Soviet notes", 20 August 1953; C(53)242 "Reply to the Soviet 
notes", 28 August 1953 
133 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)91" Meeting, 20 August 1953 
160 
The Committee saw the announcement of further relaxations of Soviet policy 
towards East Germany in late August as an interesting development. 134 The leaders of 
the two nations had met in Moscow between 20-23 August, followed by a communique 
describing agreements on the principles of a peace treaty, an end to reparations, the 
cancellation of debts, economic aid for the GDR, the exchange of full diplomatic 
representation and the return of more POWs. The JIC noted that so many decisions in so 
short a time probably indicated "little, if any, real negotiatioW'. The intention to bolster 
the GDR government was clear, as was the attempt to influence the West German 
elections. There was little cause for celebration in the GDR yet, according to the 
Committee, since the economic concessions did not necessarily mean an end to the 
"milking" of East Germany. Yet they slightly contradicted themselves within their 
summary, stating that the return to German ownership of all enterprises except Wismuth 
A. G.,, the uranium mining company, would mean "that the East German economy is 
going to benefit'. The agreements might "lessen... the contrast between East and West 
Germany", but the JIC warned, "as a whole the decisions hardly seem a good augury for 
agreement on reunification". 
Certainly, the antagonistic language from each side about the other's plans for 
Germany did not end. 135 Coleman reported to Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, Kirkpatrick's 
successor as I-Egh Commissioner in Germany, that he was no more optimistic now about 
German unity than he had been before. The Commandant explained, "nothing has... 
been done to make the Eastern programme for unity appear more acceptable to Western 
opinion and in reality German unification is probably regarded at best as only a distant 
goal. -3-)136 
The JIC believed nothing had changed in terms of Soviet intentions in Germany 
since their last assessment in June 1952. Their paper in October made the point that 
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both East and West shared the same ultimate aim: to integrate the whole of Germany 
into their alliance via securing the parts of Germany they currently occupied. 137 The 
Committee thought that this meant the immediate Russian aim had to be thefi7Ustration 
of the EDC and NATO. They also believed that, even though the Soviets might be 
willing to accept a permanently neutral and unified Germany because it was more of a 
blow to Western defence than their own, the riots in June and Adenauer's success in the 
West German autumn elections must have demonstrated that free elections in Germany 
would go against them. This meant "the prospect of their offering constructive 
proposals for the settlement of the German problem has therefore diminished", and in 
fact the JIC doubted whether the Russian offer of a unifiedl neutral Germany could be 
serious. The Committee noted, though, that due to the pressure from Germany for 
reunification and French uncertainty over the EDC the Soviet government had 
"considerable room for manoeuvre. " They would be able to constantly dangle the 
prospect of reunification, and in the case of the EDC failing, make such an offer 
genuine. Even then, the JIC thought the deep-seated Russian distrust of Germany would 
make it unlikely they would offer a full withdrawal on conditions acceptable to the 
West. 
In November, the Committee produced a paper on the "Situation in East 
Germany", at the request of the FO, summarising the developments in the Zone since 
June. 138 It described a familiar scenario,, involving more liberal economic policies and 
political rearrangements designed to boost the GDR's credibility in the face of the EDC 
agreements. Changes had, however, been noted within the East German armed forces: 
The emphasis is no longer on making them fully effective combat forces. The intention 
seems to be to keep the naval and air forces as training cadres and to use the KVP 
primarily as an internal security force. All three could however be expanded for an 
operational role if necessary. 
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The KVP was estimated to have been reduced from 94,000 men to about 76,000. 
Besides these developments, the JIC reported that the Soviet air forces in Germany had 
been inexplicably weakened by the withdrawal of the 11-28 bomber force. The rest of 
the GOFG training and trooping remained normal, with an estimated strength of 400,000 
men. 139 A slow down or complete halt in construction at some airfields, Ruegen Island 
and the old Junkers aircraft factory had been seen, however. 
The explanation for most of these new arrangements was that the GDR 
government was meeting its earlier promises of reduced defence spending. 140 Such a 
reduction, plus the concessions from the Soviet Union announced in August and a focus 
on food and consumer goods production, was likely to "be of real benefit to the East 
German economy" according to the j1C. 141 From September on, there had been some 
speeches indicating a hardening attitude towards renewed efforts for collectivisation and 
increases in worker norms, but the Committee noted that "so far care is being taken not 
to spoil the effect of the economic improvement'. BR1XM1S reported the' completion 
of a successful harvest and the tremendous increase at reduced prices of consumer goods 
. ), 142 available to the public . 
The other side to the GDR government, however, was a 
tightening grip on security. Tough people were brought into the Ministry of Justice to 
hand out harsh penalties to those accused of being Western provocateurs during the 
riots. 143 The JIC also had information that "the security drive continues and recently the 
[GDR] Government may have picked up a few genuine agents of the Gehlen 
organisation". The Committee concluded "all in all, the [GDR] Government seem to be 
succeeding in reimposing their grip". 
The beginnings of the Four-Power conference in Berlin did not bode well. 
Disagreements took place about where the talks would be held and what issues would be 
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allowed on the agenda. 144 Dean commented, "It was difficult to see the reason for all 
this prevarication unless it was due to a Russian desire to boost the East German 
Government. " 145 Once the conference had begun, the JIC gloomily reported that "even 
before the Berlin Conference opened there was little expectation among the Soviet Zone 
population that it would succeed; but if it fails, there will be a feeling that the last chance 
of liberation and reunification has been loSt. -)7146 Tight security in the GDR during the 
talks ensured there were no disturbances, nor did the JIC anticipate riots as a response to 
the potential failure of the conference. Instead, the Committee predicted that the more 
likely outcome would be a large increase in the numbers of refugees from the East. 
Hoyer-Millar reported mid-way through the talks that the "German public seems now to 
have accepted with resignation that there is no chance of an agreement on the 
reunification of Germany. " 147 He continued, 
Each successive Plenary Session has seemed to batten down the Iron Curtain a little 
more firmly... Everybody is waiting to see what will be the last rabbit out of Mr 
Molotov's hat in the form of a wider European security system but there is a general 
impression that Mr Molotov's rabbits are already looking a bit long in the tooth. 
Once the conference had finally ended unsuccessfully, Eden's report to Cabinet 
suggested that the JIC had accurately predicted that the Russian attitude to Germany had 
not changed. 148 The Foreign Secretary told his colleagues, "One of the most noticeable 
features had been the extreme rigidity of the Soviet attitude towards European 
problems. " He was more reassuring, however, given he felt that the Russians did not 
have "any real fear of the Germans in the immediate future or that they would regard the 
ratification of the European Defence Community as a serious threat demanding some 
form of military counter-action. " Eden had also seen that the West Germans were 
becoming very impatient over the delays in bringing the EDC and Bonn agreements into 
force. 
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In the months after the Berlin Conference, the JIC kept a close eye on the 
Russian response for indicators of future policy. In March, the Committee interpreted 
one of Molotov's speeches as an indication that the disruption of the EDC and NATO 
remained the highest Soviet priority, but that thoughts were now turning to the 
conference scheduled for spring in Geneva to resolve outstanding issues on the Far 
East. 149 He had given no indication that he would be prepared to compromise in 
Geneva. The JIC recognised, however, that the Russians would continue to offer up 
proposals to interrupt the ratification of the EDC. The Soviet note of 31 March renewed 
the offer of a European Security Pact, first made in Berlin, as an alternative to NATO 
and the EDC. 
150 The Russian suggestion that they could perhaps join NATO was 
thought to be part of the obvious propaganda efforts to cast the Western Allies as 
uncooperative aggressors. Hoyer-Millar reported that the Soviet's insistence on granting 
the GDR -sovereignty" in March was adding to the mood of uncertainty in West 
Germany. 151 
In April, the JIS carried out their first survey of the implications of the Russians 
4 152 
granting the GDR freedom to form its own internal and foreign policies. They 
concluded that the changes proposed were in fact ones of form rather than substance, 
since the SED as a puppet of the Russians would take over. "Effective control over East 
Germany" would remain in Soviet hands. The real change for the West, the JIS thought, 
would be an increasing pressure to recognise the GDR g overnment. They foresaw that 
the Russians would try to force negotiations to take place with the GDR direct, and 
should the West refuse this,, the difficulties in conducting normal business concerning 
Germany might be multiplied. The FO felt it was too early to predict any of this though. 
Hoyer-Millar was able to report that the GDR government was "more firmly in the 
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saddle that ever before", with their strength bolstered by the improvements in the 
consumer side of the economy and even tighter state security. 153 
Dean commented to the HC in June that "it was becoming obvious that there 
were likely to be changes in the political scene in Germany in the next few months. , 154 
Restrictions on movement had been lifted and the Soviet Iffigh Commission was being 
reduced in size. The JIC concluded that these measures, on top of the other moves 
towards sovereignty since March, were "no doubt intended to pave the way for fresh 
attempts to establish relations between East and West Germany. " By the end of August, 
the Russians had given up their buildings in Karlshorst and had moved all of their people 
into the Soviet Embassy in Unter den Linden. 155 
Throughout the Berlin conference and beyond, the JIC's reporting on the Soviet 
Forces flowed. The Prime Minister was encouraged to hear whilst the conference was 
on, that SHAPE felt the Russians were not in a position to launch an attack and that the 
movement of the required reinforcements to the forward areas in Eastern Germany 
would probably be noticed. 156 The JIC reported that during the negotiations, all Russian 
training activity and movements remained normal. 157 The pattern of training did alter 
after the conference but the Committee thought this was down to the fact that General 
Gretchko had just come in as the new Commander-in-Chief of GOFG. 158 A short period 
of intensive training, not usually seen in spring, was short-lived, however. 159 One of 
Gretchko's lasting changes was the renaming of GOFG as GSFG (Group of Soviet 
Forces in Germany). 160 Summer training too was different under the new Commander, 
held at lower levels in the early season than had been seen before, but with very large- 
scale exercises later. 161 By the end of the year, it looked as though GSFG might actually 
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be increasing in size, as the annual trooping brought in more men than it took away. "' 
The JIC estimated that both morale and numbers swelled to 420,000 during late 1954.163 
The British assessments of the East German forces in 1954 remained the same, 
however, concluding that the whilst the KVP might be up to 80-85,000 better trained 
men, it and the other GDR forces remained unable to provide "any efficient first line 
formations". 164 The Americans decided that because of improvements in training, 
however,, the KVP should be "credited... with limited offensive capabilities". 165 The 
JIC reported that improved morale and security had resulted in a "sharp drop" in the rate 
of defection, and therefore intelligence. 166 
Dealings with West Germany 
Nineteen Fifty Three began with controversy for the British - West German 
relationship. Dr. Naumann, Goebbels' former State Secretary, and his collaborators 
were arrested in January for their attempts to infiltrate the FDP and the autumn 
elections. 167 The British authorities had decided to exclude the Germans from the 
operation because of worries about reliability, so the inevitable consequence was offence 
within the BfV. 168 Eden told the Cabinet that in his view, "if this had been left until all 
powers had been transferred, the Federal Government would probably have been 
reluctant to make any drastic move until the conspiracy had assumed more formidable 
proportions. " 169 Once the haul of seized documents had been examined by BIO(G), the 
British handed over the case to the Germans with the intention that they prosecute 
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Naumann. 170 Adenauer gave his private approval for British actions throughout the 
operation, but in the end a firm enough case could not be put together to try Naumann. 
For Kirkpatrick, despite the lack of a trial, the value of the case lay in both disrupting the 
network and drawing German attention to the fact that these kinds of dangers still 
existed. 171 
There was still a distinct lack of trust towards the Germans, even though the 
EDC and Bonn agreements were awaiting ratification. The JIC believed that special 
measures were required for information sharing within the planned EDC system because 
neither were the Germans yet reliable partners, nor were they rectifying this problem 
quickly enough. 
172 Furthermore, once the Germans were in the EDC, the security 
problem would expand to include their industries relating to defence. 173 Indicating that 
some things were considered too important to be handed over,, under the Bonn 
convýentions,, the Germans were not to be given control of their border with East 
Germany or dealings with the Russians in the GDR. 174 
The activities of some German ex-military men and scientists in Egypt, who it 
was felt were assisting the Council of the Revolutionary Command against British 
forces, raised concern. 175 The War Office and FO conducted regular analysis on the 
levels of influence these Germans had. 176 A JIC paper produced in January 1954 
concluded that West Germans were engaged in military activities in Egypt, Syria, Spain 
and South America. 177 Whilst these groups were not thought to be particularly co- 
ordinated, they had the potential to combine with West German officials to form a series 
of networks "of considerable intelligence value". The Committee thought that so long 
as German and British interests remained close, these groups should present no problem, 
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but still "the activities described must be closely watched for their effect on British 
interests. Y) 
The JIC(G) was exploring the West German intelligence agencies during the 
summer of 1953. Of particular interest was the Blank Office, the department named 
after its director Theodor Blank acting as an unavowed Ministry of Defence, which was 
both the main customer and co-ordinator of the FRG's intelligence activities. 171 In July 
1953, a joint BfV - British operation caught Bruno Sniegorski, a Polish intelligence 
service agent, who had been working inside the Blank Office. 179 Kirkman felt that the 
German intelligence services were "leaning more and more to the UK agencies for 
guidance". 180 He thought there needed to be a gradual handover of responsibility to 
them once the Bonn agreements came into force, but only after a Memorandum of 
Understanding had been agreed that permitted the Allies to continue some of their 
intelligence work on German soil. In particular Kirkman felt that good work done 
establishing sound relations with both the Lander authorities and the Gehlen 
organisation would put the British in a strong position to get what they needed. Ward 
felt that in fact more could be done by the Security Service, in particular in trying to 
work with the BfV and LfVs to improve their poor record. 181 
The upsurge in interest in reunification after the June riots and the early talk of 
Four-Power talks dominated the September 1953 West German elections. 182 Although 
he was returned as Chancellor,, Adenauer had undergone some criticism from his 
opposition that commitment to the EDC made reunification less likely. The feeling in 
the JIC was that the Germans did not want reunification at all, but that it was too 
politically risky for them to say So. 183 Once the Berlin conference had failed the pace of 
change in relations between the Allies and Germany quickened. Talking with the 
Russians had been seen to fail, so final movement towards enacting the EDC and Bonn 
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agreements could begin. The problem though was French ratification. The Chiefs of 
Staff had first noticed in late 1953 that the French government might not get the EDC 
Treaty through the French Assembly. 184 As a consequence, Eisenhower put pressure on 
the British to guarantee forces for European defence and the Chiefs of Staff and FO 
began considering alternative ways for the Germans to make a defence contribution. 185 
The JIC recognised that the circumstances of intelligence in Germany would 
soon change and all the talk of the last couple of years about reducing costs in Germany, 
German security and relations with the German intelligence services would have to be 
turned into Policy. 186 The JIC(G) considered what level of intelligence would be 
required on the FRG itself after ratification of the EDC, in order to keep a check on 
whether they were sticking to the agreements. 187 They decided that they should "not be 
given the task of collecting intelligence about the Federal Republic after ratification but 
nevertheless they should continue to supply London with any intelligence which came 
their way. 5)188 
Preparations for the failure of the EDC Treaty were well under way during the 
summer of 1954.189 Dick White, Director General of M15,, recommended after a visit to 
review the BfV and LfVs that a new German security service was needed in order to 
cope with the demands of participation in European defence. 190 At the same time the 
Chiefs of Staff had decided on the strengths that the West German armed forces should 
have if they rearmed under NATO rather than the EDC. 191 The Foreign Secretary told 
the Cabinet in early July that the delays in the French ratification were causing unease in 
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West Germany and that the British and Americans had decided to uncouple the Bonn 
agreements fTom the EDC Treaty. 192 
According to Hoyer-Millar, "the prestige of the Federal Government [had] 
suffered a painful blow", when in July, Otto John, the head of the BfV, appeared to 
defect to East Germany. 193 The JIC were told by SIS that their conclusion was that John 
had crossed to East Berlin "voluntarily but not necessarily with the intention of 
defecting -)7 
. 
194 They also mentioned the antipathies that had existed between the various 
German intelligence organisations, the real cause of John's disaffection according to 
Markus Wolf 195 Wolf, the former head of East German foreign intelligence, also claims 
that John never intended to defect, but was taken across the border whilst drunk or 
drugged by an old friend. Roger Hollis, Deputy Director of M15, told the JIC that his 
Service had not gained the impression John was planning to defect during their recent 
dealings with him. The Committee as a whole thought that the risk of damage to British 
intelligence operations was "not great" but that the political ramifications were more 
serious. Explanations from the West German authorities that John had been kidnapped 
were blown away when John held a press conference in East Berlin on II August - 
196 He 
claimed his motivation had been Nazi influence in the FRG and a desire to reveal the 
true nature of the Bonn agreements and the EDC. A further defection, that of Karlfranz 
Schmidt-Wittmack, a CDU Bundestag deputy, on 22 August brought more revelations 
about secret parts of the EDC Treaty allowing stronger West German forces than had 
been announced. 
In August, the French Assembly failed to ratify the EDC Treaty. 197 They were, 
however, willing to allow the Bonn Conventions through. 1913 The JIC thought the 
Russians would continue to use propaganda to play on French fears to ensure German 
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rearmament would not occur by any means-'99 Hoyer-Millar reported that even though 
200 failure had been expected, the West Germans were bitterly disappointed . 
Peter Hope, 
the FO official who took over the JIC(G) Chairmanship from Kirkman at the end of 
1953, explained to the JIC in September that the plans for intelligence collection in 
Germany now needed to be renegotiated, since they had all been drawn up based on the 
201 EDC 
. 
It was his view that the Americans might take the opportunity to press for the 
retention of more intelligence privileges under a secret Memorandum of Understanding, 
even though it looked likely the Germans would be granted increased sovereignty under 
post-EDC agreements, 202 By the end of September the answer to German rearmament 
looked certainly to be West German membership of NATO. 203 
The talks between the Western European allies and the US in London from 28 
September -3 October did not discuss the detail of intelligence requirements in 
204 Germany. It was agreed that the allied forces would retain their existing powers to 
protect themselves until the West Germans themselves could offer such protection. This 
meant communications interception could continue until German legislation allowed 
them to take it over. Dean emphasised that this meant that once interception was in 
German hands, it would be down to intelligence co-operation to secure the product of 
this valuable source. Shortly before the talks in Paris between the US, Britain, France 
and Germany that agreed the termination of the occupation of Western Germany and 
German entry into NATO for 1955, the secret Memorandum of Understanding was 
205 agreed with the Germans. It stated that, as before, the forces in Germany reserved the 
right to protect themselves so long as the Germans could not. 206 Communications 
interception was to go the same way: it remained in allied hands until the Germans could 
do it themselves. The key point was that the Germans should agree to the use of these 
199 CAB 158/18, JIC(54)69(Final) "Likely Communist causes of action up to mid- 1955", 18 September 
1954 
200 F03 71/10956 1, CW 10 13/3 7 Hoyer-Millar to FO, 2 September 1954 
201 CAB159/17, JIC(54)85tMeeting, 28 September 1954 
202 DEFE4 lnO, A89 to HQ NAG, 14 September 1954 
203 Dockrill, Britain's PoliTý', pp. 143 -6 
204 CAB159/17, JIC(54)89 Meeting, 7 October 1954 
205 The talks took place from 20-22 October 
206 F0371/io9583, CW 1072/3 11 No. 876 Hoyer-Millar to FO, 14 October 1954 
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powers before they were used, unless military urgency precluded it. Hoyer-Millar was 
satisfied that Britain's intelligence requirements would be met under this agreement. 
The JIC reported in December that Soviet bloc Moscow Conference, which 
threatened to set up a Soviet-Satellite defence organisation and increase Eastern 
European armament if the Paris agreements were ratified, was a return to the familiar 
tactics of Russian propaganda. 
207 The Committee thought the Russian note of 9 
December which re-emphasised the Moscow threat was more "intimidation than 
-)-) 208 cajolery . They did not, however, foresee that if the Paris agreements came into 
force., the Soviets would reverse their policy of "peaceful co-existence" . 
209 The JIC 
thought the Russians would probably go through with their threats to bolster East 
European defence, but they would "Avoid actions which they estimate would run the risk 
of provoking a war". 
Cutting the cloth 
The preparations for reorganising and rationalising British intelligence in 
Germany in response to the handover of power had actually begun long before the Bonn 
agreements were finally ready to come into force at the end of 1954. Reilly and 
Kirkman realised the numbers and costs of BIO(G) had to be cut so they continued the 
series of planned reductions that had been taking place since 1947. However, they went 
further than before, presenting to the Chiefs in August 1953, not only a schedule for 
drastic cuts in manpower, but a wholesale reorganisation of the chaotic intelligence 
collection bodies that came under the BIO(G) umbrella. 210 
207 CAB 158/18. JIC(54)66/23,9 December 1954 
208 CA-B 158/18, JIC(54)66/24,16 December 1954 
209 CAB 158/18, JIC(54)66/25,23 December 1954 
21 0 DEFE4/64, COS(53)9e Meeting, 21 August 1953 
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The decision to rebuild stemmed largely from the findings of the JIC delegation 
that travelled to Germany on 10 - 24 January 1953 . 
21 ' Their task was to examine the 
machinery, the manpower, the collection methods and the financing of BIO(G), all with 
212 an eye to making reductions in budget without reductions in product . 
In mind also 
was the sensitive issue of needing to continue intelligence collection without offending 
the Germans. 213 The delegation found the 1952/53 cost of BlO(G) was 12.68 million of 
which roughly il million came from the UK, the rest coming from the Occupation 
CoStS. 214 About il million of the total budget was spent on SIS in Germany, noted as 
C's "most important overseas station" by the delegation, including about 1400,000 for 
agent payments. 
The final proposals went before the Chiefs in August. From early on, it was 
clear to the JIC that JIC(G) needed a new charter and permanent contracts for staff in 
Germany. 2 15 The JIC had the first of several extraordinary meetings about intelligence 
in Germany on 10 April. 216 They agreed straight away with the delegation's 
recommendation that BIO(G) be split down into four smaller units: a "British Forces 
Security Unit" (BFSU) to interrogate refugees, intercept communications and provide 
securit Y217; with SIS, JIB and STIB organisations. The last three were to be directed by 
their London departments, but administered locally by the Army through the BFSU. 
The JIC(G) was given an FO chairman, Peter Hope, and made the co-ordinating body 
for these new units. 218 The JIC also decided that as much of the new organisations as 
possible should move to Munchen Gladbach to be closer to the Northern Army 
Group. 219 They also wanted to begin implementing these changes straight away, 
working on a gradual run-down until the Bonn conventions were ratified, a levelling-out 
21 1 DEFE41/70, JIC/7053/16,10 January 1953 
212 CAB 176/40, JIC/50/53,6 January 1953 
213 DEFE4/59, COS(53) I" Meeting, I January 1953 
214 CAB 176/40, JIC/50/53,6 January 1953 
215 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)3 I" Meeting, 19 March 1953 
216 CAB159/13, JIC(53)37h Meeting, 10 April 1953 
217 BFSU was renamed the British Services Security Organisation (BSSO) in March 1954, see 
CAB159/15, JIC(54)23 rd Meeting, 17 March 1954 
218 CAB159/14, JIC(53)113'h Meeting, 29 October 1953 
219 CAB 159/13, JIC(53)50'h Meeting, 14 May 1953 
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in reductions whilst German intelligence developed and then a final set of cuts once the 
Germans were in a position to take over more functions. 
SIS in Germany was to be saved ftom major cuts because their output was 
valued too highly by the customer departments in London . 
220 Also outside the major 
upheavals was JSIG, which was left to operate as part of the Northern Forces HQ within 
the NATO structure, although it was given more relaxed guidance on what material 
could be shared with Allies. 221 It was important that the JIC leave some of these planks 
in place so that their submission to the Chiefs could reasonably claim the provision of 
intelligence would not be diminished. 222 Furthermore, the JIC stressed that "the 
programme of reduction should wherever possible be related to the ability of the 
Germans to fill the resulting gaps in our intelligence from their own resources. " The 
proposal to the Chiefs outlined a shrinkage in budget ftom 12.25 million to 11.8 million, 
but with the SIS portion remaining at LI million. Personnel would be cut from 880 to 
550-600 British staff, probably with a larger number of locally employed Germans. 
Once the Chiefs had approved the plan, mid-1954 was the target date for the 
changes. 223 The major problem foreseen was persuading the Treasury to establish the 
permanent posts in Germany. Only 35 permanent senior posts had been agreed, but at 
lower pay than before. Three-year temporary contracts were to be offered to others. 
Within their acceptance of the proposal, the Chiefs noted that satisfactory terms of 
service were necessary for BIO(G) in order to keep the right calibre people in 
Germany. 224 They also commented that because of the end of Occupation Costs, the 
intelligence burden on the British budget would increase, despite these reductions. As 
such, they anticipated further cuts would have to be made down the line. 
220 CAB159/13, JIC(53)68h Meeting, 2 July 1953 
221 CAB 159/14, JIC(53)79h Meeting, 23 July 1953; CAB 158/16, JIC(53)82 "Release of classified 
information within NATO and to Allied officers of integrated staffs", 15 September 1953 
222 CAB 158/16, JIC(53)83 "Future of the British Intelligence Organisation, Germany", 13 August 1953 
223 CAB159/14, JIC(53)8e Meeting, 13 August 1953 
224 DEFE5/48, COS(53)423 "Future of the British Intelligence Organisation, Germany", 26 August 1953 
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The JIC discussed the new JIC(G) charter in November, with Peter Hope in 
attendance. 
225 
The charter had to mould the old system into a committee that matched 
the changes within BIO(G). The JIC would keep its split responsibility to the High 4-- Commission and Commander-in-Chief, Germany as well as the JIC. It was thought that 
although JIC(G) would not be given its own JIS, some formal arrangement for a staff 
was required "as a considerable amount of drafting work was likely to fall to the 
Committee in the future". The new committee was also probably going to be required to 
meet more than once a month to execute its functions adequately, which looked like they 
would increase. In fact, the new JIC(G) came into force in January 1954, before the 
changes to BIO(G) were complete. 226 The Chiefs and FO sent a message to the High 
Commissioner and Commanders-in-Chief in Germany to back-up the advent of the new 
Committee. They stated that the new JIC(G)'s "main task will be to maintain and if 
possible improve the flow of vital intelligence from Germany, especially on the USSR 
and Eastern Germany, at as low a cost as possible. " As part of this, the Committee was 
to "establish and maintain relations with the future German intelligence authorities and 
organisations so that the latter may be in a position as soon as possible to take over 
progressively many of the functions now discharged by the British intelligence 
services. " These tasks,, however!, would be difficult because of other allied intelligence 
organisations in Germany, the long distances to be travelled for meetings and the state of 
flux within BIO(G). 
When Kirkman retired from BIO(G) in December 1953, he told the JIC the 
227 
reorganisation was going smoothly. He reported that he was leaving relations with 
the French, Americans and Germans improved, but still with their difficulties. He also 
thought that intelligence was interpreted in a "more balanced" way than it was in 195 1. 
The Service staff though "were inclined to be insufficiently curious and expected too 
much to be done for them by intelligence authoritiesY). Soon after Kirkman's farewell, 
the Permanent Under- Secretaries Committee on Intelligence met to discuss costs in 
225 CAB159/14, JIC(53)118'hMecting. 12 November 1953 
226 CAB158/16, JIC(53)120 "Organisation of intelligence, Germany", 14 December 1953 
227 CAB159/14, JlC(53)l24flMeeting, 3 December 195-3) 
176 
228 Germany and Austria. They demanded further cuts as soon as possible. They also 
decided that from 1954 onwards, the costs would be met by the Service departments 
alone, rather than splitting the burden between the Services and the FO. 
Dean visited Germany and the new JIC(G) in February 1954 to examine the 
progress of the reorganisation . 
229 He was satisfied, but noted that events in Germany 
were moving on. With the Berlin conference out of the way, the path finally looked 
clear towards the handover of power. This signalled that the financial and political 
pressures which the JIC had been discussing were about to become reality. More 
importantly Dean thought, this meant that Ministers were required to begin making 
230 decisions on the degree to which co-operation with the Germans should take place. 
He told the Chiefs that "the moment had been reached when certain responsibilities 
would have to be turned over to the Germans. " He went on, "There were three 
important aspects in which we required German co-operation - Secret Intelligence, 
censorship and security - and these had such important political considerations that 
Ministerial approval would be required for any steps that could be taken. " His specific 
recommendations on this were made in April and approved by the Prime Minister in 
May. 23 1 The details of this have been withheld ftom public view. It is clear from other 
sources, however, that Britain continued to work with the Germans to improve the 
efficiency of the BfV, liaison with the Gehlen organisation improved and censorship 
remained in Allied hands until the Germans were able to take it over. 232 
Conclusions 
The pace of events up to June 1953 was so quick that the riots took most by 
surprise; the East Germans, the Russians, the Americans, and the British, including the 
228 CAB176/46, JIC/148/54 "Allocation of charges, BIO(G) and Austria7,18 January 1954 
229 CAB159/15, JIC(54)17'hMeeting, 25 February 1954 
230 DEM/69, COS(54)36hMeeting, 31 March 1954 
231 CAB 158/17, JIC(54)30(Final) "Review of Intelligence and Security Organisations in Gemiany", 13 
April 1954 
232 CAB159/16, JIC(54)62nd Meeting, 15 July 1954; Critchfield, Partners at the Creation, p. 177 
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JIC- British intelligence suspected the unpopularity of GDR regime and knew of some 
of the underlying economic problems. The JIC misjudged, however, the bravery of 
some East Germans in the face of terrifying internal repression. It is hard, nevýertheless, 
to criticise the Committee for not predicting a spontaneous event; the very nature of such 
an event means that the key indicating information probably does not exist in any form 
that any intelligence service can acquire and make use of Once the rioting had begun, 
BRDMS demonstrated yet again their value as a source of critical information. That 
the JIC appreciations of the causes and course of the disturbances produced shortly after 
stand up well next to recent historical research, indicates that the JIC at least had the 
right mind-set to produce accurate interpretations of Soviet bloc affairs when relevant 
information was available. 
The specifics of high Russian policy and intentions still eluded the Committee. 
The whole of Whitehall admitted a lack of understanding of the post-Stalin Kremlin, of 
Beria's downfall and of Soviet-GDR policy in the aftermath of the June 1953 riots. 
Under Dean's September 1954 definition of the JIC's role, however, this does not appear 
to have been as significant as it may initially seem. Taking the Chiefs of Staff 1947 
hope that intelligence should provide warning of events, the JIC had clearly failed with 
the Berlin blockade, the Korean War and the 1953 riots. 233 By Dean's definition, 
however, the Committee had been performing a more successful function. providing a 
constant backdrop to policy-making; establishin patterns of Soviet bloc activity; and 9 il 
gathering as much relevant information as possible for the eventuality of war. That 
Dean wanted to introduce the WRCI indicates his ambition to drive on the development 
of the Cold War JIC system. 
By the end of 1954, the future shape of the operating-environment of British 
intelligence in Germany was clearer. The JIC hoped that the process of British 
retrenchment would be matched by increased reliance on the Germans to provide 
intelligence cover of their own. There is little doubt that intelligence liaison is never as 
perfect a solution to intelligence gaps as being able to afford your own arrangements, but 
233 See Chapter One 
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there was no choice for the JIC. British intelligence had been forced to recognise 
politically and financially, and then demonstrate in reality, that British relations with 
West Germany had changed from occupation to alliance. 
The June 1953 riots also demonstrated that the rules of engagement for British 
intelligence operating in Europe were fixed; intelligence-gathering, rather than liberation 
was the role. The Government had rejected the idea of fermenting unrest behind the 
Iron Curtain in 1952, but the 1953 riots were the first practical test. Even the Americans 
were restrained; propaganda and the food distribution scheme seemed to be the limit of 
their activities. Wilfried Loth describes the June 1953 riots as "precisely the point at 
which the structure of the Eastern and Western blocs ceased to be at risk". 234 The Soviet 
use of force to support the GDR government and the Western reticence to intervene 
directly to facilitate revolution demonstrated that the division in Europe was fixed in the 
minds of Cold War leaders. 
234 Loth, "Gennany in the Cold War" in Westad, Reviewing the Cold War, p. 253 
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Cha pter Four: 1955 - 1957 
Lows and highs of intelli2ence 
The very lowest 
Historical attention has been drawn to Whitehall and British intelligence during 
1955-7 for all the wrong reasons; and not just on account of the Suez debacle. It is 
difficult to reasonably propose that there was an active role for intelligence assessment 
in policy-making during Eden's premiership, when so many authors have so cogently 
argued that the Whitehall machine as a whole malfunctioned during 1955-6. Although 
Cradock does not ascribe a "flawless performance" to the JIC over Suez, he does suggest 
that what good advice they had to give was ignored by Eden. 
While the Prime Minister was ready to call on individual officials or parts of the 
intelligence community to do his bidding, he and his colleagues were clearly not 
prepared to listen to the collective wisdom of its senior body. ' 
Kyle describes a problem far wider within government-. so few people in key 
ministries actually knew about the deal struck between Britain,, France and Israel 
agreeing to collude in an attack on Egypt that proper administration of the build-up to 
military conflict was impossible. 2 One of those kept out of the loop, Sir William Hayter, 
reported in his memoirs the reply of one of his colleagues in the FO, after Hayter had 
enquired as to whether Britain would use force to regain control of the Canal: " 'That I 
can't tell you, ' replied the Under- Secretary. " Hayter observed: 
At the time I took this somewhat ambiguous reply to mean that he did not know the 
answer. I have since wondered whether that meant that he knew the answer but was not 
allowed to tell me. 3 
1 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 13 3 
2 Kyle, Suez, pp. 346-7 
3 Hayter, A Double Life, p. 140 
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Within the JIC, that the Prime Minister was ignoring their assessments was not 
the only symptom of disease. The members found themselves meeting together to 
discuss Egypt, with some round the table knowing the full story, such as Dean who had 
sealed collusion by signing the Sevres Protocol on behalf of the government, whilst 
others knew little. 4 Effective and meaningful assessment of events must have been 
impossible. The JIC often found itself working with minimal intelligence during the 
Cold War; that the Committee was in a position at any time where those present had to 
withhold crucial information in a crisis is a sign of administrative insanity. 
Suez was not the only difficulty facing British intelligence between 1955-7,, 
however. Questions asked in the House during the autumn 1955 session about Burgess, 
Maclean, Philby and their relationship with Moscow caused the goverment to worry 
about the need for a public enquiry into security. ' Although revelations about 
intelligence were minimal, the public hunt for the "third man" was on. 6 Only a few 
months later, in April 1956, two SIS operations could have openly disrupted the visit of 
Khrushchev and Bulganin to Britain. That the visit was completed without a diplomatic 
row was down to Russian decision-making not British. The Berlin spy tunnel, a joint 
SIS-CIA operation, ran from 11 May 1955 and tapped Soviet telephone lines in East 
Berlin via a tunnel from West Berlin. 7 Thanks to George Blake, one of the officers 
involved with the project and a KGB spy, the Russians knew about the project from the 
start. The Russians 'discovered' the tunnel whilst carrying out repair work on 22 April 
1956. At the same time', Buster Crabb, an SIS-employed frogman, disappeared whilst 
trying to gather intelligence on the Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze in Portsmouth harbour. 8 
The Russians said nothing until after Khrushchev had left, when the press started to sniff 
around the story. An enquiry into the operation conducted by Sir Edward Bridges, Head 
4 Cradock, Know Your Enem pp. 123 -4 S CAB 128/29, CM(55)36"' meeting, 20 October 1955; House of Commons Official Report, Vol. 545,25 
October 1955, Col. 29 and 7 November 1955, Col. 1483-1611 
6 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 436 
7 See Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin 
8 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 523-5 
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of the Civil Service, revealed that the operation had been conducted without proper 
precautions or authority, 9 
Although each of these events caused relatively little publicity about the 
workings of British intelligence, during those days of absolute secrecy on such matters, 
even the slightest revelation was unwanted. Indicating the levels of anguish behind 
closed doors, Eden hastened Sinclair's replacement as Chief of SIS with Dick White, the 
former Director General of the Security Service, and ordered Dean with the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, to look at intelligence oversight. 10 Suez followed soon 
after. The greatest significance of this catalogue, however, lies in the responses to these 
low points. White went on to rule over a period described by many SIS officers of the 
time as "the foundation of the modem Service", although White was only one of a few 
key figures in this renaissance. " Dean and Brook ushered in a new system of 
Ministerial approval for operations. 12 The JIC too, reached new heights once the 
Egyptian dust had settled, moving from the Chiefs of Staff to become a more powerful 
body within the Cabinet Office. 13 Despite, or perhaps because of, the problems of 1955- 
6. intelligence took on a form in 1957 with far more potential influence within the 
British government. 
Exorcising the Geneva Spirit 
The assessment of international politics was a closely guarded FO function that 
the JIC had to work alongside. In a paper prepared for the Foreign Secretary, unnamed 
FO officials made accurate predictions in January 1955 with regard to the Russians' 
reactions to the Paris Agreements, which had been designed to bring the FRG into 
9 "Report of an enquiry on an intelligence operation against Russian w s", Bridges, 18 May 1956, 
released -under the Freedom of Information Act by the Cabinet Office, June 2006 
http: //www. cabinetoffice. gov. uk/foi/reading_yoom. asp 
10 Bower, Perfect English Spy, pp. 161-162; Aldrick Hidden Hand, p. 525 
11 Private information 
12 AldriCk Hidden Hand, p. 526 
13 See below 
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NATO. 14 The JIC received a copy of the assessment which stated that Soviet threats 
made to deter ratification of the Agreements might well be put into action, if the 
Western plans remained intact, in order to save face. The FO felt it "very probable" that 
both Anglo- and Franco-Soviet Treaties would be denounced and an Eastern European 
defence organisation would be established. It was deemed "probable" that East German 
armed forces would be overtly formed, but potentially only once West German forces 
had been established. Whilst the FO thought it "unlikely" that the Russians would try to 
invade West Berlin, they believed it "very likely that the Western Powers will be forced 
to deal with the East Germans on all matters affecting their rights in Berlin". The paper 
was somewhat off in terms of predicting other Soviet diplomatic responses to the 
Agreements, however: it did not foresee a Soviet-East German peace treaty and it 
suggested that the Russians were likely to be uninterested in international conferences 
on Germany and disarmament. 
The Naval Attache in Moscow, Captain GM Bennett, attended the JIC on 3 
February to give his assessment of Soviet reactions to German rearmament. 15 He 
reported that "from his contacts with ordinary people in Russia", there was genuine fear 
that the Germans would break free of the restraints put upon them under NATO and 
attempt to retake Eastern Germany before marching on Russia. Like the diplomats, 
Bennett thought the advent of an Eastern European counterweight to NATO likely, 
including an East German army. Bennett commented that whilst ordinary Russian 
CC citizens were aware of atomic weapons, they were more frightened of German divisions 
than of bombs dropped from American aeroplanes". Kenneth Strong, Major-General 
Boucher (DMI) and Dean all agreed that if current estimates of Soviet atomic warfare 
training were correct, their defensive nature fitted into logic based around Bennett's 
observations. 
Unexpected changes in the Soviet leadership during February slightly unsettled 
the JIC view of Soviet intentions. The Committee assessed the resignation, or ousting, 
14 CAB 176/52, JIC/148/55 "Soviet Reactions to the Paris Agreements", 17 Januarv 1955 
15 CAB159/18, JIC(55)12"' meeting, 3 February 1955 
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of Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers on 10 February, two days after 
announcements had been made in the Russian news. 16 They recognised that 
Khrushchev's hand in the determination of policy would now be stronger; a worrying 
development given that he had "shown a more doctrinaire and inflexible approach on 
international issues than Malenkov". The JIC were in the ma ority of people who had no i 
idea that Khrushchev's previous attitudes had been part of a ploy to win conservative 
Soviet support in a bid for power, before going on to adopt Malenkov's more 
conciliatory approach to the West. 17 To have known this, the JIC would have had to 
have pulled off an intelligence miracle: access to the inner-most thoughts of Khrushchev 
himself Consequently, the Committee anticipated "a sharper phase of Soviet foreign 
policy", under a "more impulsive" leader. 
The following week, the JIC issued a Special Weekly Summary entitled 
"Changes in the Soviet leadership". 18 A copy of this assessment can still be found in the 
Prime Ministers' files, giving a firmer indication than usual that at least this assessment 
reached the very highest tier of British policy-making. 19 The paper admitted that little 
was known about the motivations behind Malenkov's resignation, suggesting a 
combination of pressure from poor economic performance and internal power- struggles. 
The JIC believed that Bulganin's promotion to Chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
Zhukov's elevation to Defence Minister represented both a victory for Khrushchev in 
the race for overall power and a stronger influence on the Kremlin for the Army, 
because of both Bulganin and Zhukov's military backgrounds. As they had in the past, 
the JIC had to admit, "Soviet actions are incalculable. We have no reliable evidence of 
proceedings within the Soviet leadership. " Furthermore, there was no great 
improvement over the next couple of years as further changes took place. 
16 CAB158/19. JIC(55)8/6, Weekly Summary of Intelligence (WSI) 10 February 1955 
17 Harrison, Hope M., Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East Gennan relations, 1953-61 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 52-3 
18 CAB 158/19, JIC(55)8/8 WSI 17 February 1955 
19 pREMI 111015. In the vast majority of cases intelligence-related papers are removed from the Prime 
Ministers' files before they are released for public access. 
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The FRG finally joined NATO on 8 May, after the Paris Agreements had been 
ratified by the Western allies. As before, French agreement was the crux of the 
development of plans into reality. The period running up to May was tense, so the JIC 
kept up political reporting about likely Soviet responses. 20 In March, the Committee and 
the CIA agreed that the East German authorities were planning to disrupt railway traffic 
between East and West Berlin,, in the event of ratification . 
21 The Soviet Union was 
expected to continue making full use of propaganda and diplomatic means to upset 
Western defence plans. 
22 By this stage, the JIC was also reporting that the Russian 
responses to the Agreements were an indication of "how real is the fear of Germany 
inside the Kremlin", perhaps an indication that Captain Bennett made an impact during 
his visit. SIS reports were rather more alarming. They had received indications that 
arrangements were being made to run Soviet agents in West Germany, without means of 
communication via West Berlin: "the implication was that they [the Russians] were 
preparing for the occasion when West Berlin would cease to be a political entity. 
The Soviet response to the Paris Agreements was not the only concern with 
regards to West German entry into NATO. The problem of security had been a constant 
talking point within the JIC since 1950. By 1955, the difficulties had not evaporated; a 
NATO inspection team reported that no classified information could be trusted to the 
Germans. 24 The JIC recognised that this was politically unfeasible since the FRG had to 
be treated like any other NATO power. Furthermore, intelligence on West Germany had 
to change. British assessments of West Germany produced for NATO would clearly 
have to end . 
25 Whilst some intelligence-gathering powers were retained under the 
Memoranda of Understanding, by and large, the Germans themselves would have to be 
the biggest force in counter-intelligence and counter- subversion work. 26 That said, even 
20 CAB159/18, JIC(55)25ý'meeting. 24 March 1955 
21 CAB 159/18, JIC(55)20'hmeeting, 3 March 1955 
22 CAB158/19, JIC(55)10(Final) "Survey of World Communism in 1954", 24 March 1955 
23 JIC(55)25hmeeting 
24 CAB159/18, JIC(55)3dmeeting, 7 January 1955 
25 CAB176/52, JIC/274/55 "Quarterly counter-intelligence reports by JIC(Germany)", 26 January 1955 
26 CAB 176/52, JIC/467/55 "Future intelligence requirements in Germany", 15 February 1955 
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by 19573 the British government was not keen to renegotiate the Memoranda, in favour 
of relinquishing more powers to the Germans. 27 
The question of whether West Germany should be an intelligence target and with 
what priority attached, was not easily solved. 28 A visit by Dean to Germany in 
November 1955 revealed that British intelligence resources were overly-focused on 
tC 29 collecting short range tactical intelligence" concerning a Soviet attack . It was 
possible to produce some papers on the FRG, although it seems unlikely that much of 
their content came from secret intelligence . 
30 Because of the reductions in Germany, 
however, there was little opportunity to improve the balance. Investigations into the 
value of intelligence-gathering in Germany in 1956 and 1957, reported that return on 
investment was still good, especially from BRDCMIS and improving liaison with 
Gehlen's organisation .31 The continued existence of JIC(G) was agreed in a new charter 
32 in late 1957. 
The Cabinet agreed that once French ratification of the Paris Agreements looked 
certain, offers to confer with the Russians "on the outstanding political problems of 
Europe" must be made. 33 The Chiefs of Staff and FO rapidly dug up the papers drafted 
back in 1953 on demilitarisation in Europe. 34 All of the old problems remained: 
successful negotiations might mean the recall of occupying forces and Russian 
insistence on a Germany non-aligned with the West. Failure of talks would continue the 
division of Germany, with the FRG remaining in NATO, but increased problems in 
Berlin and greater dissatisfaction in West Germany towards the West. The Chiefs' Joint 
Planning Staff recommended that, fi7om a strategic defence point of view, the West could 
not accept a reunified and neutral Germany without foreign troops stationed within her 
27 F0371/130860, WG 1695/IG P. A. Wilkinson to C. M. Anderson, 13 February 1957 
28 CAB159/19, JIC(55)39t" meeting, 19 May 1955; CAB159/21, JIC(55)85thmeeting, 26 October 1955 
29DEFE32/4, COS(55)103'dmeeting, 13 December 1955 
30 Approximately one a year was produced; see below 
31 CAB159/24, JIC(56)64hmeeting, 26 July 1956; CAB159/25, JIC(56)97hmeeting, 25 October 1956; 
CAB 159/27, JIC(57)53 rd meeting, 5 June 1957 
32 CAB159/28, JIC(57)73dmeeting, 21 August 1957 
33 CAB 128/28, CC(55)27t' Conclusions, 30 March 1955 




35 The minimum settlement for Britain had to be a united Germany, no foreign 
troops, but Gen-nan association with the West. Put this together with the JIC's 
recognition of the Kremlin's over-riding fear of Germany, and the British negotiating 
fall-back position looks like nonsense. 
As had been widely expected in Whitehall, the immediate response to West 
German admittance into NATO was the signature of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May. The 
JIC felt this was one component of a two part strategy: on the one hand the Russians 
were proving the strength of their bloc, whilst on the other,, as part of the positioning 
before Four Power talks, they were "propagating the concept of a neutral zone of 
countries" in central Europe. 36 The Committee believed that the primary intention was 
the interruption of Western defence plans, but such a strategy may also have been "a 
reflection of a difficult internal situation, of a desire to limit the risk of nuclear warfare 
and of the exorbitant cost of modem weapons 
The JIC was very active during the preparations for the July Geneva summit. In 
June, they examined, from the Soviet point of view, the implications of a unified 
Germany, first as a neutral power and then as a member of the Westem defence 
organisation. 37 The assessment largely went over old ground, stating that despite more 
recent Russian conciliatory displays, their basic objectives remained the same: they were 
only likely to agree to withdraw from East Germany and allow reunification if there 
were firm guarantees that all foreign forces would leave, Germany would remain neutral 
with minimal forces and their "political influence with an all-German government" was 
sufficient to keep this position. The Soviets were unlikely to agree to a reunified 
Germany, ftee to ally herself with the West; the economic, military and political deficits 
would be too great. There was a new thought attached to this though: 
if, however, a wider settlement involving a general reduction of tension has become of 
greater importance to them than we believe they might be prepared to be less rigid than 
3S DEFE6/29, JP(55)42(A) "Germany - Implications of case 3", 16 May 1955 
36 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/21 WSI 19 May 1955 
37 CAB158/20, JIC(55)36(Final) "Factors affecting the Soviet attitude towards reunification of Germany-, 
2 June 1955 
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we have suggested in their approach to German reunification, especially if they believed that the long term result might be the withdrawal of US forces from Europe and other territories. 
The inclusion of the FRG within NATO, thought the JIC, might appear as a 
confirmation of Western defence built around a permanent US presence in Europe. 
Furthermore, twelve West German divisions, whilst slightly lessened in potential in a 
thermonuclear age, still represented a shift in the balance of forces. These factors 
combined, commented the Committee, could potentially make defence too great a 
burden on the Soviet economy as well as heighten fear of nuclear attack,, such that the 
Russians accepted disarmament at any cost. This view was presented, however, as an 
unlikely possibility. The Chiefs of Staff did not have any sympathy with such views, 
sticking firmly to their opinion that Western defence would suffer too greatly if 
Germany were neutral and unarmed; they wanted their forces as far east as possible. " 
More detailed assessments of Soviet disarmament proposals were drawn up 
along side those looking specifically at the German problem . 
39 The HC believed the 
motivation behind Russian suggestions for a disarmed central Europe was a feeling of 
military inferiority; in terms of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, conventional 
weapons (once West Germany had rearmed within NATO) and the economic burden of 
defence. This meant that "the proposals [were] made with the genuine desire that they 
should be accepted" and Western rejection would hand the Russians considerable 
propaganda material. The Russian offer to drastically reduce nuclear weapons, bombers, 
missiles and development facilities looked good: even if the Soviet Union managed to 
keep a clandestine stockpile of weapons, they could not hide enough for a decisive 
strike, Furthermore, the suggested limits on aircraft and ballistic missiles would leave 
the Russians incapable of delivering a knock-out blow. One great problem, the 
Committee concluded., would be finding a satisfactory system of monitoring the 
agreements. A HC report produced in March had noted that, at the very least, by giving 
38DEFE4/77, COS(55)41st meeting.. 8 June 1955 
39 CAB158/20, JIC(55)39(Final)(Revise) "Soviet disarmament proposals", 15 June 1955 
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up East Germany, the Russians would be losing control of uranium resources "of very 
great importance". 40 
Kirkpatrick, now PUS in the FO, felt that the British aim for the Geneva talks 
had to be a united Germany, free to associate with the West . 
41 As a consequence, he 
urged that the West offer a demilitarised zone in Europe, limits on NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces, and some sort of security guarantee. The Chiefs of Staff drew up a 
disarmament plan which the JIC thought the Russians would reject on grounds that it 
42 
militarily disadvantaged them more than NATO . This proposal offered a completely 
demilitarised zone in East Germany, Austria and Western Poland, balanced conventional 
forces in West Germany and Eastern Poland and equal forces in France, Italy and the 
Western Soviet Union. Under this suggestion, NATO forces stayed put and were 
balanced with Warsaw Pact forces, but the Soviet Union had to shift its defensive 
perimeter hundreds of miles east. The Joint Planners and the JIC agreed though that a 
demilitarized zone further west would be unacceptable to NATO . 
4' The Cabinet agreed 
that a firm stand had to be taken at the summit in an attempt to achieve some sort of 
progress on German reunification, although demilitarization of some part of Germany 
and other security guarantees would have to be offered up in return. 
44 
The Geneva summit took place on 18-24 July. As Gaddis puts it, once there, 
"The Americans remained wary, seeing in Khrushchev's very flexibility a tactic that 
might lull the West into complacency, delaying German rearmament and the 
,, 45 
consolidation of NATO . Harrison suggests 
that the Soviet leader never had any 
intention of giving up the GDR. 46 Edýen reported to his Cabinet that the Russians 
insisted on new security arrangements before Germany could be reunified. 
47 The Prime 
40 CAB 158/20, JIC(55)25 "The importance to the USSR of the East German Uranium mines", 3 March 
1955 
41 PREMI 1/894, Telegram no. 3084 FO to Washington, 2 July 1955 
42 CAB 158/2 1, JIC(55)46(Final) "Europe demilitarized zones - likely Soviet vieW', 4 July 1955 
43 DEFE6/30, JP(55)64 "Germany - demilitarized zones", 11 July 1955 
44 CAB 128/29, CM(55)23,14 July 1955 
45 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 207 
46 Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, pp. 54-6 
47 CAB128/29, CM(55)26,26 July 1955 
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Minister's impression echoed the views promoted by the JIC earlier in the year that the 
Soviet leadership was more fearful of German re-emergence than American power. 
Bulganin had told Eden that neither the Red Army nor the Russian people were ready to 
accept an agreement on German reunification. 48 
Nevertheless, the good news from Geneva was that the Russians seemed 
"genuinely anxious to secure a relaxation of international tension and a friendlier 
relationship with the Western Powers. " The JIC echoed the Prime Minister's view. 49 
Their early gloomy assessments of foreign policy under Khrushchev had not been 
proven correct so far. International relationships, and expectations, had still not settled 
in a post-Stalin world. The Bonn Embassy report on Geneva probably explains this best: 
Judging by reactions in Western Germany so far, the Geneva Conference has succeeded 
in a very difficult feat: it has achieved a reduction in tension between the West and the 
Russians without any visible progress on the German question -a prospect which the Germans have always dreaded in the past - and yet has had a good reception fi7om 
German opinion. 50 
The JIC had been struggling to make sense of Russian policy towards the FRG. 
Khrushchev's invitation for Adenauer to visit Moscow, issued before the Geneva talks, 
51 
was seen as an attempt to win German sympathy. Certainly, the Committee's reports 
after these bilateral talks had taken place in September hint at British discomfort with 
improving Soviet-FRG relations. 52 The resumption of normal diplomatic affairs 
between the two powers, felt the JIC, could make things more difficult in the future. 
Whilst there was no doubting Adenauer's commitment to the West, "a direct line to 
Moscow may make it easier for his successors to revert to the old game of playing off 
East against West". The Committee believed that by allowing two German embassies in 
Moscow, the Federal Chancellor had given the Russians a bolster in their ambitions to 
gain recognition for the GDR. The agreement to return to Germany from Russia some 
48 CAB 129/76, CP(55)99 "Four Power talks", 27 July 1955 
49 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/31 WSI 28 July 1955 
50 F0371/118152, WG 1013/32 Hoyer Nfillar's weekly report, 28 July 1955 
51 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/25 WSI 16 June 1955 
52 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/38 WSI 15 September 1955 
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9! ) 000 POWs, however,, was likely to have "great emotional value" in Germany, dulling 
the pain of concessions. 
The JIC assessments of Soviet-GDR relations following the Geneva summit 
noted that Khrushchev had given assurances to the East German leadership that they 
would not be abandoned, even within the framework of peaceful coexistence. 53 
Continuing difficulties in Berlin were reported, where both numbers of refugees fleeing 
the East and restrictions on travel had increased. The Russians had also begun a new 
campaign to encourage line-crossers to return . 
54 The announcement of the Soviet-GDR 
treaty granting the GDR sovereignty on 20 September was received with little anguish 
by the jIC. 55 "In practice, it changes little in the existing position", they noted. Rather it 
was an attempt to inflate East German prestige by admitting them as full members of the 
Warsaw Pact and force the West Germans into dealings with the GDR. In particular, the 
Russians had granted the East Germans control of all but allied traffic in Berlin, giving 
them the opportunity to exert pressure on the FRG. However, the Committee remained 
confident that whilst the aim of Soviet policy for the foreseeable future would be as 
before (the disruption of Western defence plans , increasing 
influence in Asia and the 
Middle East), the chosen method would be the reduction of international tension. 56 They 
allowed for the unlikely possibility that if the Foreign Ministers' Conference planned for 
October in Geneva failed to reach agreement on any of the big Cold War issues, the 
Kremlin might be tempted "to revert to harsher policies". 
Disarmament proposals continued to come under consideration between the two 
sets of Geneva talks. The Chiefs of Staff tried to tackle the problem of inspection by 
57 
analysing the possibility of using a small land force, perhaps based on BRIXMIS . 
Their American colleagues preferred aerial inspection. The JIC, for their part, assessed 
53 CAB 158/19, JIC(55)1/9 "Periodic intelligence summary for NATO Commands", 20 September 1955 
54 CAB 158/21, JIC(55)55 "The Soviet and Satellite repatriation campaign", 17 August 1955 
55 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/39 WSI 22 September 1955 
56 CAB 158/21, JIC(55)58(Final)(Revise) "Likely Soviet courses of action up to I January 1957", 30 
September 1955 
57 DEFE5/60, COS(55)205 "Geneva proposals - inspection of forces", 22 August 1955 
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the impact of disarmament on Soviet policy. 58 They believed that even with a reduction 
in forces from over four million men to one-and-a-half milfion, ) the Soviet Union would 
be able to uphold their Cold War ambitions. Although a more defensive posture would 
have to be adopted by the Russians, they would be able to retain control of the Satellites 
and maintain a limited offensive capability within Europe. 
The British Government's position going into the second Geneva conference was 
almost identical to that before the first: offers of security guarantees were necessary to 
make progress on German reunification . 
59 After a week of talks, the JIC summarised, 
"there is little prospect of real agreement at Geneva on the basic issues. ). )60 Soviet 
proposals on new European security agreements were unacceptable to the West. The 
Committee predicted no progress on disarmament either. Although the talks were likely 
to make no head way, the Russians would look for further negotiations; "they doubtless 
calculate that they stand to gain by assiduously cultivating the 'Geneva Spirit' and that 
further Conferences will contribute to this. " By the end of the talks, however, the JIC's 
tone had changed, stating surprise at the "inflexibility" shown by Molotov in 
particular . 
61 They wondered if this reflected foreign policy disagreements within the 
Kremlin, increased confidence or perhaps a realisation that the Soviet line had been 
giving false impressions of their determination to remain in control over Eastern 
Europe. 62 As a consequence, the assessment became slightly more pessimistic: "the 
Soviet Government aim[s] to freeze the situation in Europe while waiting for the 
German situation to ripen in their favour" and in the meantime they would shift their 
focus to the Middle East. 
Eden wrote to Eisenhower, "I do not think we should take too gloomy a view of 
the Geneva failure. It was hardly to be expected that our summer weather could 
have 
58 CAB 158/22, JIC(55)65(Final) "Partial disarmament of conventional forces - probable effects on 
Soviet 
and Chinese service allocations and strategy", 13 
October 1955 
59 CAB 128/29, CM(55)36,20 October 1955 
60 CAB 159/2 1, JIC(55)8e meeting, 3 November 1955 
61 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/48 WSI 24 November 1955 
62 CAB159/21, JIC(55)92 nd meeting, 24 November 1955 
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been continued into the winter. ). )63 He was concerned, however, that it looked as if 
Germany were to remain divided, and so he promised to use the visit of Khrushchev and 
Bulganin to London in April 1956 to make progress. In the meantime, Eden told his 
Cabinet, the West's priority must now be to firm up German opinion in favour of the 
West and quickly move along with bringing West German forces into NATO. 64 
The particular difficulties of maintaining Berlin as a city under Four Power 
control were brought into sharper focus by the passing of the Geneva conferences and 
then the Soviet-GDR treaty. The confident tone of East German proclamations 
65 concerning their own powers and Soviet support were early indicators of that . In 
November, the JIC reported that the "responsibility for guarding the inter-zonal border 
and the Berlin perimeter" was being transferred from Soviet to East German border 
guard units. 66 By December, Soviet statements led the Committee to question whether 
the Russians and East Germans still considered the Four Power Agreements over access 
to Berlin to be valid. 67 The JIC admitted that it was "not yet clear how far the Russians 
are prepared to push this matter"'. A week later, after further administrative transfers of 
border control,, their assessment reported that "it does appear to be their [the Soviets] 
intention at present is to change the existing situation regarding the Four Power status of 
Berlin. 5,68 
A hint of contradiction can be found within JIC reports produced around this 
time regarding Soviet intentions. This is, perhaps, a reflection of the process by which 
assessments were drawn up. Weekly current intelligence summaries picked up the 
recent developments in Berlin and were drawn up by the weekly Heads of Section 
meeting. The larger, longer-term studies were drawn up less frequently by teams within 
the JIS probably using a wider range of material over a longer drafting period. The 
"Probable Soviet policy in the light of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers" 
63 PREMI 1/899, Telegram No. 5442,17 November 1955 
64 CAB 128/29, CM(55)41,17"' November 1955 
65 JIC(55)1/9 
66 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/46 WSI 10 November 1955 
67 CAB 158/19, JIC(55)8/54 WSI 8 December 1955; CAB 159/21, JIC(55)96 th meeting, 8 December 1955 
68 CAB 158/19, JIC(55)8/55 WSI 15 December 1955; CAB 159/21, JIC(55)99"' meeting, 15 December 
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paper was produced in mid-December, but appears to take little or no account of 
developments in Berlin. 69 The main conclusion is consistent with events; the Committee 
reassured that "the Soviet leaders will refrain from major aggression and do not intend to 
allow points of friction, such as Berlin, to develop into major crises. " However, on the 
specifics of Soviet policy, where the Committee anticipated the Russian desire to "freeze 
Europe in the status quo pending the communisation of Germany", the transfer of power 
in Berlin hinted, at the very least, that this view might already be outdated. 
All such criticism is perhaps nothing more than a reflection of how difficult a job 
political prediction was for the JIC, or indeed any intelligence organisation in any age. 
Even access to the thoughts of a foreign leader does not necessarily guarantee accurate 
prediction. The Committee had already conceded on more than one occasion during 
1955, that the knowledge of minds within the Kremlin was beyond their powers. An old 
hand at both political reporting and intelligence, Sir William Hayter, then Ambassador 
in Moscow, sent his views to the Foreign Office on Soviet policy, offering a unification 
of ideas and observations: 
As for Europe, the [Soviet] policy seems to be for the present to put it on ice. Insi ious 
nibbling at our position, in Berlin most obviously but also probably in Scandinavian 
countries., will no doubt continue., but probably not to the point where dangerous risks 
are to be run. 70 
An averted gaze 
The JIC files reveal the shifting levels of importance placed by the British 
government on the various theatres of the Cold War. The weekly assessments 
from 
1956 show a more prominent place for Nfiddle Eastern. affairs than 
had previously been 
given . 
71 The JIC had suggested that given the post-Geneva stalemate in Europe, 
Soviet 
attention would shift to increasing their influence 
in the Middle East, where they had 
69 CAB158/22, JIC(55)76(Final), 13 December 1955 
71 PREMI 1/1341,1038/122/55 Hayter to Ward "Summary of Soviet Foreign 
Policy post-Geneva", E-3) 
December 1955 
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72 been successfully "fishing in troubled waters" . As 
it happened, events relating to the 
Cold War in Europe ensured that the JIC could not focus all of its collective attention on 
the Middle East. 
The JIC maintained their overall view that the Soviets wanted to avoid war, and 
this was only likely to change if "new and more violent leaders come into power". 73 The 
20thParty Congress in February, thought the Committee, was a key indicator as to the 
strength of Khrushchev's hold over the Kremlin. 74 Besides Khrushchev's rejection of 
Stalin's "cult of personality", resolutions passed were firmly in line with the First 
Secretary's speech, especially those concerning international affairs where the concepts 
of peaceful co-existence, preventing wars and "various forms of transition to socialism" 
loomed large. The JIC's forecast for 1956 remained as before: the main Soviet effort 
would go into the Middle East and South-East Asia, whilst they sought to maintain 
divisions in Europe but with tempting offers of disarmament to placate Western opinion. 
In March, the Russians proposed reductions to conventional forces in Europe. 
The JIC carried out a support function for the British delegation to the international 
Disarmament Sub-Committee by analysing the proposals . 
7' They believed these to be a 
genuine offer. Nuclear armouries meant the Soviet Union could maintain her military 
position without having to rely on conventional forces. Furthermore, by suggesting that 
Germany and her neighbouring states remain nuclear-free zones, the Russians were 
aiming to disrupt Western defence plans far more than their own. The Committee 
thought that the benefit to the Russians of these proposals would not only be military, 
however. The Soviet economy would gain from something like ten percent more 
investment as well as an extra two-and-a-half million workers. In terms of international 
politics, the rewards would be high: a demonstrable desire to rely on peaceful means 
would have considerable propaganda value, encourage neutralism in Western Europe 
and force the West to acquiesce in the continuing division of Germany. At the same 
72 See above; CAB 158/23, JIC(56)IO(Final) "Survey of World Conununism in 1955", 20 April 1956 
73 CAB158/23, JlC(56)4(Final) "Soviet strategy in the event of global war up to the end of 1960". 2 
January 1956 
74 JIC(56)10(Final) 
11 CAB158/24, JIC(56)49(Final) "Soviet disarmwnent proposals of 27 March 1956", 10 April 1956 
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time,, the JIC reported in their weekly review that the first hints of Soviet unilateral 
withdrawals from Germany were appearing in the German press. 76 
The Committee had been keeping a watch on West Germany, both to gauge the 
effect of international events on internal German politics and the development of her 
forces. A twenty two page report on "The outlook in the Federal German Republic" was 
produced in March. 77 It noted that whilst the West German economy was in an 
extremely healthy state and the armed forces were developing, politically, the dominant 
theme was still reunification. Adenauer's government was under increasing pressure of 
accusations from opposition parties that not enough had been done to explore the 
possibilities with the Russians. However, the paper concluded that the Chancellor's 
parliamentary position remained strong enough to reasonably expect the "continuation 
of pro-Western policies and of the defence build-up". The Committee did think that the 
Federal government would be forced into further contacts with the GDR, no matter how 
much they resisted. There remained 'Ino prospecf' of reunification on terms acceptable 
to the West Germans, though. Nevertheless the Committee reminded readers that the 
Western Allies had to keep up appearances of working for reunification, whilst 
demonstrating determination to maintain their position in Berlin and the FRG's place in 
the Western alliance. 
The assessment included the first significant appraisal of the West German 
economic miracle. The rate of expansion was "remarkably high", but the JIC did not 
78 
think it could last . The good news 
for other NATO nations and their defence 
industries was that German manufacturers did not look eager to develop an indigenous 
supply of military hardware. West German armed forces were expected to be 
operational by 1959-60, with the necessary political restraints on military power in 
place. One of the only causes of delay was likely to be postponement of conscription 
laws, which the JIC did not think could be passed until after the autumn 1957 federal 
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services in West German life was a developing debate, without any clear conclusions. 79 
The Committee thought that the exact future size of the forces was uncertain,, but they 
were sure that the security arrangements showed no signs of improved effectiveness in 
either 1956 or 1957 . 
80 Dean realised that British industry needed German orders enough 
to ignore the problems of protecting secrets: "if we want to sell our goods, we cannot 
afford to be too scrupulous on the security side. "81 
According to the JIC, Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to Britain in April 
resulted in a marked improvement in the atmosphere of Anglo-Soviet relations". 82 
Fortunately, the Soviet delegation did not raise the matter of either the British role in the 
Berlin tunnel or Buster Crabb's ill-fated mission, although protests about the latter were 
made later fi7om MOSCOW. 83 Unfortunately, the minutes of JIC discussions about these 
operations and their aftermath are not yet available to the public. It would be fascinating 
to read exactly how the Committee discussed the fact that it was intelligence-gathering 
that could have easily caused serious embarrassment, if not significant damage to 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
The summer of 1956 was a relatively quiet period for matters concerning 
Germany and certainly the attention of Whitehall was being drawn further towards the 
Suez Canal. The JIC reported in July that the Soviet Foreign Ministry appeared to be 
bolstering their German expertise with new appointments, whilst East German-Soviet 
talks in Moscow revealed "no change" in Russia's policy towards Germany. 84 
Khrushchev's closing address reaffirmed that he thought "the time was not yet ripe" for 
negotiations over reunification. The major change was a reduction by half in the support 
costs the GDR had to pay for Soviet troops stationed on their soil. This was later backed 
79 CAB 179/1, VVRCI week ending I November 1956 
80 CAB159/25, JIC(56)92 nd meeting, II October 1956; JIC(56)97 th meeting, 25 October 1956, 
CAB 158/29, JIC(57)45 "Security in Western European Union countri&', 23 April 1957 
81 CAB 15 9/28, JIC(57)8 I" meeting, 19 September 1957 
82 CAB 158/25, JIC(56)63 (Final) "Six monthly intelligence digest for the Ministry of Supply - period mid- 
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83Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin, pp. 169-170 
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up with promises of "material advances in living conditions" in the GDR, so that the 
East could shine as a beacon for socialism. 85 
The only link drawn between the Suez crisis and East Germany by the JIC was 
the necessity to keep watch on Soviet troop movements, as a measure of Russian 
reaction to British, French and Israeli movements in the Mediterranean. Annual 
manoeuvres in the GDP, however, did "not indicat[e] any intention to cause alarm, since 
they were still on a small scale. ),, 86 Events in October and November 1956 in Hungary 
and Poland were far more relevant to East Germany. The rise of Gomulka to power in 
Warsaw and Nagy in Budapest looked, briefly, like real challenges to Soviet 
domination. 87 The West German press began reporting in October that unrest in 
industrialised areas of East Germany had been suppressed by troops, but the JIC claimed 
there was no reliable evidence that "anything serious had happened". 88 Intelligence 
confirmed that five Soviet divisions in the GDR had left their garrisons for the Polish 
border,, although they had not yet crossed. By the I November, these forces were 
reported to be returning to their bases. There was no sign of the Polish and Hungarian 
"infection spreading" to the other Satellites. 
On 4 November, the Red Army invaded Hungary; the JIC reported that whilst 
there had clearly been evidence of a softer Soviet attitude to the Satellites over the last 
few months, in the Kremlin's view, ) things 
had obviously gone too far. " The Committee 
noted that forces in East Germany and other Satellites were on alert in case they were 
needed to crush any further anti-Soviet unrest. GDR forces had been replaced by 
Russian forces on the East-West German border. 90 A significant observation was that 
there were no signs of any intention to use these forces for action outside their bloc 
85 CAB 179/1, WRCI week ending 9 August 1956 
86 CAB159/24, JIC(56)86hmeeting, 27 September 1956 
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borders. The JIC was also quick to quash rumours within Whitehall of Khrushchev's 
fall fTom power. 91 
By mid-November, difficulties had arisen concerning Allied access to Berlin. 
On the night of the 25 November, Soviet authorities at the border refused to allow a 
British train to leave Berlin because it did not meet new paperwork requirements. 92 This 
was the first time a train had ever been returned to its origin. The JIC was undecided as 
to the significance: was it the first indication of a tougher Soviet policy, a "routine 
probing exercise to test the strength of Allied resistance" or was it a warning to the 
Western powers not to take advantage of the difficulties within the satellites? The 
Americans also had a road convoy turned back on 5 December because they had refused 
to allow their vehicles to be inspected. In the face of Soviet intransigence, the JIC 
concluded that all the Allies could do was produce the new documentation required by 
the Russians, whilst agreeing a long-term response with the US and French authorities. 93 
In December, the JIC reviewed "Soviet policy in the light of the situation in the 
Middle East and the Satellites"'. 94 The Committee thought that the Russians would 
continue to take full advantage of Arab nationalism and anti-Western sentiment. Suez 
had given the Kremlin "an opportunity to consolidate their position" in the Middle East 
and delight in an Anglo-American split. With regard to the Satellites, however, Soviet 
policy was on a knife-edge, given the parallel ambitions of maintaining their bloc intact 
whilst offering some concessions towards liberalisation. Forceful intervention in 
Hungary had damaged the "initial advantages" gained by the policies of peaceful co- 
existence, but sticking with this policy would have to be their method of overcoming 
such set-backs. The Russians needed to face economic problems in the Satellites as well 
as a loss of trust in Satellite armed forces. 
91 CAB 179/1. VVRCI week ending 22 November 1956; VVRCI week ending 29 November 1956 
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A specific study of "the present internal situation in East Germany" was issued 
separately. 95 It included reports of both internal division within the SED and support 
within the intellectual community for "national communism". Ulbricht had not yielded 
any ground, however, reliant on his support from Moscow. His criticisms of Polish and 
Hungarian attempts to diverge from Soviet communism were stronger than those made 
in Russia herself. Such confidence, noted the JIC, had prompted "a tendency for East 
German leaders to talk big about their attitude to the West". Threats about Berlin had 
not yet been supported by the Soviet government, although they were clearly happy that 
the Allies had been forced into complying with the new documentation regime for 
access to the city. The assessment concluded, however, that the Russians were not yet 
ready to impose a partial blockade on Berlin by enforcing an inspection regime of trains 
and vehicles which the Allies had already refused to accept. Further reassurance came 
with news that, except in Hungary, both Soviet and satellite forces had returned to a 
normal, less threatening routine. 96 
Assessments showed that economically, the GDR was suffering, as both food 
and coal shortages had further damaged an already feeble system. 
97 The Russia 
Committee concluded that it was not the threat from "national communism" that posed 
the greatest threat to Ulbricht's regime, but rather the shortages in both fuel and 
consumer goods. 98 The number of refugees crossing ftom the GDR to the West had 
increased from 252,870 in 1955 to 279,189 in 1956, which was taken as a further 
indicator that the East German economy must be creaking. 
99 
95 CAB 179/1, VVRCl week ending 13 December 1956 
96 CAB 179/1, VVRCI week ending 20 December 1956 
9' CAB 159/25, JIC(56)112"' meeting, 22 November 1956 
98 F0371/128993, RC/1/57 "Trends in Communist policy - December 1956", 4 January 
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1957: testing Allied resolve in Berlin 
In January 1957, the JIC reported that apart from in Hungary, Soviet forces were 
no longer maintaining "a special state of readiness". 'Oo There had also been a return to 
the normal course of Soviet-GDR affairs, demonstrated by joint talks in Moscow. The 
promise of credit and increased imports from Russia represented a boost for the East 
German economy. 'O' On the political side, the JIC explained that there had been further 
agreements between the Russians and East Germans in favour of both a disarmed zone 
in Germany and an interpretation of the Four Power rules governing the Berlin air 
corridor as of "temporary and limited character'. The Committee anticipated a final 
resolution of the outstanding issues concerning Soviet troops based in the GDR. The 
CIA suggested these talks were likely to be an attempt to bolster the Ulbricht regime. 102 
They were also concerned that the pronouncements over the air corridor might 
foreshadow East German efforts to "exert control" over Western commercial air travel 
to Berlin. 
The 30"' Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED took place at the end of 
January, giving Western intelligence a relatively easy opportunity to pick up clues as to 
the state of East Germany. The JIC noticed "indications of the precarious economic 
position of the GDW) such as reductions in investment, coal and steel consumption. 103 
Planned production targets had already been reduced as a result of the coal shortages. 104 
In an attempt to avoid future difficulties, the GDR offered the Polish government credit 
to help develop their coal industry. 10' The overall emphasis of the Plenum, however, 
appeared to be on "ideological conformity and party discipline", amidst a regime not 
showing particular signs of fear of impending unrest. 106 The trial and imprisonment of 
the philosopher Wolfgang Harich in March, over charges of counter-revolutionary 
loo CAB 179/2, WRCI week ending 10 January 1957 
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dealings was designed "to give intellectuals a lesson in the perils of subversion and 
deviationism". 107 This, thought the JIC, was not "the panic reaction of a frightened 
regime". 
Press reports about possible revisions to the GDR-Polish border along the Oder- 
Neisse line, prompted the JIC to issue a special report in February-'08 The issue was 
thought to be part of the Soviets' approach to maintaining the integrity of their bloc, 
where moving the border in favour of either the Germans or Poles could be used as a 
reward or punishment depending on behaviour. The assessment concluded that the 
Russians had forced the GDR government to issue statements denying any pressure to 
revise the border, in order to avoid internal disagreement within the Warsaw Pact. The 
question of territory also had significance in the West German federal elections, where a 
powerful lobby was attempting to force the government to state their claim to lost 
territory in Poland. The JIC had also reported that the Russians had been attempting to 
influence the course of West German elections, not through discussion of the Oder- 
Neisse line., but by combining threats of nuclear retaliation with trade, cultural and 
diplomatic inducements. 109 Such ploys were not so one-sided, howeverl since Selwyn 
Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, informed the Cabinet that in view of the elections, "it was 
desirable that [Western] discussions on German reunification should now be 
resumed". 110 As a consequence, an international working group was set up in March. 
111 
Throughout early 1957,, the JIC was trying to make sense of events in Eastern 
Europe so that they could not only determine the exact state of the bloc's integrity but 
also suggest future trends. A lengthy assessment drafted by the JIS in February 
produced "tentative" conclusions, largely in line with those since October 1956.112 The 
Satellites would remain both economic and military assets, but also "a political liability" 
to the Soviet Union. In Hungary, the aim remained crushing disaffection, but in Poland, 
10' CAB 179/2, VVRCI week ending 14 March 1957 
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110 CAB 128/3 1, CC(57)2'd Conclusions, 21 January 1957 
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socialism would be allowed to take some account of national feeling. The prognosis for 
East Germany remained the same as it had for ten years: the Russians had to improve 
material conditions there so as to make a favourable comparison with the West. The JIC 
bad noticed a "qualification" of the language and promises made at the 20thCongress, 
since these seemed to have been the spark of trouble in Hungary and Poland. 
In the GDR, liberalisation had always been "very carefully controlled by the 
regime", since the events of 1953. Despite limited concessions, however., since 
November 1956, the Russians had made clear their intention to keep their bloc intact. 
There had, however, been carrot as well as stick, in terms of pledges to improve the 
economic conditions of ordinary people. The JIC noted these promises went largely 
unfulfilled in East Germany, but memories of the 1953 suppression and twenty two 
Soviet Divisions ensured no unrest. Perhaps the most interesting observation was "the 
refugee stream provides a safety valve through which discontented elements are always 
likely to be siphoned off to the West in times of stress' 
The Committee believed that the Soviet requirement for closely-governed 
Satellites had not yet diminished. 113 The GSFG needed to be maintained as a 
counterbalance to NATO forces in Europe, so this relied on secure lines of 
communication and forward airfields in Poland. Bauxite from Hungary, uranium ore 
from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Polish coal and German machinery could not 
easily be replaced either given their value to the Russian economy. Perhaps of greater 
significance though was the political imperative to maintain the bloc: if any Satellite 
were to break away, the Communist project for gradual world envelopment would be 
irreparably damaged. As a consequence, the Committee concluded, the Russians would 
have to maintain their military presence in Eastern Europe whilst they would be 
particularly sensitive to any Western attempts to interfere within their security perimeter. 
The carrot to encourage the satellite peoples would remain small, however: "only such 
concessions to popular opinion as may allay discontent without weakening the reality of 
their political dictatorship" should be expected. 
113 JIC(57)13 (Final) 
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In March, the JIC noted that a Soviet-GDR agreement had been signed 
confirming the "temporary presence" of Russian troops on German soil. 114 This accord 
did not go as far as that drawn up between the Poles and Russians, since troop numbers 
and movements in Germany did not require the consent of the GDR government. A 
clause allowing the Soviet troops in Germany to deal with internal security threats, 
deýduced the JIC) Cf. constitute[d] no limitation on the Soviet High Commander's complete 
freedom of action". 
The May assessment of the "Likelihood of global war and warning of attack"' 
read more like earlier documents than those of 1956.1 15 War by "miscalculation" in 
Germany or the Middle East was a'threat,, as was war caused by Western support for 
either East German or other satellite secession from the Soviet bloc. The Committee 
also believed that the removal of the ultimate deterrent through a ban on nuclear 
weapons without concurrent reductions of conventional forces made war more likely. 
However, by July, the JIC suggested that the Russians were unlikely to offer any 
concessions on either disarmament or Europe. ' 16 Because Molotov, Malenkov and 
others had finally been removed from power, the JIC thought that Khrushchev would 
rely more on the backing of the Marshals and their tougher policies. Furthermore, the 
First Secretary's "impulsiveness" would now be unchecked by the Praesidium. The 
Foreign Secretary was somewhat at odds with this view though, since he told the 
Cabinet these moves (. 4marked the elimination of the more reactionary forces". 117 He did 
agree, however, that these changes did not mean greater stability in the Kremlin regime. 
As the JIC was expressing their view that disarmament was unlikely to move 
forward, potentially contradictory reports were being received that GSFG units were 
being withdrawn. "" Given this, the impending elections in West Germany and 
Khrushchev's visit to the GDR planned for August, the JIC quickly produced an 
114 CAB 179/2, Vv'RCl week ending 21 March 1957 
115 CAB 158/28, JIC(57)30(Final)(Revise), 27 May 1957 
116 CAB 179/2, WRCI week ending II July 1957 
117 CAB 128/3 1, CC(57)50'h Conclusions, 9 July 1957 
1" CAB 159/27, JIC(57)62-d meeting, 11 July 1957 
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assessment of likely courses of Soviet action in Germany. 119 The Committee preferred 
to see the changes within the GSFG as a reorganisation rather than disarmament; whilst 
some units were certainly leaving, this was "unlikely to diminish the military capability 
of GSFG'. 120 The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons to Germany was also 
predicted. The Committee fully expected the Russians to make maximum propaganda 
value from presenting the West with what they could claim was unilateral disarmament. 
Furthermore, the Soviets were likely to "blacken the record of the Federal Government 
in handling Russo-German relations", without making any new serious proposals on 
solving the German question themselves, in a bid to prevent the re-election of Adenauer. 
The JIC thought that during Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to Berlin all efforts would 
be made to avoid undermining the credibility of the SED, so new concessions to the 
West were unlikely. East German proposals announced just before the trip included no 
surprises, suggesting an all-German council without fi7ee elections. 121 
Weekly intelligence reviews during August were full of analysis regarding the 
Soviet-GDR talks taking place in Berlin, but ultimately they reported nothing worrying 
or unexpected. East German boasting about the advent of Federal Union between the 
Soviet Union and the Satellites as a counter-balance to the Common Market in Western 
Europe was dismissed by the JIC as highly improbable self-deception. 
122 The final 
communique reiterated a "familiar Soviet position" on reunification, some new trade 
agreements and a promise of party unity. 123 The JIC concluded that the visit had, in fact, 
been more of an attempt to reassure the GDR government that recent changes in the 
Kremlin had not altered the direction of the USSR-GDR relations, rather than a bid to 
influence West German elections. 
A JIC assessment examined the "Political outlook in the Federal German 
Republic" a month before the Federal elections, in an attempt to forecast trends that 
1'9 CAB 158/29. JIC(57)79(Final) "The likely course of Soviet policy towards Gennany, as a whole, over 
the next few years", I August 1957 
120 See later for details of the reorganisation 
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would be seen after the event. 124 The Committee described their efforts as merely "a 
sketch [ofl the various possible directions which German policy may take. " They 
concluded that there was a "good chance" that Adenauer would be able to form a third 
government, which would continue the policies of the previous eight years. If the 
elections forced a coalition, the JIC preferred to see a CDU dominated alliance rather 
than an SPD one, since they feared without Adenauer more "pressure for nationalism 
and neutralism" and a weaker Western position in reunification negotiations with the 
Russians would arise. The JIC realised that the Chancellor's problem had been 
convincing the German voters that his strong alliance with the West was consistent with 
the aim of reunification. Some of the domestic opposition to remilitarisation had 
evaporated with the West German government's decision to progress at a slower rate 
using fewer conscripts but there had been greater than anticipated resistance to 
suggestions of stationing nuclear weapons in Germany. The economy remained 
Adenauer's strongest point, however, and the assessment suggested that economic 
prosperity would trump foreign policy criticism at the polls. 
After a "resounding victory" for Adenauer in the September Federal elections, 
the JIC began to report a consistent pattern of events through to the end of the year: 
occasional Soviet notes and offers over the future of Germany, combined with 
increasingly testing events in Berlin. 125 Initially, after East German authorities had 
caused trouble about fteight cars being attached to Allied trains, the JIC thought "there is 
at present no reason to suppose that this is the first step in a campaign to harass Allied 
communications with Berlin". 126 By November, the Committee suggested "the 
situation... needs watching". 127 The East-West Berlin border had been temporarily 
sealed during Eastern currency reform 128 ; after discovering propaganda material on 
board Allied trains, the Russians refused to allow mail vans in Allied trains; and Soviet 
authorities had made requests for clearance for East German aircraft to use one of the air 
124 CAB 158/28, JIC(57)34(Final), 15 August 1957 
s 125 Of 497 Bundestag seats, the CDU won 270, the SPD 169 and others 58. CAB 179/3, WRCIs wee 
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corridors. The JIC warned,, "although none of these incidents is in itself serious, any one 
of them could be used by the Russians,, if they so wished, as a first step towards 
I undermining the Allied position in Berlin' . The Committee believed the GDR 
government was certainly on a campaign to assert their "air sovereignty" - 
129 
Border controls between the two parts of Berlin did not return to normal after the 
currency reforms had been carried out,, so rumours continued to spread that the GDR 
was going to introduce permanent control measures. 130 The CIA had evidence that 
temporary U-bahn stations were being set up just inside the Eastern sector of the city, 
which they thought suggested either some sort of customs barrier or permanent 
restriction on train travel between sectors. 
13 1 The JIC recognised that border controls 
remained tighter than before, but they concluded that there were "no indications that the 
, 132 East Germans intend to introduce more drastic controls in the near future' . Whilst 
there had been some attempts by the Russians to refer Allied requests to the GDR 
authorities concerning visas and flights, the Committee did not believe the Russians 
were ready for a show-down over the Allied position in Berlin. The Americans saw 
inconsistency in Soviet action, given the contrast between tight controls over the East 
Germans to prevent them violating Four Power agreement, but at the same time granting 
them limited freedom of action to interfere with the Allies in some ways. 133 The CIA 
saw all these events as probing for weakness. 
The whole picture was made clearer, when the JIC reported in their last summary 
of the year that East German authorities had issued instructions that as of I January 
1958., all Western travellers,, excluding those members of the Allied garrisons, would 
have to obtain East German visas. 134 According to the Committee, such measures did 
not infringe rights established under the Four Power agreements, nor would their impact 
be a problem given the small number of people who fell outside the exception. 
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131 CAB159/28, JIC(57)99hmeeting, 21 November 1957 
132 CAB 179/3, V%TRCI week ending 10 December 1957 
133 CAB159/28, JIC(57)104 
th 
meeting, 12 December 1957 
134 CAB 179/3, WRCI week ending 31 December 1957 
207 
Nevertheless, it was clear that events in Berlin were beginning to move at a quicker pace 
than at any time since 1949. 
Military assessments and disarmament 
Observations of the Soviet forces in Europe as well as the developing East 
German indigenous army were given a slightly different focus during the events during 
and after the Geneva negotiations. The JIC was given a role to play in the ongoing 
international discussion about disarmament, assessing Soviet proposals for veracity as 
well as potential impact on military strength. Although such military intelligence was a 
relative strength at the time for British intelligence, achieving the level of accuracy 
required for meaningful reporting was a stem test. 
In the first half of 1955, the JIC kept particular watch on the Soviet and East 
German forces for any military response to the signature of the Paris Agreements. All 
immediate indicators proved negative, however, with no increases of garrisons or 
training reported. 135 The JIC did report that East German industry appeared to be under 
development to cope with the demands of supporting an enlarged Army, in line with 
threats made by the GDR government. 136 The East Germans also announced an 
intensification of military training along with the formation of volunteer defence units of 
factory workers. 137 The JIC's overall assessment of the KVP's capability remained as 
low as it had for the previous years, however. 
138 Recruitment appeared to be ineffective, 
although the introduction of conscription could have brought in up to 80,000 men a year, 
allowing the Army to grow from 86,000 to 326,000 strong over three years. Even then, 
the JIC believed the memories of the 1953 riots would mean the Soviets were unlikely to 
135 CAB158/19, JIC(55)8/4,27 Januarv 1955 
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give the East German forces any significant role in wartime. The CIA believed the KVP 
was even more poorly equipped than the British did. "' 
A revised list of indicators of Soviet preparations for war was issued in February, 
with its characteristic "Red" and "Amber" categories. 140 As before, the redeployment 
and dispersal of air and ground forces in Eastern Germany were considered to be 
44 essential preparations" for war. The reinforcement of GSFG units was in the lesser, 
"Amber" category. The introduction of MiG-17 fighters 141 and large numbers of T54 
tanks 142 into East Germany in May did not cause undue alarm, since the JIC believed it 
to be part of the upgrading process rather than preparations for an attack. 143 By 
September, reports of normal annual training patterns had confirmed the lack of an 
immediate threat to the West. 144 At that time, the JIC estimated the GSFG to be 4707000 
men strong and therefore not reduced in strength as the Soviet government had 
announced. 145 
Assessments of forces in 1956 were dominated by the question of disarmament. 
The year began with the dissolution of the KVP and the formation of an East German 
Army (NVA), set to grow to 170,000 men, under the control of a new Ministry of 
Defence. 146 By July,, however, the JIC reported announcements stating the Army would 
be reduced to only 90,000 men. 147 The Committee believed the underlying cause had 
been the Army's inability to recruit enough volunteers to reach their initial aim, even 
though the announcements had hailed the move as a grand gesture of peace. In fact, 
intelligence reports suggested that the strength of the NVA was around 90,000, making 
the whole thing nothing more than hot air. 
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The JIC took Soviet announcements more seriously. In May, the Kremlin 
proposed the demobilisation of 1.2 million men, reducing the Soviet Armed Forces by 
25 percent over twelve months. 148 This included a drop in strength of the GSFG by 
30,000. Reports of reorganisation in East Germany were already coming in, as well as 
indicators that initial assessments had been wrong, and that the GSFG had lost 20,000 
men from border guard units during 1955. Any real weakening of the main order of 
battle was expected to be "noticeable"), however. By the first week of June, the JIC 
reported that it was possible 8,000 had left in May. 149 BRDMS attended departure 
ceremonies for some further units in mid-June and reported that not only had fewer men 
departed than first suggested - only 7,000, including families - but also it appeared that 
only Air Force units had been so far affected. 150 The might of GSFG had not yet been 
reduced, particularly given that more powerful weapons had been introduced at the same 
time. 151 
In July, the JIC carried out a study of how the reductions would affect the 
GSFG's potential if they were carried out as announced. 152 Firstly, they noted that the 
units so far affected had been reduced as part of the reorganisation and furthermore, 
these were not line divisions. A loss of 30,000, the JIC concluded, would "not 
significantly affect the fighting power of GSFG" because under the re-equipment 
programme taking place, the fi7ont line forces had "increased mobility and fire powerli 
and were better equipped for nuclear warfare. In fact, the Committee warned that "the 
Soviet Land Forces in East Germany are today more powerful than at any time since 
1946. ')" New,, more sophisticated aircraft had been seen in East Germany too,, indicating 
increased air power in both the Soviet and East German air forces. 153 
148 4,750,000 to 3,550,000 men. CAB 159/23, JIC(56)46 Ih meeting, 17 May 1956 
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The weekly summaries for the second half of 1956 suggest a good deal of 
confusion within the JIC over the exact strength of Soviet and East German forces. It 
seems likely that the sorts of detailed intelligence required to report accurately the 
movements in and out of Eastern Germany was not available. BRLXMIS witnessed 
more withdrawal ceremonies of air units in August and there were occasional East 
German press and rail-watching reports, but this was not sufficient evidence for precise 
reporting. 154 By September, the JIC wrote that the reductions in the GSFG were 
CC probably taking place", but they had no knowledge of forces inside the Soviet Union. 155 
They were more certain that normal annual training, although on a smaller scale, and 
trooping were taking place. 156 In their last submission to NATO for 1956, the JIC put 
GSFG strength at 470,000, showing no drop at all from 1955, despite all of their earlier 
conclusions. 157 
In early 1957, the JIC reported that normal winter exercises had taken place in 
East Germany, despite the problems caused by events in Hungary and Poland. 158 They 
also reaffirmed their conclusion that there had been no drop in strength from twenty two 
line divisions in the GSFG, such that Soviet forces could launch a westwards offensive 
without requiring reinforcements. 19 The crises within the Satellites had5 however, 
reduced the value of the Hungarian, Polish and East German armies, so they had "no 
offensive value" and were even "of doubtful reliability for lines of communication 
duties 160 The GSFG had proved itself in the eyes of the JIC, however, during 
November 1956, because the forces had demonstrated their ability to "meet an 
unexpected eventuality with a high degree of readiness, mobility and efficiency. 1-) 161 
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By March, enough evidence concerning the development of the NVA was 
available for the JIC to make predictions about its final shape. 162 They expected a final 
structure of two tank and five motorised infantry divisions. Attempts by BRDMS to 
observe NVA training had been fi-ustrated though, so assessments of their standard were 
more difficult to make. 163 East German press reports made it clear that a great deal of 
emphasis was being placed on internal security duties, including within volunteer militia 
units. 164 
The reorganisation of GSFG continued to appear in JIC weekly reports, right 
through 1957. The exact nature of the changes was still unknown in May, although 
assessments of force strength were finally reduced to 384,000 that summer. 165 
Furthermore, the disruption to Soviet forces had been so great that the JIC believed the 
standard of training and operational capability of the GSFG had been reduced in the first 
months of the year. 166 CIA information roughly agreed with British intelligence, 
suggesting that rifle armies were being converted into mechanised armies, but the 
Americans too could not be sure. 167 By September, JIC weekly summaries were 
showing that GSFG training was back up to the usual level, involving many divisions in 
major exercises. 168 The late commencement of annual trooping caused some concern, 
because it meant a month with an extra 150, )000 men 
in the Russian forces, but that was 
soon dispelled. 169 By the end of 1957, one concern did r emain for the JIC and that was 
that the re-equipment programme within the GSFG left Soviet forces armed with 
weapons "markedly superior to that of Western forces in Europe. , 
170 This, combined 
with the return to high training standards, made the GSFG an even greater opponent than 
before. 
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Moving intelligence closer to the centre 
British intelligence developed a great deal during the first ten years of the Cold 
War. There was no other choice: at home and abroad every part of the machinery had to 
adapt to a new threat. Following on from Evill's report in 1947, scientific and technical 
intelligence was given a higher priority; recognition of the increasing significance of 
high technology to war-fighting power. 171 The Security Service had been trying to get to 
grips with Communist penetration. 172 GCHQ had gone from the successes of ULTRA to 
scraps of VENONA and peripheral military intelligence. 173 SIS had probably changed 
the least, despite some attempts at internal reorganisation, and they had certainly had 
very little success in gathering top-flight intelligence on the Soviet threat, thanks to the 
penetration of both their service and agent-networks. 174 Under the chairmanships of 
Hayter, Reilly and Dean, the JIC had adapted to managing their comer of the Cold War, 
but more importantly they had overseen the gradual rise in the Committee's stock within 
Whitehall. That the Committee had grown in significance within the government 
without any great amount of intelligence compared with wartime is testament to these 
shrewd bureaucratic magicians. 
During the three year period from 1955 to 1957, the modern JIC was founded, in 
a form that with only one further moment of reorganisation in 1968, lasted well past the 
end of the Cold War. 175 The crux of this change was the move from under the Chiefs of 
Staff to the Cabinet Office. 176 This explicitly changed the raison d'6tre of the JIC from 
producing studies on "defence intelligence and security" for Britain's top military 
committee to serving the Cabinet on "intelligence and defence security". As the JIC had 
been distributing its material more widely than the Chiefs for some time, the 
significance lies within the recognition that intelligence had become something that 
171 See above 172 Hennessy, Secret State, pp. 77-100 
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needed to permanently serve the highest committee in British government. Furthermore, 
the move licensed the JIC to produce political and economic as well as military 
assessments. 
The lead-up to the 1957 move began two years earlier. In August 1955, a new 
JIC charter was suggested that recognised the wider scope of assessments being 
produced beyond merely those matters of particular defence interest. 177 The 
Committee's role as manager of the whole intelligence community remained the same. 
The membership was enlarged, giving the Colonial Office a permanent seat and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) access to all papers and observer status at any 
full meetings they wished to attend. 178 The CRO was later made a full member in 
1956.179 Earlier in 1955, the alert procedure had also been re-vamped, making the 
system for dealing with current intelligence more regular. 180 Urgent intelligence 
indicating Soviet preparations for war was assessed immediately by the Heads of 
Sections,, whether in or out of office hours. In times of increased tension, the Heads of 
Sections would be in permanent session. 
The difficulties of presenting new and unexpected intelligence to the most senior 
readers were highlighted in July 1955, when Eden showed his irritation with JIC 
reporting. A report had unwisely noted that the numbers of all-weather fighters seen 
rehearsing for the Soviet Air Force Day had "come as a shock to the Air Ministry". 181 
The speed with which the Russians had produced these aircraft was "a surprise". Upon 
reading the assessment, Eden scrawled across it a terse note to the Minister of Defence. 
'No doubt you have seen this. It adds to my concern. I never like to read of 
Departments being surprised. Itistheirjobnottobe. " 
177 CAB 158/2 1, JIC(55)57(Final) "Charter for the Joint Intelligence Organisation7,26 August 1955 
178 CAB158/22, JIC(55)74 "Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee", 16 November 1955 
179 CAB 158/25, JIC(56)71 "Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee", 14 June 1956 
"30 CAB 158/20, JIC(55)24 "Evaluation of indicators of Soviet preparations for early war", 22 February 
1955 
181 pREM1 1/10 17, WSCI "'Russian Air Force", I July 1955 
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Given Eden's view,, it mattered even more whether British intelligence was well- 
placed to collect information on a Soviet attack to avoid the most critical surprise. in 
mid-1956, the JIC "expected to learn" of active preparations for war. 182 They admitted, 
however, that there was "virtually no chance" of intercepting the communication of a 
decision to attack, so it was down to interpreting military moves. In the case of a 
surprise attack therefore, the JIC did not expect to obtain any forewarning: "the 
detection of those [attacking] aircraft on Allied radar screens would be the only 
warning... in the case of ballistic missiles) there would be no warning". Away from the 
very extreme edge of current intelligence, the Committee felt that collection had 
improved. Increased levels of overt and covert sources had improved knowledge of 
Russian scientific research and development. "' Whilst the supply of German scientists 
returning to their homes after working on Russian guided weapons had virtually dried 
up, increased openness in the Kremlin's attitudes to scientific knowledge had filled the 
gap. STIB in Germany was relocated back to the JIB in London to help with the 
analysis of this information. 
In February and March 1956, the Committee introduced a new format for 
presenting their weekly intelligence product. They decided that the weekly review was 
of "limited value"'. 184 The intention behind these summaries when they were first 
introduced in 1954 was to both give the Committee and their senior customers the 
chance to see weekly developments and emerging tre nds. The Committee agreed, 
however, that the practice of viewing intelligence in isolation each week had evolved 
and very little attention was paid to the question of trends. The solution that emerged 
was a three stage process- the Heads of Section would produce a document for the JIC's 
consideration and after the Committee's discussion two further papers would then be 
produced, one highly classified with a very limited distribution and the other "an 
expurgated version" for wider circulation. 185 These became known respectively as the 
"Weekly Survey of Intelligence" (WSI or "Red Book") and the "Weekly Review of 
182 CAB 158/24. JIC(56)2 I(Final) "Likelihood of global war and warning of attack-, 1 May 1956 
183 CAB 158/24, JIC(56)32(Final) "Russian research and development up to the end of 1955", 11 May 
1956 
184 CAB 159/22, JIC(56)19'hmeeting, 23 February 1956 
185 For more on Heads of Section meetings, see Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 263 
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Current Intelligence" (WRCI or "Grey Book"). 186 The Red Book was supposed to be 
forward-looking and concise, but with factual content for the most senior few readers. A 
Weekly Situation Review for NATO Commands was also developed. 187 New paper and 
printing was also required to improve the look and feel of the documents. The 
introduction of the WSI was also used as a tool by Dean to help end the flow of weekly 
SIS ". CV) reports to the Prime Minister on the grounds that a properly assessed, all- 
source digest would be more useful than a single service's view. 188 This did not infringe 
on SIS's right to send individual reports to Number 10, however, or indeed on C's right 
of access. 
The Chairman began the discussions about a large overhaul of the JIC in 1957.189 
Intelligence was now "of national concern spread over the political, economic and 
military fields between which there was seldom a clear-cut dividing line. "190 The 
argument against making any further changes to the JIC was that procedures for 
producing political intelligence reports through ad hoc committees seemed to be 
working. This did not satisfy the Committee, however, because they believed they 
should be reporting to a wider "range of authorities"). The JIC wanted to reorganise so 
that their assessments would "make a greater impact where they would have most effect, 
i. e. on Xfinistersý. Dean put the argument in stark terms: "the Joint Intelligence 
Committee must either go forward or go back. " The proposal was that the JIC would 
come under the Cabinet Office, bringing the Secretariat and Staff with it, to produce 
reports to be circulated as Cabinet Office papers. It was hoped this would open up the 
interest in the JIC process to civilian departments and even prompt Ministers to 
commission assessments. Two unavowed, but significant aspects of the proposed move 
addressed recent problems: firstly, a stronger centre could exercise more control over the 
post-Crabb SIS; and secondly, after Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Suez, the British 
186 CAB 159/22. JIC(56)24hmecting, 8 March 1956. This "Red Boole' should not be confused with the 
"Red Book" which was the SIS document listing intelligence targets and their priorities. 
Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 263 
PREMI 1/2082, Dean to Freddie Bishop, 10 August 1957 
CAB159/26, JIC(57)13'hmecting, 7 February 1957 
CAB 159/26, JIC(57)2 I" meeting, 26 February 1957 
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intelligence community needed to demonstrate change to win back American friends. '9' 
The latter aim fitted perfectly into Macmillan's considerable efforts as Prime Minister to 
rebuild the UK-US relationship following Suez. 192 
A short submission to the Chiefs and Ministers outlined the Committee's 
vision. 
193 
Macmillan quickly gave his approval. 
194 Discussions within the JIC about 
implementing the plan and striking the right civilian-military balance within the new 
Staff and Secretariat were heated. Everyone was agreed, however, that high calibre 
people were needed under a very good Deputy Secretary "Editor-in-Chief' to produce 
the quality of reports the Committee hoped for. Raw intelligence was to be kept out of 
the weekly assessments wherever possible; references to earlier intelligence should be 
made when necessary to help foster continuity from one week to the next; and the Heads 
of Sections' drafts should only describe trends once they had become apparent, rather 
than attempting prediction. '9' The JIC decided that they "when appropriate, should 
venture a forward-looking view". 
The transfer to the Cabinet Office took effect from 14 October 1957.196 As a 
consequence of this boost to the JIC, the Foreign Office concluded that its Russia 
Committee was no longer required. 197 Hayter wrote the paper drawing their body to a 
close, commenting that the JIC was now "in a position to cover a wider field than in the 
past, including most of the subjects hitherto handled by the Russia Committee. ") Some 
of the papers, such as the "Trends of Communist Policy" continued, but as the 
responsibility of the FO's Northern Department. However, any special studies on Soviet 
bloc affairs would now be prepared by the JIC. As part of the process of 
psychologically cementing the new position of Joint Intelligence within the minds of 
Whitehall, the JIC produced a brief history on the subject, from its earliest conception in 
191 Davies, MI6, pp. 258-260; Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 128-9 
192Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 141 
193 JIC(57)40 
194 CAB 159/27, JIC(57)65"' meeting, 18 July 1957 
195 CAB159/28, JIC(57)85hmeeting, 3 October 1957 
196 CAB158/30, JIC(57)101 "Terms of reference for the Joint Intelligence Committee", 1 October 1957 
197 F0371/128994, NS 1022/16 "Russia Committee", 29 August 1957 
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1936 through to its rise to the pinnacle in 1957.198 After three pages of history, the paper 
included seven pages explaining the new responsibilities and structure of the JIC. In 
November, the Cabinet were informed about the new services at their disposal. '99 
The opportunity to improve the intelligence alert system was taken during the 
1957 move. The Prime Minister and President Eisenhower had agreed during their 
Bermuda meeting in March that "an effective machinery should be established for the 
rapid exchange of intelligence between the Governments of the United States, Canada 
and the United Kingdom on any sudden threat of Soviet aggression". 200 The Tripartite 
Alert Procedure was developed by the JIC in consultation with their American and 
Canadian counterpartS. 20' New communications links were established to cope with the 
requirements of rapid exchange of information. 202 The JIC was also forced to review its 
procedures in response to alerts, because both the Americans and Canadians believed 
they could assemble their teams of intelligence assessors within an hour. As a 
consequence, the British developed a system of nominated officers, allocated rooms and 
rules that was designed to deal with every possible scenario, from day to day routine 
through to sudden attack in the middle of the night. 203 
Conclusions 
There is a great temptation for historians to over-emphasise given moments in 
their narrative. There is little doubt, nonetheless, that the 1957 reorgamsation of the 
central intelligence machinery was of great significance within the development of the 
JIC. Cradock describes 1956 as "a low point in the history of responsible government 11 1 
so it seems that Dean"s drive to inject the JIC with extra power 
in 1957 was certainly 
198 CAB158/30, JIC(57)123 "History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation".. 29 November 1957 
199 CAB 128/3 1, CC(57)82dConclusions, 28 November 1957 
200 PREMI 1/1836, Macmillan to Eisenhower "Note on subjects mentioned7,22 March 1957. 
Macmillan 
also agreed at this time to operational U2 flights, codenarned 
AQUATONE, from British bases. 
201 CAB 159/27, JIC(57)4& meeting, 25 April 1957 
202 CAB159/28, JIC(57)88thmeeting, 10 October 1957 




well timed. This was an administrative reorganisation, which gave the JIC more 
opportunity to influence policy-making and better defined procedures for dealing with 
emergencies. There was no great new influx of intelligence, the essential raw material 
from which the assessments were derived. This move to the Cabinet Office left the JIC 
with greater potential: they were better placed to make good use of intelligence, so that 
when collection improved, the Committee had the right audience for its assessments. 
In some ways, during the Geneva Conferences, the JIC performed a role similar 
to that of 1947-9 when the Committee supported the CFM delegations. The JIC did not 
have any better specific insights into Soviet German policy and disarmament in 1955-7, 
than they did in the earlier years, but at least lesser intelligence and Cold War experience 
had been accumulating over time. Intelligence on the GSFG had built up over years, but 
the JIC still struggled with precise interpretation. In their attempts to make sense of 
post-Hungary Soviet bloc integrity, the Committee quite accurately predicted Soviet 
policy combining liberalisation and control. Despite the reduced tension of peaceful 
coexistence,, the JIC often presented a view of the Cold War world without much hope 
of improvement. They settled on a generally pessimistic view of Khrushchev, using his 
actions as a guide in the absence of intelligence. The JIC understood Soviet attempts to 
boost the GDR and the impossibility of German reunification. They discounted the 
possibility of genuine disarmament. Soviet forces always seemed to be getting stronger. 
Using Dean's 1954 description of the role of the JIC, the background provided by 
intelligence for policy-making was grim. 
204 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 134 
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Chapter Five: 1958 - 1961 
A wall or a war? 
I do not see how we can have a world war or take action which endangers 
peace on a point of this kind [whether the signature on passes granting 
access to Berlin was East German or Russian]... You can have a war about facts - about whether you are preventedftom going to a play, but not about 
whether you buy a ticketftom the theatre orftom Keith Prowse. 
- Harold Macmillan, 5 January 19591 
The events of 13 August [the closing of the borders between East and West Berlin] were unexpectedfor the West... Ihis is, without question, a defeatfor 
Western intelligence. 
- Erich Honecker, 18 September 196 12 
A weU-known story 
There is already a great deal of useful published research that covers the events 
of the second Berlin crisis (1958-6 1). 3 This comes as no surprise since, bundled with the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the period marks the high point of tension during the early 
Cold War. Many of the intelligence aspects of 1958-61 have also been well described: 
Cradock has examined the JIC's perspective 4; Maddrell has revealed how Western 
agencies prepared their agents for the closure of the Berlin border 5; and Murphy et al 
have written up both the CIA's and KGB's appreciations of eventS6 . 
The pre-existence 
of these works begs the question, what more is there to say about British policy, 
intelligence and Berlin? 
1 PREMI 1/2715, Note by Macmillan, 5 January 1959. Keith Prowse was a ticket agent. 
2 Quoted in Harrison, Hope M., Driving the Soviets, p. 208 
' Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall makes use of Russian and East German archives. Gearson, 
John P. S., Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall (London: Macmillan, 1998) tells the story from a British 
perspective. Beschloss, Michael R., Kennedy and Khrushchev: The Crisis Years, 1960-1963 (London: 
Faber, 19 9 1) provides an account of the superpower conflict. 
4Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 13 5-160 
5Maddrefl, Spying on Science, pp. 236-270 
6 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 305-395 
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There is value in tying together the general political with the specific intelligence 
history. This was the aim behind Cradock's work .7 For his chapter on Berlin 1958-61, 
Cradock analyses four of the significant JIC assessments written during the crisis, 
8 drawing them together with Macmillan's policies. One of his conclusionsi, echoing 
Erich Honecker, was that when the GDR sealed the Berlin border on 13 August 1961, 
they "achieved tactical surprise", even though the Western powers - and their 
intelligence machines - had long been aware that this was a possible outcome of the 
crisis. 9 Through the use of the most recently- available archives, Maddrell and Harrison 
have both supported this assessment. " 
The more interesting and independent of Cradock's findings was that there was 
little connection between JIC analysis of Soviet intentions regarding Berlin and 
Macmillan's "showy and ultimately ineffective" policies. " For Cradock, "the links 
between this showmanship and sober intelligence estimates were probably not very 
strong". Whilst the JIC assessments were "generally sound", the policies, 
reflect[ed] the ambitions, fears and prejudices of one highly complex individual: the 
inflated view of Britain's position and influence; the over-fearful estimate of 
Khrushchev; at the same time the over-optimistic estimate of the chances of reaching a 
general settlement with him on tolerable terms; the strong Atlanticist bias; and the 
belated and in the end still incomplete conversion to Europe. 
Cradock's evidence for this judgement was that "facing the same facts and reading 
similar estimates and predictions, the Americans drew different and rather sounder 
conclusions. " 
As described later, Cradock's tough appraisal of the relationship between 
intelligence and policy is difficult to contradict. It is perhaps unsurprising, even 
7 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 1 
8 JIC(59)17 "An assessment of Soviet policy regarding Berlin"; JIC(60)49 "Soviet intentions in the second 
half of 1960"; JIC(60)40 "Soviet and East German reactions to military measures foreseen in Berlin 
contingency planning'; JIC(61)42 "Soviet aims and intentions in Berlin7 
9 Cradock, Know Your Enem p. 156 YI 
10 Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 23 7; Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 207 
11 Cradock, Know Your Enem p. 160 
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understandable, that as tension mounted, leaders came to rely more on their basic tools 
of political instinct, combining hopeful vision and haunting memories, rather than on the 
crafted words of intelligence assessment. - to do so is to be human. Cradock's view of the 
]Prime Minister's policies, however,, is not so inevitable, although the likes of Selwyn 
Lloyd held similar views. 12 The purpose of this research is not to judge specifically the 
merits of Macmillan's actions, but other historians have since, and some individuals at 
the time, viewed Macmillan's role in encouraging negotiation with the Russians in a 
more positive light, recognising that the final, successful Western approach to pressure 
on Berlin arose from the mix of inputs. " 
There are more JIC papers on Berlin in the archive than the four Cradock used. 
Furthermore,, there are the papers released since the publication of Know Your Enemy, 
including the minutes of Committee meetings as well as the Vv1RCIs. Unfortunately this 
latter category is missing the 1960-1 papers since they were not kept by the Cabinet 
Off CC. 
14 
1 It is worth exploring these extra documents to complete the existing research, 
focusing on the main questions of whether British intelligence was caught out on 13 
August 1961 and whether the JIC did contribute to the formulation of the government's 
policies. 
There are secondary questions, largely unexplored in any of the published 
research, that need addressing. For example, what role did the Committee have in 
contingency planning? As part of the story of the development of British intelligence, 
how did the JIC perform during 1958-61 relative to its performance in the 1948-9 
blockade and 1953 riots? Had the feed of raw intelligence improved enough to make a 
difference to the quality of the assessments? How did the mechanics of the central 
intelligence apparatus perform during the prolonged crisis? Had the move from the 
Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Office had any noticeable effect on the Committee? 
12 Greenwood. Britain and the Cold War, p. 151 
13 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 141-2; Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 118; Home, Alistair, Macmillan 
195 7-1986. - Volume II ofthe Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 127-9 
14 See note attached to the front of the 1962 VVRCI file, CAB 179/8 
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The documents also expose more about the complex relationship between 
intelligence, events and politics. The oversight of both operations and internal security 
had come under extreme scrutiny, both public and private, as a result of revelations 
regarding the Berlin spy tunnel, the Crabb affair and the Cambridge spies. More than 
ever before, intelligence had moved away from being part of the unseen network of 
support for policy-making to a source of public, political pressure on the government. 
The shooting down of Gary Powers' U2 on I May 1960 and the consequent 
abandonment of the Summit meeting in Paris, was an extreme acceleration of this role 
for intelligence as part of international politics. 15 Whýen an RB-47 carrying out an elint 
"ferret" flight was shot down over the Barents Sea., on I July 1960, intelligence was 
once again reaffirmed as a source of tension rather than information. 16 
The JIC had its role to play in the governance of risky intelligence operations. 
Britain had been involved in either border, shallow or deep penetration flights of the 
Soviet bloc since 1948, for the purposes of gathering photo reconnaissance (PR), elint 
and communications intelligence (comint). 17 As technology improved, so too did the 
British aerial campaign. 18 Macmillan had given his permission for CIA U2s to fly from 
British bases in 1957, but by 1958 a small number of British pilots were being trained to 
fly missions themselves. 19 Over-flights required senior ministerial, often Prime 
Ministerial, approval and the JIC was the conduit through which permission was sought. 
Improvements in Soviet air defence and the tension over- Berlin did, ironically, reduce 
the number of U2 flights undertaken . 
20 There was pressure to carry out other aerial 
surveillance, however, including from BRIXMIS in Berlin. 21 Only Geraghty has 
mentioned, albeit briefly, the on-going operation throughout 1959-61 to gather 
intelligence on Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) installations. 22 The JIC files unused 
15 Lashmar, Paul, Spyflights ofthe Cold War (Stroud: Sutton, 1996), p. 154; Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 
pp. 13 5-6 
16 Lashmar, Spyflights, pp. 16 5 -6 
17 Ibid, p. 65; Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 215 
18 Lashmar, Spyflights, pp. 61-83,121-128 
19 Lashmar, Spyflights, p. 149; Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 530-1 
20 fbid, p. 535 
21 CAB 159/34, JIC(60)47hmeeting, 15 September 1960 
22Geraghty, BRLYMIS, pp. 90,2 94 
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or unseen by Cradock allow an examination of the Committee's role in governing the 
use of aircraft in this operation. 
The impact of intelligence on international events was not just limited to the air, 
however. Maddrell and Murphy et al in particular, and Harrison to a lesser extent,, have 
emphasised the significance of intelligence agencies in the GDR government's need to 
seal off West from East Berlin. 23 There is little debate that the primary motivation 
behind the construction of the Wall was economic: cutting off the flow of refugees from 
East to West. Beyond that, however, both Khrushchev and Ulbricht described a 
requirement for improved security and an end to the free-flow from West to East of 
espionage and subversion. It is therefore necessary to investigate whether the JIC 
recognised this description of Berlin, explicitly or otherwise. 
The JIC papers can reveal little on the human intelligence picture around the time 
of the crisis; a period marked by SIS's first notable Cold War achievements. Tales of 
intelligence collection always attract more attention than those of assessment or use. 
The U2 is perhaps the best known intelligence story of the time, but that of Oleg 
Vladimirovich Penkovsky cannot be far behind. A Lieutenant-Colonel in the GRU 
(Soviet military intelligence), Penkovsky was a run in a joint SIS-CIA operation that 
began in earnest in 1961.24 He passed on some unique military and political 
intelligence, of value during both the Berlin and Cuban crises, until his arrest in October 
1962. A couple of years earlier, the SIS had been successful in running their first 
significant agents behind the Iron Curtain. From late 1958, three members of the Polish 
security intelligence service had been passing over military, political and counter- 
intelligence material. 25 The CIA lost one of their most useful agents just as the Berlin 
23 Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 15,236-8; Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 311-2; Harrison- 
Driving the Soviets, pp. 100- 1 
24 Penkovsky is well covered in research elsewhere. Many of his case-notes have been released by the 
CIA under their Freedom of Information programme, to be found at 
http: //www. foia. cia. gov/penkovsky. asp. See also, Schecter, Jerrold and Deriabin, Peter S., The Spy "o 
Saved the World. How a Soviet Colonel changed the course of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 
1995); Penkovsky, Oleg, The Penkovsky Papers: The Russian who spiedfor the West (London: Collins, 
1965) 
25Doffil, Stephen, M16. - Inside the Covert World ofHer Alfajesty's Secret Intelligence Service (New York: 
the Free Press, 2000), pp. 703-4 
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crisis began, another GRU Lieutenant-Colonel, Pyotr Semyonovich popoV. 26 Having 
first made contact in late 1953, Popov began significant reporting in January 1956 whilst 
posted to the GDR, until his recall to Moscow and eventual arrest in late 1958. 
With these successes came painful lessons. Without the safety nets of good 
agent-running tradecraft and internal agency compartmentalisation, agents were lost. 
One of the KGB officers that uncovered Penkovsky, Victor Cherkashin, put the 
exposure down to a combination of Penkovsky's bad luck and "sloppy British 
tradecraft". 27 Cherkashin thought the choices of location for dead letter boxes and 
meetings were unimaginative and using the SIS station chief s wife as a contact was 
hopeless. Such clumsiness had tragic consequences. The loss of an agent is the harshest 
28 form of instruction for any secret service. The SIS thereafter had to develop less naive 
practices for running agents behind the Iron Cuitain. 29 
Popov's demise was due to an equally unfortunate combination of factors. The 
CLA, believed it was thanks to George Blake that the KGB first learnt about Popov, 
although there is some dispute about thiS. 
30 In September 1955, after a break, Popov re- 
established contact with the CIA via a BRIXMIS officer,, who in turn passed on the 
message via the SIS Berlin station, which included Blake on its staff. An alternative 
version is that much like Penkovsky, it was chance and increased KGB surveillance of 
the GRU that prompted early interest. " Irrespective of the Blake factor, it was the CIA 
who eventually gave the KGB proof of Popov 11 s treachery, through careless tradecraft. 
A 11. 
After his recall to Moscow, the CIA sent a coded letter to Popov's home, which the 
KGB had little trouble in deciphering. 
32 
26 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 268-281 
27 Cherkashin, Victor, Spy Handler: Memoirs of a KGB Officer: the true story of the man who recruited 
Robert Hanssen andAldrich Ames (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 66 
28 jUdd, Alan, The Questfor C: Mansfield Cumming and the founding of the Secret Service (London: 
Harper Collins, 1999), pp. 116-7 
29 private information 
30 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, p. 268 
31 Ibid, p. 274 
32 Ibid, p. 278 
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Such operational information rarely appears in the JIC papers. Certainly, in the 
above cases there are no hints to be found. These successes and later failures are 
significant to understanding the JIC, however, because they help to provide the 
background. New, valuable sources would have been a welcome boost to SIS's position 
at the Committee table, after the embarrassments of preceding years, despite initial 
scepticism about their new contribution. 33 Furthermore, the imPact of human agents was 
felt on the ground in Germany. As described above, BRDMS was occasionally 
unwittingly pulled into agent-running, but they also suffered from agents. During 
Blake's time in Berlin (1955-9), the RAF member of BRUMS was in an office six 
doors away from the KGB spy. Blake saw all BRINMIS reports and knew about many 
of the planned tours. Only after his detention in 1961 did BRIXMS realise why their 
tours during that time had been so I regularly intercepted "by an enemy that seemed 
possessed of almost occult powers". 34 
Build up to the ultimatum 
Until Khrushchev's speeches on Berlin in November, for the British government, 
the Cold War in Germany was a lesser concern in 1958 . 
35 The Middle East, Cyprus, 
Europe and Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu all demanded Ministerial 
attention. Alistair Home, Macmillan" s official biographer, reports the Prime Minister's 
estimate that during 1958, "he spent more than half of his working time on foreign 
problems". 36 
Trouble in the Middle East drew most focus away from the relative tranquillity 
of Europe. The decline of British influence in the region had quickened its pace since 
Suez. The joint SIS-CIA operation to foment a coup in Syria in 1957 came to nothing. 
37 
33 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 277 
34 G ra , 
BR e ghty WMS, p. 92 
35 For details of the speeches, see later 
36 HOMC, MacMillan 1957-1986, p. 92 
37 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 584 
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The July 1958 overthrow of Nuri Said and the Iraqi monarchy appeared to represent a 
further blow to Western power in the Arab world. " As a consequence, US marines 
landed in Lebanon and British troops were dispatched to Jordan. This predominance of 
the Middle East in British minds can be seen in the JIC files. The VvTRCI, until June 
1959 when it switched, was presented with Middle Eastern intelligence first with Europe 
taking a secondary position. '9 
The Middle East aside, Berlin, Germany and the main Cold War theatre was 
never out of the JIC' s survey. The first VV`RCI of 195 8 described new movements on the 
Berlin sector boundary. 40 Over the New Year period, Soviet troops had been brought in 
to reinforce East German police, possibly as a response to the defection of Soviet 
personnel. The GDR frontier troops had been reorganised and given a more military 
character, whilst their cheýck-point duties had been handed over to customs officials. 
Two weeks later, the JIC reported that the niggling interference with Allied access to 
Berlin was perhaps on the increase . 
41 On the 14-15 January, the Russians started to 
stamp individual travel documents of passengers on military trains, ensuring new 
documents were issued for each trip and suggesting they had the right to authorise who 
entered the city-42 After Allied protests, the practice ceased. The JIC concluded that, 
-) 43 "the Russians seem anxious to avoid provoking a serious dispute about this' . 
By July, interference had become aggression. Supposedly in response to British 
troops arriving in the Middle East, on 18 July, "a carefully orchestrated riot" attacked 
the BRIXMIS compound in Potsdam. 44 Windows were smashed and staff received 
minor injuries. Thanks to a courageous officer who decided to address the crowd 
directly, a greater misfortune was avoided. The Russians did in fact pay compensation 
38 Mansfield, Peter, The Arabs (London: Penguin, third edition 1992), pp. 258-263 
39 The positioning of items is a useful indicator of what the JIC thought mattered most to the customer. 
"Western sector" intelligence finally regained the top spot on 23 June 1959 - VVRCI week ending 23 June 
1959, CAB179/6 
40 CAB 179/4, WRCI week ending 7 January 1958 
41 CAB 179/4, VVRCI week ending 21 January 1958 
42 Murphy et al, BattlegroundBerfin, p. 308 
43 )VRCI w/e 21 January 1958 
44Geraghty, BRLWIS, , pp. 74-5 
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for the damage, but nevertheless, BRDMS moved to another more secure compound in 
Potsdam. 
On 22 July, the WRCI reported on 9 US personnel whose helicopter had made a 
45 forced landing in the GDR in June. They were finally released after weeks of 
negotiation. The Russians had tried to avoid all involvement in the issue, pushing the 
Americans towards direct dealings with the East Germans. It was the Red Cross that 
finally secured the captives' release, once the GDR realised "that they would be unable 
to extract recognition from the US authorities". The question of the legitimacy of the 
GDR in Western eyes was raised again in September, when the JIC noted that East 
German government proposals for a Four Power Commission on Germany included the 
East Germans as acknowledged participants. 46 
The Committee felt that Soviet offers of Summits and Foreign Ministers' 
meetings were the result of their increased confidence after successes in 1957 with both 
Sputnik and their ICBM programme. 47 Such confidence ought to have had its limits, 
however, as the JIC did not believe the Russians yet had the capacity to deliver a knock- 
out blow against the US. 48 According to this 1958 analysis, that might have come by 
1962. Current Soviet strength was sufficient, however, such that "the Soviet leaders are 
probably reasonably confident that the West will not carry out an unprovoked surprise 
attack"). Reminders of Soviet nuclear development were-found in the V*TRCI, when in 
March, May and October,, the JIC reported Soviet nuclear tests. 49 
The February 1958 assessment of Soviet intentions and strengths was more 
confused . 
50 The JIC thought Khrushchev's position as leader had strengthened since the 
Hungarian rising, although problems still remained in relations with the Satellites (when 
45 CAB 179/5, VVRCI week ending 22 July 1958 
46 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 9 September 1958 
47 CAB 179/4, VVRCI week ending 14 January 1958 
48 CAB 158/3 1, JIC(58)4(Final) "Soviet strategy in Global War up to the end of 1962", 24 January 1958 
49 CAB 179/4, WRCI weeks ending 18 March 1958,25 March 1958,13 May 1958; CAB 179/5, WRCI 
weeks ending 14 October 1958,21 October 1958. 
50 CAB 158/3 1, JIC(58)12(Final) "Estimates of Soviet political and economic policies and capabilities 
from 1958-1962", 13 February 1958 
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in March, Khrushchev took over from Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, this assertion was strengthened 5 1). Reassurance followed in the judgement 
that, in general, the Russians were unlikely to risk war in a nuclear age, although the 
possibility of war through miscalculation remained. As a consequence, "the USSR will 
almost certainly seek to avoid courses of action which in its judgement would involve 
serious risk of war". The Committee did not see that risk calculation as static', however, 
since as Russian nuclear capabilities increased, the West would be less likely to risk war. 
Here again, was the question of confidence: "consequently the Soviet leaders may 
believe that they can pursue certain risky courses of action with less danger of general 
war than would previously have been the case"). Recent research produced firom Soviet 
archives agrees with the Committee's judgement, arguing that confidence was one of the 
factors that led Khrushchev to his Berlin ultimatum. 52 What the JIC seems to have 
missed here, but historians since have recognised is that the picture was not just one of 
increasing Russian strength, but also of growing fear in 1958. The December 1957 
NATO decision to deploy Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in Western 
Europe had yet again sparked the generations' old Russian fear of German strength. 
In July, when the JIC produced its digest for the Ministry of Supply, the issue of 
the IRBMs was highlighted. "the Soviet Union may... genuinely believe that the 
introduction of rocket-launching sites, particularly in Western Germany, and the more 
widespread deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO forces may increase the 
danger of war by miscalculation". 53 The Committee believed that the wider context for 
Soviet foreign policy was dominated by two issues: the hopes of a Summit and of 
disarmament. On 9 June, the V%TRCI had noted that amid one of Khrushchev" s letters to 
Eisenhower, there were trade proposals that might be a gesture towards fruitful talks. 
54 
The JIC had, however, agreed with a US assessment back in January, that with regards 
55 to Germany, there was little hope of agreement. When the Cabinet discussed the 
51 CAB179/4. VVRCl week ending 31 March 1958 
52 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 111-2 
53 CAB 158/32, JIC(58)54(Final) "Six monthly intelligence digest for the Ministry of Supply - period mid- 
November 1957 to raid-May 1958", 9 July 1958 
54 CAB 179/4, WRCI week ending 9 June 1958 
55 CAB159/29, JIC(58)7thmeeting, 22 January 1958 
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chances of a Summit, they believed that US insistence on the inclusion of German 
reunification made any general Cold War progress less likely. 56 
The JIC reported on the fifth SED party congress (10-16 July), which included 
an appearance by Khrushchev and seemed to confirm previous thinking on 
reunification. 57 There had been no change in GDR-Russian attitudes to the subject: it 
was a matter for the GDR and FRG to discuss once they had been joined in a 
confederation. The assessment also concluded that Ulbricht still enjoyed Khrushchev's 
support and that in order to improve the economic comparison of the GDR with the 
FRG, "energetic measures" were being taken, based largely on Soviet aid. By August at 
least, the Russians knew the extent of the growing refugee problem: there had been a 50 
58 per cent rise from 1957. As Gaddis writes, "Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet 
Communist Party Central Committee's department on relations with socialist countries, 
warned... that 'the flight of the intelligentsia from the GDR has reached a particularly 
critical phase"'. In September, the JIC noted that although numbers for the same period 
in 1957 were down, there had been an overall increase in those passing through West 
Berlin because of greater restrictions on travel across the internal German border. 59 
Despite some political analysis, as in previous years, the vast bulk of JIC 
reporting concerning East Germany in 1958 was focused on military matters. On the 6 
January, the Russians announced that as part of a wider force reduction, during 1958, 
41,000 men would be withdrawn from Germany. 60 The JIC estimated there to be 
400,, 000 men in the GSFG . 
61 As trains used in late 1957 for the annual trooping were 
still, unusually, together, the JIC thought the Russians might live up to their promise. 
The Americans had noticed fewer armoured vehicles being imported to East Germany 
56 CAB 128/32, CC(58)20'h Conclusions. 5 Njarch 1958 
57 CAB 179/5, VVRCI week ending 15 July 1958 
" Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 139 
59 Figures are not given. CAB 179/5, VIRCI week ending 9 September 1958 
60 CAB 179/4, WRCI week ending 7 January 1958 
61 CAB 179/4, VIRCI week ending 21 January 1958 
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than previous years. 62 Nevertheless, February JIC assessments still recorded twenty two 
line divisions in GSFG and one East German Army division. 63 
The 25 February WRCI relayed an interview with General Zakharov, the 
Commander-in- Chief, GSFG, in which he had set out the changes that would take 
place . 
64 The following would disband: two mechanised divisions, one anti-aircraft (AA) 
division., three artillery brigades and five independent AA units. The JIC concluded that 
the reduction would therefore affect line divisions, although newly strengthened tank 
divisions would compensate for the lost mechanised divisions and new artillery and AA 
weapons would not mean a decrease in firepower. News of press reports about farewell 
ceremonies and the gathering of 140 troop trains was sent back from Germany. 65 
In March, the first Soviet departures were witnessed by the heads of the Western 
66 Military Missions at parades. The Allied commanders were also invited to witness 
nine further occasions. Despite the disbandments, GSFG training continued to reach 
high levels. 67 The JIC found it difficult to assess how many troops were actually 
leaving. Soon after the last ceremony had taken place on 10 April, they estimated 22- 
25,000 had gone, although there had been sufficient departing trains to carry the full 
41,000.68 Before the end of April, the JIC estimate had increased to 30,000 and by 
February 1959, it had reached 32,000.69 
The assessment of the GSFG fighting potential remained high. 'O Despite the 
reductions in manpower, increased training levels, an altered training cycle 71 and new 
62 CAB 159/29, JIC(58)e meeting, 23 January 1958 
63 CAB 158/3 1, JIC(58)3(Final) "Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential 1958-62", 19 February 1958; 
JIC(58)5(FiiW) "Employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in land campaigns in the event of global war, 
1958-62", 24 February 1958 
64CAB 179/4, VVRCI week ending 25 February 1958 
65 CAB159/29, JIC(58)17thmeeting, 27 February 1958 
66 CAB 179/4, WRCI week ending 4 March 1958 
67 CAB 179/4, VVRCl week ending II March 1958; CAB 159/29, JIC(58) I Sýhmeeting, 13 March 1958 
68 CAB 179/4, WRCI week ending 15 April 1958; CAB 159/29, JIC(58)26thmeeting, 17 April 1958 
69CAB179/4, WRCI weeks ending 22 April 1958,29 April 1958; CAB 179/6, WRCI week ending 3 
February 1959 
70 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 16 December 1958 
71 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 30 September 1958 
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equipment had "probably effected a further improvement in the efficiency and striking 
power of GSFU-'. 
72 
The troop numbers were, however, "considerably below those that 
would exist in war", and in fact further withdrawals might force a decrease in active 
training. 73 More ominous news was that on 10, October, BRLXMIS had photographed a 
74 train of "unusual composition", suspected to be a missile unit . 
The JIC believed that they were receiving good intelligence on Soviet forces in 
Germany: "we have good evidence from trooping records, barracks occupation and 
covert source information of manning levels". 
75 When the Committee issued new 
indicator watch lists in May, they noted that their expectation that even in the case of a 
surprise attack, some intelligence might be received. 76 The JIQ, however, had no 
illusions about the difficulty of the task and the limits of British intelligence: 
We have virtually no chance of intercepting either the policy decision to go to war or the 
operational orders for the attack. We must therefore rely on the experience of the 
evaluators and the correct functioning of the intelligence machine in interpreting the 
significance of military activity or other preparations pointing to a decision having been 
taken; these activities and preparations are likely to vary according to the circumstances 
leading to the outbreak of war. 77 
There might be seven days warning before an attack in the case of movement to forward 
bomber bases or submarine sightings, but only 24-48 hours in the case of increased 
activity in Soviet air defences or deployment of short-range missiles in East Germany or 
other satellites. Only radar images of bombers or missiles on radar would give warning 
of the precise moment of attack. The equivalent 1959 paper drew exactly the same 
conclusions. 78 
72 CAB 158/3 1, JIC(58)1/9 "Periodic intelligence summary for NATO Commands", 23 September 1958; 
CAB179/5, WRCI week ending 7 October 1958 
73 CAB 158/32, JIC(58)57(FhW) "An estimate of the strength of Sino-Soviet bloc an-ned forces", 28 
August 1958 
74 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 28 October 195 8 
75 JIC(58)57(FiiW) 
76 CAB 158/3 1, JIC(58)17(Final) "Indicators of Soviet preparations for Early War", 2 May 1958 
77 CAB 158/32, JIC(58)50(Final) "Warning of Soviet attack on the West in Global War up to the end of 
1959", 20 June 1958 
78 CAB 158/36, JIC(59)33(Final)(Revise) "Warning and timing of Soviet attack on the West in Global War 
up to the end of 1960", 15 September 1959 
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The crisis begins 
Khrushchev's 10 November speech to a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in 
Moscow launched the second Berlin crisis. In it, he accused the West of breaching the 
Four Power agreements on Germany by permitting remilitarisation; damaging the 
Eastern European states by using Berlin as a base for "subversive activities", - and doing 
all this without recognising the GDR . 
79 As a result, the Premier warned, the Russians 
would "hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic the functions in Berlin 
that are still exercised by the Soviet agencies", including control of Western access. 
Telegrams flew between the FO and Embassies, attempting to predict likely 
moves. Bonn was notified that, "although we must obviously take the developments 
seriously our impression from all reports available to us is that the Soviet Government 
80 
are not contemplating any drastic action in the immediate future". Sir Harold Caccia 
wrote from Washington that the Americans were taking the threat to Berlin seriously, 
81 but agreed that there was no need for radical action on the part of the Western Powers. 
The US view was that Khrushchev was at the same time testing the West and attempting 
to boost the GDR. The CIA heard from their agent Popov that Soviet officials in the 
GDR thought the speech marked a major turning point: sovereignty would be granted, 
forcing the West to deal with the East Germans. 82 
83 
The 18 November WRO included the JIC's early assessment , Khrushchev's 
statement was "stronger than anything which has been said previously" on the handing 
over of Soviet functions in Berlin. The Committee did note that in a speech on 27 
October, Ulbricht had suggested that Western actions had forfeited all rights in Berlin. 
Khrushchev had not, however, said that the Allies must withdraw from the city. The JIC 
added their accurate analysis of Khrushchev's probable motives. 
84 In a development of 
'9 Translation from Harrison., Driving the Soviets, pp. 105-6 
8() PREM 11/2715, FO to Bonn, No. 2296,13 November 1958 
81 PREMI 1/2715, Washington to FO, No. 3096,13 November 1958 
82 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, p. 306; this report was received during a 17 
November agent meeting 
83 CAB179/5 
84 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 113 -6 
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their assessment of Soviet intentions,, they recognised that this might be part of a 
campaign against the arming of the FRG with nuclear weapons, as well as a bid to win 
legitimacy for the GDR in Western eyes . 
85 This view was shared by the Western 
Ambassadors in MOSCOW. 86 The Committee thought that whilst Khrushchev must 
reckon on the Western Powers being ready to use force to prevent their ejection from 
Berlin,, he must also have calculated that "the Allies would rather recognise the GDR 
than force a passage to Berlin". 87 
Khrushchev's judgement was right, at least as far as the British government was 
concerned. The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, outlined for the Cabinet the options 
open to the West, should the Russian threats be seriously meant: abandon Berlin, 
institute another airlift or agree access arrangements with the GDR . 
88 Although he 
recommended strong demonstrations of Western commitment to Berlin and willingness 
to opt for the airlift, in his judgement, "the last course would be the most realistic". The 
JIC advised that the West had to maintain both strength and restraint as part of the bid to 
avoid war; signs of weakness combined with growing Russian nuclear capability might 
be a disastrous mix. "9 The Allies' position in Berlin was exposed, however, and each 
side knew it. The JIC did not, at this early stage, expect a full blockade of West Berlin, 
but they did suspect the Russians were "probably willing to contemplate an increase of 
tension in the area with the aim sooner or later of forcing Western recognition of the 
[GDR]". 90 The CIA agreed that the long term aim was recognition of the GDR. 91 
Khrushchev's note of 27 November went further than his 10 November speech. 
He proposed that, within six months, West Berlin become a demilitarised "free city" and 
that there be a peace treaty with Germany. 92 He also included a warning that NATO 
85 Kastner, Jill, "The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958-62" in Gearson, John and Schake, Kori (eds), The 
Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 127 
86 PREMI 1/2715, Brooks Richards to Philip de Zulueta, 19 November 1958 
87 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 18 November 1958 
88 CAB128/32, CC(58)81' Conclusions, 18 November 1958 
89 CAB 158/34, JIC(58)99(Final) "The likelihood of global war between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free 
world", 20 November 1958 
1 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 25 November 1958 
11 CAB159/30, JIC(58)77thmeeting, 27 November 1958 
92 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 106 
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force would be met with Warsaw Pact force. Before the JIC had offered an updated 
assessment of Soviet intentions, Macmillan had written to Selwyn Lloyd, "The Berlin 
issue is, in fact an ultimatum with six months to run. We shall not be able to avoid 
negotiation. 
The JIC's detailed analysis was produced on the 2 December. 94 They were 
unsure whether these new demands were a change of Russian minds and if so, whether 
Western reactions to 10 November had prompted that change. They inclined towards 
the belief that a firm reaction to the idea of access control being handed over 
immediately had forced the Russians to introduce a softer time limit. The ultimatum 
changed the Committee's view of the Soviet long-term aim- no longer did they believe 
the ultimate ambition was recognition of the GDI; ý but rather ejection of the West from 
Berlin. At the very least, it looked like the Russians were trying to force the Western 
Powers to the negotiating table to discuss the German question on their termsý- an 
assessment shared by the CIA. 95 The JIC thought the six month delay was part of the 
strategy, since the Soviets would use this time to win over public opinion and exploit 
any differences between the Western Powers. The Committee did,, however, estimate 
that the time limit was probably not quite as inflexible as the note had made out: 
It is most unlikely that the Soviet Government really expect the Western Allies to leave 
Berlin at the end of the six-months' period, but they probably calculate that at the end of 
that time they will have weakened Western resolve sufficiently to enable them to 
increase the pressure on Berlin itself and its communications without risk of nuclear 
war. 96 
The Western Allies were certainly split about how to tackle Khrushchev's 
challenge. The initial US view, championed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
was that the West should deal with the GDR as "agents" of the Soviet Union, since 
Berlin was not worth war. 97 Adenauer refused "to give an inch to Khrushchev and 
Ulbricht", warning the Americans that dealings with the GDR would jeopardise the 
93 PREMI 1/2715, Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 28 November 1958 
94 CAB 179/5, WRCI week ending 2 December 1958 
95 CAB159/30, JIC(58)79ý'meeting, 4 December 1958 
96 WRCI w/e 2 December 1958 
97 Gaddis' We Now Know, p. 141 
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FRG's alignment with the West. 98 As a consequence, Dulles dropped his approach. De 
Gaulle was roughly in line with Adenauer. Macmillan's desire to negotiate and even 
recognise the GDR left him misaligned with the other major players. 
At a military level there were also differences of opinion. The British Chiefs of 
Staff examined the military options for maintaining access to Berlin in the event of a 
hand-over of control. 99 They concluded that keeping the autobahn open with troops 
would involve a very considerable force'. It might require "at least all British and US 
forces in Europe even if it did not lead to a world war". A limited land force would be 
too easily obstructed or trapped. Probing via the air was the Chiefs' preferred option, 
although even that could be made difficult by Soviet jamming, anti-aircraft fire or 
interference in the air corridors. Furthermore, to supply Berlin by air, RAF aircraft 
would have to be drawn from other operations. 100 There was even some doubt about the 
value of saving Berlin at all, since "the only valid military reason for maintaining a 
presence... was intelligence-gathering. There was disagreement from the other side of 
the Atlantic. The US favoured sending a land probe up the autobahn to test enemy 
intentions, which they believed, would reveal the Russian willingness to concede in the 
face of American nucleaTsupremacy. 10' 
In January 1959, the Chiefs put in an urgent request for the JIC to examine the 
US plans and come up with an estimate of likely Russian and East German reactions. 102 
The paper was produced for 12 January. 103 It began with the gravest possible warning 
that supported the Chiefs' fears. - "We conclude that the situation examined in this paper 
carries with it the possibility of global war resulting from a miscalculation by one side or 
98 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 118 
9' It was assumed that in the event of the control being given to the GDR, the Western Powers would 
refuse to deal with them. DEFE5/87, COS(58)295 "Views of the Commander-in-Chief (British Forces 
Germany) on the Berlin Situation", 29 December 1958; DEFE5/88, COS(59)2 "Contingency planning 
for 
the maintenance of allied access to Berlin", I January 1959 
100 DEFE4/114, COS(58)98h meeting, 2 December 1958 
1 ()' DEFE4/115, COS(59) V meeting, 1 January 1959 
102 CAB158/35, JIC(59)13(Terms of Reference) "Berlin", 7 January 1959; CAB159/31, JIC(59)4ffi 
meeting, 8 January 1959 
103 CAB 158/35, JIC(59)13(Final) "Soviet and East German reactions to a land probe to maintain Allied 
access to Berlin", 12 January 1959 
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the other, and even of global war being deliberately launched by the Soviet Union". 
After that, the paper presented possible Soviet reactions, in order of likelihood. During 
Western preparations for the probe, the Russians would do one of three things: whip up 
such public opinion that the West might be forced to back down; launch a nuclear attack; 
or back down in the face of war. Once the mission had been launched, the Committee 
expected that it would be opposed, either by "passive measures" such as blocking the 
route - and therefore leaving the West with the problem of what to do next - or, in the 
C%-+ 
extreme, by a nuclear attack. One of the greatest problems which the JIC foresaw was 
that in order to make the probe look serious, it would have to be backed with general 
NATO mobilisation, a move which in itself made the threat of war more likely since 
Warsaw Pact forces would do likewise. 
During the Committee discussion of the paper, the FO suggested that it did not 
go far enough in presenting the dangers of a land probe. 104 They felt that the probe 
might be seen as a breach serious enough to invoke the Warsaw Pact Treaty and hence 
trigger war. If that were not the case, they were sure that once the convoy had been 
blocked,, any further Allied action would be presented as aggression by the Russians and 
a hence a justification for war. When the paper was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff on 
13 January, Dean pointed out that his Committee's conclusions were "diametrically 
opposed to those of the US State Department and the Pentagon7.105 The CIA he f0t, 
however,, "were impressed with the earnestness of Russian intentions and inclined more 
to our way of thinking". Some American assessments had already begun to point out the 
GDR could easily deal with the problem of refugees whilst the Allies remained in 
Berlin,, by simply preventing East Germans fi7om reaching West Berlin. 106 
Whilst military contingency planning began, so too did preparations for 
managing the crisis within the intelligence community. The six month deadline was set 
to run out on 27 May 1959, so that was the initial working point for the JIC. Vice- 
Admiral Inglis (DNI) suggested in February, that in order to be properly prepared for 
104 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)5 th meeting, 12 Januarv 1959 
105 DEFE4/115, COS(59)4th meeting, 13 January 1959 
106 CAB 15 9/3 1, JIC(59)7th meeting, 21 January 195 9 
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eventualities, the JIC should speed up the completion of the Joint Intelligence Room 
(JIR), the Committee's new operations centre, as well as begin to consider what 
instructions would have to be sent overseas in the case of an emergency. 107 In fact, the 
JIC Secretariat had already sent out a specific list of indicators to Berlin noting that any 
intelligence relevant to the crisis needed to be transmitted directly to the Cabinet Office 
and onto the JIR. Furthermore, the Secretariat suggested that a practice alert should be 
called in London, in order to check that the necessary staff reinforcements were able to 
arrive within the allotted one or two hours. Within weeks, the JIC had agreed their 
immediate courses of action: the JIR was to be completed by 15 April; a practice alert 
would be called once it was operational; a further practice would be used to rehearse the 
procedure for getting together the Heads of Section in an emergency; all intelligence 
from Germany would be routed to the Mt, the arrangements for rapid exchange of 
assessments with the Americans and Canadians would be checked 108 ; and the JIS would 
consider whether any particular intelligence targets ought to be raised to a higher 
priority. '09 In the end, the JIR became operational flom 15 May. ' 10 
The JIC archives currently available do not include any discussion about the 
steps taken within the collecting agencies in reaction to the crisis. Some such 
information does appear in published research, although there is little specifically about 
British intelligence. Western agencies all faced the same problem of being cut off from 
their agents, so the methods employed to maintain communication were largely the 
same. Maddrell reveals that from November 1958 on, officers and their agents, 
including those run by the SIS, began to prepare dead letter boxes, one- or two-way 
radio communication and secret letter-writing techniques, including establishing the 
necessary cover addresses. "' Murphy et al confirm the CIA's use of these methods. 
112 
Geraghty notes that BRIXMIS too were affected by the crisis, in that Khrushchev's 
hostility was taken by the security forces within the GDR as a signal to begin shooting at 
107 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)13'h meeting, 5 February 1959 
10'3 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)19th meeting, 26 February 1959 
109 CAB 159/31, JIC(59)2e meeting, 5March 1959; JIC(59)21" meeting, 12'h March 1959 
CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)32ýd meeting, 7 May 1959 
Maddrefl, Spying on Science, pp. 243 -7 
112 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 3 50-2 
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the Western Missions. "' Better co-ordinated tours between the Missions were devised 
to cut overlapping tours and hence, reduce risk. 
The requirement for intelligence from Germany had to be measured against the 
financial cost; the familiar post-war story of rising Cold War pressures balanced with 
economic necessity continued. From February until October, the BSSO in Germany was 
under scrutiny by the JIC to see how it could better perform its security functions whilst 
reducing costs. A Security Service investigation concluded that both internal 
reorganisation within BSSO and closer contact with itself would improve the product 
from Germany. 114 A civilian rather than military head was introduced. 115 A cut in 
expenditure was achieved by reducing staff from 480 to 322, as well as by passing over 
some duties to the German intelligence services. 116 The BSSO communications 
interception station in Hanover was saved only by the Americans' agreement to fund it 
completely. 117 Finally, in 1961, the BSSO was placed under the responsibility of the C- 
in-C. Germany and tasks originating in London were given secondary priority. 118 
Towards Geneva 
On 10 January 1959, the Soviet government proposed a conference to conclude a 
peace treaty with Germany. 119 The initial scepticism that any good could come from 
negotiating remained but softened enough that by February, the US and France were 
willing to join the British in suggesting a CFM. 120 On I March, Khrushchev replied 
that he would far rather hold a heads-of-government meeting, but would nevertheless 
accept the offer. The Four Powers agreed on a CFM in Geneva beginning on II May. 
113 Geraghty, BRIVXS, pp. 77-8 
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The JIC produced an assessment on 5 February of "Soviet policy regarding 
Berlin". 121 In it, they concluded that one of the main Russian aims was to force a 
Summit conference, during which they would want to "confirm the present political 
status quo in Europe", as well as "prevent the armament of West Germany with nuclear 
and rocket weapons". Beyond this more immediate aim, the Committee believed the 
Russians wanted "get the West out of Berlin", although "they probably do not expect to 
achieve this in the foreseeable future"'. In the meantime, however, the Russians were 
sure to "insist that Western access to Berlin is nominally controlled by the [GDR]". The 
JIC also repeated that the Russians would "probably feel compelled" to oppose a land 
probe to Berlin, but may not "forcibly oppose" an airlift. They did expect the Soviets to 
hand over to the GDR their "rights and responsibilities" regarding Berlin, although the 
Committee thought the "free city" proposal had been more "for propaganda purposes" 
than serious discussion. A prescient estimate was that the Russians would "probably 
permit the DDR to seal off East Berlin from West Berlin to prevent the refugee exodus". 
Finally, the JIC seemed to go some way towards supporting Macmillan's early line that 
Western withdrawal from Berlin would be "a disastrous political defeat" but "direct 
dealings with the [GDR] over access" would only be "a sharp but temporary political 
setback". 
Largely, the JIC conclusions appear accurate. Cradock has appraised the paper, 
pointing out that in two key ways the assessment was incorrect: first, the Soviets were in 
fact extremely wary of handing over powers to the GDR in such sensitive circumstances; 
and second, "the paper... underestimates the serious implications at that time of direct 
Allied dealings with the East Germans". 122 Such conclusions are reasonable, but worthy 
of exploration. British intelligence did not have the sources that could have provided the 
information which would have revealed Khrushchev's inner suspicions of the GDR 
government. If such thoughts could have been known at all, it would have taken a truly 
well-placed agent or a supreme level of communications interception. The West's best 
121 CAB 158/35, JIC(59)17(Final) "An assessment of Soviet policy regarding Berlhf', 5 February 1959 
122 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 143 
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ýCl agents at that time, such as Popov, were quite convinced that Khrushchev's threats had 
been genuine. Cradock's second criticism is more difficult to substantiate with any 
certainty. It requires counter-factual history to examine what might have happened in 
the case of Western dealings with the GDR. It is clear, however, that the Americans 
took Adenauer's warnings of the consequences of any relations with the GDR seriously. 
The American attitude to Khrushchev was certainly tougher than the British, as both the 
JIC and the Chiefs had recognised. The British fear of war was greater; the JIC seems to 
have agreed with the prevailing Whitehall view that the danger of war was serious 
enough for concessions to be the right option. 
British and American assessments of the 21't Communist Party Congress, held 
27 January -5 February, were at odds over the prospects for talks with the Russians. 
The JIC estimated that Khrushchev was keen on a bilateral agreement with the US. 123 
The American view was that Khrushchev had showed "no signs that the Soviet Union 
was willing to consider concessions in order to reach agreement with the US either on 
specific issues such as Berlin, Germany or nuclear tests, or on a general global basis" - 
124 
After meeting with Khrushchev during his February visit to Moscow, Macmillan 
disagreed. He told the Cabinet that the Russians seemed "willing to negotiate and 
compromise" and crucially, that there was likely to be some flexibility over the six 
month deadline. 125 
The intelligence picture emerging from Germany during the first months of the 
crisis was hardly comforting. Until February and early March, there had been many 
unconfirmed reports of missile-like objects, launchers and missile-carrying trains in the 
GDR. 126 The VVRCI on 23 March revealed that "a completely reliable source observed 
from close quarters a missile or missile-model". 127 The dimensions matched those of the 
SS-1 Scud surface-to-surface missile and fi7om its external appearance there was no 
telling whether it was a live or drill version. The JIC concluded that even if it was a drill 
123CAB179/6, WRCI week ending 10 February 1959 
124 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)15"' meeting, 12 February 1959 
125 CAB128/33, CQ59)W' Conclusions, 4 March 1959 
126 CAB 179/6, WRCI weeks ending 10 February 1959,17 March 1959 
127 CAB 179/6, WRCI week ending 23 March 1959 
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missile, such training was a likely indicator that live missiles were also present in 
Germany. The suspected arrival of such weapons fitted with the view in those pre- 
satellite and pre-Penkovsky times, that the Soviet Union was making significant strides 
across the military science and technology fields. 128 
Both Harrison and Maddrell write about the first presence of Russian missiles in 
the GDR at about this time, which suggests that the WRCI may have included fairly 
accurate information. It was twelve SS-3 Shyster medium range missiles, rather than 
SS-1s, that first arrived in December 1958, followed in April 1959 by their atomic 
warheads. 129 After an early accident whilst moving one of the warheads and then 
problems with the liquid oxygen fuel, the missiles became operational during May. 
According to Harrison, the CIA never confirmed the deployment of the missiles, 
although they had deep suspicions. Maddrell concludes differently, writing that the 
Americans, British,, West Germans and French all learnt about the missile deployment 
early on. 130 Both authors agree that the missiles were eventually withdrawn in August 
and September 1959.131 
The presence, or even just suspected, presence of missiles in the GDR must have 
increased the pressure on the West during preparations for the CFM. 132 In drawing up 
their position, the Western Powers agreed that they needed to find a compromise with 
the Soviets not only to avoid war, but also to secure their position in Berlin. 133 The 
disagreements over military contingency planning had been regularised with the 
formation of a tripartite planning group, codenamed LIVE OAK, under the direct 
command of General Lauris Norstad (SACEUR). 134 All plans were to be approved by 
all three governments, giving the British the hope of restraining the Americans. 135 
128 CAB 158/37., JIC(59)51 "Soviet research and development 1958", 26 May 1959. Both satellite 
reconnaissance and Penkovsky helped explode the myth of a hugely-advanced Soviet missile programme. 
See Freedman, Lawrence, "Berlin and the Cold War", in Gearson and Schake, Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 8 
1291farrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 128-9 
130 Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 172 
131 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 132 
132 Ibid, pp. 128-9 
133 Ibid, pp. 120-1 
134 DEM/l 16, COS(59)15"' meeting, 24 February 1959; DEFE4/117, COS(59)24hmeeting, 7 April 
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Intelligence activities came into the planning for Geneva. As a response to 
Khrushchev's criticism of operations being run from Berlin, ) the Western Powers 
considered trying to come to an agreement with the Russians governing the activities of 
intelligence organisations. 136 Since the crisis had begun, the KGB had been developing 
a huge propaganda effort to show Berlin as an "espionage swamp" - 
137 In order to defend 
against the accusations, both the US and British negotiating teams requested studies on 
the subject from their respective intelligence organisations. 138 The JIC asked JIC(G) to 
produce a paper on the value of British activities as well as any American or German 
operations they knew about. The idea was to discover whether any operations were of 
low enough value that they could be negotiated away to secure the presence of essential 
operations in Berlin. The appraisal was sent by the JIC to the Foreign Secretary in 
Geneva. 139 
In the event, ) significant negotiations about espionage never took place. In an 
informal meeting on I June with Gromyko, US Secretary of State Christian Herter read 
out a CIA report which catalogued the intelligence activities of both Russian and East 
German services in Berlin. 140 Gromyko, in response, "sat stony-faced", conceding once 
the embarrassment was over that "the questions of propaganda and subversion were not 
one of the principle questions to be considered' . 
Once the press had the details of 
Herter's speech, the Russian's accusations about Western intelligence largely fell away. 
The CFM lasted from II May to 16 August. The 27 May deadline passed 
without incident, but the first report back to the Cabinet from Geneva appeared to 
confirm the American pre-conference fears, suggesting that there was little common 
Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-62" in Gearson and Schake, The Berlin Wall Crisis, 
pp. 175-198 
I ý5 3 CAB 13 1/2 1, D(59)6h meeting, 9 June 1959 
136 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)32nd Meeting, 7 May 1959 
137 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 311-2 
138 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)32 nd meeting, 7 May 1959; JIC(59)33d meeting, 13 May 1959; Murphy et al, 
Battleground Berlin, p. 325 
139 CAB 159/3 1, JIC(59)34h meeting, 14 May 1959. The paper is not publicly available. The cover sheet 
can be found at CAB 158/36, JIC(59)48 "Intelligence activities in Berlin", 20 May 1959. 
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ground with the Russians, 141 The talks were blunt and were forced into a three-week 
adjournment in June. 142 The more significant developments included the Westem 
agreement to separate out the issue of Berlin from the wider problem of reunification, 
which at least made some meaningful negotiation more likely. 143 Proposals and counter- 
proposals about reducing troop numbers were traded, but came to little. Time was the 
significant reward for the West at Geneva: the Russians continued to talk tough about a 
peace treaty, but in this instance the limit set was one year. When, on 22 July, 
Khrushchev accepted an invitation to visit Eisenhower in the US later in the year, the 
CFM really became pointless. 144 Klirushchev had won his head-of-government talks 
and the West had bought a temporary reprieve. 
The JIC had a minor reporting role to play during the CFM. It was a case of 
watching events away from Geneva for indications of Russian tactics. The WRCI on 9 
June relayed that there were no signs of an imminent Soviet-GDR peace treaty or hand 
over of responsibilities in Berlin. 145 It did note,, however, that an East German 
delegation had travelled to Moscow, probably to discuss policy in light of early 
exchanges at Geneva. Throughout June and July the overall assessment remained the 
same: no signs of a handover of control, although Khrushchev was trying to maintain 
pressure on the West with constant threats. 146 The JIC continued with their view that 
Khrushchev's ambition was to force a Summit meeting. 147 It was the Western Military 
Missions that frequently suffered as both East Germans and Russians vented their 
frustration through harassment and detention of the only Westerners within easy 
reach. 148 
141 CAB 128/3 3. CC(59)32nd meeting, 28 May 1959 
142 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, p. 127 
143 Ibid, p. 121; CC(59)32d meeting 
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Once the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visit had been announced, in terms of the 
prospects for Berlin, the JIC thought matters had at least stabilised for the foreseeable 
future. 149 The Prime Minister had hopes that a longer period of stability, up to two 
years, could be agreed so that a permanent solution to the Berlin problem, including the 
withdrawal of troops might be found. "o Playing for time, whilst avoiding significant 
developments, was the British tactic. "' 
The most noteworthy intelligence produced by the JIC during the talks, was 
concerning the Soviet missiles in the GDR. Every week there was new information that 
added to the uncertain picture. As discussed above, before Geneva,, the JIC suspected 
the presence of surface-to-surface missiles. On 16 June, the WRCI reported the rapid 
development of potential SAM sites, in two locations close to Berlin, one of which was 
inside the South-West (Frankfurt-am-Main to Berlin) air corridor. 152 By 30 June, 48 
trains "with guided weapon carrying potential" had been seen in the GDR. 153 A week 
later, this number was revised to 82.154 Reports of large numbers of liquid oxygen 
wagons suggested the import of surface-to-surface missile fuel, in increasingly large 
qua ities. 155 
Nearly a month after the first reports of possible SAM sites, the 14 July WRCI 
noted that probable SAM launchers and radar had been seen at one of the sites. 156 In 
early August, the JIC confirmed that these were SAM sites, similar to those seen around 
MOSCOW. 157 Yet another month on, sightings of transporters around Berlin made it likely 
that the missiles were SA-2 Guidelines') whilst the observed movements of the 
transporters suggested further sites. 15" The picture of rapidly improving air defence in 
149 CAB179n, VVRCI week ending 4 August 1959 
150 PREMI 1/2703, Macmillan to Philip de Zulueta, 15 August 1959 
151 PREMI 1/2703, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 18 August 1959 
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157 CAB 179/7, WRCI week ending II August 1959 
158 CAB 179/7, VvTRCI week ending 8 September 1959 
245 
the GDR was filled out further by the first report of air-to-air missiles on MiG-19 
aircraft stationed in East Germany. 159 
The JIC brought their assessment relating to sutface-to-surface missiles up to 
date in October 1959.160 A "reliable source" had seen a military train in early September 
and had managed to photograph a large part of it. On board were both the tracked tugs 
and trailers for Shyster missiles, making this the first confirmed observation of this 
equipment in the GDR. The JIC had not received any trustworthy photography or 
sightings of the missiles themselves, although photographs taken in July that might have 
shown them were "still under examination"). This information had to be put together 
with all of the earlier intelligence, to come to a reasonable conclusion. The special 
railway cars capable of carrying missiles that had been reported previously, had not been 
long enough to carry Shyster missiles in one piece, although they were big enough for 
either Scuds or Guidelines. The liquid oxygen wagons would have carried fuel suitable 
for the Shyster or Scud, but not for the Guideline. From the number of wagons, the JIC 
deduced that there was enough fuel for 100 Shyster missiles, and furthermore no 
"tenable reason" other than missile fuel, had been found to explain their use. Finally, 
the V*TRCI noted their belief that since 1958, a missile with a 650 nautical mile range had 
been "available for operational use in considerable numbers"; the range of the Shyster 
was estimated at 700-800 miles. 
The final conclusion on the missiles read: 
Taking the confirmed report, of the import of SHYSTER trailers with the background of 
other reported movements which could have been associated with SHYSTER it is 
concluded that these are indications of an intention to equip the Group of Soviet Forces 
Germany with SHYSTER surface-to-surface missiles. 
In the light of Harrison and Maddrell's research, the JIC had come close to an accurate 
assessment. 161 The Committee had finally got the missile type right, although they were, 
in fact, predicting their deployment after they had been removed. There are signs of the 
159 CAB 179/7, VV'RCI week ending 15 September 1959 
160 CAB 179/7, WRCI week ending 20 October 1959 
161 See above 
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confusion caused by this error: in October 1960, the JIC reported that there was still no 
evidence that the weapons had arrived 
162 
; and in April 1961, they could still only assert 
163 that the missiles might be in Germany 
The spirit of Camp David 
Eisenhower and Khrushchev met at Camp David between 25-27 September 
1959. No material progress was made on Berlin, rather the two agreed that negotiations 
on the subject should reopen. 164 In their review of events, the JIC noticed that the final 
communique included reassurance: whilst Eisenhower had accepted that talks on Berlin 
f( would not last indefinitely", Khrushchev had agreed "no limit was attached to them". 165 
Macmillan had secured his aim, without being present at the meeting. The Prime 
Minister achieved even more of his preferred policy when he managed to persuade 
Eisenhower to turn the commitment to talks into a concrete offer for a Summit meeting 
in Paris in May 1960.166 Macmillan and Eisenhower had also managed to smooth out 
some of the differences between their attitudes to LIVE OAK planning during a pre- 
Camp David meeting, although the British were still reluctant for anything more than 
quiet planning to take place. 167 
The JIC produced a paper soon after a Summit meeting was agreed, in which 
they took stock of Soviet objectives. 168 The JIC estimated that the basic premisses of 
Russian policy had not changed: growing confidence; a desire to avoid nuclear war; and 
the omnipresent belief in the superiority of communism. From this, the assessment drew 
162 CAB158/39,. JIC(60)1/10 "Periodic intelligence summary for NATO Commands", 20 October 1960 
163 CAB 158/42, JIC(61)3 (Final) "Sino-Soviet bloc war potential 1961-1965", 26 April 1961 
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out the familiar likely long-term Soviet aims: strengthen their bloc; co-exist and compete 
with the West; spread communist influence throughout the world; and disrupt Western 
defence plans. Khrushchev's more immediate aims, however, as deduced from Russian 
statements during and after Camp David, were to reduce tension and risk of war, as well 
as moving the West towards an acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. 
Looking forward towards a Summit, the JIC believed that the Soviets would 
want to focus jointly on disarmament and Germany. The Committee anticipated no 
change from the desire to conclude a peace treaty and convert West Berlin into a free 
city. Furthermore, Russian propaganda would make every effort to present the West as 
the inhibitors of peace. More optimistically, however, the JIC thought some sort of 
interim agreement on Berlin might secure the Allied position in return for a reduction in 
the Western garrisons. The assessment finished on a mixed note,, indicating that 
provocative action before the Summit was unlikely, although the exact ramifications of 
worsening Sino-Soviet relations were difficult to foresee. 
The JIC reports on events in Germany produced during the last three months of 
1959 gave little cause for concern. GDR government announcements focused on 
economic improvements backed up a new Soviet-East German trade agreement. 169 
When the GDR threatened to raise their flag over those S-bahn buildings they controlled 
in West Berlin, as part of the October Revolution anniversary celebrations, the JIC 
suggested matters could get out of hand, given West German police had been instructed 
to remove any offending colours. '70 When 7 November passed without any GDR flags, 
the JIC put it down to "the reluctance of the Russians at present to see a disturbance of 
the atmosphere of d6tente". 171 Having achieved his long-term aim of getting a Summit 
meeting, the Committee did not expect Khrushchev to allow any activities that would 
jeopardise its coming to fruition. 172 
169 CAB 179/7, WRCI weeks ending 13 October 1959,24 November 1959 
170 CAB179/7, WRCI week ending 3 November 1959 
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In an assessment of the "Possibility of hostilities short of global war up to 1970", 
the JIC concluded that Khrushchev's chosen methods were more likely to be peaceful 
than forceful. 173 His intention was not to use Soviet aggression, but to cccreate a climate 
of international opinion in which it will be increasingly difficult for the Western Powers 
to use force to defend their national interests". Certainly, there was no chance of a direct 
Soviet or East German attack on West Berlin. The paper included no useful conclusions 
about the likely chain of events following on from interference with Allied 
communication rights. The JIC continued to believe that miscalculation or 
misunderstanding were the most likely causes of war. 174 
BRIXMIS bear the brunt 
The relative calm in Berlin after the Camp David visit was interrupted in early 
1960,, when the Russians used the Western Military Missions as a test-bed of Western 
resolve. From the beginning of the crisis, East German security forces had been making 
increasing attempts to disrupt Mission tours. 175 In February 1960, the interference 
switched to more administrative means: the Soviets took away old passes and replaced 
them with some describing the touring area as the territory of the GDR. To have 
accepted the passes would have meant recognising the East German government. 
The Allies' attitudes towards an appropriate response were varied. The 
Americans viewed the move as a deliberate attempt to force Western recognition of the 
Cj-DR, whereas the FO in London did not believe it be a "test" but "merely, from the 
Soviet point of view, an overdue piece of administrative tidying up". 
176 Although US 
authorities in Germany rated their Mission highly, the view in Washington was that the 
operation was expendable. The British Chiefs of Staff reiterated their view that 
173 CAB158/37. JIC(59)69(Final), 29 October 1959 
174 CAB 158/3 8, JIQ59)80(Final)(Revise) "The likelihood of global war between the Sino-Soviet bloc and 
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176 DEFE4/124, COS(60)12'hmeeting, 18 February 1960 
249 
BRIXMIS was the "principal source of military intelligence on East Germany and on the 
Soviet forces stationed there". The approach favoured in the US was to cast doubt on 
the future of the whole Mission system, by threatening to either restrict the movement of 
or expel altogether SOXMIS. The Chiefs were not willing to risk losing BRIXMIS. 
During a meeting of the Cabinet's Defence Committee, the Prime Minister made 
it clear he was unwilling to see the long-term future of the Mission compromised 
because of its potential role in disarmament inspection. 177 Nevertheless, for the sake of 
solidarity with the US., he had to agree to the restriction of the Soviet Mission should all 
else fail. For a month, there were no Mission tours in East Germany. The stand-off 
finally ended when the Russians backed down and reverted to issuing the old passes. 178 
The status of BRD(MIS was raised during the preparations for the Paris Summit. 
As before the Geneva CFM, the JIC produced a paper on Western intelligence agencies 
in Berlin, their value and the alternatives should their continued existence be 
j eopardised. 179 In general, the assessment emphasised the huge loss that would be felt, 
were any of the Berlin-based operations to be curtailed. '80 The question was raised 
whether BRIXMIS should be included, given its explicit role as a liaison mission rather 
than an intelligence-gathering body. The conclusion was that the Russians were fully 
aware of BRIXMIS's real function, as demonstrated by the attempts to restrict their 
activities. Furthermore, the JIC echoed earlier ideas when they suggested that the 
Missions' value as potential disarmament inspection teams should be emphasised at the 
Summit. 
As had become the norm, the JIC also produced a pre-Summit study, focusing on 
likely Soviet policy towards Germany and Berlin. "' The assessment read largely the 
same as those produced before: the Russians would not offer reunification on terms 
17*' CAB 131/23, D(60)2 nd meeting, 9 March 1960 
178 CAB128/34, CC(60)17'k' conclusions, 15 March 1960 
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acceptable to the West; they would seek to weaken the FRG and the Western Alliance, 
even by seemingly sacrificing some of their troops in the area; the aim of removing the 
West from Berlin remained, so any progress along that route would be gladly taken; and, 
finally, their tactics would continue to involve the Soviet self-presentation "as an apostle 
of sweet reasonableness and light", despite threats of unilateral action in the case of 
failure to reach agreement. 
Of more interest is the Committee's assessment of likely Soviet actions in the 
case of no agreement on Berlin. They had noted that Khrushchev had held his line that, 
in this event, the USSR would sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The JIC did not, 
however, believe this course would automatically be taken; rather there was some 
element of flexibility, meaning that' Soviet decisions would depend on "the general 
situation at the time". The paper also showed awareness that the GDR government was 
attempting to apply pressure on the Russians to carry out the threat of unilateral action, 
so that its needs could be met. The Committee recognised that even if Khrushchev were 
to sign a treaty, his aim would be to make the transition of authority "as 'painless' as 
possible" so that the West were not goaded into "drastic... counteraction"). When 
considered against Harrison's research using Russian and East German archives, the JIC 
appear to have produced a fairly accurate forecast. 182 
Amidst preparations for Paris, the JIC analysed the latest rounds of Soviet 
defence cuts as announced by Khrushchev on 14 January 1960. The Soviet Premier 
stated that Russian forces would be cut by 1.2 million men, down to 2.4 million. During 
the speech, Khrushchev gave the strength of Russian forces in 1948,1955 and at that 
time. 1133 As a consequence, the JIC was forced to carry out a review of their own 
estimates, as each of their relevant figures varied by over a million from those 
avowed. 184 In a March assessment of the reductions, the Committee noted that 1.2 
million men could be demobilised without any significant weakening of Soviet 
"' Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 121-138 
183 PREMI 1/3117, Anthony Acland to de Zulueta, 22 January 1960. In 1948 there were 2,874,000 men, 
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185 The GSFG could lose six line divisions and still match the strength of 
opposing NATO forces, whilst at the same time handing the Russians a political 
advantage. The paper relayed that Khrushchev had informed the West German 
Ambassador in Moscow that forces in East Germany were scheduled to go. The matter 
was significant enough that in a rare display of feedback, Macmillan's foreign affairs 
Private Secretary wrote, "Sir Pat Dean may like to know that the Prime Minister was 
interested in the JIC paper on the Reduction of Soviet Forces". 186 
Shooting down the Summit 
The story of the May 1960 Paris Summit is an infamous commonplace. On I 
May, a CIA U2 reconnaissance aircraft on a deep penetration over-flight of the USSR 
was shot down. 187 Between 5-11 May, the Russians slowly leaked out the news, first 
revealing the shoot-down, then that the pilot, Gary Powers, had been captured and 
finally announcing that Powers would be put on trial. 188 When instead of distancing 
himself firom the U2 flights as Khrushchev had hoped, Eisenhower supported their use, 
the Summit never got off the ground. Still, even though the Russian delegation openly 
abandoned Paris, Khrushchev did not make as much of the event as he could have 
done. 189 He told the world he was willing to remain patient over Germany and Berlin, 
making it clear he would wait for the successor administration to Eisenhower's. 190 
Macmillan was devastated that the Summit had failed. 191 His hopes had been 
realistic, however: in a rather gloomy report to Cabinet on 20 May, he suggested that 
even if Khrushchev had not left, agreement would have been difficult. 192 He was unsure 
185 CAB 158/39, JIQ60)14(Final) "Reduction in Soviet forces". 3 March 1960 
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whether the Russians would be willing to continue with negotiations and further delay 
action in Berlin. The Prime Minister warned that they had to be prepared for a peace 
treaty and interference with Western rights in Berlin. One of the few positives from 
Paris had been the closer alignment of the Allies' approach to Berlin. For the time 
being, there was to be a "softly, softly" attitude. 
The JIC's initial reactions to the collapse of the Summit were unsurprising. On 
19 May, they called the intelligence machinery up to Alert Stage 1, which put the Heads 
of Section groups on stand-by for emergency meetings. 
193 Although no specific 
intelligence had been received that warranted such a measure, the Alert was considered 
CC. 15 194 prudent . 
An updated indicator list was issued, although this was due anyway. 
Intelligence-collection had also been affected, since in the wake of the U2's downing, 
the FO had demanded "restraint [be] placed on intelligence gathering activities". 195 The 
restrictions lasted over a month; JIC(G) asked for permission to resume "normal touring 
and photo reconnaissance flights in the Berlin Control Zone" in early June. 196 
Permission was granted, with the following guidance: "the right policy was to aim at a 
steady return to normal intelligence gathering operations while taking all possible steps 
to avoid the risk of any embarrassment". 
The longer-term impact of Paris was felt in two ways in the JIC. First, there was 
the continued imperative to produce assessments of Soviet intentions in support of 
policy-making. There was also the need to think more about the problems of 
intelligence in the wider context of the Cold War. The BRIXMS passes and the U2 had 
dragged intelligence once again to the centre-stage of the international politics in the 
first half of 1960; in the second half of the year, an attack on BRDMS and a second 
shoot-down, this time of a US RB-47 elint aircraft over the Barents Sea, ensured that it 
could not escape the spotlight. 197 
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Political and military assessments 
During July 1960, the JIC produced their first two significant post-]Paris papers. 
One looked at likely Soviet reactions to LIVE OAK operations and the other at Kremlin 
policy in the round during the second half of 1960 . 
198 Cradock includes commentary on 
both assessments in his account of the crisis, concluding that, "[d]uring this period the 
JIC did not move far from its analysis of February 1959.199 
The background to the LIVE OAK estimate mirrored many that had gone before- 
the Soviet aim was "to force the Allies into de facto dealing with the DDW'; they also 
wished to avoid global war; the Russians would "endeavour to remain in control of DDR 
action7; and they would attempt to sway world opinion. 200 On the likely reaction to 
either land or air operations to force a passage to Berlin, the Committee was slightly 
more specific than it had been earlier. They anticipated that the Russians might act in a 
rather more cautious and calculated way than had been previously thought. They 
predicted that a land probe would be blocked first with physical obstacles and then by 
military force (probably East German), in each case acting rather passively in order to 
leave the Western force the decision as to whether they should initiate action. Allied air 
action would be more difficult to disrupt, but the JIC thought that the use of electronic 
countermeasures "could seriously hamper a full scale airlift") - 
The assessment warned that the danger of war through miscalculation was ever 
present, but more predictably the Soviets were only likely to escalate matters if they 
were sure Western opinion viewed war over Berlin as unacceptable. The tone of the 
paper is not quite as dramatic as the January 1959 estimate, but the underlying message 
that LIVE OAK operations were fraught with danger remained. The Chiefs of Staff and 
Macmillan certainly agreed . 
20 1 The JIC were also sure that Soviet intelligence would 
198 CAB 158/40. JIC(60)40(Final) "Soviet and East Gemian reactions to military measures foreseen in 
Berlin contingency planning", 6 July 1960; JIC(60)49(Final) "Soviet intentions in the second half of 
1960", 14 July 1960 
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have picked up the few preparations being made. This was both a blessing and a curse: 
the Russians would not be surprised by any Western action, and hence react without 
thought; however,, foreknowledge of plans would make it easier for the probes to be 
hampered. According to Murphy et al, by July 1961 at the latest, the KGB knew about 
LIVE OAK planning thanks to their sources in Western governments and NATO. 202 
The second report produced in July 1960 contained nothing new. 203 Its 
introduction was exactly the same at that produced in the November 1959 assessment of 
Soviet policy between the Geneva CFM and SUMMit. 204 The addition in 1960 was a 
prediction that the Russians would seek to maximise Eisenhower's weakness as an end- 
of-term President through more aggressive propaganda and political warfare. On Berlin 
particularly, the JIC anticipated that threats of a peace treaty would continue although 
they were "most unlikely" to actually sign one. They also suggested that any Western 
provocative actions, such as holding meetings of the Bundestag as planned in Berlin, 
might prompt Soviet "counter action" of an unspecified nature. 
In September, Ulbricht took Berlin matters into his own hands by first restricting 
access of West Germans to the East and then by forcing Western Ambassadors to show 
205 identification before entering East Berlin. The GDR government was growing 
impatient as the refugee exodus was reaching economic disaster point. 206 These actions 
were not sanctioned by the Russians, who were as the JIC had predicted, trying to 
restrain the GDR from changing the border regime in East Berlin altogether. 207 
Unfortunately, there are no JIC documents in the archive that were produced in response 
to these events; the WRCI records for 1960-1 were not kept . 
20" This is unfortunate since 
it denies the opportunity to investigate the extent to which the JIC were aware of the 
202 Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 368-9 
203 JIC(60)49(Final) 
204 See above 
205 Harfison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 144-151 
206 9,803 fled in the months of February 1960, during May 1960 20,285 had gone. Overall in 1959, 
120,230 let in 1960 this rose to 182,278. Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 148,158 
207 Ibid, pp. 149-153 
208The CIA and KGB assessments are discussed in Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, pp. 334-9 
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difficulties Khrushchev was having in holding back Ulbricht. 209 When the Defence 
Committee discussed the first of these events - the restrictions on West Germans - they displayed no particular worry. 210 
When the JIC carried out their December 1960 appraisal of the likelihood of war, 
they wrote that one of the likely causes of war by miscalculation was "if either side 
failed accurately to foresee the consequences of the policies being pursued by a third 
party with which it was associated". 211 In the section looking at Berlin, the Committee 
believed "it is not improbable that we shall be faced during the next twelve month with a 
Berlin crisis", although they could not "foresee" what form it might take. Indicating that 
they were aware of some sort of gap between the Russians and East Germans, the JIC 
noted that "the possibility that the East German Government, either acting at the 
instigation of the Soviet Government or acting alone, may cut Allied... communications 
with Berlin cannot be ruled out". The assessment suggested that the Russians might find 
themselves being dragged into difficult circumstances by the GDR government, because 
of German ftustration with a lack of progress. In such a case, the JIC recommended 
moderation on the part of the Allies so that the Soviets could regain control of events 
and lead them away from war. 
Intelligence collection after Paris 
Aldrich writes that the loss of the U2 and RB-47 "led to a public outcry in 
Britain and endless questions in the House of Commons") about the use of British 
bases. 212 The attention, focused largely on the question of authority behind operations, 
"served as a reprise of the Crabb Affair and cast a long shadow over other British 
intelligence operations". The JIC held a special meeting after the second shoot-down to 
discuss the history of the 'ferret' flights, in order to produce a briefing for the Prime 
209 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, PP. 147-156 
210 CAB131/23, D(60)9 
th 
meeting, 16 September 1960 
211 CAB 158/4 1, JIC(60)77(Final) "The likelihood of war with the Soviet Union, either limited or global, 
up to 1965", 15 December 1960 
212AIdrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 536-8 
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Minister. 213 The Committee decided that an urgent meeting was required with the 
Americans to review both the intelligence and political aspects of the flights. 214 As part 
of the effort to head off any further embarrassment, the photographic flights in the Berlin 
air corridor which had been recently reinstituted after the U2 incident were suspended 
once again. 215 
An incident involving BRIXMIS on 21 June 1960 had brought further attention 
to intelligence-gathering. A tour including the Mission Chief, Brigadier John Packard, 
was stopped by the East German Stasi, the men were attacked and their cars were 
216 
ransacked and destroyed . 
Shortly after at a news conference, Ulbricht displayed maps 
and equipment taken from BRIXMIS, claiming that these were preparations for Western 
attacks. The Russians went on to claim that Packard's safety could no longer be 
guaranteed and the British were forced to withdraw him. When the JIC discussed 
Ulbricht's performance, they concluded that although BRIXMIS should perhaps not 
have taken the maps into East Germany, "hitherto we had relied on diplomatic immunity 
for protection against their exposure". 217 Macmillan took an interest, as he had done last 
time BRLXMIS made the headlines. In a letter to the Prime Minister,, Christopher 
Soarnes, the Secretary of State for War, reiterated the high value of the Mission was 
such that "the present irritations and risks of further trouble should... therefore be 
ý 218 accepted' . 
The FO asked the JIC to carry out an assessment of BRIXMIS in light of the 
increasing harassment. "9 In particular, they wanted to know whether the motivation 
behind the action was political or the prevention of intelligence-gathering, and whether 
213 CAB159/34, JIC(60)36thmeeting, 13 July 1960. The Prime Minister asked for the material. See., 
PREMI 1/3 3 24, Dean to Brook, 15 July 1960. The paper produced is not available in the archive. 
214 Hugh Stephenson, the new JIC Chairman, met with Macmillan in September to agree on the British 
approach to joint Anglo-American rules on ferret flights. See CAB 159/34, JIC(60)48thmeeting, 22 
September 1960. As a consequence of the joint review, it became much harder to gain approval for 
intelligence Rights. See Aldrich, Hidden Hantt pp. 538-9 
"' See above; JIC(60)36thmeeting 
216Geraghty, BJ? LWJS, , pp. 79-80 21 ý CAB159/34, JIC(60)38hmeelting, 21 July 1960 
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there had been "a marked change in the East German attitude... immediately after the 
Summit Furthermore, the FO wanted estimates of what the effect of retaliatory 
measures against SOXMIS might be and how serious a loss of intelligence would be felt 
if the Missions were withdrawn. 
The JIC was certain that the recent moves were political in nature; earlier non- 
violent harassment had been used to inhibit intelligence-collection. 220 The problem with 
passes in February was to force defacto dealings with the GDR, whilst Ulbricht's verbal 
attacks on the Missions had emphasised their connection with occupation. The 
Committee noted that the violence had begun after Khrushchev had left Paris and 
announced his willingness to be patient over Berlin. They were unsure whether the East 
German measures had been carried out with Russian foreknowledge, but weresure that 
the GDR government was now out of control. The assessment even suggested that the 
Germans were acting out of frustration at Khrushchev's apparent passivity. As for the 
FO's suggested solutions to the Mission equation, the JIC were unenthusiastic. Any 
limits imposed on SOXMIS would be reciprocated, hindering intelligence-gathering and 
withdrawing BRIXMIS altogether would mean losing an irreplaceable source. The 
paper recalled the conclusions made in their pre-Paris assessment of intelligence 
operations in Berlin: "if BRIXMIS were withdrawn, it would be impossible to obtain the 
same intelligence coverage either in quality, quantity or speed, by any other means"). 
The JIC agreed with Soames; suffer the harassment and maintain the Mission. 
BRIXMS were restricted in their touring until the end of the year. In order to 
avoid further incident, the Mission was ordered to obey forbidden-area signs. In 
September, General Rohan Delacombe, Commandant in Berlin, suggested these 
shackles be removed wherever the intelligence reward was worth the risk and that 
SOXMIS be ffirther limited in their mobility. 221 JIC(G) asked at the same time that 
BRIXMIS be granted permission to make efforts to slip their tails "even at the risk of 
incident". The FO gave a firm no to ignoring signs, but a hesitant yes to eluding 
220 CAB 158/40, JIC(60)48(Final) "East German attitude towards BRDMS", 14 July 1960 
221 CAB159/34, JIC(60)45"' meeting, I September 1960 
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' (narks" 
. The JIC line remained unchanged, stating that the main aim was to preserve the 
Mission, so reprisals against SOXMIS were undesirable, and furthermore the 
intelligence being produced was still of value despite the restrictions. A second request 
to raise the limitations came in December, this time supported by the Service 
intelligence members of the j1C. 222 The Committee agreed to put the matter of 
authorising risky tours in the hands of the C-in-C Germany, but in the same signal they 
mentioned "Ministers' continuing anxiety over anything liable to affect the situation in 
Berlin". After visiting Germany in February 1961, Stephenson reassured the JIC that 
223 BRIXMIS operations "were intelligently planned and not needlessly provocative" . 
These scenes of intense pressure and scrutiny were those that welcomed Sir 
224 Hugh Stephenson when he took over from Dean as JIC Chairman in July 1960. One 
of the first papers produced under his reign was "Russian action against Westem 
intelligence gathering", which attempted to deduce whether the actions of the previous 
six months "could be construed as a deliberate plan or consists of opportunist moves to 
take advantage of the position following the U2 incident". 225 The paper considered the 
following events: the U2 and RB-47 shoot-downs; the expulsion of the US Air Attache 
from Moscow; the increasing hostility towards Western visitors to Russia; the greater 
restriction of Western access to Soviet publications; more Russian protests about the 
"buzzing" and surveillance of their ships and aircraft; the harassment of BRIXMIS; and 
the defection of two NSA officials. The list was long and it could have gone back 
further. 
The JIC concluded that there was a "deliberate Soviet policy to frighten the West 
from pursuing their former intelligence gathering activities"'. Any success in doing so 
would only act as greater encouragement to persevere with the policy. The BRIXMIS 
incidents had a special political element to them and the nature of the NSA defections 
was unknown, but the other events had "served the two-fold purpose of furthering the 
222 CAB159/34, JIC(60)60thmeeting, I December 1960 
223 CAB159/35, JIC(61)9th meeting, 16 February 1961 
224 Stephenson's first meeting was 28 July. CAB159/34, JIC(60)40'hmeeting, 28 July 1960 
22-5 CAB158/41, JIC(60)59(Final), 25 August 1960 
259 
Soviet propaganda campaign and discouraging intelligence gathering by the West". The 
U2 shoot-down in particular "must have alerted the Soviet authorities to the need for 
improved security in all possible fields and certainly contributed to the vigour with 
which the Russians have developed their propaganda campaign' 
The paradoxical dangers of intelligence operations had been exposed. Whilst 
risky operations such as over-flights and BRIXNHS tours yielded great results, once the 
covert had become public and intelligence affected international politics, intelligence 
had to be reined in. Secret intelligence often has to be kept secret for two reasons: 
firstly, when the precise nature of an intelligence-gathering operation is revealed, it 
almost certainly gives the target the opportunity to either prevent or at least make more 
difficult the collection of information by that method; secondly, disclosure is likely to 
cause embarrassment for governments and damage relations, especially when the two 
sides are engaged in open diplomacy. Bodies managing intelligence in open societies,, 
like the JIC, were, and still are, left with the need to constantly weigh up the balance 
between risk and reward. 
A case-study in collection: over-flights in Berlin 
From 1959 onwards, the Russians began to develop an air defence ring of SAMs 
around Berlin. As described above,, fi7om June 1959, the JIC reported with increasing 
certainty about the development of the sites. Geraghty writes that first ground 
photography and then an air sortie in BRIXMIS's Chipmunk light aircraft provided 
much of the early information. 226 He also reports that the pictures were on Eisenhower's 
desk within a week. Photographic flights in and around Berlin were a regular source of 
valuable intelligence . 
227 All over-flights of Soviet territory, however, were banned after 
the RB-47 shoot-down, although the aircraft continued to fly in the Berlin air corridor 
with camera ports open "to maintain continuity", but with no cameras fitted . 
228 This was 
226Geraghty, BRDMS, pp. 89-91 
227Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 10 1 
228 CAB159/34, JIC(60)36"' meeting, 13 July 1960 
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presumably for the benefit of deceiving the Russians into thinking that nothing had 
changed, whilst removing the risk of a crash revealing photographic equipment. 
In September 1960, JIC(G) requested permission from the JIC to carry out an air 
photography flight in the Berlin corridors in order to get pictures of the SAM sites, 
before roofs were installed on the buildings. The JIC agreed to a single sortie in a 
Pembroke aircraft, although Stephenson doubted they would gain ministerial approval 
for the action, because of the sensitivity of Berlin . 
229 The Committee thought the 
intelligence benefit would be great, since in the context of the crisis, it would be vital to 
know when the SAM sites were operational and furthermore the risk of incident were 
small because weekly dummy flights had been taking place since the ban had been 
brought in. 
The Prime Minister refused permission because of the proximity of the UN 
General Assembly meeting. 230 Stephenson relayed to the JIC that the ban would be 
reviewed after the UN meeting, although to gain approval, flights would have to yield 
wider intelligence on the Soviet threat rather than on Berlin specifically, because 
Macmillan did not anticipate military action in Germany. At the same time, BRIXMIS 
had suggested they could carry out a Chipmunk flight with little risk of incident. 231 
JIC(G) sent a further request in November, after the UN session had closed. 232 
Stephenson doubted Ministerial approval would yet be forthcoming. Air Marshal 
Sidney Bufton (ACAS(Intelligence)), pointed out that the resumption of photographic 
sorties was important in terms of relations with the Americans, since the BRIXXHS 
Chipmunk gave the British a capability the US did not have. In order to meet 
Macmillan's requirement of a wider intelligence reward, the Committee agreed that 
pictures from Berlin would provide information about SAM sites throughout the Soviet 
229 CAB 159/34. JIC(60)47th meeting, 15 September 1960 
230 CAB159/34, JIC(60)48hmeeting, 22 September 1960 
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233 bloc. The problem was that the full value of the opportunity would only be gained if 
flights were flown over several months whilst the sites were completed, a commitment 
Ministers would never make. The JIC decided to submit a proposal to find out. 
The proposal was detailed, specifying: the need for information on SAM missile 
and radar capabilities; the level of urgency due to the speed of construction; the 
photographic possibilities and performance offered by the Pembroke and Chipmunk; the 
priorities given to the five targets; the level of risk of a forced landing (zero for the 
Pembroke and "extremely remote" for the Chipmunk); the proposed cover story, which 
was a survey of RAF Gatow's airfield; and the speed with which film could be 
destroyed, five minutes for the Pembroke, three for the Chipmunk. 234 The paper 
concluded by referring to "a unique o pportunity" and recommended two sorties for each 
aircraft type. 
Authority was received and by the end of February 196 1, the flights had been 
235 
conducted . In order make the most of each mission, they were only carried out in the 
best possible weather. In March, JIC(G) requested permission for both more flights and 
a transfer of authority over Chipmunk flights from ministers to Delacombe. 236 
Stephenson also thought it was time for the JIC to take back responsibility for all 
photographic flights. On the advice of the Cabinet S ecretary, Sir Norman Brook, 
however,, the proposals did not go forward to Ministers, presumably because of the 
continuing problems over Berlin. 237 Nevertheless, JIC(G) requests for flights kept 
coming in. 238 
In May, Brook allowed the JIC to make its bid, although he doubted if it would 
be successful . 
239 By now, the JIC was asking for eight SAM flights, Delacombe's 
233 CAB 159/34, JIC(60)60'h meeting,. I December 1960 
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authority over Chipmunk flights and three more flights over GSFG equipment 
demonstrations. The Committee decided to drop the suggestion that they take back the 
right to approve further flights. 
It becomes much more difficult to trace this story at this point. The JIC minutes 
referring to the matter after May 1961 are scarce and the relevant Prime Minister's files 
are not available in the archive. JIC(G) sought permission for both Pembroke and 
Chipmunk flights over a range of targets in August, September and October, all of which 
had to go up for the Prime Minister's consideration. 240 In November and December, 
circumstances changed when the Soviet controller of the Berlin Air Safety Zone 
demanded that all local Western flights be limited to West Berlin . 
24' As a consequence 
both the JIC and the FO agreed that Chipmunk photographic flights outside the West of 
the city should be suspended, although visual sorties without photographic equipment 
could continue. The JIC sought permission from Ministers for the use of small hand- 
held cameras on board the flights, once ordinary over-flights of East Berlin had proven 
to be trouble-free. 242 At exactly the same time, the HC granted permission for Pembroke 
photographic flights to stray further from the centre line of the air corridors (up to 10 
miles), in order to increase the range over which they could take pictures. By the end of 
December, Ministers had once again approved the use of Chipmunk photographic 
flightS. 243 
Going to the Wall 
Two new factors affected the development of the Berlin crisis as it rolled into 
1961. East German patience had run out so that., as Gaddis puts it, "it was Ulbricht who 
drove the process, with Khrushchev scrambling to keep up". 
244 The Soviet Premier was 
240 CAB159/36, JIC(61)44h meeting, 28 August 1961; JIC(61)51" meeting, 28 September 1961; 
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forced into agreeing that should talks with the new US President John F. Kennedy fail, 
245 unilateral action would be taken. The second new variable was the young President 
himself his attitudes to the crisis once in power had to be unveiled. By the time 
Macmillan first met Kennedy as President in late March, a US-USSR Summit had 
already been agreed for 3-4 June in Vienna. 246 The Prime Minister's impressions of 
Kennedy's attitudes to Berlin were mixed. although the President seemed more willing 
to consider de facto dealings with the GDR, if access were blocked Kennedy felt a 
significant Western land force should be used to fully display commitment. 247 
Macmillan's confidence in Kennedy was not particularly shaken by the Bay of Pigs 
disaster, in which CIA-backed Cuban exiles failed to overthrow Castro. 248 
There is relatively little evidence of Berlin-related matters in the JIC files for 
early 1961. New indicator lists were issued that included the usual collection of military 
preparations in East Germany. 249 Forward deployment of GSFG, increased readiness of 
missile artillery units and priority for military trains on the railways were all on the red 
list. Under amber was interference with civil and military flights in the Berlin air 
corridors. When in late April, intelligence sources picked up a change in the pattern of 
Soviet military communications in Germany., the JIC discussed the implications of the 
move. 250 In general, however, the observations of both Soviet and East German forces 
suggested no great surprises: air defences were still improving, GSFG had received a 
new heavy tank and East German forces amounted to 13 5ý 000 menl including four motor 
rifle divisions and two tank divisions . 
25 1 There were surprises at home, however. It was 
during April that the extent of George Blake's treachery was becoming known. 252 
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In the build up to the Vienna Summit, the JIS prepared an up-to-date assessment 
of the GSFG and East German order of battle, their state of readiness and deployment, 
with particular attention on the missile UnitS. 253 The paper had been requested by 
SHAPE as part of their "comprehensive study" of the crisiS. 254 It was never issued, 
however 
. 
255 A further assessment, "Soviet aims and intentions in Berlin", had been 
planned for before the Summit took place, but it too was not completed. 256 The Cabinet 
was also being prepared for Vienna. 257 They heard that the Western Powers had agreed 
that Kennedy would not make any new proposals for Berlin, partly because the FRG was 
unwilling to accept a solution recognising two Germanies. The more optimistic note 
was that both the Americans and West Germans had agreed that the question of whose 
signature was on a pass was not worth military action. On the matter of contingency 
planning, however, the British were'still trying to persuade the Americans that an airlift 
was the right option. 258 
Vienna came to nothing, as neither side offered concessions . 
29 Kennedy firmly 
warned Khrushchev of his commitment to Berlin . 
260 Khrushchev blasted Kennedy with 
threats of a peace treaty before December. In a private moment immediately after, 
Macmillan comforted a shaken President . 
261 Kennedy was interested to read later, 
courtesy of Penkovsky,, the Russian impressions of the Summit which played up 
Khrushchev's determination. 262 The Prime Minister mused with his Cabinet in the days 
following Vienna whether it was time to allow the peace treaty to go ahead and accept 
East German control of access, whilst trying not to appear like the West was conceding 
263 defeat 
. 
After returning to Washington, however, Kennedy with Dean Acheson as his 
253 CAB 158/43, JIC(61)37(Tenus of Reference) "Posture of Soviet and East German forces in East 
Germany", 5 May 1961 
254 CAB159/35, JIC(61)26hmeeting, 17 May 1961 
255 Report withdrawn 7 July 1961 
256 CAB159/35, JIC(61)28"' meeting, I June 1961. The assessment was produced after the Summit, see 
below. 
257 CAB 128/35, CC(61)27hconclusions, II May 1961 
258 CAB131/26, D(61)31 "Berlin Contingency Planning", 30 Nfay 1961 
259Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 145 
260 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 175-7 
261 Horne, Macmillan 195 7-1986, pp. 303 -5 
262Anclrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 268-9 
263 CAB 128/35, CC(61)30"' conclusions, 6 June 1961 
265 
main Berlin adviser began to prepare for war. 
264 The CIA, when asked to make 
preparations to incite instability in the East, had to advise that they did not have the 
necessary capability. 
265 The British Cabinet Defence Committee realised they would 
have to work harder to persuade the Americans that an airlift was the only sensible 
military action if the crisis came to head. 
266 
Berlin was first on the JIC's order of business after Vienna. Major-General 
Richard Lloyd (DMI) raised the matter of public opinion in relation to the crisis 267 He 
recalled that Khrushchev had claimed the West was not willing to go to war over Berlin 
and hence, the DM1 suggested that in order to make good assessments of Soviet 
intentions, an understanding of the popular view as the Russians saw it would be needed. 
General Strong opined that after the Bay of Pigs, the American people were not 
"prepared to accept another blow to their prestige". So as to stay properly informed, the 
JIC decided to ask the Washington Embassy to provide their analysis of US public 
opinion. 
On 12 June, the JIC held a special meeting on the crisis, in which they 
considered their post-Vienna paper "Soviet aims and intentions in Berlin', . 
268 
Stephenson's comment on the report is fascinating: 
The Chairman said that the Committee was somewhat inhibited in making this 
assessment, in that they were unable to postulate what action the West was likely to take 
and could not therefore suggest what the subsequent Russian reactions might be. 
Stephenson had described one of the enduring problems of top-level intelligence 
assessment: if were not hard enough trying to make realistic forecasts about the actions 
of another state or group of individuals, in many cases there is also the constant variable 
of the impact of your own government's Policy decisions. 
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The assessment began with a few sentences on this problem, indicating that the 
JIC had not examined likely Soviet reactions to Western moves in Berlin, because the 
West had not yet agreed what those moves might be . 
269 Rather the paper described 
long- and short-term Russian objectives, as well as their probable tactics. In two 
appendices, the Committee included order of battle intelligence on GSFG and East 
German forces and a "brief resume" of economic circumstances in Berlin and the 
GDR. 270 
Cradock examines the paper, reasonably concluding that it was "probably an 
accurate picture of likely Soviet tactics and of Ulbricht's pressing need to deal with the 
refugee exodus". 271 The JIC expected an autumn peak for the crisis, as the Russians 
pushed the West into a decision between defacto dealings with the GDR or "exceptional 
measures to support its rights"'. The Committee anticipated the West taking the first 
option, which would in turn leave the GDR "more free to take the measures urgently 
necessary to control the flow of refugees through Berlin to the West". Cradock points 
out that the assessment recognised the "tensions" between Khrushchev and Ulbricht, by 
suggesting that the Russians were perhaps not prepared to sign a treaty and hand over 
the delicate question of Allied communications with Berlin to the GDR government. 
The Committee thought that the Russians had "probably not yet decided exactly how 
they will proceed"'. 
Although the JIC had written that the Soviets had probably not yet decided on 
their course of action, the Foreign Secretary, by now Lord Home, told the Cabinet on 20 
June that the Russians no longer looked willing to negotiate. 272 He did, however, agree 
that autumn would be the likely time for movement on Berlin, most probably a peace 
treaty. It seems likely that Home was responding both to Khrushchev's unequivocal 
speech on 15 June and, on the same day, Ulbricht's press conference at which he 
asserted first that a peace treaty would mean GDR control of Allied access to Berlin and 
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second that there was no plan to build a wall. 273 The East German response to the press 
conference was a further increase in the numbers of refugees fleeing. 274 Macmillan was 
aware enough of the exodus that he asked the FO for their estimate of the figures. 275 
The Prime Minister was more concerned, however, with the economic impact of the 
crisis. He wrote on 24 June, "I still think we are more likely to be bankrupted than to be 
blown up, though of course it would not be any comfort in being blown up to know that 
one was bankmpt". 276 
There was an effort to co-ordinate thinking about Berlin around Whitehall. The 
Chiefs of Staff heard from Sir Frank Roberts, Ambassador in Moscow, and Sir 
Christopher "Kit" Steel, Ambassador in Bonn, on 20 June. 277 Roberts' assessment of 
Soviet intentions was very similar to that produced by the JIC. The Chiefs also met with 
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary in charge of the FO Western 
Department; all agreed that there was still so much work to be done on contingency 
planning that only a high-level military meeting with the US, French, Germans and 
Norstad would do. The Defence Committee shared the view that planning was in a 
mess. 278 The JIC were joined by Edward Tomkins, head of the FO Western Department, 
at their 22 June meeting, who reported disagreement between the British, Americans,, 
French and Germans on both interpretation of Russian moves and contingency 
planning. 279 The British had at least decided on their chosen course of action: if a peace 
treaty were signed and the GDR took over traffic supervision, the West should accept it-, 
but if traffic were interfered with, a small land probe should be dispatched whilst non- 
273 Harrison, Driving the Soviets, pp. 178-181 
274 "17,791 East Germans had fled in May, 19,198 fled in June, and 12,578 in the first two weeks of 
July", Harrison, p. 178. In July and early Augustý the refugees numbered over 1,000 a clay. 
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military countermeasureS280 would be employed. Once the probe had been held, an 
airlift should be the next move. Macmillan did want planning attention paid to steps 
beyond, however, where preparations f 281 or war might be needed. 
On 19 July, Home warned the Cabinet that the crisis was worsening and that 
282 negotiations appeared to be going nowhere. Unknown to the West, Khrushchev had 
already yielded to Ulbricht's pressure and granted permission for a border closure. 283 
Kennedy warned Macmillan on 20 July that although they had not given up on 
negotiations, the Americans were about to begin a military build-up; he was going to ask 
Congress for an extra $3.5 billion to strengthen forces in Europe, call up reserves and 
improve civil defence at home. 284 Kennedy announced the request, whilst making a 
forceful commitment to Berlin in a broadcast on the 25 july. 285 Khrushchev responded 
in kind; he announced an increase in the Soviet defence budget as well as an end to the 
self-imposed 1958 ban on nuclear testing. Included within Kennedy's address, however, 
had been the first of a number of hints that the crisis did not have to end in war; he had 
286 committed the US to West Berlin only, leaving the option of sealing the border. 
Preparations for just that had been underway since 15 July. 
Despite the alarm of Kennedy's speech, Earl Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence 
Staff, reported to the Chiefs of Staff that the Americans had come a long way towards 
sharing the British view of contingency planning; they seemed to be willing to accept a 
small land probe and an airlift as well as non-military measureS. 287 The US, however, 
expected the British to increase the strength of their forces in Europe too. This went 
against the measures to reduce forces in Germany, outlined in the post-Suez review of 
280 Such as an appeal to the UN, economic sanctions. interference with Soviet aircraft elsewhere and a 
naval blockade. Brook set up a Cabinet Committee to consider these plans, PREMI 1/3348, PM/61/86 
Home to Macmillan, 23 June 1961 
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defence by Duncan Sandys. 288 In 1958, the British had wanted to reduce the BAOR 
from 55,000 to 45,000 men, but after US protests and an offer of over $11 million in 
financial assistance, the reduction was held off 
289 
By early 1961, however, manpower 
shortages left the BAOR at 51ý 000, whilst the Government warned NATO that it could 
only maintain 48,000 men over the 1961-3 period and furthermore,, it would have to 
withdraw three fighter squadrons from Germany unless the Germans agreed to pay their 
CoStS. 
290 
After Kennedy's 25 July speech, the Americans expected the BAOR to be 
brought back up to 55 , 000.291 The British were only able to muster an extra 2,000 men, 
292 however, although the strategic reser-ve forces in the UK were reinforced . 
On the 27 July, the JIC produced "An assessment of the overall balance of 
military power insofar as it affects the Berlin situation" from the Soviet perspective. 293 
In terms of conventional forces, the Committee were sure that the Russians would be 
confident in their superiority. Concurrent with that realisation,, however. ) would be the 
recognition that the West would use tactical nuclear weapons in response to aggression 
by overwhelming conventional forces and hence, would lead to global nuclear war. The 
JIC thought that "the risk of escalation wift, therefore, for varying reasons deter both 
sides from opening conventional hostilities' The paper echoed much that the 
Committee had written before when it described the unique problem the West faced over 
Berlin: the Soviets could raise difficulties by cutting off land access "without initiating 
hostilities". The paper's final paragraphs were on strategic nuclear attack; the JIC 
showed that they believed that the Soviets' certainty of their own destruction through 
Western retaliation would prevent them launching a first strike, unless the Russians were 
utterly convinced that a Western attack was coming regardless. In an unusual move, the 
Committee decided not to forward the paper to Ministers since "parts of the report, and 
particularly those paragraphs relating to escalation, might be open to misinterpretation if 
288 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 145 
289 PREMI 1/2325, Sir Frank Roberts to FO, No. 265 Saving, 9 September 1958. The Germans were also 
paying towards the upkeep of the BAOR: E12 million a year, the early repayment of L22.5 million of debt 
and a L50 million deposit for defence orders. CAB128/32, CC(58)3461 conclusions, 24 April 1958 
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read in isolation". 294 Instead they forwarded the assessment to officials for use in 
briefing Ministers. It was used in informal discussions between Shuckburgh and Strong 
on Khrushchev's likely actions. 
The Wall goes up 
At 1600 on 12 August, Ulbricht signed the order to seal the Berlin border. 295 At 
midnight on 12-13 August, the operation began. First, barbed wire was used to create 
the physical barrier, but within days, concrete blocks were added. Gaddis writes of the 
"sheer brutality" of this action that, in the end, not only divided the city for nearly thirty 
years but also brought some sort of a solution to the German question. 296 Harrison 
describes how the Western nations were taken completely by surprise, so much so that 
their official response took 48 hours to come. 297 Certainly the Cabinet minutes from 28 
July show that the British government's thinking was in line with the JIC's view of an 
October peak to the criSiS. 298 The news that reached London on the 13 August from 
Germany was composed, however. Once Delacombe had heard the announcement of 
the closure, he reassured Whitehall that the target of the action was the refugee flow 
rather than Western access to the West Berlin. 299 Steel followed by reporting that an 
uprising in East Germany seemed "unlikely" and urged a-cautious Western response. 300 
His wishes were quickly met: Britain and America decided on negotiation and left LIVE 
OAK at the planning level, although a 1,500-man US battle group did arrive in Berlin on 
20 August. 301 
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Erich Honecker's claim, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that the Wall 
represented a "defeat for Western intelligence" certainly appears to be valid. Although 
the missing WRCIs might tell a different story, the JIC papers and minutes show no 
specific indication that British intelligence expected a border closure in August. Murphy 
el al write that the CIA had no inkling either. 302 The East German planning circle had 
been so tight that the opportunities to gather the crucial information were very slim. 
Penkovsky learnt of the plans four days in advance, but had no means of getting the 
303 information to the West . In 1948 for the blockade and in 1953 for the riots, British 
and American intelligence did not have the sources to predict events; in 1961, the source 
existed,, but the mechanics of espionage which involved the agent collecting and relaying 
information safety followed by assessment, source-protection and distribution 
procedures, made it impossible to get the intelligence to the policy-makers in time. 304 
BRLXMIS reported on events as they happened, through Chipmunk flights as well as 
ground observation, but the Mission does not appear to have provided any 
forewaming. 305 Two BREMIS wives were in fact used satisfactorily by Delacombe to 
test the continuity of Western military access to East Berlin, as he sent them East to buy 
opera tickets. 
When the Wall went up, the JIC were in the middle of producing an assessment 
on the chances of an East German uprising over the Berlin crisis. 306 The first two 
meetings after the 13 August, however, were more focused on the practicalities of 
intelligence. The flow of material from London to JIC(G) was discussed and thought to 
be adequate. 307 Lloyd (DMI) travelled to Germany to check on supply of intelligence on 
GSFG to the British forces . 
308 He reported that "our covert cover of East Germany was 
not good although that of the West Germans was a little better". The JIC agreed to focus 
effort on improving the communication of information from the 
"" Murphy et al, Battleground Berlin, p. 377 
'0' Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy who saved the World, p. 226 
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Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), as Gehlen's organisation was now known, by 
providing another teleprinter line. The pressure of an international crisis,, however, did 
not provide release from the grip of the Treasury; on the 17 August, the JIC was 
informed that there would be a ten percent cut in intelligence expenditure for the 1962-3 
year. 309 
The JIC paper on an East German uprising became the JIC's early thoughts on 
the crisis after the Wall .3 
10 The paper reported that despite strong personal reactions to 
the border closure amongst East Germans, there were no signs of unrest. Nor did the 
Committee expect any organised resistance. Local disturbances were more likely, with 
attempts to escape along the borders. The JIC judged that the East German forces, 
backed up by the GSFG would be more than capable of dealing with any trouble and 
would do so free from the fear of Western reaction. On the crisis as a whole, the 
assessment claimed that the Russians might now be more likely to negotiate with the 
West, because the immediate problem of refugees had been dealt with. Certainly, the 
need to interfere with Western access to West Berlin appeared to have lessened from the 
Eastern perspective. 
Intelligence after the Wall 
It was far from clear at the time that the Wall had effectively ended the Berlin 
crisis. During September 1961, the Cabinet continued to discuss Germany. 
311 
Macmillan became increasingly concerned that the economic sanctions being discussed 
312 
as an alternative to LIVE OAK operations were more likely to harm West than East . 
309 JIC(61)42d meeting 
310 CAB 158/44, JIC(61)62(Final) "East Germany in relation to the Berlin Crisis", 24 August 1961 
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Adding to the apprehension, Penkovsky supplied information indicating that October 
would bring massive Soviet military exercises and a peace treaty. 313 
The JIC faced a busy time. The Committee Secretary requested an extra officer 
to support the single Duty Intelligence Officer, even though the alert level had not yet 
been raised to Stage Two. 314 A working party was formed in Germany to review the list 
of intelligence indicators relating to the crisis. In response to a request from the British 
LIVE OAK staff, the JIC agreed to send on collated photographic intelligence, elint and 
315 visual reports from the Berlin air corridor and Zonal frontier. The Committee also 
produced another survey of likely Soviet reactions to LIVE OAK and other Western 
operations. 316 The JIC's view of the response to either land or air probes was the same 
as it always was . 
317 In the case of the Allies using non-nuclear air power to force an air 
passage through to Berlin, the assessment suggested the Soviets would meet like with 
like rather than escalating to the nuclear-level. In the same way, the paper anticipated 
that the Russians would use only conventional but overwhelming forces to repulse a 
Western large-scale conventional land operation. If the Allies made selective use of 
nuclear weapons, the JIC found it "impossible to estimate" whether the Russians would 
318 back down or retaliate at either a tactical or strategic nuclear level . 
Into October, the demand for the JIC's assessments remained high. Both the 
Chiefs of Staff and Ministers received the Committee's product .3 
19 When the Political 
Adviser to Delacombe, William Ledwidge, came back to London, he attended a JIC 
meeting during which he expressed a view on the chances of unrest in East Germany 
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that matched the Committee' S. 320 There was also minor organisational change within 
the British intelligence community in Germany, although it is not clear from the archive 
whether this was a response to the crisis or a planned move. A Communications 
Security Committee was set up to co-ordinate security in Germany as directed by 
London as well as direct local monitoring and monitoring analysis intelligence. 321 
The Cabinet minutes show that from October to the end of 1961, the majority of 
the government's focus was on the opportunities of negotiating a Berlin settlement with 
the RussianS. 322 Khrushchev had announced on 17 October that a he was not necessarily 
sticking to the idea of a peace treaty before the end of the year. 323 He later abandoned 
the idea altogether, on the basis that it was too risky to put the matter of Western access 
into East German hands. 324 The standoff between Russian and American tanks at 
Checkpoint Charlie from 22-27 October proved both that the Berlin crisis was still 
dangerous, but also that talking, albeit through the back channel of Robert Kennedy and 
Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet intelligence officer, could avoid military action. 325 The 
episode was sparked when East German border guards refused to let a US diplomat 
cross into East Berlin without showing identification. The Americans sent military 
forces to emphasise that this was unacceptable. The Russians responded in kind. The 
incident proved that East German unilateral action could still spark super-power 
aggression. Unfortunately there are no JIC papers available that discuss those events, 
On 8 November, Home wrote to Macmillan that "signs are multiplying that the 
Russians are easing the pressure a little over Berlin for the time being" . 
326 Talks looked 
likely. The JIC were very keen that any negotiations secured the future of BRDMS, 
especially if a USSR-GDR peace treaty threatened to bring all of wartime measures to 
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an end . 
327 The Committee also continued to plan for the worst, where a further flare-up 
in the crisis might result in such severe Soviet security that intelligence collection 
became even more difficult . 
328 The Wall had made it hard enough. Maddrell writes that 
the closure of the border had cut Western officers off fi7om both their agents and the 
valuable source of refugee information. 329 Identifying, recruiting and communicating 
with agents had become harder and more risky. Murphy et al reveal that because of the 
reduction in case work for the CIA in Berlin, staff numbers were CUt. 
330 
Towards the end of 1961, the JIC got slightly caught up in a different aspect of 
the German question, one which took them back to the 1940s. On 23 November, all 
three of the service members of the JIC as well as Strong, drew attention to an increasing 
number of "signs of a revival of militarism in certain West German circles" . 
33 1 They 
were concerned by reports of German advocacy of massive NATO land forces, 
discussions about setting up a High Command and the Defence Ministry's desire to 
acquire nuclear weapons. Strong warned that although the military view was not 
dominant in Germany at the moment, "he believed that there was a chance of it reaching 
a dangerous pitch in three to five years' time". 
Matters concerning the FRG had previously arisen in the JIC during the Berlin 
crisis,, but usually in the familiar form of security in West Germany. In 1958, the 
Committee agreed to more intelligence being shared with the FRG Defence Ministry, 
332 but warned that most of it would end up in Russian hands as a consequence. In 
November 1960,, an assessment was issued to all relevant departments that warned that 
security in West Germany was as poor as ever. 333 Whilst the Committee realised that a 
reduction in the exchange of information would be politically unacceptable, they urged 
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Whitehall officials to encourage their counterparts to deal with the problem. Stephenson 
also raised the issue on a visit to NATO. 334 
The matter of German military strength had been discussed within the British 
government before it got to the JIC. In response to the 1958 NATO plans for tactical 
nuclear missiles in West German hands,, the Defence Committee aired their concerns. 335 
They noted that West German influence in Europe was increasing whilst their army 
would soon be the largest in Europe. Above all, the government feared a German 
independent nuclear capacity. The Defence Committee concluded, however, that risks 
had to be accepted because of the desire to keep Germany "in the Western family as an 
equal"'. The British offered their uneasy consent to the amendment of the Brussels 
Treaty in 1959, so that the Germans could undertake production Of SWS. 
336 When the 
FRG wanted the treaty amended again in 1960, this time to allow the construction of 
larger ships and mines, the Cabinet described the British conundrum: "it was in our 
interest to encourage Germany to bear a greater share of the burden of defence of 
Western Europe, but at the same time it had to be recognised that the British people had 
-) 337 a natural dislike of German rearmament' . 
In August 1960, the FO asked the JIC to produce an assessment of the "economic 
and military outlook for Western Germany". 338 The paper reported "a rate of economic 
expansion which compares well with that of France and extremely favourably with that 
of the United Kingdom". 339 The Committee noted that the large labour reserves and the 
small defence burden in the FRG had assisted the "remarkable recovery'. They 
doubted,, however, "that present boom conditions... can last much longef', especially as 
the Common Market, which had come into being on I January 1958, might bring trade 
instability. The prediction for the German defence industry was not alarming: it would 
334 CAB159/34, JIC(60)64th meeting. 22 December 1960 
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remain small and any large-scale projects would be undertaken jointly with NATO 
allies. The FRG's atomic energy programme remained small with no signs of an 
ambition to create nuclear weapons. The assessment finished by examining the West 
German armed forces. The German Army was thought not to be battle-worthy because 
of poor logistic support for front-line divisions, but would by 1965 or earlier be "the 
most powerful land force in the NATO area of Western Europe". The Navy was 
"becoming an effective force though not up to NATO standard in general training". The 
Air Force would be a "strong tactical air force" by 1964-5 if the planned build-up were 
completed. 
The November 1961 JIC concerns about West German militarism were taken 
seriously. Tomkins (FO) joined the* Committee for their discussion of the issue . 
340 MS 
office had also seen reports of militaristic talk, although upon investigation it proved 
there was no immediate cause for concern. Tomkins thought the matter warranted close 
observation, however. The JIC as a whole concluded that the German people were 
moving in the direction of European integration rather than militarism. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence of a German military atomic programme. The only concern was 
that the few West Germans who were advocating greater military strength would win 
support from those in the Pentagon whose ambitions involved frightening the Russians. 
Lloyd noted that intelligence coverage of West Germany was "small" and therefore 
might require more effort. The Committee agreed and i nstructed departments to make 
the required extra effort, paying particular attention to the formation of a High 
Command and Franco-German nuclear collaboration. 
Conclusions 
Cradock's belief that during the second Berlin crisis, the HC assessments had 
little influence on British policy seems fair, but this research suggests this was so for 
340 CAB159/36, JIC(61)64 
th 
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slightly different reasons to those he asserts. 341 Whereas Cradock describes a gulf 
between the JIC and policy-makers in appreciation of the circumstances, the course of 
events described here gives the impression more that assessments simply arrived too late 
to influence major policy decisions. The Committee's papers were often accurate in 
terms of analysing Soviet motives and intentions,, but policy in two key areas had been 
largely decided before they were produced: Macmillan had already decided to negotiate 
with the Russians; and the Chiefs were set against land action to keep access to Berlin 
open. The JIC wrote assessments that, in fact, seemed to support these choices, and may 
therefore have firmed up the zeal for the policies in the face of international opposition, 
but it is impossible to argue that the JIC's work sparked anything new. Macmillan's 
actions were consistent with JIC estimates. Throughout the crisis, they argued that one 
of Khrushchev's aims was negotiat ions, that his deadlines were flexible, that Soviet 
policy was indefinite and that there were no military moves indicating immediate 
aggression. That Macmillan chose to talk does not seem illogical, based on those 
indicators. 
The question raised by these observations is a serious one: was the JIC guilty of 
telling their customers what they wanted to hear or were the assessments a genuine 
interpretation of the information they had, which happened to confirm previous policy- 
decisions? It is very difficult to produce a full answer to this question from the archives. 
All that can be reasonably offered is that the assessments produced were consistent in 
their view of Soviet intentions and the risks of war with those that had been written 
before the crisis began. It is clear that on many of the issues surrounding Berlin there 
was a prevailing Whitehall view; the JIC certainly did not stand out with dissenting 
opinions. 
Clearly the JIC failed to predict the Berlin Wall. They had recognised the option 
of sealing the border early on, but they did not have the specific intelligence of East 
German plans in time to issue a warning. In this sense, the Committee looks to have 
performed in much the same way as it did in 1948, when they recognised the possibility 
341 See above 
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of a blockade, but lacked the crucial piece of information to make a precise forecast. Of 
course, in 1961, the fact that British intelligence had a source like Penkovsky who was is 
a position to learn of the plans was a vast improvement on 1948. In 1953, the JIC had 
been unaware of the difficulties in the USSR-GDR relationship which led to the June 
riots. By late 1959, however, the Committee's view was developed enough that they 
gave warnings of the possible consequences of Ulbricht's impatience with Khrushchev. 
An equally important, but nevertheless easily overlooked, advance in terms of 
British intelligence during the crisis was the question of authorisation and control of 
operations. Of course, before the crisis began, Crabb's adventure had highlighted the 
problem of oversight, but over Berlin, the JIC had a chance to prove that it was coming 
to terms with the potential for intelligence to cause international friction. The 
restrictions placed on BRIXMIS and Berlin over-flights during the crisis demonstrated a 
sensible level of sensitivity to tension and Ministerial anxiety. The system was far from 
perfect, but thanks to good chairmanship of the Committee and, perhaps, the JIC's new 
proximity to the centre of government in the Cabinet Office, a difficult period was 
successfully managed. 
There is little doubt that Western intelligence in general suffered a significant 
set-back when the Berlin Wall was erected. A valuable gap in the Iron Curtain had been 
closed, cutting off some sources altogether and making others a more risky proposition. 
The Wall clearly affected human intelligence the most; the barrier could only prevent the 
flow of people. Maddrell makes a tempting case for viewing the Wall as a symbolic end 
to a humint age that had begun in the earliest days of the Cold War. 
342 Certainly this 
seems correct in terms of the sorts of mass exploitation of scientists, agents, 
deserters 
and defectors which he writes about. The fact that a Corona reconnaissance satellite was 
first successfully used by the Americans in August 1960, rendering even some of 
the 
manned over-flights redundant, adds to the feeling of a new age of 
high technology 
espionage. 343 It is easy to go too far, however, particularly 
in the case of British 
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intelligence. For the SIS the 1958-61 period yielded their first real successes in terms of 
agent-running within the Soviet bloc and even then, these were still learning 
experiences. Although the SIS was certainly finished with mass operations and 
networks, humint was far from useless, especially since no overhead photograph could 
yield the thoughts of a senior Soviet politician or official. Where satellite technology 
could begin to slowly make a real difference though was first of all in revealing Soviet 
capabilities and second in performing the sort of early warning role that either BR1XMlS 
or rail-watching agents in the GDR or Poland had once fulfilled. 344 
344 HermalL Intelligence Power, pp. 74-8 
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Conclusions: a AC assessment 
The JIC's contribution to policy 
The Joint Intelligence Committee's contribution to policy needs to be judged 
against the two sets of criteria set out for it during the early Cold War: in 1947, the 
Chiefs of Staff wanted intelligence to provide "adequate and timely warning7 of crises; 
and, in 1954, Patrick Dean described a role for intelligence as providing an enduring 
information backdrop for policy-makers. In addition, judgements on the accuracy of the 
JIC's contribution to policy are part of the analysis as an historical measure of its 
performance and how valuable that contribution should have been. 
It makes sense to take Dean's metric first, to give a sense of the usual pattern of 
affairs,, away from the crises. Simply put, the backdrop provided by the JIC was, more 
often than not, worrying. In particular, the view through the German intelligence 
window gave Ministers and officials little relief That vision was of a magnitude of 
Soviet threat to Western Germany and Western Europe more widely, that disengagement 
fi7om questions surrounding both Berlin and Germany's future was impossible. 
From the earliest years covered by this thesis, the JIC described for its customers 
the significance of Germany to the security of the United Kingdom and therefore, the 
essential requirement of preventing the total economic and military potential of 
Germany falling into Soviet hands. To answer Hennessy's question about what it was in 
JIC assessments that led a war-weary and bankrupt nation to invest so heavily in 
defence',, the basic answer is fear. Even though assessments were rarely alarmist in 
describing imminent danger to European security, the repeated reports of hundreds of 
thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany, developing indigenous forces and an 
underlying Soviet desire to dominate Germany as a whole, forced successive British 
governments into pouring national resources into conventional and, increasingly, nuclear 
I See jigroduction 
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forces. John Young suggests that, "[i]ndeed, after its wartime success,, JIC's advice was, 
perhaps, over-relied upon in the early post-war period. -)-32 In one way, an understanding 
of the enduring tone of JIC assessments hints at the value of this thesis: it allows the 
reader a degree of empathy with early Cold War British decision-makers. Knowing 
something of the bad news and worst case scenarios surrounding Nfinisters and officials, 
allows the historian to make further sense of the choices made at the time. Reading the 
JIC's descriptions of overwhelming Soviet power also makes it easier to recognise that 
policy-makers knew that the next war was one Britain was unlikely to survive and 
therefore, really could not afford to fight. 
Military assessments dominated the early Cold War JIC production line. The 
target lists for intelligence collection focused on Soviet military preparations for war- 
troop numbers, their equipment, location and readiness. The available sources of 
intelligence - BR1XMIS, low-level agents, line-crossers and later over-flights - were 
more suited to gathering this sort of information. From the first months of its 
development, the Bereitschaften was given significant attention by the JIC. 
The January 1951 assessment in which the Committee openly advocated 
rearmament went further than before, bringing together threat assessments with clear 
policy recommendation. Even as the numbers of Russian troops stationed in East 
Germany gradually reduced during the 1950s, the JIC reported that the military 
capability of the GSFG was increasing. The reports of chaotic scenes as Russian forces 
prepared to enter East Berlin in June 1953, did not leave a lasting residue of doubt about 
the capabilities of the Red Army. When the intelligence picture of Soviet strength was 
at its most confused during the early 1950s, the consistent message was, whatever the 
numbers of troops, the Russians are strong enough to present a threat. The arrival of 
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles in East Germany during the 1958-61 crisis 
led the JIC to maintain a daunting assessment of Soviet strength. 
2young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, p. 150 
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Building up knowledge of Soviet capabilities was a first order priority from the 
earliest years of the Cold War. Intelligence is often intimately linked with war-fighting 
and developing a picture of military threat. Evil] noted serious deficiencies in 1947; 
through to 1961, British intelligence addressed this requirement, in terms of collection, 
organisation and presentation. Besides that question of Soviet capability, however, lay 
the matter of intent. As others such as Cradock and Hennessy have argued, the JIC's 
ability to report an absence of intelligence that the Russians were preparing to use their 
forces in an aggressive move westwards was a fundamental contribution to policy. 3 As 
this thesis sets out, negative indicators and assessments gave policy-makers room to 
operate during crises from the Berlin blockade,, through the Korean War, preparations 
for the Bonn and EDC treaties, the 1953 Berlin riots and Suez to the end of the 1958-61 
crisis. Where the JIC did warn that Western moves might increase the risk of war, as in 
1950-1 when assessments suggested that West German rearmament might quicken the 
journey to war, British policy was reined in. 
In the realms of political intelligence, however, the JIC had less to offer because 
of an absence of sources. Although reports assuring that there were no signs of 
impending attack were valuable assessments of immediate Soviet intentions, such 
information was not the basis of long-term, in-depth understanding of an adversary. 
Away from the very near horizon, JIC assessments were more general, more often than 
not giving accurate (and grim) predictions of Cold War mood, rather than the specifics 
of forthcoming crises or high-level internal Soviet bloc politics. British intelligence did 
not have the hugely insightful sources that could reveal the inner workings of the 
Kremlin or East German government, instead there was a gradual process of building up 
Cold War knowledge and lower-level information to provide a basis for analysing newer 
intelligence. On occasion, the assessments pointed out the blindingly obvious trends; 
although such observations were clearly correct, it is doubtful whether they had great 
utility for already well-informed customers. Some moments of valuable insight 
do stand 
out, however,, when held against historical research, such as the assessments produced 
3 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 52; Hennessy, Secret State, p. 12 
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before the 1960 Paris Summit, concerning Khrushchev's desire not to push the West too 
far over Berlin. 
In Germany, the path from normality to crisis was so short because troops were 
already stationed there. As a consequence, the number of opportunities to pick up on 
indicators was reduced. Fulfilling the Chiefs' requirement for warning was a very 
difficult task in Germany. The JIC failed to make specific, accurate forecasts of the 
blockade in 1948 or the Wall in 1961, although assessments were clear about the high 
tension before the incidents. The efforts made to improve levels of intelligence in 
months before the 1948 blockade were focused on picking up indicators of Soviet 
military preparations near the border, rather than on political decisions that 
foreshadowed the blockade. It was not really until the 1958-61 crisis that the Committee 
had gained enough knowledge and experience of the Communist bloc to begin to 
recognise the complexities of intra-bloc relations that could drive events. During the 
second Berlin crisis,, the JIC was in a position to provide largely accurate appreciations, 
but they missed being as useful as they could have been because they lacked timeliness. 
Before the June 1953 riots, the Committee did not seem to have the imagination to 
comprehend the possibility of significant dissent behind the Iron Curtain. Neither 
individuals nor the GDR government was credited with enough power to significantly 
alter the realities of their existence. The 1953 rioting, however, was a good example of 
where, once a crisis was underway, the intelligence picture provided in Whitehall was 
accurate. This appears to indicate, that the JIC was capable of producing sensible, well- 
informed interpretations and analysis on the Soviet bloc, albeit shortly after rather than 
before crises took place. 
To expect the JIC to have provided perfect assessments of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities is unrealistic, however. Military capabilities were ultimately knowable - 
secrets rather than mysteries - but still,, as the members of BRIXMIS knew only too 
well, information was very hard and dangerous to come by in a restrictive, police state. 
Soviet intentions were even more difficult to discover, if not impossible; the highest 
level sources may not have revealed alt, even if British intelligence had possessed them 
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consistently and in some numbers. 4 Unless an intelligence service has access to the 
inner-most thoughts of a foreign leader, it is not necessarily better placed to make 
Predictions about future events than a good diplomat, joumalist, academic or other 
commentator. The descriptor secret of intelligence does not automatically confer on 
bodies like the JIC extraordinary crystal-ball gazing abilities. Furthermore, as seen 
during the 1958-61 Berlin crisis, effective forecasting is always complicated when your 
own government's actions and those of its allies have an impact on the outcome of 
events. 
The Committee constantly strove to improve the range of sources, and therefore 
raw intelligence, available to it, with some success. Aerial reconnaissance and 
BRIXMIS,, in particular, stand out as an increasingly valuable. In other arenas, 
especially human intelligence, no matter how much an intelligence service works at its 
own recruiting methods, it is still often a matter of luck when circumstances bring a 
high-value source to the door. Despite the efforts made, by the early 1960s, there were 
still not the human or technical sources available to the British that could have enabled 
the JIC to carry out an accurate and specific forecasting function. JIC papers were, 
therefore, poor assessments based on poor intelligence - not poor assessments written 
despite good intelligence. Young is highly critical of the contribution intelligence made 
to foreign policy outcomes: "clashes between parts of the intelligence-gathering 
machine, duplication of work and mis-reading of information was inevitable and, 
although the intelligence services became an important part of the British state, with 
their own international links and a larger budget that the FO, they could not prevent 
crises and humiliation abroad. "' 
Yet it is impossible to ignore another gauge of the Committee's general 
contribution: the way that the intelligence apparatus was treated during the early years of 
the Cold War. In particular, it is unlikely that the 1957 move to the Cabinet Office 
would have been accepted by the key departments had there not been a perceived need 
4Strong, Sir Kennedi, Men ofIntelligence: A study of the roles and decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence 
frorn World War I to the present day (London: Cassell & Co, 1970), p. 154 
5young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, p. 151 
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for the JIC to serve Cabinet and value in the Committee doing so. The FO's Russia 
Committee brought together senior diplomats and military officers to harmonise foreign 
and defence PojiCY. 
6 That the JIC took over from that Committee as the focus for Soviet 
analysis is a sign of its value in terms of contribution to policy. Although the JIC had 
not performed well against the Chiefs of Staff 1947 criteria which looked to intelligence 
to provide warning of events, the wider Whitehall community by 1957 must have 
recognised the significant role intelligence had to play in contributing to policy, as 
described by Dean in September 1954. The assessments were good enough and the set- 
backs not so serious to prevent a gradual rise in the Committee's stock. Intelligence 
analysis at the centre, run on an all-source basis,, was clearly seen as a rational use of 
resources. 
Tuning the machine 
The British intelligence organisation as a whole was not static during the early 
Cold War. Failures in crises and scandal spurred change. The Berlin blockade brought 
the first methodical system of weekly reviews of Soviet preparations for war -a step 
towards a more consistent and streamlined intelligence assessment production line. 
Reilly's internal audit after Korea, recognised that problems stemmed from both a lack 
of raw intelligence upon which to base analysis and a style of writing assessments that 
was so general it avoided useful conclusions. It is not so clear that these deficiencies 
were rectified instantly, but certainly in the case of collection, matters gradually 
improved. Dean's ambition for the JIC saw a clearer definition of the Committee's role, 
the move to the Cabinet Office and new modes of weekly distribution to give the 
customer a more relevant and digestible product. Under Stephenson, a decade of 




6 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 71 
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The JIC's development was designed to provide the customer with a more 
reliable and focused service, with better understanding and control of risk. Blunders 
were dealt with through greater accountability and oversight of the individual agencies 
through the JIC. Operations had to be conducted cognisant of the limitations of 
Government policy. The Committee had some successes in this field, such as watching 
over the campaign to encourage defectors, restraining liberation operations in Europe 
and directing aerial reconnaissance over Berlin during the 1958-61 crisis. John Bruce 
Lockhart, former Deputy Chief of SIS, wrote that "trust between the policy-makers, the 
national evaluating committee, and the senior producers is vitall". 7 These developments 
were all steps towards building that trust. Exceptionally, intelligence can provide 
startling break-through information, but more often the process is one of a gradual 
building of understanding through corroboration and judgement. If Ministers were to 
accept the news brought by the JIC, especially if it that news did not fit with the 
Ministers' current world view, such trust had to exist. Whereas the Service departments 
and Foreign Office had had hundreds of years to develop their long-term relationships 
with the centre of government, the JIC by 1947 had had a little over ten. 
Of course, the intelligence community had its unique place within the UK-US 
relationship. Sharing Cold War operations and assessments represented, as post-Cold 
War it still represents, an extraordinary level of trust between nations that first 
developed in wartime. Even the greatest moments of disagreement, such as Suez, had 
relatively little impact on co-operation. Whereas Aldrich often writes in Hidden Hand 
of tension within the relationship, the day-to-day records of the JIC, especially those 
concerning Germany, demonstrate efforts to reach a common understanding of a 
common threat. It is because of this enduring collaboration with the US intelligence 
community that, as Britain's global power and influence has declined since the Second 
World War,, her abilities as a global intelligence power have developed. 
7 Lockhart John Bruce, "Intelligence: a British View" in Robertson, K G. (cd), British andAmerican 
Approaches to Intelligence (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 51 
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On the ground 
The local intelligence organisation in Germany had to adapt to the realities of 
Britain and Germany during the early Cold War. Initially, financial restrictions had to 
be balanced with clearer requirements to produce the necessary information on East 
Germany and the Soviet forces stationed there. Later, the handover of power to the 
West Germans brought the specific challenges of building new liaison relationships 
whilst securing the necessary flow of information. These developments were not often 
smooth, but they did take place without major interruption of intelligence production. 
BRDMS was a microcosm of the emerging Cold War intelligence battle. The 
Mission's official liaison duties were put aside early as the officers and men turned their 
hands to the less comfortable tasks of intelligence-gathering. Techniques had to become 
more inventive as the restrictions tightened; all whilst the demands for more and better 
information coming from the central customers grew. BRIXMIS operated beyond the 
fi7ont-line of the intelligence war and suffered for it. Those who served, however, should 
know that during the early Cold War at least, at the JIC table and higher, their 
irreplaceable contribution to the understanding of forces in East Germany was fully 
recognised and valued. 
Flaws in intelligence 
The Joint Intelligence Committee of 1947-61 was not the powerful Committee 
that Percy Cradock knew personally as Chief of the Assessments Staff in the 1970s and 
then as Chairman at the end of the Cold War. ' in terms of organisation, product and raw 
intelligence supply-feed, the early Cold War Committee had plenty of growing left to 
do. Before 1957, the JIC was part of the military establishment and defence intelligence 
dominated its product. Cradock himself notes that it was not until the 1968 reforms, 
8 Cradock, Percy, In Pursuit ofBritish Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher 
and John Major (London: John Murray, 1997), pp. 37-47 
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"that a sufficiently strong unit was established there [in the JIC] to ensure a view of 
events which would prevail against departmental interpretations. " As JIC Chairman 
ftom 1985-92, Cradock was also Margaret Thatcher's Foreign policy Adviser; a 
considerable step beyond the position that even Dean held as Chairman. 9 In Cradock's 
combined role "intelligence and policy were as closely linked as they have ever been in 
British government". Lord Butler's review in 2004,, revealed that in the run-up to the 
2003 Iraq War, intelligence and politics were too closely interwoven. 10 
Those casting around for a golden age of intelligence should beware. The 1947- 
61 period certainly could not be considered one. It is highly unlikely that any such age 
ever existed, for two reasons. Firstly, organisations such as the JIC do not operate in a 
vacuum; rather they exist on a dynamic front where government requirements and 
international affairs fluctuate. Secondly, at the root of every aspect of intelligence 
practice is human judgement. Even the most technical of collection operations relies on 
humans to task the operation, produce the assessments and above all,, make use of the 
intelligence. Kenneth Strong wrote, "The criteria for judging the relevance and 
importance of given items of intelligence are stored in the experience of the Intelligence 
Officer. "" At every stage of the process there is the prospect of ill-judgement, whether 
conscious or otherwise. It is one of greatest disappointments of studying British 
intelligence history that, because of the restrictions on records, it is extremely hard to 
develop an understanding of many key individuals, the ir values and attitudes. The 
British intelligence machine, with the JIC at its apex, is a necessary part of government, 
constantly facing a hugely challenging task. It has developed through experience as a 
means of reducing errors and providing the most useful service to its customers. But 
ultimately those involved in any system requiring human input, especially around the 
uncertainties of threat, must be always be aware of that system's flaws. 
9 Cradock was the first combined JIC Chairman and Foreign Policy Adviser. Sir Rodric Braithwaite also 
held the combined post (1992-4), but it did not survive thereafter. 
10 Review ofIntelligence on Weapons qfMass Destruction, paragraphs 463 -8 





0 Appendix B: Chronol 
1947 
March 10 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) begins 
12 Truman describes his doctrine for the first time 





Marshall announces aid package for Europe 
Evill reports on the structure of British intelligence 
London CFM begins 
London CFM ends 
1948 
February 23 Western nations talks on Germany begin in London 
March 17 Brussels Treaty signed 
20 Russians walk out of Allied Control Council 
F Soviet fighter and British airliner en route to Berlin collide -A, pril 5 
June I London talks on Germany end 
24 Berlin blockade begins 
1949 
April 4 NATO Treaty signed 
25 West German Basic Law agreed 
May 12 Berlin blockade ends 
23 FRG founded 
23 Paris CFM begins 
June 20 Paris CFM ends 
October 7 GDR founded 
November 22 Petersburg Agreement signed 
1950 
May II Schuman proposes his plan for the European 
Coal and Steel 
Community to the UK government 
June 25 Korean War begins 
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1951 
May 25 Burgess and Maclean disappear 
July 9 State of war terminated between Germany and UK 
October 26 Churchill becomes Prime Minister 
1952 
May 25- Treaty ending occupation in FRG ("Contractual Agreements" or 
26 "Bonn Treaty") signed 
27 EDC Treaty signed 
August 10 European Coal and Steel Community comes into being 
1953 
January 20 Eisenhower becomes President 
March 5 Stalin dies 
May 28 Soviet Control Commission replaced with a High Commission 
June 17 Rioting in East Berlin begins 
September 7 Khrushchev becomes First Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union 
1954 
January 25 Four-power conference on Germany in Berlin begins 
February 18 Berlin conference ends 
October 23 Paris Treaties signed 
1955 
April 5 Eden becomes Prime Minister 
May 8 FRG joins NATO 
14 Warsaw Pact signed 
July 18- Geneva Summit 
23 
September 20 GDR granted sovereignty from USSR 

















Geneva CFM ends 
20 th Communist Party Congress in Moscow 
Buster Crabb disappears whilst diving on the Ordzhonikidze 
Berlin tunnel "discovered" 
British., French and Israeli invasion of Suez begins 
Soviet invasion of Hungary begins 
Macmillan becomes Prime Minister 
USSR launches Sputnik 
JIC moves from Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Office 
27 Khrushchev becomes Soviet Premier 
18 BRIXMIS compound attacked 
November 10 Khrushchev speech launches second Berlin crisis 
27 Khrushchev's note proposes a peace treaty with Germany and gives 
a six-month deadline for progress 
1959 
May 11 Geneva CFM begins 
27 Khrushchev's six-month deadline 
August 16 Geneva CFM ends 
September 25- Khrushchev meets Eisenhower at Camp David 
27 
1960 
May I Gary Powers' U2 shot down over USSR 
16 Abortive Paris Summit 
July I RB-47 shot down over Barents Sea 
1961 
January 20 Kennedy becomes President 
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A -r, April 17- Failed CIA-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs 
20 
June 3-4 Vienna Summit 
July 25 Kennedy announces military build-up 
August 13 Border closed between East and West Berlin 
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